

From Moscow to Beijing Romania and the Mediation of the Sino-Soviet Split*

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IN APRIL 1964 the decision makers in Bucharest informed the Romanian public opinion (in a Declaration issued in April 1964) about the mediation by the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) of the Sino-Soviet split, leading to the suspension of the polemic on the general line of the communist movement for "almost a month."¹ The position adopted by the RWP must have surprised most Romanian citizens, considering Bucharest authorities' well known obedience to the Kremlin and the fact that in the context of the emerging Sino-Soviet differences, the latter had taken a firm stand against the Chinese "dissidence." Therefore, in this study, we are aiming to reveal the main political evolutions which lead, eventually, to a radical shift in the position adopted by the RWP with respect to the Sino-Soviet split.

Although in February 1956, when de-Stalinization process began, the Romanian authorities had accepted the new directives given by Moscow, the Chinese communist leaders had taken a completely different stand about the act of condemning Stalin's personality cult. Hence, in March and April 1956 Mao Zedong chaired several meetings of the Central Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) focusing on the topic of the secret speech delivered by Khrushchev on 25 February 1956, during the closed-door meeting with delegates of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).² The official position of the CCP on the subject of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was expressed in an extended article entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Published in "Renmin Ribao" on April 5, 1956, the article stressed the fact that, in spite of the countless errors made by the Soviet leader, he had to be worshiped as an authentic advocate of Marx-

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ism-Leninism. Stalin had to be acknowledged as “a great Marxist-Leninist, yet at the same time a Marxist-Leninist who committed several gross errors without realizing that they were errors.”³ The Chinese dissidence inside the Communist bloc became visible after the Polish revolt and the Hungarian revolution. Although the leaders of the RWP did not hesitate at all to give their full support to Moscow’s actions during the events in Poland and Hungary, the initial stand taken by the CCP was contrary to the Soviet one. According to the Chinese political decision makers, the Polish revolt was the direct outcome of the “great power chauvinism” exhibited by the Soviet Union in relation to the other “fraternal parties,” supporting the seize of power by Wladyslaw Gomulka. Beijing’s attitude concerning the crisis in Hungary was to a certain extent similar to the one in Poland. At first, the Chinese communists believed that the events in Hungary were prompted by Moscow’s refusal to consider the Hungarian communists as equals. But while the Hungarian revolution was gaining anti-communist connotations, the Chinese political decision makers changed their minds radically and decided to support the Soviet military intervention.⁴

In November 1957 a Conference of the communist and workers’ parties took place in Moscow, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. Actually, the meeting was organized in order to reinforce the “ideological primacy” of the Kremlin, which had been seriously damaged by the consequences of the secret report read in February 1956 by Nikita Khrushchev. According to the calculations made by the Kremlin leaders, the 12 delegations of the communist and workers’ parties present in Moscow were supposed to sign a Declaration written by the CPSU, concerning the principles which would guide the international communist movement.⁵ To Khrushchev’s surprise, though, the Chinese delegation led by Mao Zedong expressed its discontent with two of the principles included in the Declaration draft proposed by the Soviet: “the transition from capitalism to socialism” and the significance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU “theses” for the international communist movement. Complying with the principles of the peaceful coexistence doctrine, the Soviet leaders had supported the idea of a “peaceful transition” defined as follows: “securing a majority in parliament and transforming parliament from an instrument of the bourgeois dictatorship into an instrument of a genuine people’s state power.”⁶ As a response to the insistencies of the Chinese counterpart, the Soviets agreed to introduce in the text of the draft declaration both a “peaceful transition” and a “non-peaceful transition,” while stressing the fact that: “Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily.”⁷ As for the significance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU (particularly the de-Stalinization process prompted by Khrushchev), the CCP delegates called for compromise and abandoned their initial objections as a result of “the difficult position of the leadership of the CPSU at the time.”⁸ Obviously, the delegation of the RWP did not raise objections to the Declaration draft advanced by the Soviets, but made small suggestions concerning the editing.⁹

The Sino-Soviet disagreements worsened during the Bucharest Conference held in June 1960, when the Romanian authorities joined the Soviet position in condemning the Chinese ideological vision. According to the Kremlin leaders, the Bucharest Conference of the communist and workers' parties, held during the 3rd RWP Congress, was imperative, knowing that in May 1960 Khrushchev had refused to participate at the Paris summit¹⁰ (following the incident occurred on May 1st, 1960, when an American spying plane—U-2—hovering over the territory of the Soviet Union, was shot down).¹¹ To the surprise of the Chinese delegation, on June 24, 1960, the representatives of the CPSU handed out to the delegates present at the Conference an informative note concerning the Soviet ideological commandments referring to the “nature of the contemporary era,” “the issue of war and peace,” “the peaceful coexistence,” “the forms of transition to socialism,” and also a harsh indictment of the “deviations of the Chinese comrades” from the principles of the November 1957 Declaration.¹² The harsh reaction of the Soviets came after the Chinese communist leaders had published in April 1960 a brochure entitled “Long Live Leninism,” celebrating the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth. Although the brochure did not criticize openly the CPSU leadership, it pleaded for a return to Leninist orthodoxy (the brochure was interpreted by the Soviets as an attack against the Kremlin's view on the “Leninist theory and tactics”). During the meeting organized in Bucharest (June 24–26, 1960), Khrushchev severely criticized the Chinese delegation, naming the CCP “dogmatic,” “left adventurist,” “pseudo-revolutionary” and “sectarian.”¹³ Similarly, the RWP's leader fully resumed in his speech the radical criticism of the Soviet leader and added that through their actions the CCP “deviated” from the principles of the 1957 Declaration.¹⁴ Faced with the charges made by the CPSU and the other “fraternal parties,” on June 26, 1960, the CCP representatives distributed to the delegations present in Bucharest a written statement in which they described Khrushchev's behaviour as “patriarchal, arbitrary and tyrannical.”¹⁵ And yet, these tensions inside the communist bloc were not made public.¹⁶ The communiqué agreed by the delegations participating at the Bucharest Conference only mentioned that the dynamics of the international system had proven the “righteousness of the Marxist-Leninist theses” of the November 1957 Declaration.¹⁷ Behind scenes, however, the conflict was mounting. On August 2, 1960, the RWP Central Committee sent a letter to the CCP Central Committee in which they qualified the statements made by the Chinese delegation and distributed to the participants at the Bucharest Conference as “completely untrue,” and condemned the Chinese ideological vision.¹⁸

According to the agenda established at the Bucharest meeting, in November 1960, a new Conference of the communist and workers' parties was planned to take place in Moscow. On this occasion, a new Declaration was meant to be adopted in order to replace the one issued in 1957.¹⁹ In the meantime, in July 1960, the CPSU leaders had taken the decision of calling back the Soviet experts from the People's

Republic of China following the infamous behaviour of the Chinese citizens towards them.²⁰ Hence, it is not surprising that during the meeting of the Editorial Committee, convened in September-October 1960 in order to discuss the Declaration draft prepared by the Soviets, the Sino-Soviet, disagreements escalated. As a response to the Soviet Declaration draft, consisting of 51 pages, the Chinese delegation presented another 51 page draft.²¹ As for the RWP delegation, its loyalty to Moscow was undeniable and devoted to the principles included in the Soviet Declaration draft.²² Contrary to the 1957 Conference, the divergent positions of the CPSU and the CCP continued to grow increasingly apart, touching upon various topics, such as: the unacceptability of the factious activity, the transition to socialism, the “significance” of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses, the personality cult, the assessment of the contemporary era, the possibility of preventing war and ensuring peace, the peaceful coexistence, the struggle for national liberation, the economic assistance for the new independent states, the forms of transition from capitalism to socialism, the fight against revisionism and dogmatism, national communism, etc.²³ In the end, however, after long debates, the Chinese delegation, calling for compromise, signed the new Declaration of the communist and workers’ parties. According to Chinese documents, although the representatives of the CCP had been coerced to give up some of their own ideas for the sake of the “cohesion” of the communist movement, “many correct opinions” advanced by the Chinese delegates had been included in the Declaration.²⁴ The split in the Sino-Soviet relations occurred at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, when Khrushchev severely criticized the Albanian Workers’ Party while the CCP defended it. After this Congress, the USSR and its satellites, on the one hand, and China and Albania, on the other hand, pursued a so-called “polemic on the general line of the international communist movement.”

For these reasons, it is not surprising that on October 31, 1961, the RWP and the other “fraternal parties” from Central and Eastern Europe (except for Albania) sent a letter to the CCP Central Committee, informing the Beijing authorities that the representatives of the People’s Republic of China were no longer “needed” as observers at the future meetings of the Advisory Political Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.²⁵ Moreover, on March 3, 1962, in response to a demand of the Kremlin,²⁶ the decision makers in Bucharest sent a contentious letter to the CCP Central Committee, allegedly in response to the attitude of the Chinese delegation during the World Peace Council, held in Stockholm, in December 1961. In the letter, written in a deeply bitter tone, the RWP Central Committee complained about the systematic breach by the Chinese counterpart of the principles included in the 1960 Moscow Declaration:

At the end of the Conference held in November 1960, after the Conference Declaration was adopted unanimously, the Chinese comrades, who had expressed contradictory opinions against the large majority of the fraternal parties, have left us with the impression that they accepted the criticism formulated by the representatives of the international

*communist movement. We assumed that the Chinese comrades would respect the norms of the mutually agreed relations among the communist parties and put an end to the methods under criticism. However, shortly after the Conference, we noticed that these methods were resumed more intensely and more systematically.*²⁷

This was, however, the last blatant anti-Chinese position adopted by the Romanian authorities. In the course of the Conference of the representatives of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) member states, held between June 6 and 7, 1962, Nikita Khrushchev proposed the “specialization based on production branches” as a basis for the economies of the communist states from Central and Eastern Europe.²⁸ According to this plan, conceived and drafted by the Kremlin, Romania’s economy was supposed to become mainly agrarian. But this economic orientation contradicted the plans of industrialization (focused on the heavy industry) adopted at the 3rd Congress of the RWP in June 1960.²⁹ In June 1962, the reluctance of the Romanian delegation, lead by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, to accept the Soviet plans of economic integration prompted the failure of the above-mentioned Conference. Yet, only a few months later, during the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee of November 1962, Nikita Khrushchev foresaw the organization of a new summit of the representatives of the COMECON member states (similar to the Moscow Conference of June 6-7, 1962) aimed at creating a single planning organism.³⁰ Therefore, in the course of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the COMECON, in February 1963, the RWP delegation reiterated its reserves towards the economic plans of the Soviets, causing tensions in the Romanian-Soviet relations.³¹

Given the aggravation of the relations between the RWP and the CPSU, Romania pursued the “diplomacy of disengagement” in relation to the Sino-Soviet split. The RWP’s attitude, unlike in the past, consisted in refraining from taking a firm stand concerning the “polemic on the general line.” Moreover, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej charged Corneliu Mănescu, the Foreign Affairs minister, with meeting the Chinese Ambassador in Bucharest and informing him that Romania “wants normal relations with China.”³² Hence, on 16 May 1963, the Romanian Foreign affairs minister informed Xu Jianguo (the Chinese Ambassador) about the recent Soviet attempts to “distort the rationale of the COMECON’s creation,” and insisted on the tense bilateral relationship between the USSR and the Romanian People’s Republic (RPR).³³ However, lacking any feedback from Beijing after this meeting, on December 12, 1963, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej and Emil Bodnăraş organized a secret meeting with Xu Jianguo. Expressing his regret concerning the rare contacts between the two states over the past years, the RWP leader referred precisely to the event which had lead fundamentally to the cooling of the bilateral relations—the Bucharest Conference of June 1960. Thus, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej referred to the unexpected convening of the Conference in Bucharest and to the fact that the RWP leaders were not aware of the Soviet intention to distribute to the participating delegations the CPSU “in-

formative note” on the Sino-Soviet disagreements.³⁴ After mentioning the recent Romanian-Soviet differences, Bodnăraş pleaded for more intense contacts between the Romanian and the Chinese counterparts by means of mutual visits of the delegations of the two parties. However, he stressed that these contacts were not going to be straightforward, but through deviating routes (in order not to raise suspicions among the Soviets):

*Before leaving, some of the issues discussed were reiterated, particularly the need for more regular contacts and the way of pursuing them . . . Comrade Emil Bodnăraş suggested the route through Korea, Vietnam and Burma on the way to Beijing, or a visit by Chinese comrades to Bucharest coming from a different location than China.*³⁵

The meeting of the RWP leader with the Chinese Ambassador on December 12, 1963, did not pass unnoticed. Following the demands expressed by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej in favour of establishing more regular contacts with the CCP, on 24 January 1964 Dumitru Gheorghiu, the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, was received by Liu Shaoqi, the president of the PRC. Referring to the contacts between the CCP and the RWP, Liu Shaoqi expressed his approval on this matter, a concrete plan remaining to be designed. The Romanian Ambassador reiterated the idea proposed by Emil Bodnăraş on December 12, 1963, that the Sino-Romanian contacts should be pursued by means of more extended visits, thus avoiding Soviet suspicions. According to Dumitru Gheorghiu, a visit had to be organized “in spring at the latest.”³⁶

Nevertheless, the Sino-Romanian high-level contacts were made possible by the Soviets themselves. On 4 February 1964, “Renmin Ribao” and “Hongqi” published the 7th Chinese commentary concerning the disagreements with the Soviets, entitled “The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of our Times.”³⁷ A few days later, on 13 February 1964, the Soviet leaders informed the Romanian authorities about the decision of the CPSU Central Committee to discuss the disagreements between the CPSU and the CCP during the incoming plenary session, expected to take place that same month. They also informed that the minutes of the meeting and the working documents of the plenary would be made public.³⁸ Hence, one day afterwards, on February 14, 1964, the RWP Central Committee sent a letter to the CCP Central Committee in which the Romanian leaders expressed their concern about the Sino-Soviet “sharpening polemic,” stressing the fact that these circumstances required a meeting between the “representatives of the superior leadership” of the RWP and the CCP, in order to discuss the issue of the “unity of the socialist bloc and of the world communist movement.”³⁹ In the course of the same day, the Romanian communist leaders sent another letter to the CPSU Central Committee, expressing the same concern about the “sharpening polemic” and asking the Soviet leaders not to make public the “working documents of the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the disagreements with the Chinese Communist Party.”⁴⁰ After the Soviet and the Chinese authorities approved the temporary

suspension of the contention between the CPSU and the CCP, the Romanian authorities sent a delegation to the People's Republic of China and decided to inform the Soviets about the outcome of the visit. In reality, the RWP speculated on the tense relations between the CPSU and the CCP, and offered to "mediate" the Sino-Soviet split. In fact, what the decision makers in Bucharest did was to enforce the decisions made at the meetings held on December 12, 1963 and January 24, 1964. Moreover, under the new circumstances, the RWP delegation was no longer supposed to use deviating routes (as previously decided during the meetings with the Chinese counterparts), but was able to visit Beijing straightforward without raising the Soviets' suspicions.

Therefore, it was not surprising that during the Sino-Romanian talks held in Beijing (3-10 March 1964), the RWP delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer focused on pointing out the Romanian-Soviet disagreements, in order to convince the CCP leaders about the change of perspective embraced by Bucharest. The efforts of the RWP to put an end to the Sino-Soviet polemic were barely touched upon during the talks, but were directed at facilitating the Sino-Romanian rapprochement.⁴¹ On March 14, 1964, after a short visit to North Korea, the RWP delegation headed for the Soviet Union, in order to inform Khrushchev on the result of the talks with the Chinese counterpart. The Romanian-Soviet meeting took place on March 15, 1964, in the town of Pitsunda (Abkhazia) and consisted in a short communication by the Romanian side on the outcome of the Sino-Romanian negotiations which had taken place in Beijing. Ion Gheorghe Maurer explained to the Soviet hosts the reasons which determined the RWP leaders to take the trip to China and presented the details of the Sino-Romanian talks. At this point, the Romanian delegation leader stressed the fact that the constant position supported by the RWP in Beijing had been the peaceful resolution of the Sino-Soviet disagreements, based on the principles included in the Moscow Declaration of 1960. At the same time, Maurer informed the Soviet leader that the Chinese counterpart had approved the publication of the working documents of the CPSU plenary meeting of February 1964 and that the decision makers in Beijing, thus, decided to continue the polemic.⁴² Nikita Khrushchev proposed to the Romanian side to prepare a "document" signed by the CPSU, the CCP and the RWP in which the Soviets and the Chinese would commit to stop the polemic.⁴³ Three days later, during the meeting of the Politburo of the RWP Central Committee, of March 18, 1964, the Romanian communist leaders accepted Khrushchev's proposal to send a message calling for the end of the public contention.⁴⁴ Thus, on March 25, 1964, the RWP Central Committee sent a letter to the CPSU and the CCP Central Committees, asking them to end the Sino-Soviet ideological polemic.⁴⁵ This action underlined the imperative need to take measures in favour of ending the sharpening polemic which threatened the integrity of the socialist bloc. The Bucharest leaders insisted that this contention affected the relations between the socialist countries and that the international communist movement was on the verge of "breaking up," while the menace of "imperialism" was at its peak.⁴⁶

On March 28, 1964, the CPSU Central Committee approved the Romanian initiative in an answer to the letter sent by the RWP leaders on March 25, 1964, but was cautious about the way in which the Romanian proposal would be received by the CCP leaders.⁴⁷ The Chinese leaders did not respond to the appeal made by the RWP. Instead, on March 31, 1964, they published a new contentious article in “Renmin Ribao” and “Hongqi,” entitled “The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev’s Revisionism.”⁴⁸ In response, on April 3, 1964, the Soviets published not only the working documents of the February plenary meeting of the CPSU, but also a caustic editorial in “Pravda” which reinforced the Sino-Soviet ideological divergences.⁴⁹ Thus, the Sino-Soviet contention resumed.

This turn of events had been anticipated by Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. On February 24, 1964, the Romanian leader had confessed to I.K. Jegalin, the Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest, that the mediation of the Sino-Soviet conflict was unlikely.⁵⁰ The mediator’s role assumed by Romania had been merely propagandistic and meant to place Romania as a moral state actor, acting according to the principles of the Moscow Declaration (1960). Under these circumstances, at the meeting of the Politburo of the RWP Central Committee, held on April 2, 1964, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej asked the participants to draw up a public Declaration (which would become the Declaration of the RWP Central Committee of April 1964) insisting on the following aspects: the neutrality of the RWP in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute; the one month suspension of the Sino-Soviet contention due to Romania’s efforts; the RWP’s position on “fundamental” issues, such as: war and peace, the peaceful coexistence, the principles underlying the relations between the “fraternal parties”; all these principles respected the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960.⁵¹ It is worth noting that the post-1989 Romanian historiography accepted the idea of the “mediation of the Sino-Soviet split” disseminated by the RWP leaders, without pursuing a conclusive archive research. If pursued, this would have definitely caused a review of the position adopted by the Romanian People’s Republic in relation to the Sino-Soviet polemic.

IN CONCLUSION, we may state that since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet tensions in 1956, Romania’s attitude reflected ideological conformism and a complete obedience of the RWP leaders to Moscow. It was in 1962, when the Romanian-Soviet disagreements started inside the COMECON, that the Romanian state reconsidered its position inside the communist bloc, pursuing a limited detachment from the Kremlin. Hence, the visit of the RWP delegation to China, in March 1964, should be analysed from the new political perspective adopted by Bucharest, aiming to counterbalance the hegemonic intentions of the Kremlin by means of a Sino-Romanian rapprochement. In fact, Romania assumed the role of “mediator” as an excuse to arrange a direct high-level meeting between the delegations of the RWP and the CCP without raising the Soviets’ suspicions.

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Notes

1. *Declarație cu privire la poziția Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mișcării comuniste internaționale adoptată de plenara lărgită a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964* (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1964), 11.
2. Chen Jian, Yang Kuisong, “Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” in Odd Arne Westad, eds., *Brothers in Arms: the Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 260.
3. “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, April 5, 1956,” in *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), 1-20.
4. Mark Kramer, “The USSR Foreign Ministry’s Appraisal of the Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split September 1959,” in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 6-7 (1995-1996): 173.
5. Central National Historical Archives (hereinafter, CNHA), Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 1/1957, 8-11.
6. “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, September 6, 1963,” in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 71.
7. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 12/1957, 19.
8. “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, September 6, 1963,” 74.
9. Dan Cătănuș, “PMR și evoluțiile ideologice din lagărul comunist. De la Revoluția ungară din 1956 la Consfătuirea de la Moscova din noiembrie 1957,” in *Anuarul Institutului Român de Istorie Recentă*, vol. II (Iași: Ed. Polirom, 2004), 195.
10. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 28/1964, vol. II, 27.
11. See: “73. Soviet Statement on the U-2 Crisis, May 1960” and “74. Dwight D. Eisenhower: U-2 Incident Speech, 25 May 1960,” in Spencer C. Tucker, Priscilla Roberts, Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., eds., *Cold War: A Student Encyclopedia*, vol. V (Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2008), 2536–2542.
12. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 33/1960, 3-68.
13. “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, September 6, 1963,” 81.
14. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 35/1960, vol. I, 101–108.
15. “Statement of the Delegation of the Communist Party of China at the Bucharest Meeting of Fraternal Parties, June 26, 1960,” in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, 110.
16. See also Jeremy Friedman, “Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s,” *Cold War History*, X, 2 (May 2010): 263.
17. “Comunicatul cu privire la întâlnirea reprezentanților partidelor comuniste și muncitorești din țările socialiste,” *Scânteia*, XXIX, No. 4872, June 28, 1960, 1.
18. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 7C/1960, 3–23.
19. *Ibid.*, file 28/1964, vol. II, 31.
20. “Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 18 July 1960,” in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 8-9, (1996-1997): 249–250.

21. "1960 octombrie 24. Stenograma ședinței Biroului Politic al CC al PMR cu privire la lucrările comisiei pregătitoare a Conferinței partidelor comuniste și muncitorești de la Moscova," in Dan Cătănuș, ed., *Între Beijing și Moscova. România și conflictul sovieto-chinez*, vol. I (Bucharest: INST, 2004), 112.
22. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 60/1960, 1.
23. *Ibid.*, file 28/1964, vol. II, 31.
24. "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, September 6, 1963," 87.
25. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 9C/1961-1964, 8.
26. *Ibid.*, file 15U/1962, 144.
27. *Ibid.*, file 9C/1961-1964, 27-28.
28. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Cancelarie, file 29/1962, 97.
29. "Directivele Congresului al III-lea al PMR cu privire la planul de dezvoltare a economiei naționale pe anii 1960-1965 și la schița planului economic de perspectivă pe 15 ani," in *Congresul al III-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român* (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1960), 645-688.
30. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Cancelarie, file 6/1963, vol. I, 86.
31. *Ibid.*, file 4/1963, 15-17.
32. Lavinia Betea, *Convorbiri neterminate* (Iassy: Ed. Polirom, 2001), 89.
33. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 53/1963, 8-13.
34. *Ibid.*, file 94/1963, 3-31.
35. *Ibid.*, 32.
36. *Ibid.*, file.93/1963, 27.
37. Before this date, the CCP had published six different commentaries on the Sino-Soviet ideological disagreements: "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, September 6, 1963," "On the Question of Stalin, September 13, 1963," "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?, September 26, 1963," "Apologists of Neo-colonialism, October 22, 1963," "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace, November 19, 1963" and "Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies, December 12, 1963."
38. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Cancelarie, file 10/1964, 37.
39. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 9C/1961-1964, 115-116.
40. *Ibid.*, 117.
41. *Ibid.*, file 29/1964, 1-123.
42. *Ibid.*, file 30/1964, 1-15.
43. *Ibid.*, 39.
44. "1964 martie 18. Stenograma ședinței Biroului Politic al CC al PMR în care s-a discutat problema realizării unui Apel către partidele comuniste privind încetarea polemicii și care să fie semnat de PMR, PCUS și PC Chinez," in Dan Cătănuș, ed., *Între Beijing și Moscova. România și conflictul sovieto-chinez*, vol. I, 1957-1965, 298-311.
45. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 6/1964, 21.
46. *Ibid.*, file 9C/1961-1964, 233-241.
47. *Ibid.*, file 20U/1964, 18-19.
48. See: "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism, March 31, 1964," in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, 359-413.
49. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR - Secția Relații Externe, file 96/1964, 12.

50. Ibid., file 6/1964, 5.

51. CNHA, Fond CC al PCR – Cancelarie, file 13/1964, 5–8.

Abstract

From Moscow to Beijing: Romania and the Mediation of the Sino-Soviet Split*

The post-1989 historiography disseminated, as a fact, the mediation by Romania of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1964, leading to a one-month suspension of the polemic on the general line of the communist movement. This idea was rooted in the preamble of the 1964 Declaration, disseminated in the Romanian historiography as the “Declaration of Independence.” This paper is trying to decode the main political-diplomatic evolutions which eventually lead the Romanian authorities to “mediate” the Sino-Soviet conflict, as well as to reveal the obscure reasons behind this decision.

Key words

Marxism, revisionism, Sino-Soviet Split, mediation, ideology

