

The Higher *Raison d'État* and the Imperative of World Peace

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The Treaty of Trianon and its Ratification by Romania

*“The true source of the
unity of the Romanian
people is not this treaty . . .
but the vivid consciousness
of the Romanian people
and its sovereign rule.”*
(Iuliu Maniu)

THE HISTORIC signing of the Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, on 4 June 1920 at Trianon, marked the completion, of a political nature mainly, of this fundamental act of law and international relations of the contemporary era.¹ This crucial political moment was followed by the required legal procedures, i.e. the ratification by the signatory states, as a condition of form and substance regulating the effective entry into force of the treaty.

For Romania, as an Associated Power, the Draft Law ratifying the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexed Declaration, signed at Trianon, became the subject of an extraordinary session of Romania's Senate,² in keeping with the Royal Message issued on 9 August 1920. The delegates of the five Senate sections (in this order: Spiru Gheorghiu, D. Alexandrescu, C. Meitani, Lazăr Popescu and N. Batzaria) met on 11 August 1920 under the chairmanship of C. Meitani, designated D. Alexandrescu as the rapporteur and unani-

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mously accepted the said Draft. The Draft Law presentation in the Senate plenary took place in the session held on 14 August 1920, after the passing and voting of the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919.

The Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon included a single article whereby “The Government is authorized to ratify and implement the Treaty.” The explanatory memorandum regarding the Draft Law, signed by the minister of foreign affairs, Take Ionescu, emphasized the crucial importance of the treaty that sanctioned the unity of the Romanian national state. “With the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon, the relationship between us and Hungary will become normal,” indicated the Draft Law statement of reasons.

The meeting of the Romanian Senate devoted to the debate on the Draft Law for the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty was moderated by the Senate Chairman, General C. Coandă. Nine senators participated in debating the Draft Law: I. Păcurariu, Ion Nistor, Ibrahim Themo, G. G. Mironescu, Liviu Micșa, Christache Georgescu, George Bilașco, Gen. Silviu Herbay, and Eugeniu Bran. Of these, five represented the historical provinces that had joined Romania. The debate continued throughout 16 and 17 August 1920, and ended with Take Ionescu’s speech and the passing of the Law.

The proceedings were dominated by the insistent assertion of the fundamental political and historical importance of the Trianon Peace Treaty for Romania, as well as by the minute analysis of the dissatisfaction generated by the provisions regarding the drawing of the Banat and Maramureș borders. The most substantial presentation, providing a general historical perspective, was made by the distinguished historian Ion Nistor,³ while issues regarding the Banat and Maramureș regions received particular attention from the representatives of those areas. The presentations made by the latter disclosed issues or opinions regarding the painstaking progress of the Peace Conference proceedings, their intricacies and difficulties. The best informed speakers expressed opinions on a number of relevant articles and specific provisions included in the Trianon Treaty.

“We, the inhabitants of Transylvania, have been looking forward impatiently to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, so that, by sanctioning the rule of law . . . one might dispel some vain hopes harbored by our Hungarian brothers, who have become Romanian citizens . . . We, the members of the National Party, are voting for the ratification of this Treaty. When we do that, we are keen on receiving some guidance regarding our relations with the neighboring state, Hungary,” asserted Senator Liviu Micșa⁴ in his speech. “We do realize that in Hungary and perhaps also among some of our citizens of Hungarian descent, there is discontent in the wake of this Treaty,” added the same senator, claiming that “we can only regret this discontent and try to make them understand that the territories for which we have fought . . . belong to us in keep-

ing with historic rights and with natural law.” The speaker emphasized the importance of the minority rights provisions contained in the landmark Resolution of Alba Iulia.⁵ As he also dealt with some topical domestic political problems, Senator Liviu Micșa’s speech generated some clarifications (Gh. Fleșariu, Ilie Beu etc.), the discussion taking a risky turn towards political disputes that went beyond the topic of the debate (the effects of the change in government in Transylvania). Senator Liviu Micșa emphasized the need for administrative reform based on the principle of decentralization and warned of misconduct—revealed by the press—in dealing with the minorities. The conclusion of this speech was devoted to the need to regulate the issue of Austro-Hungarian war bonds in favor of those for whom their recovery was a vital necessity.⁶

An extensive presentation on the Maramureș state border was conducted with particular competence in the Senate plenum by Senator George Bilașco,⁷ a representative of the said area. Other speeches on relevant historic and current political issues regarding Transylvania were made by Senators Silviu Herbay⁸ and Eugeniu Bran.⁹

The Senate deliberations on the ratification of the Trianon Treaty were comprehensive, substantial, held at a high level of national political responsibility. The explanatory inroads regarding some sources of dissatisfaction on the border issue in Banat and Maramureș revealed an acute moral dilemma, which did not go as far as targeting the very treaty whose ratification was and would remain a higher *raison d’État*.

These overall problems of substance were synthesized in the remarkable concluding speech delivered in the Senate by Take Ionescu,¹⁰ the minister of foreign affairs and the initiator of the Draft Law for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon. The speaker placed special emphasis on the importance of the treaty, on the signature placed on this treaty by Romania’s representatives, on the political responsibility that was incumbent upon Romania in its foreign policy and international relations. These fundamental realities required careful attention, including the approach to the more sensitive issues relating to the borders. Take Ionescu, a diplomat of high repute as well as a leader on the domestic political arena, had enough insight to be able to grasp the grounds for dissatisfaction on such sensitive matters as the border issue, but he was adamant in rejecting any possible side effect they might have had on the treaty to be ratified. As a politician, he could admit “that Romania’s map might have looked quite differently had the Romanian state known how to handle the situation.”¹¹ He himself knew very well and in detail about the unsatisfactory performance of some representatives of the Romanian state present at the Paris Peace Conference. According to Take Ionescu’s political vision, Romania’s relations with Hungary were to undergo both a quantitative and qualitative change and development.

*We are frankly determined to make it easy for Hungary in order to ensure a good relationship with this country. I can understand Hungary's pain. From its prewar state to the present one, from that Hungary that stretched from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea, to present-day Hungary, there is a huge difference. Obviously, their pain must be great, the more so as Hungary left its minorities in the new neighboring states. In the future, Hungary will have to face its internal material difficulties and the hardships caused by the existence of Hungarian minorities in the new states. Nevertheless, Hungary too should consider the Treaty as final, no matter how they feel about it . . . To this latter kind of Hungarians we ought to reach out . . .*¹²

At the end of the fairly extensive deliberations, the Draft Law for the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty was adopted by the Senate of Romania with 68 white balls and one black ball.¹³ The validation procedure of the Draft Law for the ratification of the treaty continued, in accordance with the constitutional provisions, with a debate on the Draft in the extraordinary session of the Assembly of Deputies, on 25 and 26 August 1920.¹⁴

The meeting held on 25 August 1920 by the Assembly of Deputies,¹⁵ led by Chairman Duiliu Zamfirescu, concluded the debate on the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles with a vote on the Draft Law for its ratification (142 white balls, one black ball), passing immediately to the deliberations on the ratification of the Trianon Treaty of Peace with Hungary. The deliberation went at a faster pace due to the fact that some of the preliminary proceedings initiated by the Royal Message on 9 August 1920 had been taken care of by the Senate. Thus, the Committee of Delegates of the 7 sections (I. Lăzărescu, D. Rădulescu president, Panait Bobeș, Al. Bilciurescu, Dr. Ion Jacob, Florian Heredeu and D. R. Ioanițescu rapporteur) met on the same day of 25 August 1920, admitted without any reservations the Draft Law authorizing the ratification of the Trianon Treaty, presenting the report in the plenary session of the Assembly of Deputies in the afternoon of the same day; there was no need, therefore, for the rapporteur's introductory speech or the statement of reasons from the minister in charge. The Delegates' Committee "looked into the Draft Law passed by the Senate, and accepted it without any reservation . . . just as submitted" and asked for the approval of the Assembly of Deputies.

The general debate started rather abruptly, signaling that deliberations on the ratification of the Trianon Treaty were likely to point to the sensitive issue of the dissatisfaction with the new south-western, western and northern borders of Romania (Banat, Crișana, Sătmar, Maramureș). The first speaker, deputy Avram Imbroane, after an introductory speech, filed a statement on behalf of the Banat Romanian MPs from all political parties represented in the House (16 signato-

ries) who asserted that they would “vote against the ratification of a treaty that is filled with injustice.” This was followed by a substantial exposé made by MP Dumitru Lascu¹⁶ regarding the westernmost border in the Arad, Bihor and Satu Mare regions. This presentation was highly important, of great scientific and historical interest, given its in-depth analysis of real facts and details. The meeting on the first day ended after midnight with the general speech delivered by Amos Frâncu.

Upon resuming the debates (Thursday, 26 August 1920),¹⁷ MP Gaspar Muth, the representative of the Banat Swabians, took the floor and protested against the division of the Banat region as well as against the fact that the Swabians had not been included in Article 11 of the 1919 Treaty on Minorities (regarding the ecclesiastical and educational autonomy of the Swabians, Saxons and Szeklers). Then the Declaration of an MP representing the Maramureş area (read in absentia) deplored the fact that the Romanians inhabiting Tisza’s right bank had been left outside the country. On behalf of the Socialist Party, MP N. D. Cocea took the floor for a short exposé that only dealt with some general war issues. Traian Lalescu, although a signatory of the abovementioned Declaration of the Romanian MPs from Banat, resumed the argument and delivered a personal comment.

Iuliu Maniu’s speech in the House and Take Ionescu’s one in the Senate rose to the highest level of political thought, eloquence and style, dominating the parliamentary debates devoted to the ratification of the Trianon Treaty with their comprehensive scope, subtlety of approach, conscience and responsibility, demonstrating that their authors were genuine statesman rather than mere politicians.

The leader of the Romanian National Party in Transylvania paid a heartfelt historic homage to the forerunners and artisans of the Union, stressing the need “to ascend to the higher spheres and let our soul soar, so that we might move forward.” Iuliu Maniu drew the audience’s attention to the specific and definitive fact that “the true source of the unity of the Romanian people is not this treaty . . . but the vivid consciousness of the Romanian people and its sovereign rule. This great achievement springs in fact from decisions made in Bukovina, Bessarabia and Transylvania . . . This treaty only stands for an international recognition, a consolidated Union on the international level and a more powerful State.” But this treaty—continued Maniu—“has its darker parts. This is human and I would say this is unavoidable. These shadows cause us a lot of pain. However great was the joy over the Union as a momentous event, we need to deal with the painful parts . . . [but] they are not allowed to obscure the large and grandiose perspective upon this accomplishment of the . . . Romanian nation.”¹⁸ With these emphatic and nuanced statements, the illustrious orator indirectly but implicitly gave the right answer and provided wise guidance, at the right moment and

at a time when one could still feel the influence of emotional states, of partial views, of elements that could have affected the thorough comprehension of the major historical and political implications currently at stake.

The public expression of these complex truths was particularly necessary, as they could not be glossed over or avoided, no matter how difficult it was to approach them or draw conclusions likely to contribute decisively to a solution. Fully aware of the heavy responsibility of such a political statement, Maniu did not hesitate to spell out concretely and analytically the painful issues that cast a shadow over the general satisfaction of having accomplished the Great Union.

With remarkable political lucidity, Maniu summed up the main issues regarding the setting of the new border of Banat, Crișana and Maramureș, dubbed as “an unfathomable whimsical game.” He stated that “in this situation, if only one had had deeper insight into the matter and more diligence in insisting upon that area of our great national interests, one could have found a remedy.” Maniu too considered that some provisions regarding the ethnic minorities were likely to be detrimental to Romania’s sovereignty, but he once again highlighted the importance of ensuring minority rights, of promoting the Romanian spirit of tolerance.

In like manner, the speaker commented on other provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, especially the financial ones, referring then to some aspects of the activity of the Ruling Council, which he chaired, regarding the preparation of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

The speaker could not totally refrain—as leader of the opposition—from some critical remarks addressed to his political adversaries in the ruling party, whose expected retaliation came through the voice of Duiliu Zamfirescu.

It is significant that at the end of his speech Iuliu Maniu placed special emphasis on the important and necessary changes to be made in Romanian-Hungarian relations. “When we have completed this process, we will not be carrying a grudge against our neighbors . . . in our near future there should be true brotherhood between our nations.”¹⁹

The speech held by Take Ionescu, the foreign minister, at the end of the deliberations of the Assembly of Deputies presented the conclusions of the process of ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by the Romanian Parliament. The speaker stressed that there can be no Romanian politician likely to take upon himself the responsibility of not signing or rejecting the treaty, just because of some partial dissatisfaction, despite any justification that he might have. Take Ionescu insisted on the positive side of the Romanian state policy, whose result was that the Romanian borders were set by international treaties that provided for a new configuration of law and international relations. These boundaries could have looked differently, with a few more favorable details, but they certainly could

not have been what one wanted or hoped for; Take Ionescu went to great lengths in accounting for these political conclusions.²⁰ However, at the end of the deliberations, two more statements were added: P. Râmneanu, on the Banat region, who stated that he would not vote for the ratification, and a group of MPs who were also retired officers, who declared that “only with heavy hearts will we vote for the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.”

AFTER THE vote ending the deliberations was requested and accepted, the single article ratifying the Peace Treaty of Trianon was read out and subjected to voting. The result of the vote was the adoption of the single article.²¹ Out of 154 votes, the white balls “in favor” were 134 and the black balls “against” were 20. This result may be considered natural, expressing the democratic and open deliberations of the Romanian Parliament on such a crucial issue regarding the situation and international status of the Romanian state.

The results of the parliamentary political analysis and the important decisions adopted, i.e. the ratification by Romania of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, demonstrated the constructive perception of the treaty in Romanian society, in the public consciousness of that age, with positive effects over the short and medium term perspective regarding the internal and external development of the Romanian state.

The final article of the treaty stipulated that it “shall be ratified . . . The deposition of ratifications shall be made in Paris as soon as possible. The signatories whose Government does not reside in Europe shall be entitled to give notice to the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative in Paris, that their ratification has been made, and in this case, will have to forward, as soon as possible, the instrument of ratification.”²² Upon the completion of the ratification procedure, in order to make the entry into force of the treaty valid, that same final Article 364, stated that

*A first record for the deposition of the ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Hungary, on one side, and by three of the main Allied and Associated Powers, on the other. Immediately after the conclusion of this first procès-verbal, the Treaty shall enter into force between the High Contracting Parties, which will have ratified it in this way. For the calculation of the deadlines included in the present Treaty, this date will be the date of its entry into force. In all other respects, the Treaty will enter into force, for each Power, on the date when its ratification was handed in. The French Government will present to all the signatory Powers a certified copy compliant with the record accompanying the deposition of the ratifications.*²³

Consequently, according to these stipulations, the reference date for the entry into force of the treaty was to be the date of its ratification by Hungary and three of the major Powers, the act thus signed and ratified being designated as the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. The entry into force for each Power was to be considered the date of the deposition of the ratification.

The treaty ratification by the signatory Powers began in the summer of 1920. Romania fulfilled this treaty requirement by discussing the ratification of the treaty in the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies, from 14 to 26 August 1920. Most signatory Powers carried through the ratification procedures in the second part of 1920 and at the beginning of the following year. In London, in the House of Commons, the debate regarding the Bill for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon was conducted mainly on 20 April 1921, and continued and ended on 25 and 26 April 1921. In the House of Lords, the debate took place on 5 May 1921, with conspicuously strong views both for and against, in a heated atmosphere.

The ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by Hungary constituted the most difficult test for the completion and entry into force of the treaty, as it needed a somewhat longer time, due to its high complexity. On 15 November 1920, the legislative proposal of Pál Teleki's government regarding the "organization of the Trianon Peace" was greeted by the National Assembly with a "Solemn Statement of Protest."²⁴

The Hungarian ratification process was certainly the most strenuous, the task of promoting it being bitter and unrewarding, considering the circumstances that made it necessary for the political-diplomatic decision-makers to accept it, despite their known reluctance. The decision-makers directly in charge had to address in their diplomatic argumentation Hungary's higher *raison d'État*, without being able to nurture even the hope of partial redress. In such a highly tense atmosphere, István Bethlen's new government, through its foreign minister, Miklós Bánffy, and at the insistence of some of the Allied Powers, managed to effect, on 26 July 1921, the adoption by the National Assembly of Article XXXIII regarding the Peace Treaty of Trianon "as a ratification equivalent."²⁵ Immediately after the adoption of the text, the National Assembly members repeated their protest, in an act to be largely assigned to the general stream of Hungarian revisionism.

According to the specifications in the introductory part of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, "as of the effective date when the Treaty enters into force, the state of war shall end. From that moment on and subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, there will be official relations between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary."²⁶

Considering the above, we come to realize the potential effects of an otherwise unlikely rejection of the Trianon Treaty by Hungary or Romania or by

any of the Allied Powers, by any High Contracting Party to the Treaty. The unprecedented risk of causing havoc in international relations and the resumption of war, extreme sanctions, all could have become a reality.

The representatives of the Allied Powers concluded in Paris, on 26 July 1921, at 18:00, a preliminary protocol which stated that “With the start of the procedure of first depositing the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, signed at Trianon on 4 June 1920, the Allied Powers declare that they reserve all rights that might belong to them as a consequence of the non-execution of the terms of the Armistice or their incomplete execution by Hungary.”²⁷

On the same day and at the same hour, the same representatives proceeded to prepare the Procès-verbal for the deposition of the ratifications of the Peace Treaty signed at Trianon on 4 June 1920, presented to the Government of the French Republic.²⁸ The ratification instruments or the notifications regarding their transmission, submitted and considered—upon examination—to be proper and valid, were entrusted to the Government of the French Republic for safekeeping in its archives. The Procès-verbal stated that the depositions were made by four of the major Allied and Associated Powers: the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan,²⁹ by five other Allied and Associated Powers: Belgium, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam and Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, mention being made that subsequent depositions shall be approved in accordance with the final clauses of the treaty.

In this respect, on 15 October 1921 at 11.00, the Procès-verbal of the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Trianon was drawn up, signed on 4 June 1920 by the King of Greece, and submitted by the chargé d'affaires of Greece in Paris; this Procès-verbal was signed only by the representatives of France and Greece, A. Briand and P. A. Metaxas.³⁰

A similar Procès-verbal was concluded on 31 October 1921, at 11.00, for the deposition of the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by the Emperor of Japan. The Japanese ambassador in Paris informed the French Government via a Note dated 21 July 1921 that the Emperor of Japan had ratified the treaty (without mentioning the date). Moreover, the Japanese ambassador had attended the first deposition of ratifications of 26 July 1921, being one of the signatories of the Procès-verbal.³¹

It cannot go unnoticed that during the same day of Wednesday, 26 July 1921, there took place three episodes in the history of the treaty ratification. In the morning, in Budapest, the National Assembly passed “Article XXXIII concerning the Peace Treaty of Trianon,” which was communicated with maximum urgency to the Government of France, the repository of all treaty documents. In the wake of this communiqué, in the evening of the same day, the Protocol by which the Allied Powers reserved all the rights they might enjoy in case Hungary

failed to comply was signed in Paris, at 18.00. At the same time, the first Procès-verbal of the deposition of the treaty ratifications by the first 10 states was signed. Its importance lies in the fact that it was the main legal document allowing the entry into force of the treaty. The quick succession of the above-mentioned episodes is also indicative of the way in which all the factors involved worked for the implementation of the clauses assumed in the treaty.

It should be pointed out that in none of the documents regarding the above ratifications could one find the date of the conclusion or implementation of the ratification procedure by the signatory states of the treaty.

After 26 July 1921, the ratification deposition schedule included the USA, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland and Portugal. This set was later joined by ten further signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations, included as Part I of the Treaty of Trianon, and their ratification, respectively (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Peru, Uruguay).

Mention should also be made that in most cases the conduct and the content of the debates on all these ratifications are still little known.

The moment when the Hungarian ratification and the ratifications made until that date by most signatory Powers were placed on record marked the actual entry into force of the treaty between the High Contracting Parties. The deposition of the ratifications and the remission of the certified copies were bound to end in the following time interval.

Compliance with the Treaty of Trianon provisions should be considered in its fullness, not only formally and judicially, but as part of the whole that forms the actual entry into force of an act of fundamental international importance, implemented through the full exertion of the force of law, and in light of the comprehensive enactment of the international relations that were bound to derive from it. For any political reference, the date of the Treaty of Trianon is the date when the act was signed, i.e. 4 June 1920, while for historical reference, the date is the effective date of its entry into force, when its ratification by Hungary and by the majority of signatory Powers became of public record.

Romania was at the forefront of these developments, both in its capacity of signatory Power to the Treaty alongside the other Allied and Associated Powers and on account of the number of treaty provisions concerning it. Last but not least, the implications envisaged the establishment of normal relations with Hungary for both Romania and the other signatory Powers. In the wake of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary became again, after nearly four centuries, an independent state. Thus, the Treaty of Trianon inaugurated Hungary's diplomatic relations with the signatory Powers. The inauguration of diplomatic relations between Romania and Hungary was prepared in parallel to the treaty ratification, as it was proper between two new neighboring states, initially taking the form of a Mission, then that of a Legation.

In all these extensive political and diplomatic developments arising from the establishment, signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty of Trianon, the analysis of the conduct of all ratifications by the signatory Powers is of real scientific interest, if we intend to fully grasp the subtleties and the various points of view expressed. Nearly a century after the conclusion of the treaty, the comparative investigation and assessment of all ratifications is a mere desideratum.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY of the main countries involved in the Treaty of Trianon is still marked by the partial, national-subjective political approach. A historical approach to the treaty could facilitate the emergence of a more objective perception of the event. This perspective is however limited by revisionist and neo-revisionist tendencies, with political underpinnings, that impair the development of works cultivating a comprehensive scientific approach, of genuine historiological value, respecting 21st century standards concerning theoretical principles.

The previous century saw the polarization of biased views even in works of good repute. This happened in developed countries with valuable historiographical traditions. This is the conclusion one can draw if one carries out an overall assessment of the ratifications of the Treaty of Trianon. Most papers analyze them in revisionist or anti-revisionist terms, or in a national historiographical framework. In some western works, the Treaty of Trianon is seen especially in the light of the Hungarian Question,³² which narrows its historical perspective. The Treaty of Trianon, both as the process and the product of legal and political ratification, but most particularly as a fundamental historic act, means much more than the Hungarian Question, it means the sum—not necessarily the arithmetical one, but rather the organic fusion—of all the issues related to peace and international relations in the postwar period until today, and looking forward into the future.

Irrespective of the differences of opinion and interests, or even of sharp contradictions in some cases, in absolutely all situations the higher political interest, the *raison d'État*, had to prevail, as it accounted for the very existence and future of each state, and it was this *raison d'État* that eventually leveled out seemingly irreconcilable asperities, because they were negotiated under the aegis of the Peace Conference forum.

Amid all this turmoil, World Peace as a supreme imperative prevailed and all the stakeholders involved in these long-range political and diplomatic developments had to comply with it. These objective, scientific findings, of a universal nature, completely remove all speculative endeavors to redefine the Peace Treaty of Trianon with Hungary through the gross falsification of its title as the Trianon Diktat. This manipulation turns out to be increasingly offensive, unacceptable, provocative, utterly dangerous, requiring the international community to issue a firm response.

The global dimensions of the issue account for the resulting scientific, historic and fundamental conclusions regarding the importance of the Treaty of Trianon in contemporary world history. Reason, as an absolute supreme imperative of divine essence, presided over the closure of the great tragedy represented by the First World War, allowing humanity to return to the wholesome normality of peace.

The higher *raison d'État* which is specific and individual to any state and the supreme imperative of international peace are fundamental factors of permanent validity, underpinning international relations to this very day. The emergence of the European Union and the European integration of almost all states in Central and Southeast Europe have opened a new perspective in exploring these universal lessons of history.

Considering the factors that are still hampering an accurate investigation of and a proper assessment of the Treaty of Trianon, factors that may even affect the conduct of socio-political relations, in particular through the widespread practice of political manipulation, the treaty itself provides us with a more truthful solution, i.e. it allows itself to be read as a valuable chapter of historical culture, as a symbol of consciousness and responsible reflection in the creative perspective upon the world of today and tomorrow.

THE FULL, original, official text in French and its translation into the Romanian language, in: *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român: Recunoașterea ei internațională*, vol. 6 (Bucharest: Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1986), doc. no. 890, pp. 142–272 (in French), pp. 272–399 (in Romanian). It is divided into 14 parts (I–XIV), containing 364 articles, followed by a Protocol and a Statement. The official text was written in French and German. According to art. 364, “In case of dispute, the French text will be used for reference, except for Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) and Part XIII (Labor), where the French and the English texts shall have the same weight.” The Plenipotentiaries of the signatory States “signed the present Treaty . . . issued at Trianon . . . in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic on the basis of which authenticated copies will be issued to each of the Signatory Powers.”

The scientific historical research on the complexity and implications of the Treaty of Trianon has increasingly felt the need for a bibliography that should be wide, comprehensive, international and focused on its analytical themes. This bibliography should form the basis for further studies on the legal-historical, socio-cultural, and political significance of this fundamental act of contemporary international relations. For those with a vested interest in denying the importance of the treaty, mention should be made that 34 states were involved in its development, conclusion and signing, which means most of the states and of the world population of that time. □

ANNEXES

PROTOCOLE.

Au moment de procéder au premier dépôt des ratifications du Traité de Paix entre les Puissances alliées et associées et la Hongrie, signé à Trianon le 4 juin 1920, les Puissances alliées déclarent réserver tous les droits pouvant leur appartenir par suite de la non-exécution des clauses d'Armistice ou de leur exécution incomplète de la part de la Hongrie.

FAIT à Paris, le vingt-six juillet 1921, à dix-huit heures.

(L. S.) MILNE CHEETHAM.

(L. S.) JULES CAMBON.

(L. S.) BONIN.

(L. S.) K. ISHII.

(L. S.) E. DE GAIFFIER.

(L. S.) D. J. GHKA.

(L. S.) M. BOCHKOVITCH.

(L. S.) CHAROON.

(L. S.) STEFAN OSUSKY.

(L. S.) PRAZNOWSKI.

Copie certifiée conforme :

Pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,

Le Chef du Service du Protocole,



PROCÈS-VERBAL

DU DÉPÔT DES RATIFICATIONS SUR LE TRAITÉ DE PAIX

SIGNÉ À TRIANON LE 4 JUIN 1920,

Entre, d'une part, les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, Principales Puissances alliées et associées, la Belgique, la Chine, Cuba, la Grèce, le Nicaragua, le Panama, la Pologne, le Portugal, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, le Siam et l'État Tchéco-Slovaque, constituant avec les Principales Puissances ci-dessus les Puissances alliées et associées et d'autre part, la Hongrie, ainsi que sur les actes suivants qui le complètent : le PROTOCOLE et la DÉCLARATION, en date à Trianon du même jour.

En exécution des clauses finales du Traité de Paix signé à Trianon le 4 juin 1920, les soussignés se sont réunis au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, à Paris, pour procéder au dépôt des Ratifications et les remettre au Gouvernement de la République française.

Les Instruments des Ratifications ou notifications de leur envoi, par quatre des PRINCIPALES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES ET ASSOCIÉES, savoir :

L'Empire britannique,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

La France,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

— 2 —

L'Italie,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

Le Japon,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration (l'instrument sera remis ultérieurement) ;

Et par les autres PUISSANCES ALLIÉES ET ASSOCIÉES ci-après, savoir :

La Belgique,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

La Roumanie,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

L'État serbe-croate-slovène,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

Le Siam,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

La Tchéco-Slovaquie,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

Ainsi que par

La Hongrie,

Pour le Traité de Paix, le Protocole et la Déclaration ;

ont été produits et ayant été, après examen, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont confiés au Gouvernement de la République française pour rester déposés dans ses archives.

— 3 —

Conformément aux dispositions des clauses finales précitées, le Gouvernement français donnera avis aux Puissances contractantes des dépôts des Instruments des Ratifications ultérieurement effectués par les États qui sont signataires desdits Traité, Protocole et Déclaration et qui n'ont pas été en mesure de procéder dès aujourd'hui à cette formalité.

EN FOI DE QUOI, les soussignés ont dressé le présent procès-verbal et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

FAIT à Paris, le vingt-six juillet 1921, à dix-huit heures.

(L. S.) MILNE CHEETHAM.

(L. S.) JULES CAMBON.

(L. S.) BONIN.

(L. S.) K. ISHII.

(L. S.) E. DE GAIFFIER.

(L. S.) D. J. GHIKA.

(L. S.) M. BOCHKOVITCH.

(L. S.) CHAROON.


(L. S.) STEFAN OSUSKY.

(L. S.) PRAZNOWSKI.

Copie certifiée conforme :

Pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,

Le Chef du Service du Protocole,



PROCÈS-VERBAL
DU DÉPÔT DES RATIFICATIONS PAR LA GRÈCE
SUR LE TRAITÉ DE PAIX

SIGNÉ À TRIANON LE 4 JUIN 1920,

Entre, d'une part, les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, Principales Puissances alliées et associées, la Belgique, la Chine, Cuba, la Grèce, le Nicaragua, le Panama, la Pologne, le Portugal, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, le Siam et l'État Tchéco-Slovaque, constituant avec les Principales Puissances ci-dessus les Puissances alliées et associées et, d'autre part, la Hongrie, ainsi que sur les actes suivants qui le complètent : le PROTOCOLE et la DÉCLARATION, en date à Trianon du même jour.

En exécution des clauses finales du Traité de Paix signé à Trianon, le 4 juin 1920, LE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES DE GRÈCE À PARIS s'est présenté aujourd'hui au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, à Paris, pour procéder au dépôt des ratifications de Sa Majesté le Roi de Grèce, sur ledit Traité, le Protocole et la Déclaration, et les remettre au Gouvernement de la République française.

L'instrument de ratification a été produit et ayant été, après examen, trouvé en bonne et due forme a été confié au Gouvernement de la République Française pour rester déposé dans ses archives.

— 2 —

Conformément aux dispositions des clauses finales précitées, le Gouvernement français donnera avis de ce dépôt aux Puissances contractantes.

EN FOI DE QUOI, les soussignés ont dressé le présent procès-verbal et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

FAIT à Paris, le quinze octobre 1921, à onze heures.

(L. S.) A. BRIAND.

(L. S.) P. A. METAXAS.

Copie certifiée conforme :

*Pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,
Le Chef du Service du Protocole,*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "P. Fougère", written in dark ink. The signature is positioned below the typed text and is underlined with a single horizontal line.

PROCÈS-VERBAL
DU DÉPÔT DES RATIFICATIONS PAR LE JAPON
SUR LE TRAITÉ DE PAIX

SIGNÉ À TRIANON LE 4 JUIN 1920,

Entre, d'une part, les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, Principales Puissances alliées et associées, la Belgique, la Chine, Cuba, la Grèce, le Nicaragua, le Panama, la Pologne, le Portugal, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, le Siam et l'État Tchéco-Slovaque, constituant avec les Principales Puissances ci-dessus les Puissances alliées et associées et, d'autre part, la Hongrie, ainsi que sur les actes suivants qui le complètent : le PROTOCOLE et la DÉCLARATION, en date à Trianon du même jour.

En exécution des clauses finales du Traité de Paix signé à Trianon, le 4 juin 1920, L'AMBASSADEUR DU JAPON À PARIS s'est présenté aujourd'hui au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, à Paris, pour procéder au dépôt des ratifications de Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon, sur ledit Traité, le Protocole et la Déclaration, et les remettre au Gouvernement de la République Française.

L'Ambassadeur du Japon à Paris ayant informé le Gouvernement français, conformément aux dites clauses finales, par note en date du 21 juillet 1921 que Sa Majesté l'Empereur du Japon avait ratifié les Actes susdits, a participé au premier dépôt des ratifications le 26 juillet 1921.

L'instrument des ratifications a été produit et ayant été, après examen, trouvé en bonne et due forme, a été confié au Gouvernement de la République Française pour rester déposé dans ses archives.

-- 2 --

Conformément aux dispositions des clauses finales précitées, le Gouvernement français donnera avis de ce dépôt aux Puissances contractantes.

EN FOI DE QUOI, les soussignés ont dressé le présent procès-verbal et y ont apposé leurs cachets.


FAIT à Paris, le trente et un octobre 1921, à onze heures.

(L. S.) L. BONNEVAY.

(L. S.) K. ISHII.

Copie certifiée conforme :

*Le Ministre plénipotentiaire,
Chef du Service du Protocole,*



SOURCE: Diplomatic Archives of Romania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Procese-verbale de depunere a Ratificărilor Convenției de Pace de la Trianon, 4 iunie 1920," unnumbered folder.

Notes

1. *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului roman: Recunoașterea ei internațională*, vol. 6, doc. no. 890 (Bucharest: Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1986), 272–399.
2. *Desbaterile parlamentare. Senatul. Sesiunea din 1920. Ședințele din 14, 16, 17 August 1920 (sesiune extraordinară)*, no. 32 (22 August 1920): 623–628; no. 33 (24 August 1920): 629–639; no. 34 (26 August 1920): 647–658.
3. *Ibid.*, 629–634.
4. *Ibid.*, 637.
5. *Ibid.*, 638–639.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, 650–652.
8. *Ibid.*, 652–654.
9. *Ibid.*, 654–656.
10. *Ibid.*, 656–658.
11. *Ibid.*, 656.
12. *Ibid.*, 658.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Desbaterile Adunării Deputaților sesiunea 25, 26 august 1920 (sesiune extraordinară)*, no. 54 (11 September 1920): 1282–1288; no. 55 (17 September 1920): 1289–1302.
15. *Ibid.*, no. 54 (11 September 1920): 1282–1288.
16. *Ibid.*, 1283–1288.
17. *Ibid.*, no. 55 (17 September 1920): 1289–1302.
18. *Ibid.*, 1292–1296.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, 1297–1301.
21. *Ibid.*, 1302.
22. *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale*, 397.
23. *Ibid.*, 398.
24. *Magyarország történeti kronológiája, 3, 1848–1944* (Budapest: Academic Press, 1993), 876.
25. *Ibid.*, 881.
26. *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale*, 274.
27. “Procese-verbale de depunere a Ratificărilor Convenției de Pace de la Trianon, 4 iunie 1920,” unnumbered folder (Bucharest, The Diplomatic Archives of Romania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 July 1921).
28. *Ibid.*, Procès-verbal of 26 July 1921.
29. See also note 31, *infra*.
30. Procès-verbal of 15 October 1921.
31. Procès-verbal of 31 October 1921.
32. *The Hungarian Question in the British Parliament: Speeches, Questions and Answers in the House of Lords and the House of Commons from 1919 to 1920*, with an introduction by Roland E.L. Vaughan William, K. C. (London: Grant Richards, 1933).

Abstract**The Higher Raison d'État and the Imperative of World Peace:
The Treaty of Trianon and its Ratification by Romania**

The complete history of the Treaty of Trianon should necessarily include the final phase, the treaty ratification by the signatories, as a condition for its entry into force. Analyzing the history of the Peace Treaty of Trianon ratification (1920–1921), our study includes some considerations on the treaty historiography and the need to broaden its scope at the level of 21st century standards. The decisive factor in the adoption and implementation of the treaty was—if we ignore the divergences over details—the understanding of the general political responsibility, of the *raison d'État* of each signatory Party, of world peace as the supreme reason. The Treaty of Trianon may be considered a valuable chapter in the knowledge of history, a test of conscience and responsible reflection that creatively look forward to the world of today and tomorrow.

Keywords

ratifications, *raison d'État*, peace as supreme interest, perception of the treaty