

# Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the Beginning of the Sino-Romanian Rapprochement (1963–1964)

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*“He did not know what to believe. It was puzzling that Romania, from a loyal ally beforehand, had begun to act that way.”*

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**W**HEN the communist regime was introduced in Romania, the leaders of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) swore an oath of allegiance to Moscow. And yet, the “fraternal” relations between the two states were irreparably altered in 1962 by the emerging Romanian-Soviet economic dispute inside the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Essentially, the Soviets supported the reform of the institution by means of an integrationist economic policy, which aimed at creating a “single planning unit.”<sup>1</sup> The RWP, however, rejected the Kremlin’s proposal motivating that the creation of this supra-state unit contradicted the principle of non-involve-

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ment in the domestic affairs of the member states, thus, breaching national sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

Faced with the Kremlin's insistence to reform the COMECON, since 1963, the Romanian leaders tried to get closer to Beijing in order to counter the Soviet hegemony. But this proved difficult because ever since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split, the Romanian authorities had backed Moscow unquestioningly. In June 1960, during the Conference of the communist and workers' parties which took place in Bucharest, the Romanian leaders adhered to the position adopted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), condemning the "ideological heresies" promoted by Beijing.<sup>3</sup> The RWP's attitude generated a cooling off of the Sino-Romanian political-diplomatic relations.

In the spring of 1963, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej pleaded for the first time in favor of a Sino-Romanian rapprochement and asked the Romanian Foreign Affairs minister (Corneliu Mănescu) to convene a meeting with the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest (Xu Jianguo). According to the orders received from the RWP leader, Corneliu Mănescu was supposed to inform the Chinese ambassador about the Romanian-Soviet economic dispute inside the COMECON, and tell him that the Romanian authorities wanted to improve relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), "independent of the position assumed by the Soviets."<sup>4</sup> Hence, on 16 May 1963 Xu Jianguo was invited at the Romanian Foreign Affairs ministry where Corneliu Mănescu proceeded to a detailed presentation of the Romanian-Soviet economic dispute inside the COMECON, also explaining the refusal by the Romanian authorities of the Kremlin's integrationist economic vision.<sup>5</sup> Referring to the reaction of the Chinese ambassador towards the new position adopted by the RWP, the Romanian Foreign Affairs minister wrote in his memoirs: "He did not know what to believe. It was puzzling that Romania, from a loyal ally beforehand, had begun to act that way."<sup>6</sup>

The meeting of 16 May 1963 was recorded on listening devices without Xu Jianguo being aware of it,<sup>7</sup> and the transcript of the discussion was handed over to Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej who approved the issues raised by Corneliu Mănescu.<sup>8</sup> Beijing's cautious reaction to the renewed attitude adopted by the People's Republic of Romania (PRR) determined Gheorghiu-Dej to invite Xu Jianguo to Snagov, on 12 December 1963. In the course of the meeting which lasted over 6 ½ hours, the RWP leader raised four distinct topics: the cooling off of the Sino-Romanian relations after the June 1960 events in Bucharest (Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that Romania had not been informed in advance by the Soviets about their intention to publicly condemn Beijing's ideological visions); the breach by the CPSU of the equal rights of all communist and workers' parties and of the principle of non-involvement in domestic affairs; the Romanian-Soviet economic dispute and the talks held on Khrushchev's visit

to Romania in June 1963; the need for more intense Sino-Romanian contacts.<sup>9</sup> In fact, the convocation of the Chinese ambassador on 12 December 1963 had two clear goals. On the one hand, it proved to the leaders in Beijing that Gheorghiu-Dej shared Corneliu Mănescu's point of view, and on the other hand, in the course of the above-mentioned meeting the RWP addressed openly the request to hold bilateral meetings with the Chinese counterpart. This time, the efforts of the Romanian authorities were successful, and on 24 January 1964 the CCP leaders expressed their availability to attend a bilateral meeting.<sup>10</sup>

Once the Chinese authorities agreed to organize a bilateral RWP-CCP meeting, the Romanian communist leaders were able to explain in detail the Romanian-Soviet dispute and the decision taken by Bucharest to distance itself from Moscow. Yet, the main obstacle in organizing this bilateral meeting was precisely the Kremlin's suspicion. With respect to this problem, the Bucharest authorities found an original solution in order to preempt a hostile attitude from Moscow: the mediation of the Sino-Soviet split. Thus, in February 1964, the RWP sent both to the CCP<sup>11</sup> and the CPSU<sup>12</sup> a letter in which Romania offered to mediate this split which "risked" affecting irreparably the unity of the communist bloc. As expected, both the Chinese<sup>13</sup> and the Soviets<sup>14</sup> accepted the "proposal" of the RWP. A Romanian delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer travelled to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and had bilateral talks between 3 and 10 March 1964. In the course of these talks, the RWP delegation made an extensive illustration of the main Romanian-Soviet dissensions in an effort to persuade the Chinese about the change of mind which had occurred in Bucharest.<sup>15</sup>

In its turn, the CCP delegation led by Liu Shaoqi, the president of the PRC, presented the main evolutions of the Sino-Soviet split.<sup>16</sup> During the talks his Romanian counterpart also addressed the need to put an end to the CPSU-CCP conflict. However, Liu Shaoqi reminded the RWP representatives of the position they had adopted before 1962: "Concerning the public dispute, I remember that the RWP Central Committee (CC) also agreed to it in the opinions expressed at the 22<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the CPSU."<sup>17</sup> In fact, during the meeting of the RWP delegation with Mao Zedong (on 10 March 1964) the Chinese leader brought up again the pro-Soviet position adopted before by the Romanians (with respect to the dispute between the CCP and the CPSU), as well as the radical change in Romania's foreign policy over the past year:

"Mao Zedong: You see, in the course of only one year your attitude has changed. On what side are you? Left, middle or right? Are you dogmatic or revisionist, or are you in the middle?"

Nicolae Ceaușescu: We are Marxist-Leninist . . ."<sup>18</sup>

At the end of the Sino-Romanian talks in Beijing, the CCP representatives were not entirely persuaded with respect to the reconfiguration of Romania's

position inside the communist bloc, and remained cautious. As to the Soviets, on 15 March 1964, they were informed by the RWP delegation which had returned from China about the discussions between the RWP and the CCP. It is worth mentioning that the delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer adopted a double tactics in relation to the Soviets by suggesting to Khrushchev that the Sino-Romanian talks held in Beijing had insisted exclusively on the need to end the dispute between the CCP and the CPSU, and stated that the Chinese expressed their intention to continue the public polemic.<sup>19</sup>

Although the efforts of the RWP in Beijing to end the Sino-Soviet split had failed, the main aim of the Sino-Romanian talks was the notification of the Chinese counterpart about the Romanian-Soviet dispute. Moreover, taking advantage of the “pretext” of mediating the Sino-Soviet split (an initiative flaunted among the communist and workers’ parties), Gheorghiu-Dej gave the impression that Romania was acting according to the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960. It was, by all means, a propagandistic exercise, but it allowed the Romanian leader to convene (in April 1964) a plenary session of the RWP CC, which would debate topics such as Romania’s efforts to put an end to the CPSU–CCP polemic, the fundamental principles of the international communist movement and the Romanian-Soviet economic dispute inside the COMECON.<sup>20</sup> On 10 April 1964, while the RWP CC plenary was still ongoing, Liu Fang (the new Chinese ambassador to Bucharest) was received by Gheorghiu-Dej, who informed him about the fact that the Romanian authorities were involved in the drafting of a declaration concerning the principles of the international communist movement. Making reference to the expected result of these discussions, the RWP leader added: “We might end being criticized by the Chinese and Soviet comrades equally. What can we do? We will defend honestly and clearly our points of view.”<sup>21</sup>

The warning made by Gheorghiu-Dej proved to be real, if we consider that in what concerned the fundamental ideological aspects of the international communist movement (issues such as peace and war, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and forms of transition from capitalism to socialism), the attitude of the Romanian authorities was identical with the one expressed by the Soviets.<sup>22</sup> Besides, when the Declaration of the RWP CC was published in April 1964, the Romanian leaders brought up the Romanian-Soviet economic dispute inside the COMECON and Romania’s firm disapproval of the integrationist economic policy promoted by the Kremlin.<sup>23</sup> As a consequence, the Romanian-Soviet relations grew worse, but in exchange, the reservations expressed by Beijing concerning the new vision adopted by the RWP disappeared. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in the course of the visit made by the RWP delegation to Moscow, between 26 May and 9 June 1964, the Soviets openly

expressed their discontent. Anastas Mikoyan, Nicolai Podgorny and Yuri Andropov, in their discussions with the Romanian delegation led by Chivu Stoica, condemned the following actions of the decision-makers in Bucharest: the ill-timed publication of the Romanian-Soviet economic dispute in the Declaration of the RWP CC of April 1964; the emergence of an anti-Soviet attitude in Romania; the change in the name of the streets with a Soviet designation; the orientation of Romania's trade towards the West etc.<sup>24</sup>

In this tense atmosphere of the Romanian-Soviet relations, on 5 June 1964, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej invited Liu Fang at Snagov with the intention of familiarizing the Chinese ambassador with the main evolutions which followed the publication of the Declaration of the RWP CC. At this point, Gheorghiu-Dej and Emil Bodnăraş made a harsh indictment of the USSR behaviour. The RWP leader accused the Soviets of exercising "great power chauvinism" by repeatedly breaching the principle of non-involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries.<sup>25</sup> This accusation against the USSR was interpreted as a compliment to the Chinese interlocutor, because this label had been put for the first time by Mao Zedong on 27 January 1957.<sup>26</sup> The Romanian leader even discussed the intelligence-gathering activity organized by the Soviets in Romania, saying:

*I am referring to equal rights, to the non-involvement in domestic affairs, but their intelligence-gathering activity in Romania is pursued in secret and over the head of our party leaders: they are searching for things that they believe we are hiding. This shows their contempt for the principle of non-involvement in domestic affairs, and a reflection of the inequality which allows the big and the tough to claim more rights than the little and the weak . . . Comrade Khrushchev trusts us but, nonetheless, he wants to have his people in our country and in our party. He has a large staff in charge of that and he has also tried to recruit military, civilians etc. to work for them.*<sup>27</sup>

As for Emil Bodnăraş, he built his discourse around the well-known "Valev Plan," as it was known in Romanian historiography. It was in fact an article signed by E. B. Valev under the auspices of the Moscow University, whose publication was fully supported by the Soviet authorities after the adoption of the Declaration of the RWP CC in April 1964. Essentially, the article focused on the prospective creation of an "inter-state production complex" in the Lower Danube area, aimed at covering territories from Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union (approximately 150,000 km<sup>2</sup> and 12,000,000 people).<sup>28</sup> Under these circumstances, in the course of the appointment he had with the Chinese ambassador on 5 June 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej pleaded for a firm response of the Romanian authorities, describing Valev's article as "a plan for the disman-

ting of Romania.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, on 12 June 1964, *Viața economică* magazine published, apart from E. B. Valev’s article, a vitriolic commentary on the article. According to the commentary made by the Romanian authorities, Valev’s article “disregarded Romania’s sovereignty by proposing a dismantling of its territory and national economy.”<sup>30</sup>

The debates which animated the meeting of 5 June 1964 made the object of the audience obtained by Dumitru Gheorghiu (the Romanian ambassador to China) with Zhou Enlai, the prime-minister of the PRC. On 17 July 1964, the Chinese P.M. characterized the attitude taken by the RWP against Valev’s article as follows: “The Romanian comrades reacted promptly taking decisive measures just in time. These measures proved necessary. Otherwise, Khrushchev’s revisionist plan would have caused even more harm . . . Our party admires your resistance to the pressures made by the USSR because you are in a worse situation than we are. You are being surrounded by countries lead by revisionist leaders.”<sup>31</sup>

In the meantime, on 21 June 1964, during a discussion with I. K. Jegalin (the Soviet ambassador to Bucharest) Gheorghiu-Dej informed him that the Romanian authorities were aware of the meeting between Tito and Khrushchev which had taken place in Leningrad, after the return of the Yugoslav leader from an official visit to Finland. Since they also raised the issue of the developments in Romania following the adoption of the April Declaration, the RWP leader informed the Soviet ambassador about Romania’s intention to organize a meeting with the Yugoslav leaders.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, on 22 June 1964, the RWP representatives and those of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia met in Pișchia (Banat region). At this meeting, Josip Broz Tito informed Gheorghiu-Dej that in the course of his previous meeting with the Soviet leader, Khrushchev had shown concern about the publication by the RWP of the April 1964 Declaration, as well as about the anti-Soviet atmosphere which was emerging in Romania. The Yugoslav leader had suggested Khrushchev to discuss these problems with the RWP leaders.<sup>33</sup>

It was under these tense circumstances of the Romanian-Soviet relations that, on 26 June 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej handed over a letter to the USSR ambassador in Romania which was addressed to the CC of the CPSU, asking them to organize bilateral consultations concerning “various problems in the relations between the two parties and countries.”<sup>34</sup> The Romanian-Soviet consultations were organized between 7 and 13 July 1964 and were marked by mutual verbal clashes. Speaking to the RWP delegation chaired by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the CPSU representatives condemned several actions taken by Romania: the publication of the Romanian-Soviet dispute inside the COMECON; the “equal” treatment of the USSR and China in the Declaration of the RWP CC issued in April

1964; the instigation to anti-Soviet feelings in Romania, including by discussing the inconvenient setting up of the “sovroms”; the intensification of trade with capitalist countries; the non-recognition of the Soviet Red Army as a “liberator” of Romania. Conversely, the RWP delegation, invoking the principle of non-involvement in domestic affairs, protested against the intelligence-gathering Soviet activities in Romania.<sup>35</sup> Obviously, the Romanian-Soviet talks were marked by a constant lack of agreement.

However, judging from the perspective of the RWP’s objectives, the discussions in Moscow were successful considering that they allowed the Romanian authorities to invoke, in their talks with the Chinese, the “pressures” coming from the Kremlin. Thus, when he met Liu Fang on 28 July 1964, Emil Bodnăraş informed him in detail about the Romanian-Soviet consultations held in Moscow and the position taken by the RWP delegation.<sup>36</sup> Once the Beijing authorities were persuaded about the “Romanian dissidence” inside the communist bloc, the Sino-Romanian rapprochement, according to the RWP, pursued two distinct goals: to intensify the Sino-Romanian contacts (by secret meetings too) and to encourage mutual information on the separate contacts with the USSR. In the summer of 1964, the first goal was already achieved. On 17 July 1964, the Chinese prime-minister insisted on the fact that the festivities organized in honor of the “20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Romania’s liberation” and of “the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the proclamation of the PRC” were windows of opportunity for enhancing the talks between the two parties. Also, given the festive atmosphere, these talks were not susceptible of raising suspicion among the Soviets.<sup>37</sup> In return, Emil Bodnăraş informed the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest that the RWP intended to invite delegations from all the socialist countries to the manifestations planned for 23 August 1964. The reasons behind this decision were explained by Bodnăraş as follows:

*We want to do this so that inviting China . . . does not look like a demonstration . . . We told you that we want to invite all the socialist countries and it would be good also that Albania send its delegation too . . . We want the Chinese comrades to send a delegation too so that we can return the visit on the occasion of the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. In this case, nobody will wonder why the Romanians went to Beijing and our delegation will be able to continue the talks started in Bucharest or will discuss those things which will seem necessary then.*<sup>38</sup>

As a consequence, on 5 August 1964, the RWP CC addressed a letter to the CCP CC in which they invited a delegation to attend the manifestations of 23 August 1964.<sup>39</sup> Similar letters were sent to all the representatives of the social-

ist states. However, the RWP and the CCP had decided in advance the details of the meeting, namely at the end of the festivities of 23 August 1964, without the Soviets being aware of it (according to Emil Bodnăraş: “It is better this way because the other delegations will have left and it will be quiet”).<sup>40</sup> Romania’s plans were, however, postponed by the Soviets who unexpectedly announced their intention to organize Romanian-Soviet talks. Thus, on 25 August 1964, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej hosted, on the premises of the RWP CC, the CPSU delegation led by Anastas Mikoyan. The talks focused on the economic relations with capitalist states, and on the position adopted by the RWP in relation to the convening of a new conference of the communist and workers’ parties. Referring to the first topic of discussion, the Romanian leader stressed that Romania was only following the example of the Soviet Union, namely was trying to gain advantageous loans from the West.<sup>41</sup> Concerning the second topic, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej did not give a clear answer to the Soviet delegation, simply stating that the debate concerning the organization of a new conference of the communist and workers’ parties was on the agenda of the RWP.<sup>42</sup>

After the CPSU delegation left Romania, on 26 and 27 August 1964 in Timiș, the RWP leaders met the CCP delegation led by Li Xiannian (vice prime-minister and finance minister of the PRC). In the first day of the talks, Gheorghiu-Dej together with Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Emil Bodnăraş resumed the topic of the Romanian-Soviet dispute mentioning issues such as: the economic dispute inside the COMECON; the visit of the RWP delegation led by Chivu Stoica to Moscow (in May–June 1964), and the “intelligence-gathering activities” of the Soviets on the Romanian territory. Also, the RWP leader informed the representatives of the CCP about the discussions they had had with the CPSU delegation the previous day, stating that the Romanian authorities did not accept the convocation of a new conference of the communist and workers’ parties. According to the leaders in Bucharest, the main cause of these dissensions was the USSR, because it had adopted a position on both sides of the fence, pursuing its own interests to the detriment of the interests of the international communist movement.<sup>43</sup> The second day of the Sino-Romanian talks in Timiș focused on the illustration by the Chinese delegation of the main differences of opinion between the CCP and the CPSU. The leader of the Chinese delegation made a retrospective of the Sino-Soviet relations, insisting on the following topics: the CCP’s refusal in 1956 to accept a Soviet military intervention planned by the CPSU leaders during the events in Poland; “the great power chauvinism” exhibited by the USSR in its intention to create a common Sino-Soviet fleet and to install a long-wave radio station in China (to be used by Soviet militaries); Khrushchev’s treason by accepting the so-called “Camp David spirit” and the withdrawal (in July 1960) of the Soviet experts from China.<sup>44</sup>



The Sino-Romanian talks of 26–27 August 1964 were essentially informative. Both sides analyzed their separate conflict with the Soviets and proposed an increase in the economic relations between them.

As decided in the meeting of 17 July 1964 between Zhou Enlai and Dumitru Gheorghiu,<sup>45</sup> a delegation of the RWP was going to attend the festivities related to the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the PRC's proclamation. Thus, on 18 August 1964, the CCP leaders sent a letter to the RWP CC inviting a Romanian delegation to attend the Beijing festivities planned to be organized in October.<sup>46</sup> On 29 September 1964, the RWP delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer had a first round of consultations in Beijing with Zhou Enlai. Throughout the entire meeting, the Chinese PM, similar to what Li Xiannian had done in August 1964, analyzed in detail the Sino-Soviet disputes.<sup>47</sup> Liu Shaoqi, the president of the PRC, received the RWP delegation on 7 October 1964. The discussions focused on the Soviet intentions to convene a conference of the communist and workers' parties, as well as on Romania's refusal to accept this conference.<sup>48</sup> One day later, on 8 October 1964, the RWP delegation was received by Mao Zedong. The topics discussed addressed the main political developments which were ongoing at international level, as well as a short retrospective of the Romanian-Soviet dispute. Barely one month later, on 7–8 November 1964, the delegations of the RWP and the CCP had new talks in Moscow, where they had been invited to attend the anniversary of the "October Revolution." During this encounter, the two delegations discussed the circumstances of Khrushchev's overthrow, as well as the thorny issue of convening a new conference of the communist and workers' parties.<sup>49</sup> Thus, the second goal of the Sino-Romanian rapprochement, vigorously defended by the RWP, was reached: the mutual information concerning the separate relations with the USSR.

In conclusion, we may state that the main reason behind the Sino-Romanian rapprochement and the reconfiguration of Romania's position inside the communist bloc was the conflict inside the COMECON. Since 1963, over the course of several meetings with the CCP representatives, the Romanian authorities succeeded in convincing the leaders in Beijing that the Romanian-Soviet relations had deteriorated and that in the future they will not follow Moscow's directions blindly. After the death of Gheorghiu-Dej (March 1965), Nicolae Ceaușescu took over the China policy promoted by his predecessor and the good Sino-Romanian relations were preserved until the dissolution of the communist regime in Romania.



## Notes

1. Central National Historical Archives (hereafter cited as CNHA), *Fund CC al PCR—Căminarie* (hereafter cited as *CCPCR-C*), file 6/1963, vol. 1, fol. 86.
2. *Ibid.*, file 4/1963, fol. 6–15.
3. CNHA, *Fund CC al PCR—Secția Relații Externe* (hereafter cited as *CCPCR-SRE*), file 35/1960, vol. 1, fol. 104.
4. Lavinia Betea, *Convorbiri neaterminate* (Iași, 2001), 89.
5. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 53/1963, fols. 3–20.
6. Betea, 91.
7. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 53/1963, fol. 20.
8. Betea, 91.
9. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 94/1963, fols. 3–32.
10. *Ibid.*, file 93/1963, fol. 27.
11. *Ibid.*, file 9C/1961–1964, fols. 115–116.
12. CNHA, *CCPCR-C*, file 10/1964, fol. 38.
13. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 9C/1961–1964, fols. 125–126.
14. CNHA, *CCPCR-C*, file 10/1964, fol. 39.
15. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 29/1964, fols. 1–16.
16. *Ibid.*, fols. 17–32.
17. *Ibid.*, fol. 88.
18. *Ibid.*, fols. 121–122.
19. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 30/1964, fols. 1–5.
20. CNHA, *CCPCR-C*, file 13/1964, fols. 5–10.
21. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 5/1964, fol. 16.
22. See the vision defended by the CCP in: *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking, 1965), *passim*.
23. *Declarație cu privire la poziția Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mișcării comuniste internaționale adoptată de plenara lărgită a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964* (Bucharest, 1964), 31–42.
24. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 34/1964, fols. 173–199.
25. *Ibid.*, file 5/1964, fol. 29.
26. “Speech, Mao Zedong, ‘On Sino-American and Sino-Soviet Relations’ 27 January, 1957,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Washington, 1995–1996): 152–153.
27. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 5/1964, fols. 30, 34.
28. David Floyd, *Rumania: Russia’s Dissident Ally* (London, 1965), 105–106.
29. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 5/1964, fols. 32–35.
30. “Conceptii potrivnice principiilor de bază ale relațiilor economice dintre Țările Socialiste. Despre ‘Complexul Economic Interstatal’, în general, și despre concretizarea lui ‘Dunăreană’, în special,” *Viața economică* (Bucharest) (12 June 1964): 12.
31. CNHA, *CCPCR-SRE*, file 93/1963, fols. 42, 47.
32. *Ibid.*, file 6/1964, fol. 29.
33. *Ibid.*, file 20/1964, fols. 70–89.
34. *Ibid.*, file 6/1964, fol. 34.

35. Ibid., file 35/1964, vol. II, fols. 2–237.
36. Ibid., file 5/1964, fols. 63–71.
37. Ibid., file 93/1963, fol. 48.
38. Ibid., file 5/1964, fol. 78.
39. Ibid., file 9C/1961–1964, fol. 274.
40. Ibid., file 5/1964, fol. 101.
41. Ibid., file 16/1964, fol. 118.
42. Ibid., fol. 127.
43. Ibid., file 40/1964, fols. 3–41.
44. Ibid., fols. 42–45.
45. Ibid., file 93/1963, fol. 48.
46. Ibid., file 9C/1961–1964, fols. 276–277.
47. “1964 septembrie 29, Beijing. Stenogramă a convorbirilor care au avut loc, din inițiativa părții chineze, între delegația de partid și de stat condusă de Ion Gheorghe Maurer, președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri, și delegația chineză, condusă de Zhou Enlai, premier al Consiliului de Stat,” in *Relațiile româno-chineze, 1880–1974: Documente*, ed. Romulus Ioan Budura (Bucharest, 2005), 522–534.
48. See “1964 octombrie 7. Stenograma discuțiilor purtate de delegația română la Pekin cu Liu Shaoqi, Ciu En-lai, Deng Xiaoping, Pân Ci-jen, Li Sien-nien,” in *Între Beijing și Moscova: România și conflictul sovieto-chinez, 1957–1965*, ed. Dan Cătănuș (Bucharest, 2004), 393–404.
49. See “1964 noiembrie 7, Moscova. Stenograma convorbirilor dintre delegația română de partid și guvernamentală condusă de Ion Gheorghe Maurer, președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri și delegația chineză condusă de Zhou Enlai, premier al Consiliului de Stat, aflate în vizită la Moscova” and “1964 noiembrie 8, Moscova. Stenograma convorbirilor dintre delegația română de partid și guvernamentală condusă de Ion Gheorghe Maurer, președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri, și delegația chineză condusă de Zhou Enlai, premier al Consiliului de Stat, aflate în vizită la Moscova,” in *Relațiile româno-chineze, 1880–1974: Documente*, 606–629.

## Abstract

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the Beginning of the Sino-Romanian Rapprochement (1963–1964)

The Soviet insistence to create a “single planning unit” inside the COMECON led to the emergence of intense Romanian-Soviet differences of opinion in 1962. The leaders in Bucharest interpreted this initiative as an attack against Romania’s national sovereignty. Under these circumstances, and trying to counter the Soviet hegemony, the Romanian authorities initiated a series of diplomatic actions in order to achieve a Sino-Romanian rapprochement. The present article is based on documents from the Romanian archives and presents the main stages of the Sino-Romanian rapprochement and its impact on the relations between Bucharest and the Kremlin.

## Keywords

communism, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Mao Zedong, Nikita Khrushchev, Sino-Romanian rapprochement, Sino-Soviet split, Valev Plan, COMECON