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P R O F I L E

## 1821. Tudor Vladimirescu A Historiographical Topic Two Hundred Years Later

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THEODOR AMAN, *Tudor Vladimirescu* (1879), aquaforte and needle engraving, 18.5×11 cm

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**T**HIS YEAR, there will be two centuries since one of the more complicated events of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, for both national history as well as for that of Southeastern Europe, historically known as “The Revolution led by Tudor Vladimirescu.”

The copious amount of historiographical materials published so far<sup>1</sup> might leave one under the impression that everything has been said. Nothing could be farther from the truth, since we find ourselves far from the closing arguments of a debate that is still in dire need of new points of view, preferably devoid of ideological bias—be it Forty-eighter, Marxist, ultra-nationalist, post-modernist, etc. Professionally analyzing the sources—the local ones in regional context as well as the re-

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gional ones in a general European context—is the only way to contribute to a still challenging topic.

Between the years of 1948 and 1990, the subject at hand has been one of the favorite topics of the Romanian movie industry, bleeding into the public space as historical fiction, feature films, debates and conferences, public forum monuments, philatelic issues, deltiological series, medals, street names, public school and cultural center names.<sup>2</sup> The comics from the last page of the children's and teens' magazine *Cutezătorii* (The Daring), a splendid display of penmanship, were often inspired by this subject, because it was broadly tackled in the time's history handbooks. The classes in Modern History at various universities used to begin with this very moment, because it was the actual debut of modern history itself.<sup>3</sup> It's quite possible that some of the professors teaching those courses didn't believe that a historical era could begin on a specific day, seemingly under the precise cut of a scalpel, just like the former era could not end on the day before that. But the ideological requirements that a dictatorial regime had taken up and turned into a political agenda were far more pressing and untouched by the methodology of historical research.

Following the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, the entire matter fell into oblivion, faced indifference or became a mere mandatory academic topic, as it remains to this day. It was a somewhat natural reaction, because the excessive attention previously granted to it created the rather false impression that all points of view had been explored. Moreover, all of a sudden, numerous historiographical topics, forbidden under the communist regime, were coming to light and catching everyone's attention. The two causes overlapped, thus condemning our current topic on the long run. Will it ever catch the researchers' eye again?

Today, the 1821 Revolution, as well as other historiographical topics connected to historical events of paramount importance, such as the 1848 Revolution, the Union of the Romanian Principalities or the War of Independence, only remain in the pages of magazines published until thirty years ago, disregarded by researchers.

The situation is somewhat of a paradox, should we consider how difficult it is to find unpublished *primary sources* regarding the events that took place in Moldavia and Wallachia in 1821. Internal documents started being published as early as the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, an endeavor that went on well into the late eighties.<sup>4</sup> And we have had major contributions to relevant international documents, at least as far as the Western space is concerned.<sup>5</sup>

Far less known, although partially published,<sup>6</sup> are some Russian documents, especially the reports by Russian Colonel Pavel Liprandi, that ought to be re-

evaluated given their relevance and the information they provide, information often kept secret because it was at odds with the official historiographical thesis of the communist regime regarding the 1821 events. Future research of the Russian archives will undoubtedly unearth other documents from that era, drawn up by various authors from the Russian space, both official and private, who found themselves in the Romanian Principalities at that time.

Ottoman documents are all but absent, and the studies conducted so far<sup>7</sup> merely indicate the viewpoint of the suzerain power, instead of actually publishing the sources that outline it. The lack of these sources leaves a huge gap and, without filling it, we will not be able to clarify some essential issues.<sup>8</sup> If the internal documents are known, as well as the Western and partially even the Russian ones, those of the Ottomans remain in the shadows to this day, and publishing them ought to be a historiographical priority on the matter.

Another issue that caused the emergence of divergent viewpoints was the general classification of the event: a *rebellion* or a *revolution*? The answers provided between the mid-nineteenth century and the present time barely acknowledge the developments occurred during the event itself. The reference system was, more often than not, either ideological, or pertaining to Southeast European historiography. For instance, when Nicolae Bălcescu—the ideologist of the 1848 Revolution in the Principality of Wallachia—approached the events of 1821 and especially Tudor Vladimirescu,<sup>9</sup> he did so because he wanted to provide his contemporary compatriots with a role model, with a path, one that was relevant not necessarily for what Vladimirescu had accomplished, but for what the revolutionaries of 1848 wanted to achieve. Also, given the fact that the national divergence between some members of the Romanian nobility and the great Greek nobility in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century turned into a lasting historiographical confrontation between Romanian and Greek historians, the Romanian point of view could not sit below the Greek one. The Romanians needed to match the discourse regarding the Greek Revolution—and so they did, by creating one about a Romanian Revolution that took place in 1821.

In our opinion, an answer to this question should be somewhere in between. As far as the actual developments go, the event is closer to a rebellion. After all, the term mentioned in the sources of that time when referring to the event was *uprising*, which rather translates to unrest, rebellion, riot.<sup>10</sup> As for the aftermath, we can speak of a revolution because 1821 made the Ottoman Empire replace an entire regime, the Phanariote one, which had been introduced to the Principalities during the early eighteenth century for strategic reasons.

Historiography seems to minimize, if not completely disregard, the part played by the *Romanian patriotic nobility* in organizing and initiating the 1821

movement. The starting point was creating a clear national identity among the high noble families of Wallachia and Moldavia, as a consequence of the Enlightenment ideology that penetrated the entire Balkan Peninsula through the agency of Greek culture. Ironically enough, this particular culture, which in the Principalities was under the patronage of Phanariote princes, would create a ripple effect that would clash with the very Greek interests. The Enlightenment, in its more conservative, Southeast European form, engendered—among other things—the two nationalist branches (Greek and Romanian) that would come at violent odds in 1821. Some of the Wallachian high noblemen opposed the Greek national project aimed at subduing the Principalities, the *Megali Idea*. The love of country—which, for the time being, was only expressed by the noblemen—collided with another love of country: that of the Greek princes and noblemen. Moreover, eager to prove to the suzerains how determined they were to exert power again, after a century of sitting on the side, the nationalist Wallachian nobility took action, in an already tense situation where the Philiki Hetairia (Philikí Etaireía) had initiated the Greek revolution. They had to seize the opportunity to simultaneously express their solidarity with the Ottoman Empire and to reveal their own national project.

We must emphasize the fact that the high nobility in Wallachia, just like the one in Moldavia, was not on the same page as far as their allegiances went. We have one group—perhaps the most numerous one—unquestionably faithful to the Ottoman Empire, but weary towards any type of change, even one that would have led to the replacement of the Phanariote regime, a thing they desired, but had no intention of getting involved in actually achieving it. Another group, less numerous but far more determined, even braver one might say, also entirely loyal to the suzerain power, was becoming more and more outspoken: a resistance movement to the Phanariote regime, fueled by the sense of their own national identity. Yet another group, also not very large, had become faithful to the Greek national project and to the *Megali Idea*, and their affiliation to the Phanariote regime was based, aside from financial interests, on family ties achieved through Romanian-Phanariote marital alliances.<sup>11</sup> A fourth group, perhaps the thinnest, was harboring an ever-growing sense of fidelity towards the policy of the Russian Empire in the Principalities, and received significant support from the Russian Consulate in Bucharest. The latter would increase its influence following the 1829 Peace Treaty of Adrianople, when the Russian protectorate over the Principalities would become a principle of international law.

However, in this confrontation, the Romanian patriotic nobility were at a great disadvantage when it came to the Greeks: the lack of an army. In Bucharest, the Greeks had the prince's guards and the mercenary troops, not very numerous but enough to provide a military upper hand. The captains of these units, Bim-

bashi Sava (Savvas Fokianos), Iordache Olimpiotul (Giorgios Olympos), Ioan Farmache (Giannis Farmakis)—to mention just a few names—were known for their fidelity to the Hetairia, even though they were not all of Greek ethnicity.

**T**HESE ARE the circumstances under which Tudor Vladimirescu emerged. For the posterity, probably also due to his tragic demise, not just to the part he played in 1821, his biography underwent considerable alterations. Vladimirescu was one of the Pandours<sup>12</sup> who had fought in the Russian-Austrian-Ottoman wars in the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Initially, the term was used for the Croatian irregular troops hired in the Habsburg Empire, and it reached the Romanian territory during the Austrian rule over Oltenia between the years 1718 and 1739.<sup>13</sup> The Pandours were countrymen from the region of Oltenia who, in exchange for their military service, were granted certain privileges, mostly fiscal. In time, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century, they mastered the art of warfare and fought as auxiliary troops alongside the Austrians and the Russians, against the Ottomans.

Tudor Vladimirescu was born in an Oltenian rural family, in a village with a name similar to his (Vladimiri) in the Gorj area. Being literate, he became the right hand man of great nobleman Ioan Glogoveanu, who appreciated his loyalty and promoted him to land bailiff (a sort of overseer for one of the family estates, called Cloșani). Glogoveanu's son Nicolae kept Vladimirescu in his service, and sent him to Vienna in order to sort things out with an inheritance left by the wife of his new employer, who had lost her life to disease.<sup>14</sup>

The Russian-Ottoman war fought between 1806 and 1812 brought a decisive turn, not just in the life of our hero, but also in his legacy. As the leader of a Pandour unit that operated alongside the Russian troops, the military conflict provided him with a chance to stand out. His military bravery would be rewarded in the name of the tsar, as he would be granted the Order of Saint Vladimir.

His contemporaries saw him as a brave officer, a great organizer, a master in all things pertaining to warfare, a charismatic, strong and spirited commander. Tudor Vladimirescu thus became a man of the sword rather than of the quill, a fighter rather than an ideologist.

Historiography, especially during the communist regime, made him into a defender of the exploited.<sup>15</sup> The thesis of class conflict found in the character of the 1821 hero a paramount example of a humble-born man who got involved in the fight against social injustice, an example of his kind being able to rise above the life of poverty of humiliation imposed upon them by the nobility. "The Demands of the Romanian People," the founding document of this theory,

was taken out of context, turned into absolutes, tacitly appended where certain things were merely sketched, and turned into a reference system.

However, a comparative analysis of all the proclamations to the people issued by Vladimirescu, from the very beginning of his action in Oltenia, throughout his journey to Bucharest and during his stay in the Wallachian capital, shows that the social agenda became more and more diluted, eventually fading away completely when he openly addressed the issue of mandatory taxes, which meant, first and foremost, preserving, rather than eliminating an established taxation system.

Moreover, his main counselor, the one closest to him, Bishop Ilarion of Argeş,<sup>16</sup> was harboring nationalist feelings rather than a desire for social change.

Was Tudor Vladimirescu an anti-Ottoman fighter? Definitely not, because, as proven by his letters to the pasha of Vidin, he identified himself as a loyal subject of the sultan and tried to clarify his actions in regard to the Ottoman Empire. No matter how hard it is to digest, in our opinion there is a strong possibility that one of Vladimirescu's allies was the suzerain power, because, between February and May of 1821, he was the only one who turned out to be a loyal supporter of the Ottoman interests north of the Danube. Besides, during the Ottoman military action in Wallachia, the empire directed an unusually fierce attack at the Hetairia troops, not at the Pandours. Neither Vladimirescu, nor the Romanian patriotic nobility questioned for a single moment the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire over the Principality of Wallachia.

Was he an anti-Phanariote? Probably yes, considering that he had been introduced to the anti-Phanariote atmosphere of the patriotic nobility, whose members were openly against the Phanariote regime. But the complicated events of the year 1821 forced him to be cautious in terms of this agenda, especially since the power void that followed the death of Phanariote Prince Alexander Soutzos, the dismantlement of the Ruling Committee and the flight of the Romanian noblemen who had been involved in the plot at Braşov and Sibiu, all provided him with an extraordinary opportunity: becoming a leader.

The fighter was becoming more and more aware that the circumstances might give him a shot at the throne. He was in command of an army of approximately 5 to 6 thousand people, he had no direct opponents, the power was held by no one, and he had the determination required in order to take up this position. All he needed were the noblemen, the only ones able to give him the single thing he lacked: legitimacy.

Considering this context, Tudor Vladimirescu's relationship to the nobility becomes another essential issue. We believe that this relationship constantly evolved and changed as the power positions shifted. If, at the beginning, the patriotic nobility who wanted to see the Phanariote regime gone were the ones

who dictated terms and Vladimirescu the one who accepted them, the situation changed rather quickly. Eager to have a military force in Bucharest, capable to guarantee a victory against the Greek nobility, the plotters hired him to organize the Pandours, arm them and bring them to the capital. The money he got for it—the total amount is a matter of legend, augmented by the collective imagination of the posterity—was used to buy horses, weapons, and food.

In our opinion, the Padeș Proclamation, issued in early February of 1821, pinpoints the exact moment when a rift appeared between the nobility and Vladimirescu, the time when he started acting on his own, which compromised the initial plan, thus forcing the plotting noblemen to abort all initiative and flee to Transylvania. As he approached Bucharest, he tried to bring the noblemen back to his side, and his efforts multiplied after he entered the capital, because only the nobility could provide him with the legitimacy he needed in order to seize power. Just like Alexander Ypsilantis, who had also taken it upon himself to carry out an elaborate action, put together by the tsar's officials, when he had led his Hetairia troops in Moldavia, Vladimirescu found himself in an impossible situation. A good strategist, he understood the difficulty and cautiously withdrew to Cotroceni, then to Golești, in order to weather the consequences of the Ottoman military action.

The nobility felt the same, in the safety of the temporary self-exile in Transylvania. After all, the main difference between Vladimirescu and the nobility was the fact that the latter were no longer actively engaged, while the former continued to pursue what had become his own political agenda. The nobility was well aware of the fact that, due to the part they had played in conceiving a plan to overthrow the Phanariote regime by force, the sultan held them accountable, and the desire to save themselves superseded the desire to save the country.

The sudden assassination of the Pandours' commander by members of the Hetairia brings another issue to attention: Vladimirescu's relationship with the Hetairia.

The Philiki Hetairia had appeared in 1814 in Odessa<sup>17</sup> as a secret, revolutionary organization, aimed at liberating Greece from under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly active throughout the Balkan Peninsula, in the Romanian Principalities it had the protection of the Phanariote princes and the majority of the Greek nobility. The beginning of the Greek revolution, when General Alexander Ypsilantis led the Hetairia troops in Moldavia, and the anti-Ottoman uprising south of the Danube, brought Vladimirescu in close proximity of the Hetairia project.

The document that sealed the deal between himself, on one hand, and Hetairia captains Giannis Farmakis and Giorgios Olympios on the other, a document discovered in the Vienna archives as a copy made at the time, has completely

different interpretations in the Romanian and the Greek historiographies. While Romanian authors believe that the document depicts the free actions carried out by the Romanians and the Greeks in entirely particular and independent manners, Greek historiography interprets the paper as a recognition of Vladimirescu's subordination to the Hetairia. An impartial reading of this source does not really provide us with hard facts. It really cannot do so, because the deal was a secret and also a discreet one. We do not believe this particular, singular document, to hold the absolute value it has been vested with so far.

We believe this, too, to be connected to an ongoing development. The relationships between the two parties fluctuated at different paces, with different intensities, sometimes several times over the period of a single month. The two parties were never in a relationship of subordination, nor did they have a military or political collaboration; instead, they kept dancing around one another, trying to set the boundaries of their own fiefs. The Ottoman military intervention, aimed exclusively at the Hetairia troops in Wallachia and, then, in Moldavia, cleared the air once and for all.

Vladimirescu's assassination by Hetairia Captain Basilios Karavia, the one who had organized and led the massacre of the Ottoman community in Galați, at the end of May of 1821, increases the uncertainty. Also, it is difficult to explain how the Greeks managed to arrest him in the middle of the Pandour camp at Golești, in broad daylight, without anyone trying to do something to prevent it.

Greek historiography justifies Vladimirescu's sentence on account of the alleged treason on behalf of the Ottomans. There is not a single ounce of truth in such an allegation, since there had been no alliance to betray. In reality, it appears that the members of the Hetairia, Alexander Ypsilantis in particular, were interested in the money Vladimirescu had received from the plotting noblemen in order to organize the Pandours.

The action taken by the Hetairia in the Principalities gives cause for another topic that has been too little discussed, if not altogether ignored: the part played by the Russian Empire in supporting and organizing the events in the Romanian Principalities and in Southeastern Europe in 1821.

Historian Andrei Oțetea was the very first to propose,<sup>18</sup> with all due precautions, an evaluation of the part played by the Russian Empire. In our opinion, Russia's involvement in both the Greek revolution and the Balkan developments was decisive.

First of all, the Hetairia, a secret, revolutionary organization, couldn't have appeared on the territory of an autocratic empire without the tsar's blessing. The leader of the Hetairia was nobleman John Capodistrias (Ioannis Kapodistrias), foreign affairs minister of Tsar Alexander I, and one of the military commanders was Alexander Ipsilantis, a general in the Russian army. Russia was interested

in waging a new war on the Ottoman Empire, but it needed a pretext, for two reasons: on one hand, to prevent anyone from accusing it of breaching the 1815 Peace Treaty of Vienna, which had laid the ground for a new European order in the aftermath of the Napoleonic era, based upon keeping the status quo; on the other hand, because the Ottoman Empire had grown closer and closer to Great Britain, which had an interest in keeping the Straits neutral, thus providing the Ottomans with significant support.

The pretext had to come from the Hetairia; the latter, in alignment with Russia's strategic interests, had been tasked with organizing anti-Ottoman riots in continental Greece and in the Balkan Peninsula, in order to provide the Russian army with a pretext to defend the Orthodox Christians (i.e., Greeks) in these areas, should the Ottomans take military action.

The entire plan was compromised by the premature action taken by General Ypsilantis who, without the tsar's green light, crossed into Moldavia in early 1821. Pressured by Austrian Chancellor Metternich, who had been informed regarding the Russian plan, Emperor Alexander I stated, during a diplomatic meeting at Laybach, attended by those who had signed the Peace Treaty of 1815, that his armies would not intervene. The tsar's statement almost immediately triggered a fierce military reaction from the Ottoman Empire, which had received diplomatic assurances that the tsar would remain true to his word.

The events of 1821 deserve a fresh approach and perhaps the bicentennial anniversary would turn out to be the right time for it.



## Notes

1. Alin Ciupală, "Revoluția română de la 1821: Tudor Vladimirescu: Bibliografie generală," *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Barițiu" din Cluj-Napoca* 47 (2008): 557–578.
2. We do not have an inventory of all these works, dealing under various forms and shapes with the "1821" topic, and especially with "Tudor Vladimirescu," but today every city in Romania has at least one street bearing this name.
3. Mircea T. Radu, "La Révolution de 1821—début de l'histoire moderne des Roumains," *Roumanie: Pages d'histoire* (Bucharest) 5, 2 (1980): 254–287.
4. See chapter "Izvoare," in Ciupală, 557–563.
5. For example: D. Găzdaru, "Una relazione manoscritta italiana sulla rivoluzione di Tudor Vladimirescu," *Diplomatarium Italicum* (Rome) 2 (1934): 240–273; Pavel Mocanu, "Revoluția de la 1821 în documente diplomatice portugheze," *Revista de istorie militară* (Bucharest) 2 (66) (2001): 33–36; Cornelia Alexandra Moraru, "Tudor Vladimirescu în documente italiene," *Tribuna* (Cluj-Napoca) 24, 25 (1980):

- 7; Victor Papacostea, “Revoluția din 1821, privită de un misionar catolic,” *Revista istorică* (Bucharest) 15, 1–3 (1929): 8–13; Marian Stroia, “Documente din arhivele spaniole referitoare la revoluția română din 1821,” in *Documente recent descoperite și informații arheologice* (Bucharest: n.p., 1987), 3–10; Nestor Camariano, “Tudor Vladimirescu în lumina unor documente din Arhivele din Viena,” *Studii: Revistă de istorie* (Bucharest) 16, 3 (1963): 643–650; N. Corivan, “Informații inedite din arhiva Ministerului de Externe de la Viena cu privire la răscoala lui Tudor Vladimirescu,” *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie “A. D. Xenopol”* (Iași) 5 (1968): 195–201; Vasile Arimia et al., eds., *Revoluția din 1821 condusă de Tudor Vladimirescu. Documente externe* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1980), 496 pp.; Lucia Taftă, “Diplomația franceză și criza orientală din 1821,” in *Închinare lui Petre Ț. Năsturel la 80 de ani*, edited by Ionel Câdea, Paul Cernovodeanu, and Gheorghe Lazăr (Brăila: Istros, 2003), 747–753.
6. Andrei Oțetea, lead editor, Nichita Adăniloiaie, Nestor Camariano, Sava Iancovici, Ioan Neacșu, and Alexandru Vianu, eds., *Documente privind istoria României: Răscoala din 1821* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1959–1962), vol. 1, 422 pp., vol. 2, 407 pp., vol. 3, 551 pp., vol. 4, 331 pp., vol. 5, 626 pp.; Victor Papacostea, “Știri din presa rusă cu privire la tulburările revoluționare din 1821,” *Revista istorică română* (Bucharest) 11–12 (1941–1942): 308–313; Marian Stroia, “Corespondența Consulatului rus din București, o importantă sursă documentară în cunoașterea evenimentelor revoluționare de la 1821 în Principatele Române,” I, *Revista Arhivelor* (Bucharest) 74, 2 (1997): 164–194; II, *Revista Arhivelor* 75, 1–2 (1998): 81–116; Lucia Taftă, “Documente externe referitoare la anul revoluționar 1821 în sud-estul Europei: Jurnalul lui Grigorie Stroganov, ambasador al Rusiei la Poartă,” *Studii și materiale de istorie modernă* (Bucharest) 11 (1997): 171–205.
7. M. Guboglu, “Un mănunchi de documente turcești privind evenimentele din Țările Românești în jurul anului 1821,” *Revista Arhivelor* 1, 1 (1958): 234–256; H. D. Siruni, “Documente turcești referitoare la evenimentele din 1821–1822,” *Arhiva românească* (Bucharest) 4 (1940): 259–263; Valeriu Veliman, “Tudor Vladimirescu în documente turcești,” *Tribuna* 24, 25 (1980): 3; id., “Noi documente turcești privind evenimentele din 1821–1822,” *Revista Arhivelor* 65, 1–2 (2003): 202–220.
8. Such as the great delay in organizing the Ottoman military inroad north of the Danube in 1821 or the relationship the nobility and Tudor Vladimirescu had with the Ottoman authorities.
9. Nicolae Bălcescu, *Mersul revoluției în istoria românilor*, in *Opere*, vol. 2, *Scieri istorice, politice și economice 1848–1852*, critical edition and notes by G. Zane and Elena G. Zane (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1982), 107–113; Mihai Chiper, “Revoluția și revoluționarii,” in *Enciclopedia imaginariilor din România*, general editor Corin Braga, vol. 3, *Imaginar istoric*, edited by Sorin Mitu (Iași: Polirom, 2020), 290–291.
10. The term, of Slavic origin, was extended to the members of Tudor Vladimirescu’s movement. For its etymology, see A. de Cihac, *Dictionnaire d’étymologie daco-romane: Eléments slaves, magyars, turcs, grecs-moderne et albanais* (Frankfurt: Ludolphe St. Goar, 1879).

11. The son of a wealthy Greek noble family would marry the daughter of a Romanian noble family, never the other way around, because, by marriage, the Romanian girl brought her dowry in lands, while the Greek young man provided the political protection of his family. This was a win-win situation for both families. The lands were passed on within the Romanian noble families and the only way for the Greek families to gain possession of them was through marriage. Once the Phanariote regime was instated, the public positions were held, with very few exceptions, by Greek noblemen.
12. Vladimir Osiac, *Pandurii din Țara Românească* (Craiova: Scrisul Românesc, 1995).
13. Șerban Papacostea, *Oltenia sub stăpânirea austriacă (1718–1739)*, edited by Gheorghe Lazăr (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1998).
14. Dan Berindei, *Revoluția română din 1821* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1991), 54–55.
15. For example, Mircea T. Radu, *Tudor Vladimirescu și Revoluția din Țara Românească* (Craiova: Scrisul Românesc, 1978).
16. Mihai Rădulescu, “Prietenia și colaborarea patriotică dintre Tudor Vladimirescu și Ilarion al Argeșului în opere literare,” *Mitropolia Olteniei* (Craiova) 33, 10–12 (1981): 564–568; Nestor Vornicescu, “Despre activitatea episcopului Ilarion al Argeșului, sfetnicul lui Tudor Vladimirescu, din anii 1820 și 1821: Câteva date noi,” *Mitropolia Olteniei* 33, 1–3 (1981): 7–77; Spiridon Căndeia, “Revoluția lui Tudor Vladimirescu și episcopul Ilarion al Argeșului,” *Mitropolia Ardealului* (Sibiu) 12, 8–9 (1967): 715–726.
17. N. Camariano, “Despre organizarea și activitatea Eteriei în Rusia înainte de răscoala din 1821,” *Studii și materiale de istorie modernă* 2 (1960): 73–103.
18. Andrei Oțetea, “Les Grandes Puissances et le mouvement hétéairiste dans les principautés roumaines,” *Balkan Studies* 7, 2 (1966): 379–394; id., *Tudor Vladimirescu și revoluția din 1821* (Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1971).

## Abstract

### 1821. Tudor Vladimirescu: A Historiographical Topic Two Hundred Years Later

Following the excessive attention paid to this event during the communist period, nowadays the 1821 Revolution, as well as other historiographical topics connected to historical events of paramount importance, such as the 1848 Revolution, the Union of the Romanian Principalities or the War of Independence, only remain in the pages of magazines published until thirty years ago, being largely overlooked by researchers. The present paper analyzes the situation of the sources, national and international, dealing with this event, the debate concerning its precise nature—rebellion or revolution—as well as other potential avenues of research, from the involvement of the emerging patriotic nobility to the biography and the agenda of Tudor Vladimirescu himself.

## Keywords

Romanian revolution of 1821, Tudor Vladimirescu, Philiki Hetairia, Romanian Principalities