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Structure of the Serbian Family in the Late Middle Ages

Ema Miljkovic and Sinisa Misic

Niš University, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History, +381-18514244139,
ema.miljkovic@filfak.ni.ac.rs.
Belgrade University, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History; +381-113206270,
simisic@f.bg.ac.rs

Abstract: Historical circumstances, as well as specific social, demographic and cultural models which existed in the Serbian medieval society made an impact on the characteristics of the family. One of the major issues is the quantitative size of the family and predominant type: nucleus or joint (extended) family.

This paper is based on the research of relevant primary sources: Serbian diplomatic sources and the first Ottoman census books, which make possible not only to establish family types and its quantitative size, but also to point out to demographic changes caused by the Ottoman conquest in South Eastern Europe.

Keywords: Historical demography, nucleus family, extended family, Serbian society, Middle Ages.

Studies of the Serbian medieval family structure had begun with Stojan Novaković (Novaković 1965). Later, the historians neglected those researches, leaving history of the family as a subject to the sociologists, who, with few exceptions, did not study the medieval family. The main reason for such development is the lack of primary sources (almost the earliest sources for this topic are the Ottoman census books, available from the second half of the 15th century). The most abundant, and in this respect most important pre-Ottoman sources are charters (chrisobules) from the monastery of Dečani, issued in the time period between 1330 and 1343-1345 (Ivić and Grković 1976). They contain specific list of agricultural and cattle-breeding (Wallach) population on the monastery estate. This list is incomplete, since only adult males had been registered. There is almost no data about the noble families. It would be very important to find out whether they continued to live in the extended families or not? For our subject, information from charters (chrisobules) from the monasteries of St. Stephen and St. Archangel are also very important.

Those census books present, in fact, list of houses as the smallest and the most basic fiscal unit in village or *katun* (Novaković 1965: 69). The tax was collected by the house, and the house had juridical responsibility for all its members. The article 71 of the Emperor Dušan`s Legal code prescripts that if brother, or son or relative living in one house make the evil deed, he should be handed over to the authorities, or penalty should be paid by the master of the house (Radojčić 1960: 56). If father and son are separated and live in different houses, pays only the guilty party (Radojčić 1960: 53). The quoted article, as well as some other provisions of the Legal code, urges the separation of the extended families and creation of the nucleus families. On the estate of Bogorodica Bistrička monastery, a son, after getting married, could stay only three years with his father; after that he had to make a house of his own (Novaković 1912: 590, 1965: 157). This was the way for the authorities to protect the nucleus families, since the separation of the extended families was in their best interest. Despite those efforts, the extended family did not completely disappeared, and its existence had been registered in the Serbian charters. Regarding the family structures, the legal provisions are very different from one monastery estate to the other. For example, the legislature given in the St. Stephen chrisobule provides, for the nucleus families, a possibility to be joined „two in one", so that the labour would not be much harder for them then for the members of the extended ones (Kovačević 1890: 8).

From the quoted Serbian medieval sources we can conclude that there existed both nucleus and extended families. Research based on the first Ottoman census books showed that during the second half of the 15th century, existed both types of the Serbian family, as well (Bobić 1998, 2001).

The Emperor Dušan`s Legal Code determines family by the notion of house, further determined with the notions of home, bread and estate (Radojčić 1960: 53). Persons gathered around one home,[1] producing and spending together, owing an adequate land estate, form a house. The population lived in small houses (nucleus) or in the larger (extended – *zadruga*) ones. From the medieval documents, it is possible to determinate complexity level of the Serbian *zadruga* (extended family) during the 14th and 15th century. The exact type of the family is influenced by the economic and fiscal system, which, as we saw earlier, is not favorable for the extended type of families. Also, longevity in the Middle Ages influences formation of the extended family consisting of one generation of brothers. The research conducted for the region of the Branković family showed that the most common family type for that region in 1455 was extended family of the fraternal type (Bobić 1998: 397).

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1 The Slavic term *zadruga* meaning extended or joint family is in use in literature (Hammel 1972).

The most abundant sources for analyze of structure and size of *zadruga* are the charters issued at the Monastery of Dečani. In all registered villages, as well as in the Dečani *katuns* existed nucleus families. The Dečani estate consisted of 40 villages and 9 *katuns*, with a total of 2097 houses of *meropahs,* together with the craftsmen and priests and 69 houses of *sokalniks* (all together 2166 agricultural houses), as well as 266 houses of the Wallach (cattle-breeding population). The total for the whole estate of 2432 houses is 12.000 inhabitants approximately (Ivić and Grković 1976, Novaković 1965). If we compare the data regarding houses from the Dečani Chrisobule from 1330 with the one issued by the king Stefan Dušan in 1343-1345, we can conclude that the majority of the houses were the same as in 1330, while some of them had vanished and some were divided (Novaković 1965, Blagojević 1970: 16-17). A certain number of new houses had been registered, but it is not possible to conclude whether those families are newcomers, of formed by the former members of the extended families who reached the legal age in the meantime and separate themselves into their own house, forming thus a new nucleus family. It is possible to conclude that the extended houses registered in 1343-1345 and not registered in 1330 consisted of the newcomers, since the time period of less than fifteen years in not long enough to allow formation of the extended family only by the birthrate, although with the fraternal extended families even that possibility cannot be completely excluded. The paternal *zadrugas* not mentioned in 1330 consisted, most possibly, only of the newcomers.

The most common type of the extended family existing on the Dečani estate was community of father and mature sons (paternal type) or community of the married brothers (fraternal type) (Ivić and Grković 1976). The provisions of the Emperor Dušan`s Legal Code show that those were the two most common types of the extended families, not only on the Dečani estate, but in the whole Serbian state. The above quoted articles 52 and 71, in provisions related to the bearing of guilt by the extended family, mention particularly father, sons and brothers, and article 66 describing the extended family, means by that term specifically fraternal family type (Radojčić 1960: 55). Bearing all this in mind, we can conclude, beyond any doubt, that the paternal and after it fraternal extended family was the most common type of the extended family by the Serbs during the 14th century. The analysis of the 1455 year census book for the Branković family region (mostly today's Kosovo and Metohija) shows that, for the next hundred years, there were no great changes in the structure of the Serbian family. In the Branković family region there were 5.705 nucleus families (57%), 1.018 paternal extended families (10%) and

3.130 fraternal extended families (31%); as for the number of inhabitants, 50.5% of the whole population lived in the fraternal extended families (Bobić 2001). It should be pointed out that the short length of human life at the time influenced formation of the extended families of the fraternal type (as communities of married brothers). It is also important to notice that the nucleus families as well as the extended ones are not permanent categories and are subject to change in every generation. The change of the family type, from nucleus to the extended one, depends on the female fertility and male survival rate. One of the main characteristics of the Serbian *zadruga* is its intention to division, urged by the fiscal system.

On the Dečani estate, existed only a few strong *zadrugas;* in some settlement there is no single one. In the village of Papraćane, we note an extended family consisting of its head Bogoje, who had an adult son called Goislav and aged father Raško who was not capable to be family head anymore, and also living in community with him were his brothers Milja and Dobrčin (Ivić and Grković 1976). This is extended paternal-fraternal type of family, consisting of five adult males. The example of family of certain Dražoje in the village of Strelac shows that three generations of a family can live in the same house. Together with Dražoje, as a family head, lived his son Šakoje, as well as his adult grandson Dragoš Šakojević (Ivić and Grković 1976). The extended family could also consist of uncle with his nephews, but this was not an often case. Such example is family of Dobroslav, with his nephews Bogoslav and Hranislav Gradenović, living in the village of Bohorići (Ivić and Grković 1976). The same example could be seen in the village of Ljubolić, as well as in the village of Bunjane. Beside nephews, the extended family could possibly consist of father-in-law and son-in-law, but also of father with his sons and son-in-law. For example, in the village of Babe, there was an extended family whose head was Rad, and its members were his aged father Ivan, sons Miloš and Bratun and son-in-law Hranoje. Thus, it can be concluded that son-in-law could be a member of the extended family, living together with the brothers of his wife, and not only in case when there was no male descendant in the family. There is also an example of family consisting of father-in-law and son-in-law, as it was a case with Dragoslav and his son-in-law in the village of Trebopolje. More often, sons-in-law were part of the extended family consisting also of sons of its head. Family consisting of certain Dobrovoj, with his two sons-in-law named Miroslav and Laloje is registered in the charter (chrisobule) of Dečani. Like sons-in-law, who are not blood-related with the family chieftain, stepson also could be a member of an extended family, as it was a case with family of certain Miroslav from the village of Čabić. Beside

him, this *zadruga* consisted of his brother Ranko, his sons Petina, Miroslav, Miloš and Stepan, as well as his stepson Voineg, thus being, with total number of six adult males, one of the strongest houses in the village of Čabići (Ivić and Grković 1976).

The number of adult male members of one extended family on the Dečani estate varied from two to five; mostly the number was three. All extended families with five and more male adults on that particular estate can be considered as strong ones. Large extended families, with more than ten adult males are very rare. We will mention quite examples to strengthen this statement. The strongest *zadruga* in the village of Ljubolić had eight males. The head was Stanislav, while his father Dobroslav was still alive. In the same house also lived his adult sons Prijetelj, Dabiživ and Šišman, his brother Radoslav with his son Pribil, as well as their third brother called Svrkota. In the village of Babe the strongest household was the one of certain Slavomir, who lived with four of his brothers and two sons. However, the most numerous house in this village was extended family of Gradoje Lisica, consisting of seven of his sons, as well as of his brother with one son of his own, making total of ten adult males. In the village of Čabić the most numerous extended family consisted of eight and in the village of Srednje Selo seven adult males. In the village of Gorane, the extended family led by Čjudan had ten adult male members and consisted of brothers, their sons and aged father (grandfather). Family with similar structure, consisting of 11 members, lived in the village of Šipčane. Its head was Dobromisl, and it consisted of brothers and their sons. Those mentioned family do not, by their predominant characteristics, differ from the paternal-fraternal *zadrugas* consisting of lesser number of male adults; the only difference is in number of their members. In the village of Grnčarevo the strongest household was led by Negoslav Šlemanović, and it consisted of its head, his two brothers and his three nephews (his brothers' sons). The strongest paternal-fraternal family was registered in the village Vrmoša, today in northern Albania, whose head was certain Dragčuj Radun. Beside him, his family consisted of his aged father Radomir, his five sons, his brother Hranac with three sons, and four other brothers of Dragčuj, which make total of 15 adult males (Ivić and Grković 1976, Mišić 2005).

The strongest extended family on the Dečani estate was led by Tolislav Lačković. It consisted of his father, two of his sons, and his four grandsons (one of his sons had three and the other one son). Together with him, lived also seven of his nephews, with four sons of their own, as well as certain Hranislav Desimirić, who was most probably somebody`s son-in-law or nephew (Ivić and Grković 1976: 12, Novaković 1965: 160-161, Bobić: 1996: 34).

The *zadruga* consisted of 20 male adult members and was the remarkably strongest one

Figure 1. The zadruga led by Tolisav Lačković on the Dečani estate

On the Dečani estate, there was no difference between villages and *katuns* regarding organization and structure of the family. Even within Wallach population, there were many nucleus families, while the extended ones were either of paternal or fraternal type, consisting of two to five adult male members. Only two stronger *zadrugas* were registered, one among the Wallach group of Lapčinovci, the other among the group of Tudoričevci. In both cases, those are the families of the *katun* heads. Lapčin lived together with his father, who was no longer head of his family, and brother Srdan, as well as with his three sons and two sons of his brother, making total of eight adult males (Ivić and Grković 1976). Tudorc, as well, had an aged father, named Bač,

and his family consisted of him and his six sons, as well as of his brother Rad and his four sons, making total of 13 adult male members (Ivić and Grković 1976: 123, Novaković 1965: 161). The same family structure could be observed with the fishermen and artisan families; they also lived mostly in paternal and fraternal extended families (Ivić and Grković 1976: 94, 96, 128, 187).

The Dečani chrisobules also registered a large number of priests. They are an interesting category, since they were *baština* owners, and not dependant population. However, structure of their families does not differ from the family structure of the agricultural and cattle-breeding population. A certain number of priests lived in nucleus families, but they also lived in the extended families consisting of theirs sons (paternal type), a sometimes even of their brothers. An interesting example presents the village of Grmočel where nine priests were registered. Of that number, three priests lived in the nucleus families, while other six lived in the extended families; four of them with their sons (paternal), one with his brothers (fraternal), while certain priest named Milša lived with two of his brothers and one son (mixed paternal-fraternal type) (Ivić and Grković 1976: 81, 88, 89, 100). The issue of fiscal policy applied to such families would be a subject of special study.

Beside the mentioned ones, some other preserved Serbian medieval charters could give valuable information for our subject. In that particular sense, the most important ones are charter of King Milutin issued to the St. Stephen monastery in Banjska (1313-1316) and charter issued by Emperor Stephen Dušan to the monastery of St. Archangels (1348/49), where the Wallach families living on the above mentioned monasteries estates have been registered. The structure of the family of the population living on the estate of St. Stephen monastery does not differ from the one described on the Dečani estate. The most numerous were nucleus and smaller extended families. Certain Rajan with his children and his brother Parkač with his children are separately registered among Wallach group called Pijainci (Kovačević 1890: 7). It is obvious that two brothers lived in the individual houses. Here we can more often find extended families with sons-in-law as their member. We will mention the example of the Bulgarian *katun*, where six extended families with sons-in-law are registered. In two cases the extended family consisted of sons and their wives brothers, while the family of certain Litrokos consisted of his children, son-in-law and his wife brothers. It was forbidden, on the Banjska estate, for the Serbs (agricultural population) to marry into the Wallach (cattle-breeding) population, and if someone despite everything accomplished such a marriage, he had to go back to his father land. Those that had been married that way for a long period of time (*starinici*) could not be members of the

group of *vojnici* (the most favorable social group within the Wallach population), but they all had to be members of the *ćelator* group (the lowest social group within the Wallach population) (Kovačević 1890: 6). This provision was meant to preserve the required number of the agricultural population, so that they could not possible change their status by marriage. Maybe the large number of sons-in-law with the Wallach extended families is related with this law.

The similar structure of the Wallach family has been registered on the St. Archangels estate as well. Here we can observe, as more common, the extended families consisting of brothers and nephews (Mišić 2003: 101, 102, 104, 106). On this monastery estate as well, the extended families with sons-in-law as their members were presented in larger numbers, in comparison with the agricultural population, regardless the fact that adult sons lived in the same house. There are no houses with large number of family members. In this charter have been registered the artisans living in the city of Prizren, as well as masters from the district of Pnuća (construction workers). The structure of their families was similar to the above described ones: they lived either in nucleus families or in the extended ones, of paternal or fraternal type, with several adult males as their members (Mišić 2003: 101, 106, 109, 110).

The data from the Ottoman census books preserved for the *sanjak* of Smederevo from the first half of the 15th century show that the population with the status or *reaya* lived in the nucleus, while the extended families were registered within the Wallach cattle-breeding population.

In the *sanjak* (region) of Smederevo, in the seventies of the 15th century, the cattle-breeding population has been registered in villages and not in *katuns* or *cemaats* (groups), although *katuns* as a fiscal unit had been mentioned in the prescribed law regulations for the Wallachs of the sanjak of Smederevo (Bojanić 974: 13). In 1476, there were 6.926 heads of the Wallach families with 4.882 added (*tabi`*)[2] members of the household. In the next few decades, that number of added family members had increased, i.e. we can witness the process of formation of the extended family, since in 1476 there is an average of 1 *tabi`* on 1.4 household heads, while that number in 1528 is 1 *tabi* on 0.9 household heads (Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu tahrir defterleri, 1476 (6); Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1528 (978), Šabanović 1964: 33-112).

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2 *Tabi`* is an adult male living as joint member of the extended family, and could have his own family. For approximation of population the authors took into consideration all relevant studies in historical demography (Hollingsworth 1969, Pressat 1985 and Kertzer,1997).

Figure 2. Relation between the household heads and joint members of the family in the sanjak of Smederevo 1476-1528 (families with the Vallach status)

Very interesting example presents the Wallach group lead by *knez* RadovanBakić, that was situated in the *nahiye* (district) of Brvenik (western Serbia) which consisted in 1476 of 811 Wallach households with 482 added members (average of 1 *tabi`* on 1.68 household heads), while in the group led by his inheritor Herak Bakić during the thirties of the 16th century there were 730 households and 1.557 added family members (1 *tabi`* on 0.47 household head) (Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu tahrir defterleri, 1476 (16); Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu tahrir defterleri 1528 (978)), as shown on Figure 2.

After analysis of the Wallach census book made for the *sanjak* of Smederevo in 1476, it can be concluded that almost all population with that particular social status lived in the extended families, since there is no cases when after one household head was registered separately as head of a family his son of brother; most often they are registered as added member of the extended families. As illustration, we will mention couple of examples of the extended families registered in the village of Rudo Polje in 1476: it was often the case to have family head living in the extended family with his brother (Radašin Danilac, and with him Radoj, his brother) or sons (Milić son of

Milovan, and with him Pavle, his son; or Radohna *old*, and with him Todor and Petko, his sons). Some of the families consisted of both brother and son of the family head (Vučerina son of Bogdan, and with him Raško, his brother and Stanica son of Vučerin). There are some cases when a father and his two sons make an extended family, while father`s nephew is the head of the different household, which could be seen from the example of the family of Novak, son of Radič, who lived in the extended family with his sons Radivoj and Radosav, while Radivoj, nephew of Novak, was the head of the separate household. It can be easily assumed that Radivoj, Novak`s nephew lived in the extended family with his father, and when his father died he became a head of the family, without joining the family of his uncle (Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu tahrir defterleri, 1476 (16)).

However, the 1528 census book reveals more complicated family structure. For example, also in Rudo Polje it was registered a family led by Vojin, son of Radivoje, and with him his brothers Marko and Radič, his sons Radosav and Radoje, as well as his nephew Rajko, or family led by Vuk son of Pomilić, who lived in the same family with his three brothers Cvetko, Vukica and Bogdan, as well as with his son Radivoje (Istanbul, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu tahrir defterleri 1528 (978)).

On the other side, census book of the *sanjak* of Herzegovina from 1476/77 does not give the same picture regarding the family structure. The cattle-breeding population of this province was registered in the *cemaats*, not in villages, since they had different summer and winter settlements. Cattle-breeding, Wallach population living in the *nahiye* of Kukanj had been divided into 6 *cemaats* (with total of 178 household, with average of 29.6 households per group) and with 26 single male households, which is extremely high number for the Wallach population. This number could be understood only when framed in the larger historical context of the waste movement of the Wallach population from the *sanjak* of Herzegovina to the *sanjak* of Smederevo that took place during the seventies of the 15th century. It can be assumed with certainty that some of the adult males previously living in the extended families decided not to move, but to stay in their previous settlements, while the rest of the family left looking for better living conditions.[3]

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3 This movement was not always voluntary decision, since there are some strong indications that it happened under the authority of the Ottoman central government. Thus, since the Wallach population probably did not know what to expect in their new settlements, some of the family members were left behind.

In the census book of the Wallach population of the *nahiye* of Kukanj (*sanjak* of Herzegovina) there is no one single member of the household registered as a *tabi*` (joint member), which as we have already seen was not the case in some other provinces in the Balkans at the same period (Vasić 1958). Also, in the same census book, it was often a case to register two sons of the same father as heads of the different families, usually one immediately after the other. Thus, it can be concluded that during the seventies of the 15th century, in the *sanjak* of Herzegovina the process of formation of the extended family was at its beginning, which is strange bearing in mind the fact that this social group lived in *cemaats*, divided among summer and winter settlements, all that being factors that imply the urge to live in the extended families (*zadrugas*). The fact that the household led by two brothers were registered separately does not always mean that it was *de facto* situation, but it can be assumed that sometimes the Ottoman administration separated them nominally, just for the fiscal reasons, in order to collect larger taxes.

It can be concluded that the structure of the Serbian family during the 14th and 15th century depended on various factors: firstly on birthrate and mortality rate, and later on the state fiscal system. The explained factors did not support formation of the large, strong extended families, which means that the family could easily be divided. In all analyzed preserved documents, we can find a large number of nucleus families, as well as the extended families of paternal or fraternal type, although the mixed paternal-fraternal type could also be observed. The extended families usually consisted of two to five adult male members, and in the majority of the settlements there was a least one household consisting of six to nine male members. The extended families with more than nine adult male members were very rare, and the largest registered family in the medieval sources is the one living on the Dečani estate, consisting of 20 adult male members. It can also be concluded that the family structure did not depend on the profession, since there are no important differences between the family of the farmers, cattle breeders, fishermen, artisans; the only difference was larger number of sons-in-law as the family members within the Wallach population. When we compare the Serbian medieval sources from the 14th century with the data from the Turkish census books from the second half of the 15th century, we can conclude that the family structure did not change for that century and a half, and that it kept the same characteristics as the ones that have been observed in the chrisobule of Dečani.

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Living Together in the Romanian Society:
Domestic Violence between Love and Law, 18th Century

Constanţa Vintilă-Ghiţulescu

"Nicolae Iorga" Institute of History, Aviatorilor Blvd. no. 1, Bucureşti, Romania, +40-12125337, cghitulescu@gmail.com

Abstract: Violence is an important "ingredient" in the ancient regime, so the domestic violence is a part of the couple live. Our paper tries to analyse the roots of this violence and its persistence during the centuries and in the mentalities of people. In the 18th century, the law allows the domestic violence and offers a lot of meanings and interpretations between a fist beating and a stick beating, between a wound done by a knight and a wound done by a poker etc. The same law analyses meticulous the different shapes of verbal violence, the crime and its circumstances, the masculine violence and the feminine aggressiveness, the male domination and the female obeisance. The judicial practice is the mirror of this law "translated" into compromise solutions. Judges and actors talk a lot about violence regarding sometimes as a necessity, sometimes as an ordinary anger, sometimes as an immeasurable brutality. Their "words" are every so often different from law conception. The judicial archives give us a plenty of information to building all these scenes where the violence finds its justifications, its interpretations, its language, its solutions. The ecclesiastical courts judge and investigate many trials in the 18th Romanian society; husbands, wives, neighbours, priests, judges and "experts" (usually the doctors) arrive in front of the courts for telling their testimonies and histories about domestic violence[1].

Keywords: domestic violence, Wallachia, family, women, sexuality, Orthodox Church

Violence is an essential and recurring element of Romanian society in the second half of the 18th century and in the beginning of the following century. It comes in many varieties: domestic violence, public violence, and institutional violence. It can be encountered under private roofs, within the family, but also in the *mahala* alleys (in the neighbourhoods and parishes of towns) and along the village paths. It would be performed by lay public servants and by church clerics alike. It would become manifest in the most disreputable local pubs, as well as in broad daylight. The State and the Church are still unable to control this phenomenon by placing upon it a monopoly. They are still unable to develop institutions powerful enough to overcome this aggressiveness, to "tame" it, and to transform it by means of an education delivered in the name of tolerance (Elias 1973, Foucault 1997). They still fail to impose a social equilibrium allowing for social relations and transactions to be settled otherwise than by violent means. Both the secular and the ecclesiastic power abide by the dictum "an eye for an eye", responding to violence by violent means. A midnight brawl in the central square of a community will be sanctioned by chastising the perpetrators with a beating or a flogging, in the same central square, only in broad daylight, and advertised for everyone to watch.

Domestic violence becomes a factor of permanent instability. The state and the church bestow men with higher authority over their families, allowing them even to punish their wives and children for disobedience. Finding a justification for the presumable need for physical coercion to impose order within the domestic group results in the development of a significant degree of aggressiveness of the head of the family, an aggressiveness that is now recognized as a national custom and is often used with or without pretext (Ghițulescu 2007: 147-178).

A series of proverbs commends such violence, which swings between love and necessity. Such manifestations retain the women and the children as its prime objects; and it is no coincidence that the same women and children are those who are to be loved and educated. It is a day and age when education can only be imparted with one's fists and sticks, because one of its core components is vested in the cloth of obedience. Thus "a woman not scolded is like a mill unlatched; she does not grind well" (Pann 1991: 318); in other words, women "need" a good beating if they are to become or remain good housekeepers. Should we also recall the proverb of biblical lineage, "a good beating is a slice cut from the heavens" what emerges is an unequivocal awareness and tacit acceptance of this aggressiveness, one that, *de facto* and *de jure*, is deemed to be the right of the stronger party. From the same perspective it is also integrated in the codes of law used for adjudicating the various causes.

One such code, of Byzantine extraction, used in the practice of law before the drafting of the Civil Code (1864), is *The Guide to the Law* (1652). In what follows, I will address the adjudication of a number of causes where violence plays a central part: divorce trials for various reasons (life hardships, adultery, abandonment, bigamy, sodomy, etc.)[2].

Domestic violence and the law

A "bad life" had many manifestations, from verbal and physical violence, to the interference of the parents and the tyranny of the mother-in-law. It is interesting to see first how the text of the law defined "inimical life". Sections 183, 184, 185 and 220 describe in a series of articles "inimical life" and the ways in which it could be invoked by men and women alike. Article 1 of Section 183 reads as follows: "The woman can seek permission from the ecclesiastical judge to separate from her spouse when the latter beats her up and causes her bodily harm with weapons" (Îndreptarea legii 1962: 180). The terms "beating" and "bodily harm caused by weapons" were also explained: it was clear that the occasional slap on the face could not be serious reasons for divorce. Article 2 explains that "genuine beating" was only that which caused such disability that the woman "was no loner able to speak and tell the judge her complaint"; if the "beating was not of that nature, divorce could not be granted" (Îndreptarea legii 1962: 181). Separation was allowed only if the wife had indisputable evidence to prove that "cruelty and aggression" were repeated and could have led to death. The two terms defined widespread behaviour frequently invoked as a reason for divorce, when the culprit was the man, and when he beat his wife often, without any particular reason, and using a stick, for instance. But if the beating only involved the use of "the hand or the fist", it was not considered "cruelty", no matter how often it was applied (Îndreptarea legii 1962: 181). However, if a woman dared to raise her hand against her husband, he obtained divorce without further discussion (Îndreptarea legii 1962: 226). The law upheld a man's position in the family and allowed him complete liberty in the control of domestic life. Cruelty was associated with the husband because of his position in the family, but also as a consequence of his physical strength and which he frequently exercised[3].

In these circumstances, domestic violence, so frequent in petitions addressed to the ecclesiastic authorities, did not always represent sufficient

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[2] For a broader discussion of the divorce in the Romanian society, for the 18th-19th centuries, see Barbu 1992; Bolovan 1999, 2007; Ungureanu, 2004; Brie, 2008; Burian 2010.

[3] For an overview of the literature on many forms of violence, see Ingram 1987; Ronsin 1990; Stone 1992; Gowing 1996; Leneman 1998; Menchi, Quaglioni 2001; Capp 2003; Phillips 2004; Foyster 2005; Hardwick 2006; Muravyeva 2008; Vintilă-Ghițulescu 2009, 2010.

grounds for separation. The tribunal did not stop the husband from punishing his wife, but tried only to inscribe domestic violence within established norms: in the first place, the husband could only beat his wife when she disobeyed, but left it to him to establish and define her guilt; secondly, the church attempted to mitigate male violence by appealing to the husband's compassion.

Based on this definition of violence enshrined in the law and ingrained in the proverbs, I shall investigate the daily practice and the people's lives to answer the following questions: how do the women define and integrate such male violence, how do the men interpret the feminine violence, how does the ecclesiastic court analyse and reconcile these types of aggressiveness, according to the community testimony.

"*...and he beat me to death*"

For instance, let us look into the divorce trial between Maria and Evcea the candle-maker, set in Bucharest, on 23 May 1798. Maria's complaint describes a situation that is encountered rather often in the relations between spouses: verbal and physical violence, squandering the dowry, and extreme poverty. "He beat me to death and above all he sold one gold ring of mine and a couple of nacre rosaries, and he pawned my houses", this is the summary the woman offers for the latter years of her life, when daily fights and the squandering of her dowry seem to have become a common occurrence. In fact, this is not her first time to file a complaint. She mentioned such scenes in the past, as well, and since the violence did not appear to be very serious, so as to endanger the woman's life, and since her dowry was not entirely scattered, the various courts where they appeared then insisted that they make peace, in the hope that Maria's husband would mend his ways. On 29 May, the spouses appear before the ecclesiastic tribunal, and Maria supplies her own body as irrefutable evidence of her previous testimonies. The priestly fathers, rightful judges of such cases, note: "the plaintiff was seen as very badly beaten, probably with a taut whip, and just barely not blinded of an eye". The husband's defence of his actions is an accusation that "she is the one who runs suspicious errands and goes to dubious places", in which case such beatings would be deemed not only appropriate, but needed. Men have the mission to straighten and correct such disgraceful behaviour, because the woman, who is considered a "feeble vessel", cannot choose between good and evil.

Marital fights are numerous and varied, and the archives of the ecclesiastical tribunal supply a wide range of motives that set spirits alight and degenerate in fierce beatings. Any object in sight becomes a formidable corrective weapon: pistol, rifle, knife, axe, a piece of the fence, a kitchen chair,

the pan dangling in a nail on the wall, the dish sitting on a bench, the branches of the orchard trees, the shovel behind the house are all reasonable additions to the fight between the spouses. Yielding to the fear that they might succumb under such, possibly lethal, blows, the parties often ask for help from any acquaintance of a stronger constitution who might alter the balance of forces within the family[4]. Anastasia's story, set in the parish of Sfântul Gheorghe Vechi, in Bucharest, is another case of male physical and economic violence, a conduct that disturbs domestic order: "eleven years after they were married, […] and because he is stubborn, he only looks after his own pleasures, stumbling from a tavern to another, and wandering into every café and card game saloon in town, squandering whatever he earns, and he does not bring her anything, neither food enough to stay alive, nor clothing to keep warm. But he beats and tortures her senseless and without pity, calling her a whore, while she carries no blame, so that from all these beatings she has acquired dizziness and a broken arm. And fearing for her life, she asked for justice" (DANIC, mss. 143, ff. 205[r-v], 21 June 1793). For this woman, the life hardships do not hold only a physical, but also an economic dimension, because a slap or two can be accepted, while poverty and the squandering of one's fortune can only increase the daily tension and above all the state of insecurity.

Extreme violence was possible also because, at the time, by marriage a woman became the property of her husband, who was allowed to do as he pleased with her: in this respect, men's and women's discourses complemented each other. A husband would often brag at the public house that he had full authority to kill his wife, set her on fire or hang her, if he so wished, because she belonged to him and nobody could stop him, while the woman in her turn would say that she often put up with the beatings and the torture – which was easier to do for younger women – because her husband was her master and she owed him obedience and submission. The church, which upheld the principle of a woman's inferiority and implicitly the man's educational role – even when education assumed violent forms – did not take seriously a wife's accusations at the first hearing in court, especially if the traces of violence were no longer visible. The ecclesiastical judge simply remonstrated with the husband and required the woman to return home, in the hope that things were going to improve. Ruxandra Picătură states: "I did not marry with the intention to obtain a separation from my husband"; only the hardships of common life,

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[4] This is Ilinca's story (from the Vlaşca district), repeated by her husband, when he promises to make amends for his bad behaviour: „I used to torture her with the bat and with the stick and when I jumped at her with the sword and with the pistols I scared her. And she was so afraid of me, that she ran and went into hiding away from our home for a summer and a winter, walking barefoot through foreign houses" (BAR, mss. 638, ff. 87[v]-88[r], 4 April 1783).

where the husband's aggressiveness and irresponsibility play an important role, pushed her to seek the court's assistance (BAR, mss. 3932, ff. 68ᵛ-69ᵛ, 21 April 1800). Ana, who asks for the intervention of the authorities to pacify her house, has a similar discourse: "May the court teach him to be wise and bring his earnings home, rather than spend them when he is drunk. And may he stop beating me when he is drunk, since I am not guilty of anything, but his temper is, as it is commonly known, and all the neighbours will testify to this truth", she writes on 25 October 1791, thus taking stock of the conduct of Niţu the shoemaker (BAR, mss. 640, ff. 81ʳ⁻ᵛ).

"… I scold her like a man…"

The judicial archives unravel the manner wherein the functioning of a household is conceived. In their complaints, men and women reiterate their exigencies with respect to their partners, shedding light on those dysfunctions that suddenly shatter the unity of a family. The man occupies the main position in the economy of a household, and his main obligation is that of working for the benefit of the other family members. Meanwhile, the woman's task is to manage the household and, above all, to show submission. Submission is a form of respect towards the head of the family, and of recognizing the relations of domination within each household (Bourdieu 1998).

Men had a clear awareness of their authority and they expressed it forcefully: "I rebuke her like a man", "In order her as a man to obey my will, and not do as she wishes", "she is not submissive as a wife should be to her man", "she won't listen to my advice", are some of the accusations of men when their authority was challenged. Husbands could be very demanding. The slightest suspicion that his wife's behaviour was inappropriate would justify a man's punishment. He had the support of neighbours – men and women alike – because it was generally accepted that a woman should not reprimand or beat her husband at home, and even less in public. The neighbours' dissatisfaction grew with each word spoken in court, with each challenge to male authority, if a woman chose to make a spectacle of herself. This attitude generated a permanent tension within the small community.

If male tyranny existed, so did female tyranny. Nagging was something that nobody tolerated. "Quick-tempered and nimble-tongued" was said of a wife who talked incessantly, made comments, was intolerant and dissatisfied, replied back, or rebelled, instead of being docile and gentle. Another set of accusations referred to women who would steal minor items either for food or to pawn or sell the stolen goods, usually at the public house. With her thieving and drunkenness, a wife could dishonour her home and ruin her family.

A woman's garrulousness could result in a colourful outflow of language. A whole range of swear words and insults would descend upon a man's head. Women's repertoire of expletives was much more imaginative than men's. Here are the most frequent, imperfectly rendered into English: milksop, midget, syphilitic, thief, drunk, scoundrel, sodomite, rogue, barbarian, money-squanderers, scum. Some of these also applied to mothers-in-law, who were also graced with: old whore, old sow, bitch, etc.

Very seldom, the women's verbal violence is accompanied by physical violence. Very few men ever accuse effective attacks from their wives. Generally, women throw some object or other or hit and run, aware that they cannot prevail in a *mêlée* combat. "At night when he was asleep, it appears that she hit him with the end of a cane in the head just above his eye", says Dobre the grocer from Golescu's neighbourhood in Bucharest. When he recovered from his 'dizziness', his wife Sofica was already gone, taking with her the bag he had clutched at his chest. In another three days, Sofica answers her husband's reproofs in the same way: "he says that because the plaintiff had gone again elsewhere without his knowledge and permission and because she returned late, when she did come back, he says that he asked her 'where had she been?' and 'why does she not stay home to see to her own tasks?'. And without providing any answer whatsoever she took a chair and unexpectedly hit him again in the head"(BAR, mss. 3932, ff. 87[r-v], 19 September 1800). Such scenes are not at all frequent; and when they do occur, they are the talk of the town, and are held as highly condemnable and humiliating.

"...and to love each other"

The Church builds its entire strategy of guardian and keeper of the social order inside the parish on a direct control over the family. This control is not systematic and permanent, nor is it developed through homilies, theological works like family manuals, or other works that analyse the sins, virtues and values of the Orthodoxy[5] or through some strong ties between central authority and its local representatives. Such control may be grasped by the researcher by looking at the many lawsuits to identify the views expressed by the metropolitan, the bishops, and by the members of the synod with regard to each one's role inside the family. The traditional roles stand out, the attributes and hierarchies being well established, so that each member may fit perfectly into a "harmony" necessary for maintaining a social equilibrium.

When Ghincea the draper from the Boteanu parish, Bucharest, produces witnesses to prove that his wife, Ilinca, has "evil walks" (suspicious

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[5] See Brundage 1987; Delumeau 1998.

dealings and destinations), the ecclesiastic tribunal not only condones the correction of such behaviour with beatings, but even participates in bringing the woman under control by exactly the same method. Let us quote the husband's version of the story: "understanding that my wife's walks are evil and beginning to suspect and hold her in contempt, I took her before the father priests. And as they investigated the cause, they realised that my wife had been seeking evil things and they immediately scolded her and placed her in jail for several days". The letter intervenes at a moment when matters have calmed down, when, besought by the wife and by her relatives, her husband forgives her, but the bodily punishment cannot be discarded. In addition to the right bestowed upon the husband to educate his wife by beatings, the Church does not refrain from interfering within the marriage, seizing the right to apply physical punishment to either one of the parties, according to their blame, in order to restore domestic order. The Ghincea-Ilinca couple commit themselves before the judges to live well and to love each other. Such marital love has two components: obedience from the wife – "that (Ilinca – n.n.) will be guardian of our vows and she will obey me and show me submission as her man" and sustenance from the man – "and I promise not to mention again any of the events that came to pass, but I will take pity on her like a wife of mine and I will bring her all that is needed in a home". This commitment is guaranteed by the relatives, who are mentioned in the document and who can be found among the signatories of this letter of intent. The church as mediator intervenes in the couple's relations and attempts to ensure the due respect to the domestic order iterating a punishment: "that one among us who will not keep his part of the promise, once his guilt is proven and the congregation [*sobor*] is notified, the guilty party will be reprimanded with ecclesiastic and political punishment" (BAR, mss. 634, ff. 65[r-v], 5 August 1770).

In its turn, the community believes that beatings are an essential part of the good functioning of the marital mechanism and recommend the men to control and dominate their families by means of an authoritarian behaviour. When Sandu the merchant from Craiova complains to his father-in-law about his wife's behaviour, the latter encourages him to mend her ways with a solid beating (ANR, Fond Mitropolia Ţării Româneşti, CCCLX/1, 21 August 1816). Still, such violence must remain within certain bounds and it must always be justified. The same community admits that beatings are not a solution for settling daily misunderstandings, but only transitory means for identifying the roles within a household. The godfather of the couple formed by Sandu and Ilinca from Craiova, a mediator in their numerous marriage disputes, does not condone the use of violence, stating that "if they will end up keeping their

marriage together by the force of his blows, that is not honourable either" (ANR, Fond Mitropolia Ţării Româneşti, CCCLX/1, 21 August 1816). Therefore, force cannot be the cement of marital agreements, although it is counted among the male attributes. Therefore, the community often intervenes in marital disputes, almost always taking the woman's side, in an attempt to circumscribe the recourse to violence. Through its interventions, the small parish actually desires to secure its internal order. Marital disputes disturb their daily tranquility, their nightly sleep, creating insecurity and instability in a time when other forms of violence (wars, epidemics, conflicts with the authorities, etc.) are already part of everyday life. Nevertheless, the behaviors of the interested parties are still judged differently. When they are called as witnesses in lawsuits, the neighbors tell the couple's story from their own perspective, judging attitudes, passing verdicts, analyzing words spoken plainly and clearly.

Maria from Bucharest has the entire neighbourhood on her side when she files complaint against her husband, Evcea the candle-maker. First the host from the residence that the couple has been renting for some time shows his indignant disapproval of the man's violent ways, which he recounts in court in great detail: "he is an ill-tempered man, and he always beats her and they quarrel, and he even calls her a drunkard. But I have not seen any other fault in her, like being prey to any drinking habit or any other cursed actions, except that she answers against his questions and accusations", write the clerics sent into the *mahala* to inquire among the neighbours. The focus of the investigation centres on the behaviours, seeking justification for male aggressiveness. The smallest shade of guilt where the wife is concerned becomes important for rejecting the request for divorce and for coagulating sufficient evidence of the wife's guilt, so as to keep her within the couple. Misunderstandings that go back for many years continue to be subject to such judicial mediation, which offers opportunities for compromise and the hope for an apparent calm. "A certain Manole, one of their neighbours there, showed that on another occasion when they had quarrelled he had acted as their mediator and they had made peace; and he had advised him to live well with his wife", notes the recorder for the same case. This quarrel took place in 1795; another one occurred in 1797, and on both occasions the cleric-judges considered that the husband's violence does not endanger the wife's life, and asked her to return to the marital bed. Only in 1798, the past and especially the present could no longer be ignored, as the violence became unbearable and exceeded all acceptable limits. Yet this decision is not a definitive one, being just a respite for the negotiation of a new compromise. Found guilt of beating his wife "with enmity" and for no apparent fault of hers, Evcea has to return

her dowry, and is subsequently sent for a year to perform forced labour "to serve as illustration and example to all those who behave like him" (ANR, mss. 140, ff. 28ᵛ-29ʳ, 29 May 1798). A year of separation appears to be enough, in the church's view, for recovery and reflection.

Such leniency is never proposed in the cases where women are the perpetrators of domestic violence. In their testimonies, the neighbours of the couple formed by Dobre and Sofica emphasize the woman's rebellious behaviour, who "showed him disobedience and with unrestrained dealings went where after her lustful heart in places where married people should not set foot". Having hit her husband confirms such disobedience, although Sofica motivates her action with the claim that "he had called her a whore". The investigation in the *mahala* becomes less relevant since Dobre presented himself to the court bearing the marks of his wife's attacks: "we saw the bruises around the plaintiff's eyes, and the fact tat his head was bleeding on one side", it is written. These marks on the male body are much more important than the scars of the female victims. They alter the marital rapports of the couple, a change that nobody desires; therefore the female violence does not need any more justification, and it cannot be motivated, rather it can only be intentional: "it is obvious that this was no mistake, but a blow dealt on purpose, and it almost put his life in danger", the court notes, entirely sympathetic with the husband. This time there can be no offer of a compromise, because remaining by the side of such a woman would mean accepting the dishonour o one's inferiority. The court cites the code of law [pravila], list 212, *chapter [glava]* 220, which states that "if the woman should beat her man, they have to be separated". By the same logic of the educative example as before, Sofica is sent to the nunnery, "to repent for the consequences of her sins" (BAR, mss. 3932, ff. 87ʳ⁻ᵛ, 19 September 1800).

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Domestic violence is part of the social landscape at this beginning of modernity. However, one can notice that the manners of interpretation differ according to the perpetrators' character as they trigger and sustain the tension of each circumstance. Male violence is tacitly accepted as long as it respects certain limits; while female violence, although not as aggressive as the masculine one, is considered an insult for the men's honour and prestige. In its turn, the Church intervenes between husband and wife as a mediator upon their request, in order to mitigate the more aggressive behaviours. Even though it seems to take the abused woman's side, the Church grants the separation at the end of a long series of counselling sessions and compromises. The fear to

partake in a suicide (a threat habitually uttered by the desperate women) or in a murder, which also occurs sometimes because of repeated beatings, induces the Church to agree with the invoked divorce. Unwillingly, the Church maintains this hotbed of domestic violence, because of the tolerance displayed towards the male behaviour, but it merely fits the mentality of its time. The 18th century is built on the men's superiority and, by consequence, on the women's inferiority. Even if she enjoys several legal facilities, for a long time still, the woman remains an inferior being, suspected of falling into sin more easily than the man, of erring more easily, of not always knowing to choose between good and evil (Scott 1988: 125-153, Amussen 1985: 268-287). Therefore, she must permanently be guided and supervised by men, and she must remain surrounded by the family's "walls".

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Beyond Politics is Life! Family Formation, Reproduction and Divorce in Communist Romania

Luminiţa Dumănescu

"Babeş-Bolyai" University, Centre for Population Studies, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, +40-264-599613, lumi.dumanescu@ubbcluj.ro

Abstract: The present article tackles certain aspects related to Romanians' matrimonial behaviour during the Communist period. The work's sources and methodology as well as its entire structure do not allow for an exhaustive, complete unfolding of this subject. Nevertheless, I will henceforth present a few considerations on the following topics: paths and means of forming families, the spouses' place and role within the family, the functions and prerogatives of the spouses' relatives, the size of the family, rearing and educating children. I will also add a few notes regarding divorce, although, after this procedure is initiated, family life drastically shifts its course, abides other forces and is characterised by a distinct participation of the main actors, parents and ex-spouses.

Keywords: family life, communism, marriage, reproduction, divorce

1. Introduction

What I intend to analyse in the present work is, in fact, an aspect of life during the Communist period that is very well known by people in general, as it was shared and experienced by all those who set up their families between 1947 and 1989, a phenomenon which entitles all those who underwent it to talk and testify about what they endured! Between the bohemian interwar years and the bewildering post-1989 period, people lived, loved and hated in a unique manner, which is difficult to explain to those for whom freedom of choice and speech are uncontested rights. Founding a family during Communism, because this is the article's subject matter, meant abiding novel norms that were superposed over the old frames and were often compatible with the pattern of the new man, contoured in the Party's imagination. To speak about matrimony and family in the Communist period implies simultaneously considering the people, the state, the institution of family, the church; freedoms and constraints; options, paths and means. Both the constitutions and the Family Code unsurprisingly maintain marriage within the civil sphere, in accordance

with the state's character and its previous efforts in the direction of secularisation. Moreover, churchgoing and attending religious ceremonies was forbidden to party members, as was the celebration of Christmas and Easter.

Setting aside the fact that it was imposed and took place abruptly and artificially, receiving access to education and employment led to a restructuration of the Romanian family. Young and less young people abandoned the villages – the rural areas in general – leaving in waves for the cities, especially for the industrial centres, where the availability of jobs made possible a rapid absorption of these internal migratory waves. The changes taking place within the social context brought about a number of significant transformations in the Romanians' matrimonial behaviour. Two aspects were defining: the youth gained freedom from the parents' patronage and the marital market diversified. If in their places of origin youth had relatively few alternatives when it came to choosing a life partner and their choice had to be at least approved by the family – if not recommended or even enforced –, once they left the parental home the former "natural" order is profoundly shaken, the situation drastically changes and these metamorphoses affect the institution of family itself.

Some voices state that breaking away from the parental home and all the changes invoked so far did not have the anticipated effect in the case of the relationship between spouses due to a psychological fact: the wives had already internalised a number of attitudes and behaviours, such as fearing their husbands, avoiding pleasure and accepting the sexual act as a "necessary evil", required only in order to start a family (Băban & David 1996). After conducting their interviews, the above-cited authors reach the conclusion that socialism entwined around the traditional, patriarchal system and that "the pseudo-puritanical atmosphere was forcefully imposed by the socialist reinterpretation of feminine modesty" (Băban & David 1996: 3).

I confess that I was not especially interested in reproductive behaviour, intrinsically connected with the decree 770/1966 and its disastrous effects upon Romanians' lives during the Communist period. My reasons for such an approach were twofold: on the one hand, both the decree and its effects are well-known – as they were one of historians' preferred topics immediately after 1989, precisely because of the destructive consequences brought on by this legislative act – and, without new sources on the subject, I consider that a mere extension of those already said would be not only obsolete, but also unethical. On the other hand, family life cannot be reduced to reproductive behaviour: a series of other aspects are just as important, some perhaps even more important. For example, child-rearing practices are the ones which give

substance to the family's characteristics in a given historical context and, for this "odious" epoch, they have not yet been studied.

2. Marriage during the Communist period

Almost universal marriage is one of the Romanian people's historical constants. All evidence shows that, for centuries, except for 2-4% of the population that fulfils all the criteria required in order to get married, everyone starts a family, at an earlier or an older age. Only recently, as demographic and sociological studies indicate, a certain part of those who form the critical mass for matrimony prefer other variants of union, especially concubinage. The universal character and the precocity of the Romanian marriage cannot be disputed, our country being therefore integrated amongst the other East-European states from the viewpoint of this behaviour (which was itself recently subjected to contestation – see Szołtysek 2012). Nevertheless a series of elements that differentiate modern society from the traditional one can be identified in the length of time. As the study centres on the relationship between continuity and change, I will present a few characteristics of the traditional marriage in order to more convincingly illustrate the transformations suffered by the institution of matrimony during the Communist period. Moreover, right from the start, I wish to draw the reader's attention to the fact that founding a new family through marriage was the domain in which the state interfered the least during the Communist period, such constraints as imposing different taxes on celibates lacking the power to seriously affect the number of matrimonies. And, of course, it must be reminded that most of those who have studied the family during this period emphasise the fact that the various disorientations which have affected the Romanian society during the almost five decades of Communism have actually strengthened the institutions of marriage and family. People transferred everything that was not allowed in the public space to the private, intimate sphere, within the family!

The traditional society was an eminently collective one and, for centuries, marriage remained *the most public of the private rites* (Mureşan 2005: 206). The traditional manner of forming families involved the entire domestic group, marriage representing, in fact, an alliance between families that knew and accepted each other. For a long time the parents' option and sanction played a primordial role in setting up new families. In addition to the parental choice and control, the community, the state and the church also imposed their rigorous restrictions. All these factors struggled to establish written or

unwritten rules, which would maintain a certain degree of morality and submissiveness, especially in the rural environment.

My hypothesis, expounded with other occasions (Dumănescu 2010, 2012), is that the foundations of the modern Romanian family, in the sense proposed by Western theoreticians, were laid during the Communist period – irrespective of the fact that it might seem strange to support such a hypothesis, if one has in view the mechanisms, the means through which this result was reached. My opinion is mainly supported by the fact that the traits which give the family its modern character were cultivated through the Party's ideology and actions: a higher degree of individual autonomy (in relation to the family's older members), living in another village or town than the parents and close relatives, an increase in the rate of women's employment, a more balanced distribution of household roles, a reduced gap between the duration of women's and men's studies, excluding children from the labour force, mass education within specialised institutions, social protection through institutions from outside the family. Nevertheless, some traditional functions of the family were preserved and even consolidated: providing support, material and moral assistance or the possibility of refuge – especially as, in totalitarian regimes, the individual is continuously threatened in the public sphere.

Naturally, in order to outline these traits, we must first analyse the changes which took place within the traditional family, those substantial changes inextricably connected to the dominant criteria that lie at the foundation of a new family: choosing a partner, the residence, the power relations within the couple, the relationships between parents and children, the family's functions, the familial structure, the degree of stability and the value bestowed upon the family in reference to society as a whole (Iluț 2005: 88).

The parents' power of decision with regard to their children's marriage becomes history for the majority of the population. All available proof leads to the conclusion that matrimonial autonomy increased during the 20th Century, even if parents continued to have a say in such matters as their children's marital choices and lives, especially in those parts of Europe where the extended family continued to survive amongst and alongside other types of families (Therborn 2004: 107). As for the Romanian family, there is still an acute need for research that would clarify the problems of intergenerational familial support and of exchanges viewed as a measure of providing interfamilial help.

Another substantial change that can be added to the list is that of the age at marriage, which increases proportionately with the length of the youths' studies, with their opportunities and, as a result of the latter, with their

aspirations. The age at marriage has increased with time from 15-16 years for girls and 18-20 years for boys in the 18th Century, to 21-22 years for girls and 25 years for men in the second half of the 19th Century (Bolovan 1999: 111). Ioan Scurtu estimates that in the Old Kingdom the average ages at marriage were 12-13 years for girls and 17-18 years for boys (Scurtu 2003: 128). Moreover, when questioning the respondents with regard to the matter of matrimony, the 1930 census took into consideration the individuals above 13 years of age. Of course, this age, considered precocious nowadays, was typical rather of the Romanian village than of the urban environment, which was more progressive with respect to marriage, especially in the interwar period.

Women's education and their access to employment have influenced, I believe, to a great extent, the changes in the marital market. It is not improbable that the villages were responsible for the perpetuation of the traditional manner of setting up new families, namely at relatively young ages and in the conditions with which the community was accustomed for centuries! In fact, as I was stating from the beginning, we cannot claim that we are dealing with a unique pattern, just as unique models do not exist for previous periods either. There will always be models, variants and sub-variants of the same phenomenon, due to certain factors that can have different influences depending on the context in which they operate and propagate themselves.

The Communist period can be divided into two intervals from the viewpoint of the Romanians' marital behaviour also. In the Communist regime's first stage, which lasted until Nicolae Ceauşescu assumed the power, researchers have identified the existence of a crisis of the family stemming from the state's efforts to disunite society. This crisis' defining elements are massive industrialisation, collectivisation, rural exodus, school attendance, making use of the feminine workforce. All these elements left their mark on family life, but another fact cannot be disregarded: people had just left behind a devastating war and a normal life climate could not be restored over night. On the other hand, the years after 1967 were devoted to consolidating the institution of family, both through positive methods, such as providing support for mothers and children, granting children's allowances, etc., but mostly through coercive ones – forbidding abortions, rendering the access to

contraceptive means more difficult[1] and harshening divorce legislation. Let us treat these stages separately, one at a time!

Professor Traian Rotariu considers that this particular situation encountered during the first few years of the Communist regime represented, in fact, a combination of factors: those inherited from the interwar period (i.e. Romania's eminently rural character), the situation which arose as a consequence of the war and the brutal changes brought on by the new political and social system (Rotariu 2003: 227). As the data provided by the National Institute of Statistics shows, between the interwar period and the 90's, with the exception of a few years for which there is no available information (i.e. during the war and immediately after the conflagration), there existed some fluctuations in the marriage rate, but they are considered circumstantial.

One can notice that, in the interwar years, the marriage rate exceeds 9‰, the decrease recorded between 1940 and 1946 is actually due to lack of data, while after 1947 and during the entire sixth decade the rate's values are above 11‰. Professor Rotariu offers a number of explanations for these variations: marriages that could not take place during the war were completed after it ended, a part of the war widows remarried and the more numerous generations born during the interwar period entered the marital market (Rotariu 2003: 227).

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[1] An official policy of forbidding contraceptive means did not exist until 1985, but, according to the testimonies, they could extremely seldom be found and people only had access to pills, spermicides or condoms through the help of certain contacts and influential friends. In 1985 both the import and the use of contraceptive means are deemed illegal. Using intrauterine devices is also prohibited. As a result, the small border traffic proliferates, the contraceptives' black market flourishes and boxes of condoms become valuable gifts. Autochthonous sterilizers produced illegally, pills and spermicides containing cocoa butter and quinine enter the country from Hungary and are sold at high prices on the black market. According to the contemporaries' testimonies, the price of a box with 3 condoms represented the equivalent of a day's work (David 1991: 231-240). Petru Popescu narrates how, in the 70's, he bought condoms amounting to 100 Deutsche marks from East Berlin, enough to fill up a suitcase, in order to give them as presents to his friends upon returning to Romania (Popescu 2009: 15-29).

Figure 1. Marriages rate by urban and rural areas, 1930 to 1940 and 1946 to 1999

Source: National Statistics Institute, 2006.

There is no doubt that this is what happened since at the middle of the 60's the marriage rate has returned to the value it had during the interwar years and, afterwards, beginning with the year 1965, it dropped, reaching a historical minimum in 1969 - 7‰. In 1977-1978 the rate increases again, attaining a value of 9.2‰, after which, in the eighth decade it will stabilise at 7-7.5‰. According to Traian Rotariu, these fluctuations' explanation lies in the different sizes of the generations born before and after the Second World War; as a result, the period's social transformations did not influence the matrimonial behaviour. It is true that, with the exception of higher taxes imposed on celibates, the state's constraints did not primarily have in view the marriage rate. Nevertheless, even if from the viewpoint of volume and rates no causal relations can be established between the social context and climate, on the one hand, and the evolution of the number of matrimonies, on the other hand, certain modifications in concluding a marriage as an act of founding a new family (especially in what concerns choosing a partner) have undoubtedly existed and I will make reference to them below.

In the years after the Communists assumed power, a mixture of practices regarding matrimony can be identified. According to some

testimonies, weary of the war's horrors, people married quickly, after only a few weeks or months of dating (Rostás and Văcărescu 2008). With just a few things in their suitcases, with their marriage certificate in their pocket and with the hope that the matters important for the family, especially the problem of housing, would eventually be sorted out, young people started their lives, often even without a wedding ceremony, having completed only the required civil formalities. For a few more years things continued according to the old customs: girls, which were generally uneducated, agreed to romantic meetings suggested by family members, relatives or girlfriends and found husbands in their near circles and environments; on the other hand, the men, accustomed to a higher degree of independence, were the beneficiaries of this system.

With time, women's education had an effect upon marriage. In theory, the women's prolonged education leads to a decrease in the matrimony rate (both during their studies and after obtaining a diploma[2]), as well as in fertility. Cornelia Mureşan demonstrates that a tendency of postponing marriages until after the completion of studies can be detected in Romania only after the fall of the Communist regime (Mureşan 2012: 123). By analysing the data provided by the 1966 and 1977 censuses we can ascertain that the percentage of women who had graduated from a higher form of education was rather low in both situations, even if the size of the literate population has constantly increased after the 1948 education reform and the introduction of mass education. Women represented the main social category had in view by the 1948 law and, as a result, it had the most visible impact in their case. In fact, just by reading the data, according to the 1966 census all women under 30 years of age were schooled and illiteracy was eradicated! But ten years later it became obvious that this had happened only on paper[3].

Literacy literally means teaching somebody to write and read. In this sense, the official data published, without explanations, in the census, denotes that no person over 12 years of age was illiterate! Such a reality would have led, by way of consequence, to a situation at least similar 10 years later, at the next census. But, willingly or not, an explanation of the manner in which the last category, *primary schools and other situations*, was formed slipped out: this rubric was comprised of those who had attended school for 4 years (i.e. elementary school), those who had participated to adult literacy classes, those who

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[2] Josef Brüderl, Andreas Diekmann, „Education and Marriage. A Comparative Study", paper available online at the address:
http://www.sowi.unimannheim.de/lehrstuehle/lessm/papers/marriage.pdf.
[3] At the 1966 census no explanation regarding the manner of defining the different education stages is provided. At the 1977 census, this information is available and the category "primary schools and *other situations*" (s.n.) also included the illiterate!

declared that they could write and read without having been formally educated, those who declared that they could only write or read, but also those who knew neither.

On the one hand, the results of the census show that much more women than men remained at the level of primary school or in the conditions expressed by this indicator. Moreover, women were more oriented towards secondary schools and the first stage of high school, where their percentage surpasses that of the men who attained the same educational level. On the other hand, it is impossible to estimate the depth of literacy as long as the last category of the census encompasses all the situations that could not be comprised by other groups, including illiterates. We are forced to accept the idea, corroborated by many other contemporary sources and personal memories, that literacy was a declared aim of the Communist regime and that for the young population (i.e. under 30 years of age) it was achieved to a large extent, even if not entirely. I state this because after reanalysing the data included in the 1966 census, this time having in view the levels of education and the age groups, I found that, for instance, for the age group 20-24 years, out of 628,078 women, only 363,282 have graduated from different levels of education, that is to say a little more than half of them.

Schooling led to the acceleration of the women's emancipation phenomenon. The entire Communist legislation insists upon the equality between woman and man at the workplace, but also in the sphere of private life. Although most of the socialist period's researchers tend to consider that the state's egalitarian policies had only a superficial character and were related more to theory than practice (Zembrzuska 2000; Massino and Shana 2009; Massino 2004, 2010), it is undeniable that socialism offered women the chance to education, to an occupational status – which was correlated with the existence of an income –, to socialisation and social benefits they had not yet ever had.

2. Reproductive behaviour and the family's size during the Communist period

The Decree 770 and its disastrous consequences (Doboş, Jinga, Soare 2010) have yielded a vast number of discussions and works about Romania, about the Romanians' intimate life, reproductive behaviour and the constraints to which they were subjected from this viewpoint, about the hundreds of thousands of women who died as a result of illegal abortions, about the black market of contraception. This sombre, hideous face of Communism has

generated hundreds of entries in the international databases[4]. Only a much smaller number of studies have tackled other subjects pertaining to the Romanians' reproductive life during this period and those studies belong especially to sociologists. I will therefore follow the logic of the numbers and rates used by the latter in order to explain the evolution of marriage and birth rates in Romania during the Communist period.

According to the National Institute of Statistics, 482,084 children were born in 1930. So, in a period when Romania was a preponderantly agrarian country, the birth rate had a value of 34.1 for every thousand inhabitants. Gradually, the number of newborn babies decreased. In 1938 the rate dropped to 29.5‰ and in 1956 it had fallen to 24.2‰ (David and Wright 1971: 205). In 1960, probably also due to a liberalisation of abortion, 352,241 births were recorded, i.e. 19.1 live babies for every thousand inhabitants. The decrease was going to become larger in the following years: in 1963 the number of births dropped under 300,000 (15.7‰) and three years later – to 273,678 (14.3‰). In the same time, a report of the Ministry of Health, presented in the plenum of the Romanian Communist Party's General Committee, showed that 1,115,000 abortions were recorded in 1965, that is to say four abortions for every live birth (David and Wright 1971: 205). The Decree 770 of 1966 doubled the number of births, which reached 527,764 in 1967. Thus, for seven months, between December 1966 and June 1967, the birth rate tripled and, on the whole, the raw birth rate rose to 27.4‰ in 1967, double as compared with the rate recorded in 1966 (INS 2006). After this date, the birth rate decreased little by little each year, reaching 17‰ (381,101 births) in 1981. In 1983, the rate of 14‰ was attained again, Romania therefore returning to the situation of the year 1966, before the abortion was forbidden. In 1985 the law of abortion was modified through the decree 411 which increased the age at which a woman was able to request an abortion to 45 years and, as a consequence, the number of newborns rose also: the birth rate reached 16.7‰ in 1987. In 1989, 369,544 births were recorded, 16 live newborn babies for every thousand inhabitants, but in the first year after the fall of the Communist regime the birth rate dropped to 13.6‰, the lowest since 1930[5].

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[4]The conclusion I've reached after two years of researching the international databases is that approximately 80% of the works dedicated to Communist Romania, written both during the Communist period and especially after 1989, are dedicated to abortion and the effects of the antiabortion legislation.

[5]Detailed analyses of the marriage phenomenon, including aspects related to the rank of births, can be found both in Gheţău's study, published by INED in 1983, and in the more recent analysis conducted by Traian Rotariu and published in *Demografia şi sociologia populaţiei.*

It is worth mentioning that until 1978 more children were born in the rural environment than in the urban one, but, beginning with the year 1979, the situation reverses for a few years in favour of the towns. Between 1979 and 1989 the birth rate was higher in the cities with 1-1.5%, with the exception of 1982 and 1983 when the rates were relatively equal for the two environments. This situation is even more interesting if one considers the fact that, by tradition, the rural world has always yielded more children! Moreover, the urban environment equals the rural one from the viewpoint of the population's size only in 1985.

The answers obtained through the questionnaire used for a previous work show that, regardless of residence, the nuclear family is majoritarian, over 65% of the respondents declaring that their families are composed only of the parents or of the parents and their children (Dumănescu 2012). Nevertheless, significant differences appear when we analyse the structure of families with children as a function of their residence. For instance, families with two children live alone, without any other relative, in a smaller proportion in the rural environment, where familial solidarity seems to be maintained at superior levels for a longer period of time. These families' proportion is 47.1%, while, in towns, it reaches 65.7%. But, surprisingly, families with three children live alone in the same proportion, irrespective of environment – 64%. In the rural areas, the increase of the number of children is directly proportional with the number of the household's other members, therefore decreasing the percentage of nuclear families.

Families without residing children live alone in the vast majority of cases, both in the rural environment and in the urban one (73.3% and 76.8%, respectively). For this category, in both environments, another person is a part of the household's structure in less than 30% of the cases. In a similar manner, families with one child are majoritarian in our sample in both rural and urban areas. The information extracted from the same sample shows that, irrespective of residence, most Romanians – approximately 65% – live within nuclear families. Differences can be noted when taking into account the number of children that was declared and the presence of other people within the household. Thus, families without residing children are the ones living alone in the highest proportion: 73.3% in rural areas and 76.8% in urban ones. In the urban environment, the percentage of nuclear families with one child is smaller with almost 9 points as compared with families without residing children (68%), while in rural zones the weights of the two types of families are equal. Things change rather drastically in the case of families with two children inhabiting in the rural environment, as they remain nuclear families in less than

half of the cases (47.1%), the rest of them living together with other relatives. Noteworthy is the fact that, although it decreases a little, the weight of nuclear families with two children which live in urban areas remains elevated: 65.7%. As a result, we can note that in the rural environment the number of people that are part of the same household as the parents increases as the number of children becomes larger.

Lacking other data – for now – we limit ourselves to suggesting that the preference for an extended family is associated with the birth of more than two children in the respondents' families. We would need more data in order to conclude in favour of the hypothesis that a traditional reproductive behaviour implies a traditional manner of living, i.e. along with one of the spouses' parents. This situation could be determined by the smaller availability of houses in the rural environment, as compared with the urban one, where the state provided apartments for workers in exchange for slender rents that were usually correlated with the incomes. The research conducted at Buciumi also revealed that the households comprised of husband, wife and children represented the majority (41.8%). Besides, even in the situations when more familial nucleuses lived under the same roof, the youth preferred to live separately (*de chilin*) from their parents: they administrated their budget, food resources, time, etc. independently (Neamţu and Bădina 1970: 181).

It must be noted, even if purely informatively, that, from the 744 respondents with children, 557 have one or two children and 187 more than two children, as follows: 53 families with three children, 19 families with four children, a single family with six children and two with seven. Therefore, the two children familial model predominates in the sample[6], a fact which is in full accordance with the theories about the modern family's reduced size.

3. Divorce during the Communist period
One of the elements that place the seal of *traditional* upon the Romanian family of all the historical periods, not just the Communist one, is the attitude towards divorce. Being at first eminently and later on, after 1945, preponderantly agrarian, the Romanian society, from top to bottom, has firmly rejected divorce as a juridical solution for ending a marriage. It seems that the Biblical moral, "what God has united, man must not divide", was placed, in most cases, above any of the couple's problems. In 1930, 6,338 divorces were recorded in the entire country, that is to say 0.45 divorces for every thousand

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[6] Much more data about the families' reproductive behaviour (especially about the women's fertile age) is required in order to elaborate such a model and, as a result, lacking this data, we limit ourselves to observing the high frequency of families with one or two children amongst the families that include children.

inhabitants. Until 1940 this value knows a series of fluctuations, but does not surpass 0.73‰, recorded in 1938. Sociologists and demographers (Trebici 1979, Mureșan 1999; Rotariu 2010) have found the explanations for this reduced rate (as compared with the rest of Europe), in the country's agrarian structure, which, in its turn, has led to typically rural behaviours. The system of social constraints is very powerful in these areas and this is indicated by the divorce rate, which is 3-4 times more reduced than in the urban environment. In 1940, when the war began, the divorce rate had the value of 0.50‰; no data is available until the end of the war, but in 1946 the same rate had increased to 1.05‰. Why the rate doubled after the war cannot be explained, but, on the other hand, for its 3 to 4 times increase recorded in the 50's and the 60's, specialists invoke the lifestyle's relaxation that occurred immediately after the war. The divorces' volume constantly increases reaching 36,947 in 1960, a year in which the divorce rate surpassed 2‰. In 1961 it decreases a little, but in 1962 a historical maximum from this viewpoint is attained: 2.04 divorces for every thousand inhabitants. Until today (when it is situated around the value of 1.7‰), the divorce rate was not higher than the one recorded in 1998, namely 1.78‰.

Figure 2. Divorce rate by urban and rural areas 1930-1940 and 1946 to 2000.

Source: National Statistics Institute, 2006.

The fugure presented above graphically illustrates the anomaly that took place in 1967, as a result of the fact that decree 779 came into force. This legislative act drastically reduced the possibilities of divorce, in order to strengthen family life. In 1967, probably due to the social shock resulting from this decree's stipulations and from the fact that many couples did not "fulfil" the conditions which were required for divorcing, only 48 divorces were pronounced, 33 in the urban environment and 15 in the rural one. As people – including those who were part of the system – accommodated to this decree's provisions, the volume of divorces started increasing and thus, from 48 in 1967, it reached 14,472 in 1973, 17,951 in 1974 – a year in which certain modifications of the decree 779 were introduced - and doubled in 1975: 34,779 divorces and a rate of 1.62‰.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that in the urban environment the divorce rate was several times higher than in the rural one. For instance, in 1960, when the rate reached 2.01 divorces for every thousand inhabitants, the urban areas contributed with 3.85‰, while the rural ones only with 1.14‰, this being the highest divorce rate ever recorded in the rural environment (as compared with 4.19‰, which is the corresponding rate for the urban zones).

The same figure shows that, except for the massive fall of the year 1967 and the three peaks of 1976, 1979 and 1988, when the average was 0.21 divorces for every marriage, the rest of the period recorded values situated between 0.4 and 0.11 divorces for every marriage. What is even more interesting is related to the situation after 1989 when, despite the fact that the barriers to ending marriages were eliminated, the divorce rate does not increase dramatically, but even decreases in 1992. In 2000, for example, the rate divorces/marriages was 0.19, the same as the one of 1985, but in an entirely different context. And this happens although the states surrounding Romania have double or triple rates and in the Occident approximately 50% of all marriages end in divorce[7]. How can this be explained, if not through the Romanians' typical behavioural traditionalism? It seems that other explanations also exist and they are highly pertinent: firstly, the situation is due to the rural environment's massive contribution. Owing to the fact that around 45% of the population lives in these areas a classic behaviour towards divorce is perpetuated by this environment, the result being divorce rates that are 2-3 times lower in villages than in towns. Secondly, professor Rotariu identifies a shortage of available homes, which forces many Romanians to continue living under the same roof although they have all reasons for separating. And, lastly,

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[7] See, for instance, the Czech Republic or Lithuania.

according to Traian Rotariu (2010: 235-237) in Romania, the psychological costs of divorce are still extremely large..

Concluding remarks

Marriage remains the only way of founding a family and the proportion of married people in the population remains high for the whole period although the nuptiality rate decreases constantly starting from the 60s, from 11,6 marriages per 1000 inhabitants in 1956 – 1958 to 9 marriages per 1000 inhabitants during the next two years (1959 – 1960) reaching 7,3 in 1984 (Trebici and Ghinoiu 1986: 79). What change, as we have already shown, are the mechanisms of founding a new family. Between the wars the age at the moment of marriage was very young – even the 1930 census considered the population above 13 for marriage which was more a business of the parents than of the future spouses. We know the rules regarding marriage, which had to respect certain social layers like military or priests Scurtu 2001: 130). Generally, in the inter-wars period, similar to what was previously going on, marriage happened inside the same social group, defined by fortune, social status, studies and the differences in social statute generated real dramas. Very recent studies (Cucu and Culic 2012: 159-170) prove a degree of marital homogamy, which was increased for several social categories (intellectual or peasants who marry predominantly inside their own group), for those born before 1939. The authors conclude that the structuring of the society for this generation was a masculine one, where production activities, work and all other activities generally belonging to the public space belonged to men. On the opposite, the data for the generation that married in the 60s shows a destructuration of the class relations but also a closing of the social group of intellectuals who were going to marry in higher proportions inside their own group. One decade later, the highest degree of homogamy was to be found among the qualified workers, 62,8% of who were going to marry between them but the destructuration continued, all other social categories marrying in important proportions with qualified workers (the most numerous were the clerks – 50%, workers from the commercial sector – 46% and unqualified workers – over 42%. The fact that only 10% of the intellectuals marry with workers proves, according to the two authors, that the universitary education was, for the last period of socialism, the most important border between classes.

All data shows that, like in previous periods, the universality and precocity of marriage are characteristics that perpetuate during socialism. But the typology of the families changed fundamentally, in the context of the

synergic action of the three factors mentioned at the beginning – industrialization, urbanization, schooling – and of other factors of secondary importance.

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Romania and Hungary: Comparative Perspectives on Pronatalist Policies in Communist Regimes

Alexandru Onojescu, Ciprian Moldovan

"Babeș-Bolyai" University, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Department of History, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, +40 264 -405300, alexandru.onojescu@ubbcluj.ro, ciprian.moldovan@ubbcluj.ro

Abstract: The main purpose of the study is to provide a comparative perspective on the pronatalist policies of the two communist countries: Romania and Hungary. Beyond the general ideological and political context of the entire Communist Bloc, the paper focuses on three major coordinates: 1. gender differences and the way they were handled by each state; 2. the drafting of legislation on abortion, family and social protection, and the effective implementation of pronatalist policies (restrictive measures vs. incentives); 3. assessing the impact of these policies.

Keywords: communism, Romania, Hungary, pronatalist policies, gender, family, abortion.

1. Introduction

Over time, throughout the entire world, the issue of abortion represented for politicians, sociologists, psychologists, physicians, demographers and clergymen one of the most sensitive subjects of public debate due to its ethical, moral and humanitarian implications. In the USA, for example, any candidate with viable chances for Presidency must have a clearly defined standpoint in this respect, a fact emphasized during the 2008 presidential campaign (Curry 2008). However, the abortion issue is not a constant public debate subject in the American society alone. In the same year, a statistic conducted by the Center for Reproductive Rights revealed that 34% of the world population lives in countries with a moderate legislation on abortion, about 26% resides in countries where abortion is banned, while the remaining 40% lives in states with no restrictions on abortion (Alters 2010: 109). These results well circumscribe the classification made by Levine and Staiger (2004: 228) who assessed that there are three distinct categories of the legal status of abortion: 1. „life/medical" where abortion is granted only on the basis of precise medical

reasons; 2. „medical/social" at which point abortion is accessible only to those with medical problems, including mental ones, or for social reasons; 3. „on request" where abortion is allowed on request. Corroborating the above stated, the percentages lean towards a favorable trend for abortion: above 70% of the global population lives in countries where abortion is permitted for various reasons. Though, a hundred years earlier the situation was entirely unfavorable to this type of pregnancy prevention. Developing a historicist perspective, Henry P. David (1992: 3-4) asserts that abortion is as old as humanity and it finds a place in all cultures, but the attitudes of the political and religious officials towards this phenomenon radically varied in time. The evolution from an attitude of total opposition to one of partial acceptance was relatively fast if we take into account that the 2008 report designates 56 states with a legislation that allows abortion without restrictions, while a similar report in 1975 indicates only 11 countries with a similar policy (Berelson and Lieberson 1979: 586).

In this study we aim to offer a wider comparative historical perspective on abortion as a fundamental element around which the pronatalist policies of the communist states in Central and Eastern Europe have revolved. Case studies will cover Romania and Hungary, countries whose intentions regarding fertility growth followed the general trend of this type of policies throughout the communist space, even though its implementation has been essentially different. The approach is not an easy one because any analysis of demographic policies must take into account a number of interconnected factors: humanitarian, ideological, economic, social and even sanitary. In the case of socialist states these factors become more important as the pronatalist policies form an integral part of a more extensive socio-economic ensemble (Macura 1974: 374). Beyond the general ideological and political context of the whole Communist Bloc which will be inevitably mentioned, this paper focuses on three major coordinates: 1. gender differences and the way they were handled by each state; 2. the drafting of legislation on abortion, family and social protection, and the effective implementation of pronatalist policies (restrictive measures vs. incentives); 3. assessing the impact of these policies in each state. Evidently, we will try to capture the general characteristics, trends, similarities and differences, the allocated space not being enough for a more detailed analysis.

2. Between Ideology and everyday life: the role and status of women in communism society

Among other fundamental innovations the communist regimes brought to power there is also the elevation of women's social status and their labor market integration (Macura 1974: 378). The Soviet Union launched a powerful policy with strong feminist overtones (Ilic 2001: 1) that covered the entire social, political, economic and biologic spectrum. Through a series of decrees they proclaimed equal rights between women and men, women's right to own property and to sue for a divorce, the legalization of abortion, their right to freely choose how many children to have, and mostly, the right and obligation to work. Gradually, immediately after the Second World War, through the process of sovietization and satelization, all Central-East European countries adopted these new ideological precepts. In Hungary and Romania all constitutional norms and those concerning family, property and labor relations encompassed specifications to ensure an equal status in society for women and men.

The Constitutions of the Romanian People's Republic enacted in 1948 and 1952 granted women the right to work and entitled them to equal pay with men. The Family Code of 1954 provided equality between husband and wife in terms of rights and responsibilities in marriage, as well as the ability to divorce on demand (Dumănescu 2010: 115, 118). The Constitution of 1965 provided the state as guarantor of equal rights for all citizens, any deviation from this principle being prohibited. The Criminal Code of 1948 and that of 1968 established penalties for such deviations (Moskoff 1978: 452). In Hungary, beyond the Constitutional Act of 1949 and the Criminal Codes of 1950 and 1961 which stated and guaranteed equal rights without any discrimination, the most important and interesting piece of legislation was the 1952 Family Code which remained in force until the end of the Communist regime. The law gave both partners the right to sue for a divorce, but not before giving reconciliation a chance (Haney 2002: 29). The law also stipulated the joint ownership right of women and men for properties acquired during marriage. Furthermore, in case of a divorce the woman had the right to reside in the family apartment. When the woman was granted the custody of the children, she also got the right of residence until the State solved the problem of housing, even if the apartment was acquired by the husband before marriage. Thus, one can notice the existence of an egalitarian trend regarding regulating women's social status in communist society.

The existence of a large body of State and Party documents which constantly reaffirmed gender equality was contradicted by everyday reality. This discrepancy was best reflected by the limited participation of women in

political decision making. Promoting women in party structures was only made in so far to ensure the Party's legitimacy by the representation of a broader social base. Otherwise stated, women become „fillers" in different hierarchies, respecting a certain „quota", as well as the representatives of some ethnic minorities (Nelson 1985: 158-159).

In Hungary, around 1974, the percentage of women in the municipal councils was 25.1% and in the regional ones 30% (Volgyes 1977: 187)[1]. When referring to leadership positions only 6.6% of the popular councils were run by women and none of the regional councils. At national level, 24% of the legislators were women, percentage which reflected the proportion of female party members. At party leadership level, the real source of power where most decisions were made, women were underrepresented: out of the 105 members of the Central Committee 9 were women (8.5%), and out of the 13 members of the Politburo only one was a woman (7.6%). Further data referring to Hungary could not be identified.

Romania, however, represented a special case due to Elena Ceauşescu's presence as a constant factor in promoting women in politics. Back to 1973 Nicolae Ceauşescu deplored their poor promotion in all political echelons (Fischer 1985: 126). Thus, if in 1974 there were only 2 women in the Political Executive Committee (9%), in 1979 their number rose to 5 (20%), to become stable at 3 (14%) in 1984 (Olteanu 2003: 37-38). In the Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party the proportion of women also rose from 4% (1965) to 24% (1989). In the Great National Assembly the proportion of deputy women became constant around 33% since 1980. The same year also recorded a peak of female presence among the Government: not less than 6 women hold a ministerial office (Olteanu 2003: 40). Therefore, we are dealing with a better integration of women at executive decision-making level in Romania than in Hungary. Besides, in no other country of the Communist Bloc did women advance on the political ladder as Ana Pauker and Elena Ceauşescu did in Romania.

Based on the above-mentioned statistics a few features of promoting women in the political communist society of the two countries can be determined. Firstly, the proportion of women appointed to leadership positions decreases as we approach the top of the hierarchy, and secondly, it increases in areas where it was considered they held specific expertise: education, health, social security, and light industry. It has been demonstrated that women held more than 50% of the jobs in health and education

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[1] All statistics related to public position of women in Communist Hungary were extracted from Volgyes 1977.

committees, between 31 and 50% in the commissions for light industry and community services, and less than 30% in the commissions for budget-finance, construction, planning, legislation and administration (Nelson 1985: 161). As far as vertical promotion is regarded, it is obvious that women were better represented in the legislative bodies than in the executive ones, and this is because parliaments and popular councils have never been bodies with a real political power.

Although discrimination against women in holding public offices was not the only way of expressing gender differences, we chose to start with it because it was the most obvious and the most accessible. It was the ultimate form of discrimination and, probably, the most important one: there was a constant tendency towards detaining women from taking part in the decision making process that involved them directly, at least as much as men. But then, there was a demographic equilibrium between women and men in both countries in the overall share of the population, though this was not reflected in the political representation structures. Several authors reached the conclusion that the poor representation of women at political decision-making level was due to the so-called women's „double burden" as mothers and workers (Einhorn 1991, Fischer 1985, McIntyre 1985). The lack of their presence in the public space was due to their inability to perform, without any help, this „third burden".

Another explanation, just as pertinent and which, in a way, complements the above one, is the survival of traditional mentality regarding gender relations. Regardless of massive industrialization and urbanization, both countries held a very important component of rural population, which represented about 45% of their population in 1989. If we add a high percentage of inhabitants that, over a generation, have migrated from rural to urban areas, this argument gains momentum. According to some researchers, communism produced a metamorphosis of the traditional patriarchy into a state patriarchy, where women and men alike blindly obeyed the Party and the State, always living under the impression that nothing depended on them (Miroiu 2002: 213-214, Einhorn 1991: 79). The poor representation of feminism in both countries is also due to mentality. This was not only a feature of the communist period, but a constant throughout modern history. Feminism or the matter of women's role and status in society never ended up as an independent ideology, being either incorporated in nationalism or in socialism (de Haan, Daskalova and Loufti 2006: 6). Unable to develop, the feminist ideas were scattered when communism came to power. Besides, as long as the equality between women and men was ideologically proclaimed and

established by law, feminist ideas seemed stale. Therefore, the only women organizations that were accepted, beside the cultural ones, were the party organizations which mostly militated in favor of some vaguely defined objectives like peace and brotherhood on earth.

As a first conclusion, women's condition in communism was due to the worker-mother fundamental contradiction generated by a mixture of egalitarian legislation and traditionalist mentality. Labor in socialist economy was a right and a responsibility both for women and men. In addition, women also had the obligation to ensure the country's demographic future. As such, we will see that the greatest challenge for the Romanian and Hungarian regimes would be finding the proper policy to merge the growth of the fertility rate with planning and economic growth. Now, in the first stage, we will briefly deal with women's role in socialist production and their socio-economic status.

Since the first moments of launching the socialist economic project in Hungary and Romania, women's integration in the labor market was required. In Hungary, the percentage of working women increased steadily over the entire period of the communist regime: if in 1949 only 34.6% of the whole female population was part of socialist activities, the percentage would rise to reach 49.90% in 1960, 63.7% in 1970, 70.8% in 1980 and 69.6% in 1990 (Łobodzińska 1995: 144). Romania's success in the integration of women in socialist labor was downright spectacular: after a nine-year period, in 1956, the authorities reported the integration in the labor market of 79.3% of the whole female population (Moskoff 1980: 601). Whereas for communist regimes this statistics represented good reasons for joy in their competition with the capitalist system, for women the benefit was ambivalent. While their job provided certain independence and a superior status by contributing to family income, their labor market integration produced a fundamental change in their lifestyle and not necessarily a positive one.

From the very beginning, the women faced a long series of discrimination. Firstly, they were excluded from the area of physical labor, such as heavy industry, transportation, petro-chemistry, mining, etc. In turn, men excluded themselves from some activities where women started to become a majority, starting thus a process of womanizing certain professions. Textile industry and different public services such as wealth, education, consumer-goods trade and accounting became free from the prestige men's noble professions enjoyed. Furthermore, men's work was qualified, while women's was unqualified or semi-qualified. Besides, according to socialist standards, men's activities were the ones to produce significant income, and women's work was associated with spending financial resources. This did not mean at all

that the working conditions for women were lighter than for men. On the contrary, a statistics on 1979 Hungary revealed that the percentage of women working in shifts was higher than of men (49% vs. 43%), and the hardest work in agriculture was performed by women (Kulcsár 1985: 198). A similar situation for Romania has been identified by William Moskoff (1978: 441-442).

The disparity regarding women's qualification has both a cause and an effect. The cause primarily resides in education, in the way women were prepared for the labor market. The effect consists of lower wage levels for women than for men. In the present state of the research, the lack of complete serial data for both countries, but especially for Romania (Łobodzińska 1995: 208), averts us from making a comprehensive comparative analysis of the two above-mentioned aspects. Therefore, we will again resume to a series of general remarks, pointing out that the trends were similar to a great extent, as revealed in the researches of Völgyes (1985), Łobodzińska (1995) and Moskoff (1978). At a legislative level, the educational system could not have been a discriminating one, as communist regimes could not be accused they did not insist upon raising the level of education and reducing illiteracy rate. Nevertheless, the occurrence of certain stereotypes and the selection performed by the teachers pushed women to certain careers. The selection process took place when completing the secondary school. Then, most boys were directed towards vocational schools which ensured specialization and professionalization, hence the possibility of higher income and greater opportunities for promotion in economic management jobs. Instead, girls were guided towards different schools, and the ones who preferred vocational schools were directed to areas such as trade, postal services, health, education or childcare.

As far as the income level of women in relation to men is concerned, despite an egalitarian legislation, it was poor throughout the communist regimes in Hungary and Romania. As far as labor market required qualified workforce and it paid accordingly, women were disadvantaged from the start: they never earned the same as men even if they held the same job (Kulcsár 1985: 202-203).

Though, women's duties did not end at work. Once out of the factory or the institution she worked for, the woman got in charge with her second key role, that of housewife. The sociological surveys on Hungary and Romania have revealed that women were in charge for most activities related to housekeeping and childcare. In the case of Romania, working women received certain help from their husbands with shopping, dishwashing and cleaning, whilst cooking and doing laundry was mostly a women's pursuit (Moskoff

1978: 451). Regarding childcare it has been demonstrated that women spent twice the time men did for this activity, with variations depending on social class. Likewise, there was a difference between women living in villages and those living in cities: the first allocated twice the time for housekeeping than the latter. As for childcare, women in cities were more careful with children (Kulcsár 1985: 212-213). As such, women were forced to streamline time, so they were more stressed and slept less and not as intense as men.

The general conclusion to be drawn on the status of women in Communist Romania and Hungary is an ambivalent one. On the one hand, there was a considerable advance in terms of women's social mobility, their level of education, the access to labor market and social visibility, compared to the period before the Second World War. On the other hand, implementing this egalitarian policy has been made due to great efforts on the part of women, who were forced to accept the double part imposed by Communist society: lower income than men and a professional guidance to comply with the requirements of the Party and the State and, concurrently, to spare men's pride. Besides, their horizontal and vertical social mobility was strongly limited. Otherwise stated, there was an extraordinary difference between legislation and everyday reality which would become more acute with the implementation of pronatalist policies.

3. Between reward and liability: pronatalist policies in Hungary and Romania

Before depicting the main coordinates of pronatalist policies in the two countries, we have to proceed towards a general evaluation of their demographic situation. The general trend for the period 1950-1965 is one of demographic decline, and we will briefly define it bellow. Our research will also embody the problem of abortion, a method of ending a pregnancy which became a constant of the demographic issue in all communist countries, not only in Hungary or Romania.

The most ample study on the demographic situation of the Communist Bloc countries belongs to Jerzy Berent (1970a, 1970b). The two articles explain a variety of factors that support the decline of demographic growth rate in both countries. Taking into account both demographical factors (the process of population aging, the nuptiality rate, the divorce rate, etc.) and socio-economic ones (rural-urban differences, regional, professional and educational disparities of the main demographic indicators, the importance of family income, women's working status, housing conditions, religious attitudes, etc.), Berent's conclusions invalidate a well-established belief of Marxist literature,

namely that the demographic decline was only a feature of the capitalist countries, while communist regimes were defined by high birth rates and permanent population growth (Berent 1970a: 35). The author has clearly demonstrated that urbanization and massive industrialization, the increase of educational level, and women's free access to the labor market led to a decline in the birth rate and total fertility rate. Besides, Berent noticed the same phenomenon for Western Europe. The difference consists in the speed with which this has occurred in the eastern part of the continent. For example, in a 15-year period the number of births in Hungary decreased by about 37% (David 1999: 148) and in Romania it declined by about 44% (Băban 1999: 194). For Hungary, the minimum was reached in 1962 when the birth rate became the lowest in Europe, i.e. 12.9, and Romania's minimum was reached in 1966 at a rate of 14.3. The direct consequence of this "demographic transition" (Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 34, Rotariu 2011: 20) was that the total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen below the replacement level: in 1965, for Hungary it was 1.82 compared 2.60 in 1950, and for Romania it fell from 3.14 to 1.91, which meant that in the next decade the population would decrease. It has to be observed that throughout the entire period the actual population has not decreased; on the contrary, it has increased by about 11% in Hungary (the period 1950-1970), and by 24% in Romania (Macura 1974: 369).

Another essential feature of the demographic decline of the Communist Bloc refers to what Libor Stloukal (1999) called "the abortion culture". The considerations which made abortion the most used form of pregnancy prevention were mainly ideological and political. The first country to legalize abortion on demand was the Soviet Union in 1920. As long as the woman was "free" and had equal rights with men it was normal to have the fundamental right to decide how many children to have. The law was so liberal that it allowed abortion at any stage of pregnancy and it did not require the procedure to be exclusively performed in specialized medical units. Only in 1926 restrictions for the pregnancies over three months were introduced, the only exceptions being for medical reasons (Avdeev, Blum and Troitskaya 1995: 42-43). Anyway, the exponential increase of abortions, most of them undertaken in inadequate conditions, as well as the demographic crisis experienced in USSR in the late '20s lead to a total ban of abortion in 1936, under Stalin's regime. The outcome was going underground; due to the absence of other contraception methods, abortion remained the only form of birth-control. The risks were very high: the conditions for such procedures were as bad as they could be, and the punishments were very harsh. As such, after 1953, the policy of the new leaders in Moscow was also reflected in the

abortion legislation. In 1955, abortion was again legalized with the specification that it could be carried out only in specialized medical units and only until the third month of pregnancy inclusive. Beside the ideological issues related to de-Stalinization, the new legislation had also had a pragmatic, "utilitarian" feature, meant to end the high rate of morbidity and mortality caused by illegal abortions (David 1992: 5).

Following the Soviet model, all Communist Bloc countries, except Albania and the GDR, have passed similar legislation. In Hungary, the abortion liberalization (June 3rd 1956) occurred concomitantly with the waiver of Ratko law stipulations enacted in 1953 (David 1999: 152, Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 100-101). The work of the then-health minister, Anna Ratkó, the law was aimed at stopping the troubling large number of illegal abortions which ended with different medical complications. All those involved in committing such procedures were sanctioned with penalties of up to 15 years. Medical boards were set up to decide upon abortion for serious medical and social reasons.

Even without an explicit pronatalist intent, Ratkó law also had provisions for improving the medical services for pregnant women and the social services for families with children, and the increase in the number of institutions for the reception and care of children. Therefore, the natality rate increased between 1953 (21.6) and 1954 (23) compared to 1952 (19.6); in 1955 it started to decline again (Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 217, 101). As a matter of fact, 1954 marked the peak growth of gross birth rate throughout the communist period in Hungary (Keil and Andreescu 1999: 479). Despite the severity with which it has been imposed, at least in the first two years, the abortion rate has not declined because the institution of medical boards produced an explosion of legal abortions. According to some experts, between 50 and 70% of all recorded legal abortions were, in fact, illegal ones due to the absence of the above-mentioned regulations (Frejka 1983: 505). For example, the rate of legal abortions increased of about 6 times in 1953-54 (David 1999: 149). As such, total abortion rate (both legal and illegal) only decreased in 1953 to continually grow until 1958 when it got higher than the birth rate (David 1999, 149). Total abortion rate is a great indicator of Hungary's explosive abortion growth: in 1959 it was 2.1, to reach a maximum of 2.7 in 1969 (Frejka 1983: 500). The 1956 liberalization did nothing else than to establish this trend. According to the new legislation, abortion was authorized for pregnancies up to 12 weeks, with the exception of women under 20 years of age who could interrupt a pregnancy up to the 18th week. There was only one restriction, namely the authorization for abortion had to be awarded by the medical boards

enforced by the Ratkó law, and the procedure had to be performed only by qualified medical staff in hospitals. The role of these boards was a symbolic one. They could reject an application just once, but when the patient insisted they had to approve it.

Romania has not distanced itself from the "soviet fashion", therefore the Decree 463 issued in September 30th 1957 legalized abortion. Women could seek an abortion up to the 3rd month of pregnancy including, without any sort of approval from a medical board. The fee was insignificant (30 lei, the equivalent of 2 US dollars) and the physicians were entitled to perform 10 such procedures a day. Furthermore, the regime organized centers for such interventions in the main hospitals and in factories where women workers prevailed (Băban 1999: 196). The most important aspect of this law was that, starting with 1958, we have the first statistics on the number of abortions in Romania, which will allow us both to depict the evolution of this phenomenon and to explain the authorities' reaction. In Romania's case there also was an explosion of legal abortions: if in 1958 were registered 129,500, in 1959 they would reach 578,000 (Băban 1999: 196). By 1965, the total number of abortions reached 1,112,700. Total abortion rate is also relevant: it reached 7 in 1962 and a maximum of 7.5 in 1965 (Frejka 1983: 500), which reveals that the abortion rate was quite high even before the liberalization of 1957.

As we have seen before, the demography of Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary and Romania's, was marked by two simultaneous trends: the increasing number of abortions and the declining birth rate. The question that puzzled the experts is to what amount the first trend has had an influence on the second one. Perhaps the best answer to this question is that of Tomas Frejka (1983) who, following his research, reached the conclusion that the decline of the birth rate began before implementing the liberal legislation on abortion, with the share of a myriad of factors. It is highly possible that this legislation quickened the decline of fertility, though not in an essential way (Frejka 1983: 517). Similarly, according to the same researcher, restraining the access to abortion had a meager and short-living influence on increasing the natality. As such, it cannot be stated that abortion was the main suppressor of demographic growth. Pregnancy interruption was also shaped by social and economic factors, by the availability of other contraception methods or by legislative, cultural and political canons.

The leaders of the two communist regimes were not in sympathy with the expert's conclusions. Especially the ones in Romania, by joining the two indicators, concluded that one visibly influenced the other, thus their entire pronatalist policy was focused on the matter of abortion. There were essential

differences of approach between the two countries, according to their socio-economic level. If the Hungarian regime understood much better that demographic decline was not only the consequence of an increased abortion rate, Ceaușescu's regime would hold on this reductionist vision. Hence, Hungary has had a much more predictable policy, focused particularly on positive socio-economic incentives, while Romania has chosen the severe path, the arbitrary one, mainly based on coercion and touching almost all aspects of the private life of women and men alike. Furthermore, in the case of the Romanian pronatalist policy the negative incentives dominated.

The turntable of Ceaușescu's pronatalist policy was the Decree 770 issued on October 1st 1966. Briefly[2], the decree incriminated abortion under Article 8 of the Criminal Code and abolished the provisions of the Decree 463 of 1957. The only cases in which an abortion could be performed by obstetricians in professional hospitals were: 1. pregnancy threatened woman's life and could not be rectified through other means; 2. one of the parents suffered from a serious illness that could be transmitted hereditary or could result in serious congenital malformations; 3. the pregnant woman presented serious physical, mental or sensory disabilities; 4. the women had to be over 45 years of age; 5. the woman gave birth to four babies and was caring for them; 6. the pregnancy was a result of rape or incest. The Decree was followed by various Instructions (no. 819 issued on October 19th 1866 and no. 405 of May 9th 1967) that brought under regulation the activity of the medical boards which approved abortion, their composition, the bureaucratic track to be accomplished by each woman to get an abortion, as well as assessing the exceptions in detail.

The famous Decree 770 would remain in force for 23 years until the fall of Ceaușescu's regime, though with a series of amendments. The first amendment was issued in 1972 when women's minimum age to claim an interruption of pregnancy was lowered from 45 to 40 years. In 1974, following the statistics that proved the limited effects of the 1966 legislation, the regime decided to issue the Instructions no. 27. These hardened control and monitoring by imposing the participation of an agent of the Prosecution and one from the Ministry of Interior at the meetings of the medical boards. They also had to be present to the periodic and unexpected gynecological exams performed in factories to track down early pregnancies. To leave no room for

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[2] Considering that the main features of Ceaușescu's pronatalist policy are already widely known, we will only emphasize the original contributions of various authors on the subject. The main works with an exhaustive approach of the subject are: Moskoff (1980), Băban (1999), Kligman (2000), Doboș, Jinga and Soare (2010).

interpretation, the Instructions have made a clear legal separation between spontaneous and provoked abortion.

Confronted with a lower natality rate the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party has issued several documents aimed to incentivize all institutions in charge with this matter. Genuine five-year demographic plans included objectives such as "decreasing the number of abortions by 30%" or achieving the same population growth as in 1975. Finally, the last legislative act was the Decree 411 of 1985 which brought up two significant changes: reverting the minimum age for an abortion to 45 years and raising the minimum number of children from 4 to 5. Basically, there was a tightening of the conditions under which abortion was approved.

Ceaușescu's pronatalist policy was not only bound at restraining the access to abortion. The right to sue for a divorce and the access to birth control pills were also strictly restricted. In case of a divorce, judicial fees were hugely raised, making them proportional with the income. They ranged between 3000 and 5000 lei (= 170-280 $). Furthermore, there was a 6-month probationary period meant to reconcile the two spouses. As a result, the divorce rate decreased from 37,000 (1865) to 48 (1967) (Băban 1999: 198). As far as birth control pills are concerned, it has to be noted that up to the '80s there has been no explicit regulation, the only reference being the restriction of the use of medicines with adverse influence on pregnancy through the 1974 Instructions. Authorities' concern will ultimately lead to regulating the use of contraceptive pills by limiting, as far as possible, public's access to them. Physicians and chemists have been banned from prescribing recipes, preparing and releasing contraceptive products. There was no state policy concerning the import of such medicines, a fact that lead to the perpetuation of abortion as the sole method of controlling fertility. Population's access to pills, condoms or any other kind of contraceptive methods was limited by their high cost and their inefficiency.

In his attempt to convince the population to respect the Party's demographic plan, Ceaușescu also issued a policy of socio-economic stimulations of the population through a series of incentives, both positive and negative. It can be noted that most of these were meant to help the families with at least three children and to solve the conflict of the double part the socialist system required from women: that of parent and worker. Among the negative incentives there was the imposition of additional taxes for persons over 25 years without children, irrespective of gender. Thus, Decree no. 86 of 1966 provided a 10 or 20% increase of the income tax, depending on the income amount and on the wage bracket. Law no. 1 issued in 1977 changed

the way people without children had been "fiscally punished": from now on, they will pay a fixed contribution which varied from a minimum of 250 lei to a maximum of 550 lei, depending on their income. Those who obtained incomes from agriculture were also taxed. In 1985 Ceauşescu decided to increase these taxes with between 300 and 400% (Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 257-262).

Positive incentives were much more elaborated, passing through stages of growth, three coordinates being reported: the number of children, parent's income and their place of residence (rural or urban). Due to the high number of normative acts, we will only list the main types of positive incentives, which have been best described by Doboş, Jinga and Soare (2010: 230-255) and we will try to emphasize the growth trends. Childbirth allowance (1000 lei until 1985 and 1500 afterwards) was a fixed amount awarded to all mothers who delivered more than 3 children. Before 1967 this amount was only granted to mothers with at least 10 children. Gradually, not being fastened to the fluctuations of inflation, its value as percentage of the average monthly income will drop from 86% in 1966 to 55% in 1985. The monthly state allowance for children has permanently increased through a series of legislative resolutions: 1969, 1971, 1973, 1977, 1979, 1982 and 1985. Despite some significant growth it can be noted that up to 1985 the total amount of the state allowance for a family with 4 children has never exceeded 47% in urban areas and 35% in rural areas, these being the levels reached during the period 1977-79 and 1982-85. Barely after 1985 will these quanta exceed 50% in urban areas (Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 246-247, 277). Likewise, throughout the '70s, the regime concentrated on supporting the enlarged families with 6 to 9 children. Then, in the '80s, it shifted its focus to medium-size families with 3 to 5 children.

Maternity leave was or was meant to be a form of social stimulation of natality. Settled in 1965 it remained in force until 1989. It provided that working women were granted a 112-day paid leave, of which 52 prenatal, 60 post-natal; an insufficient amount. The quantum of the allowance depended on the number of months they have worked: maximum 90% of the income for those who completed at least 12 months of uninterrupted employment and minimum 50% for those with up to 6 months work experience. The only change took place in 1966 when mothers delivering from their third child up received, irrespective of the length of their work experience, 100% of their basic wage. In order to find a balance between the role of mother and that of worker the regime adopted the parental leave which presumed that women with children younger than 7 years could opt for a part-time time table. It has to be specified that there were a series of security norms of protection for pregnant or postpartum women who wished for employment reinstatement:

they were exempted from performing heavy physical duties, working overtime or in night shifts or were granted the so-called breastfeeding breaks.

In many aspects, Hungary's pronatalist policies were much more complex than Romania's. After 1956, the liberalization of the communist regime allowed the occurrence of a debate regarding the best solutions, whilst in Romania it was under Ceaușescu's discretionary will. If in Hungary the technocratic versions were the accepted ones, in Romania experts' supererogation was surpassed most of the time by the blunt political will of the regime to control the number of abortions at any cost. Despite the permanent growth of the abortion rate and[3] a sudden decline of births which came to be the lowest in Europe (David 1999: 147), Hungary, benefiting the experience of the years 1953-55, refused to resort to a drastic limitation on abortion access. Instead, under public pressure, the regime has tolerated the use of traditional contraceptive methods, and also of modern ones, such as the pill or the IUD (intrauterine device), which were introduced and widely used as from 1967 and 1971, respectively. This is one of the reasons the number of abortions has significantly declined in the '70s (Doboș, Jinga and Soare 2010: 109-111).

The second reason was the State's political intervention against abortion through the Resolution no. 1040 of 1973. As from January 1st 1974 certain restrictions have been imposed on the procedure of interruption of pregnancy. The new regulations do not resemble in any way with Romania's legislation. It is sufficient to mention that, in the same year, the regime in Bucharest tightened anti-abortion restrictions. Furthermore, the official message of the Hungarian Government assured the public opinion that the new policy will not be in any way similar to the "Ratkó regime". The role of the medical boards was only conventional, their task being to discern between a series of precise criteria on which to approve women's request to end a pregnancy. Thus, this option remains valid for: 1. unmarried and divorced women or widows; 2. women who have been separated from their husbands for at least 6 months; 3. women whose pregnancy was the result of a criminal act; 4. married women who were older than 35 years; 5. women who have already delivered 3 children or 2 children and have experienced an "obstetric event". The condition was that of a pregnancy of no more than 12 weeks. Moreover, the board's agreement could also be given in extreme social cases: the lack of decent housing conditions, a husband completing the military service, an inmate husband, or for medical, eugenic or legal reasons (Doboș, Jinga and Soare 2010: 105, David 1999: 153). Although these measures were announced prior to their enforcement, the public opinion has perceived them

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[3] The maximum was reached in 1969.

as severe, consequently there was some opposition. Hence, the 1956 legislation has been mostly preserved; the medical boards did not take their role seriously, the abortion requests being admitted pretty easy. The 1974 legislation has undergone four minor changes: in 1979 the minimum age to ask for an abortion was raised to 40 years; in 1982 it recurred to 35 years; in 1986 the procedures to obtain the approval for an induced abortion were greatly simplified; and in 1988 the medical boards were abolished.

Therefore, the power of the Hungarian pronatalist measures did not reside in the legislative regulation of abortion. As we noted, Hungary initiated relatively late measures to restrict abortion, despite the alarming statistics. Instead, the regime in Budapest has early adopted a policy of positive socio-economic incentives for births, whose antecedent dated back to 1912 and 1924, when the system of family allowances for children and the paid maternity leave for a period of 12 weeks were enacted. As from 1951 the state allowance for children has been modified according to the priorities of the regime: either encouraging families with 2 children (1965, 1974), or the one with 3 children (1959, 1972, 1985); adjustments have been made according to the inflation rate (Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 220-221, McIntyre 1985: 275-276). The only variable in granting the allowance was the number of children. It is interesting to note that in the period 1953-1972 the state allowance for children was not granted to families with one child. As far as the effective quantum of the allowance as percent of the average wage is concerned, our figures for Hungary are incomplete. Although, from the figures we have we can deduct that the figures have been slightly larger for 1972 compared to Romania (McIntyre 1985: 260) and 1985-86 (Doboş, Jinga and Soare 2010: 277)[4].

Birth allowances have also increased. Introduced in 1967, it consisted of 1000 forints, divided as follows: 600 forints cash and 400 in baby clothing coupons. In 1972 the allowance for the first child increased by 10% and for the 6th child or a higher rank increased by 100% to reach 2000 forints. In 1974 the allowance was made even, 2500 forints irrespective of the children's rank, and in 1985 it would sum up 4500 forints (=52$), with a rate of about 75% of the monthly average wage.

The real innovation of the regime in Budapest concerning the implementation of its pronatalist policy was the introduction of parental leave (*GYES*) (Haney 2002: 104). Starting with 1967 the parental leave completed the 20-24-months maternal leave. This type of leave was 25 months long and was worth among 500 and 600 forints depending on mother's residence. In 1969, the period increased to 31 months, and the payment differences between

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[4] 47% vs. 43% for 1972 and 63% vs. 53% for the years 1985-86

rural and urban areas disappeared. In 1973, for 24 months, mothers who decided to stay home were granted a monthly allowance representing about 75% of their wage as workers, regardless of the child's rank. After this period, up to the completion of those 31 months, the women received a fixed allowance between 800 and 1200 forints, this time broken down according to the number of children.

4. Among success and illusion: a compared assessment of the demographic policies in Hungary and Romania

In this part of the study we will try to evaluate the impact of the Hungarian and Romanian pronatalist policies, on short or long term, as well as their quality. As such, we will have to consider other factors that indirectly affect the birthrate. According to Bernard Berelson (1974: 2), the Government of a state engaged in a pronatalist policy has five possible strategies within reach which can be used individually or combined: 1. to communicate with people in order to influence their demographic behavior in the desired manner; 2. to provide services to effect the desired behavior; 3. to manipulate the balance of incentives and disincentives to achieve the desired regulation; 4. to shift the weight of social institutions and opportunities in the desired direction, and 5. to coerce the desired behavior through the power of the state. Of all these, the most handy strategy for Romania was coercion. Through the draconic regulations of 1966, 1973 and 1983, as well as by restraining the access to any modern method of contraception, Ceauşescu's regime manifested zero tolerance towards preventing and interrupting pregnancy. In this way, the Party and the State usurped the fundamental right of spouses to decide the dimension of their family, and gave them nothing or almost nothing in return. The purpose of this deterioration of the relationship between the State and its citizens was "noble" and challenging: permanently increasing the birth rate in Romania so as to reach a population of 25 million in 1990 and 30 million in 2000.

It cannot be said that the regime has not recorded successes in achieving those objectives. The immediate effect of the decree issued in 1966 was a very strong increase in birth rates from 14.3 in 1966 to 27.4 in 1967 (Băban 1999: 194). Likewise, the total fertility rate almost doubled: from 1.9 in 1966 to 3.66 in 1967. However, in 1968, the two indicators started again to fall to 18.2 and 2.43 in 1973. Following the Instructions in 1973 the growth of the same indicators has not been as high: 20.3 and 2.70 (1974). Up to 1983, the two indicators will decline to the same minimum they set down before 1966, which marked Ceauşescu's long-term pronatalist policies as failure. The years 1984-1987 recorded an increase in the rate of births up to 16.7 and up to 2.42

in the total fertility rate. After 1987, the rate of population growth will again decrease, to reach in the first year of transition a historic minimum of 13.6 and 1.83 below replacement level, a phenomenon firstly marked by the historic decision of the new leaders in Bucharest to exculpate abortion. In line with these increases and decreases, the abortion rate registers a similar trend: it declined in the years following the State's intervention, to constantly grow afterwards. Two features can be extracted from these data: the first, that fertility increased only when the State directly stepped in with additional measures of coercion; and the second, that every time this intervention took place its effects were all lower (Keil and Andreescu 1999: 485-486), which entitles us to believe that in the end, regardless of the actions of the regime, the fertility would drop below replacement level. However, Ceauşescu's success was rather a 23-year delay of the phenomenon, a thesis argued mainly by Bernard Berelson (1979). He compared the fertility rate in Romania with the average fertility of other five countries of the Communist Bloc (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and Poland) during the period 1956-76. Briefly, the demographer argued that the year 1966 was crucial for detaching Romania from the demographic trend of decline which characterized Eastern Europe. Its calculations showed that Romania registered a 39% surplus of births in the first decade after the implementation of antiabortion legislation, which meant half of the 12% overall population growth during the period 1966-76. In the same year, Berelson was convinced that Romania could attain its demographic target for 1990, causing a "*forced transition extension*" (Rotariu 2011: 22).

Of the measures mentioned by Berelson and stated above, Hungary preferred a combination of coercion and positive socio-economic stimulation, with emphasis on the latter. Two were the main features of the Hungarian pronatalist policy, which were essentially different from the "Romanian model": 1. Hungary did not cling to support large families, but rather to encourage women to deliver at least one or two children; 2. While Romania has primarily focused on bringing in as many children, Hungarian pronatalist policy focused on raising and caring for children (Haney 2002: 93). Hungarian politicians have preferred a qualitative growth rather than a quantitative one. Thus, State's intervention in intimate family life was not as striking as their eastern neighbor's, Hungary preferring to leave the decision concerning the number of children up to each family. This consideration is mostly strengthened by the liberalization of the contraceptive market starting with 1967. As a consequence, in 1977: 73% of the Hungarian women used a contraceptive method other than abortion: 55% used the pill, 20% coitus interruptus and 14% IUD (Frejka 1983:

515). The widespread use of modern contraceptives concurred with a lower abortion rate, which proves a smarter pronatalist policy: they managed to control the number of abortions through prevention.

The major issue in Hungary remained the low fertility rate, and the phenomenon depicted by Keil and Andreescu for Romania also applied in this case. Hungary managed only twice to impose a substantial increase in the birth rate and only for a limited period of time. The first time was after Ratkó law, as we already described it above, and the second time after the 1974 combined measures of restricting abortions and increasing the socio-economic incentives, when the birthrate and total fertility rate increased from 15 and 1.95, respectively, in 1973 to 17.8 and 2.3 in 1974 and to 18.4 and 2.38 in 1975 (David 1999: 148). Between these two peaks, Hungary confronted itself with total fertility rates below the replacement index of 2.1. As such, the country's overall population has continually declined after 1981, a trend which has been preserved up to nowadays. If, by definition, a pronatalist policy means the active interest and the effort of a Government to impose a population growth by stimulating the birth rate (Legge and Alford 1986: 710), then it can be stated that the Communist regime in Hungary failed in such a politics.

The above-mentioned arguments, even if relevant, are not enough to fully explain the failure of the pronatalist policies in Hungary and Romania. The picture is much more complex because it includes both issues related to public policies directly implemented on abortion, fertility or marriage, and a series of indirect aspects, considered by many scholars as being more important than the first: the availability and quality of childcare institutions, the existence of a housing policy to meet the demands of demographic growth, the availability of sufficient consumer goods (electronics, clothing, food), access to education, a better division of gender roles especially in family and in society overall. The State had to direct its social institutions and to create a series of social opportunities to support its demographic policies. All the more, urbanization and industrialization have produced important mutations in all spheres of society, changing the attitudes regarding kinship relationships, the system of beliefs, education, health food and even gender roles (Berelson 1974: 2-3).

We can again report differences between the two communist states. Hungary invested much more in social areas such as health, social assistance, and childcare institutions in a time when the economic crisis and the failure of the socialist reforms led to a massive pauperization of the population. This phenomenon is best illustrated by the proportion of income sources in a typical Hungarian family. In 1960, 80.4% of the family income came from the wages and only 18.4 from the State (social benefits). In 1990, the percentage of

the income obtained from wages decreased to 58.1% and that from social benefits increased to 41.4%. According to the formula of Janos Kornai (2000: 144), the Hungarian state has turned into a welfare state in its intention to improve the situation of poor families. Anyhow, the State aids proved to be insufficient facing increased inflation. In Romania such political and social behavior has been excluded as long as everybody had to participate in the effort of paying its foreign debt. Moreover, basic consumer goods began to be rationalized (electricity, drinking water, fuel, and starting 1982, because of the disastrous agricultural production, even food). The Romanian state compelled the population to consume a minimum necessary rather for survival than for comfort.

Hungary stood better in dealing with facilities and child care institutions. Nevertheless, in 1972, the Hungarian state was able to provide only 10% of the nurseries needed for children aged 5 months to 3 years, and only 58.9% of the kindergartens for children from 3 to 5 years (Mieczkowski 1985: 260-261). Instead, in 1974, Romania ensured 41.9% of the needed kindergartens (Moskoff 1980: 609). Nor in terms of housing, the efforts of the two countries were not up to the standards of their desired demographic growth. Throughout its 23 years, the Ceauşescu regime supported large families with more than 3 children, but this policy has not been reflected in securing a decent home. Even if a slightly upward trend can be observed, the apartments with three or more rooms built by the State have never exceeded a percentage higher than 42.3%, a peak reached in the period 1981-85. After this period the program of building houses has stopped due to the economic crisis (Turnock 1990: 140). In Hungary's case, the emphasis was on two-room apartments which, in 1986, represented 48% of the total house building fund. Efforts in this regard were in accordance with the principles of a pronatalist policy focused on the family with 2-3 children. However, the conditions wherein they were built were not at all comfortable: 22.8% of these apartments lacked drinking water and 69.8% lacked gas (Locsmándi and Sillince 1990: 442).

The lack of childcare institutions and the scarce housing policy are just two examples that illustrate the failure of modernization in the way it was imagined by the communist leaders. The legitimacy of the Communist regimes collapsed as the State was no longer able to meet its liabilities: to raise living standards, to guarantee stable prices and a coherent system of social politics, as well as other socio-economic benefits meant to ensure regime's tranquility and the implementation of its policies. As a consequence, none of the demographic politics of the two countries were able to breach such economic, social and political context.

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Religious Minorities, Political Majorities: the Alawis in Syria and the Maronites in Lebanon

Valentina-Tania Duna

"Babes-Bolyai" University, Faculty of History, Cluj-Napoca, Romania,
+40-264-505300, tania_duna@yahoo.com

Abstract: This article analyzes the evolution of two minority communities from the Middle East: the Alawis in Syria and the Maronites in Lebanon. The author considers their identity as a religious one, despite the attempt of the Great Powers to forge national identities based on ethnic loyalties in the Middle East after the First World War. Even though at first sight these two communities seem to have more differences than similarities, this paper employs the comparative analysis to point out that their cases are actually very alike due to the historical geopolitical context of the Middle East These minorities have both played a major political role throughout the modern period, acting more like political majorities interlinked with the post-colonial regimes shaken by the recent Arab spring.

Keywords: Alawis, Maronites, religious minorities, Middle East, Syria, Lebanon.

Introduction

This article aims at presenting two distinct communities that have played an important role in the arena of the Middle East, especially since the beginning of the formation of the nation-state system in the Middle East: the Alawis in Syria and the Maronites in Lebanon. Considering the important events known as the Arab Spring that have shaken the Middle East in 2011-2012 we believe that the story of the two religious minorities could allow the understanding at least partly the causes of these events. That is because at one time in their history, both minorities saw themselves forced to seize the power due to the passivity of the majority.

The Maronites

The story of the Maronite minority begins in 423, when a Syrian monk named Maron founded the Maronite faith.

With the Arab conquests in the seventh century, the territory inhabited by followers of Saint Maron was surrounded by Arabs, so that the "Maronite

island" could not communicate with the rest of Christendom, whose main centers were then Rome and Constantinople. In 687 the Maronites have chosen their own patriarch - Saint John Maron (Joannes Maro or Yuhanna Marun in Arabic), Patriarch of Antioch from 685 to 707. This angered the Emperor of Constantinople, Justinian II. That is how in 694 the Byzantine forces attacked the Maronite monastery on the River Orontes in Syria, where the Saint Maron lived. He escaped to Lebanon and, helped by 12,000 Maronite fighters he managed to defeat the Byzantines who followed him in Lebanon. However, the Maronites were not able to defend against the powerful Arabs who had started their rise to power so they were forced to retreat in the heart of the mountains, where they were constantly harassed by the Arabs. Over the centuries, however, the Maronites were able to maintain their unique culture and traditions.

Today it is estimated that in the Middle East there are about 9 million Maronites, scattered in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. There is also a Maronite diaspora in Australia, Canada and the U.S., which counts at around 3 million people (Stokes, Gorman, Newmann 2009: 446).

The Maronite community has found a refuge in Lebanon not only in 694, but also after the First World War. Ever since the division of the Middle East by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French wanted a mandate over the Lebanese territory in order to keep the privileges of the Maronite minority. But inside the mandatated territory, the Maronites had the same position that the Alawis had gained in Syria: although representing only 30 percent of the total population, they have come to lead Lebanon, but with French aid. Thus, inside the Lebanese society the Maronite minority that became a political majority was afraid of a possible assimilation by the Muslims. On the other hand the rest of the Muslim population would not have wanted to live in a country led and dominated by Christians, but would have preferred a union with Syria. The perceptions of the two communities have only maintained a latent tension in Lebanon, so the "Switzerland of the Middle East" (Calvocoressi 2000: 383) finally exploded in a conflict that lasted nearly twenty years.

The Maronites in Lebanon

In the period following the First World War, the Great Powers (Great Britain and France) mandatated by the League of Nations attempted to change the identity of the people in the Middle East: if inside the Ottoman Empire the religious identity played an important role (which was proven by the administrative division of the Ottoman Empire into four millets: Muslim, Greek, Armenian and Hebrew), in the "new world order", the winners of the

"game" brought to the stage of the Middle East the ethnic identity, especially through the concept of self determination (Weller 2005: 3-28) promoted by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson during his famous speech in which he exposed the 14 points (1918).

As the history would follow its course, these changes would have crucial consequences for the political arena of the Middle East. In the 1930s and the 1940s, as response to the mandates system and the redrawing of the map of the Middle East, the local powers adopted a new European concept – nationalism. The national identity based on ethnic identity gained more and more ground in the Middle East. At least this is what it looked like, for, in most cases, for the Arab people in the area, nationalism did not mean the same thing as it had for the Europeans: the concept was adapted to the local values and traditions. The result was absolutely astonishing, for the Middle East did not seem to be governed by the same rules as the ones functioning in the Western part of the world. And even more, despite the nationalistic values that entered in the Middle East via the European Powers after the First World War, the most powerful linkage for the people living in this region seems to have remained the religious one.

Most of the newly created states in the Middle East after the First World War were an artificial construct, for they did not reflect the religious or ethnic realities in the territory: this was the case of Iraq, Syria or Lebanon. Thus, while in Iraq there were three major communities (the Shi'a Muslims, Sunni Muslims and the Kurds), the case of Syria and Lebanon was even more complex. The French, who had acquired the status of mandatory power in Syria, decided to partition Syria on the basis of the religious identity of its population in order to achieve a more efficient administration. Thus, Syria would look like this (Kamrava 2005: 45):

1. A territory that would become Lebanon and where an important Maronite minority lived;
2. An Alawi state in North;
3. A Druze state in South;
4. Aleppo and Damascus would become city-states.

The territorial changes in the Middle East in the aftermath of the First World War were not followed by other significant ones. Neither the political arena did not change a lot, for the regional system became quite stable, whether one refers to the traditional monarchies in the region (such as the ones in Saudi Arabia or Morocco) or to the regimes installed after a military coup (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia) (Humphreys 1999: 25). That is until the Arab Spring of 2010-2011, when at least three leaders and their subsequent

regimes were replaced: Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia.

Lebanon was born as a state in the Middle East not having a national foundation based on an ethnic identity. One can rather say that when it decided to break Lebanon from Syria, France had as a main objective keeping the autonomy and the privileges of the Maronite community. This could only become possible if the French would prevent the incorporation of Lebanon into a Greater Syria. But the French got caught in their own trap, for in the territory that formed Lebanon the majority of the population was Muslim, the Maronites representing only around 30%. Because of this demographic reality, the greatest fear of the Maronites was that they could have been assimilated into the Arab world, thus having their identity destroyed. On the other hand, the Muslims have always wanted the unity with Syria in order to avoid living in a state dominated by Christians and, at the same time, to return to their own Arab cultural roots. Both communities would perceive each other as a threat to their own identitary security. Moreover, the Maronites have favoured a French-Mediterranean orientation, always looking towards Europe and backwards to the Arab world. The Muslim population did not share the same feelings, for they had not been consulted when they were incorporated into Lebanon. The Christian minority realized that the only way it could keep the political domination in the newly created state was to rely on the French aid (Haddad 2002: 31).

The existing religious mosaic in the new state made it difficult to create a coherent system of government because, except the Maronites and the Druzes living in enclaves defined by territorial terms, the remaining population was extremely heterogeneous in terms of religion (which had not caused problems during the Ottoman Empire thanks to the *millets* administrative system, which stressed the religious identity of the people living inside the Ottoman Empire, for there were four *millets:* the Muslims one, the Greeks one, the Armenians one and the Jews one (Lewis 1995: 322)). The loyalty of the different religious groups manifested in a rather clientele system, from local notables (urban or rural), also different in religious or ethnic terms (from Druze princes, Maronites merchants to Sunni landowners) and promoting the interests of their clients. An effective policy that would have allowed the survival of the Lebanese state should have taken into account all these competing demands.

The transition to internal autonomy was easier (compared to Syria) because of Maronites, which led to the establishment of a Constitution in 1926, which gave Lebanon some political rights, but in essence, the mandate was maintained, and the French High Commissioner had the right to suspend

the Constitution and dissolve the Parliament (as it happened on two occasions, between 1932-1934 and 1939). In 1936 France and Lebanon signed a treaty in which stipulated the importance of the representation of all the segments of the population in the government and administration. In 1937 Emile Edde - one of the Maronite political leaders was elected President and the Muslim Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab was appointed Premier. Thus, a precedent was created, because the pattern would repeat itself until the 1980s. But that also convinced the Muslim leaders that their interests were better represented if they were inside the political system. However, just like Syria, Lebanon would not win its long wanted independence (promised in the treaty of 1936), and in the eve of World War II the French High Commissioner suspended once again the Constitution and dissolved the Parliament.

The problems of France during the Second World War also affected Lebanon, where there were three actors in a diplomatic conflict: the Vichy regime, the British government and Free French movement led by General Charles de Gaulle. In addition to suspending the Constitution (which caused a political crisis), Lebanon faced with an economic crisis (exacerbated by the lack of food for the population). The Free French troops together with the British ones entered Lebanon, removing the troops loyal to Pétain (Hourani 2010: 362). De Gaulle promised Lebanon its independence in 1941, but he did not keep his promise, restoring the mandate. The popular and the British pressures forced the French to restore the Constitution and organize elections in 1943, the results being by far anti-French. Just a few days after the war had ended in Europe, de Gaulle began sending reinforcements to all the garrisons in the Levant. French troops landed on the Lebanese coast, remembering to the Lebanese what happened in 1920, so the local people became violent. The French responded by bombing Damascus. It took the intervention of Great Britain to France to agree the withdrawal of its troops. In December 1946 the last French troops left Lebanon.

Following the same pattern mentioned above, Bishara al-Khuri was elected President, who designated Riyadh al-Sulh Prime Minister. The two tried to solve the problems in Lebanon caused by the religious and ethnic diverse groups through an agreement in 1943 known as the National Pact (Felton 2008: 327). The document recognized Lebanon as a distinct state, which removed the fears of Maronite Christians that they could be swallowed by an Arab-Islamic state. Meanwhile, the agreement mentioned Lebanon's Arab identity, which was part of the Arab world, thereby calming Lebanese Muslims who stopped wishing the incorporation of Lebanon into a larger Arab state. This Pact along with the Constitution drafted in 1920 and the established customs during the 1930s served as a framework for the Lebanese political

system until the civil war broke up in 1975. Despite all these, one should note that the political representation was frozen in the year 1932, when a census stated that the Christians were more than Muslims, even though the demographic reality changed later. The Shiite Muslim minority remained underrepresented in the Lebanese political structures, although 20 percent of the population was Shi'a.

Since the end of World War II until the 1960s Beirut was the jewel of the Eastern Mediterranean, a glittering metropolis where a bridge between East and West had been created. From a financial standpoint, Beirut could have been compared to Switzerland (Calvocoressi 2000: 383), because after the massive nationalization that took place in all other major Arab cities (Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad), the Arab investors with their capital have turned to the capital of Lebanon. This made the Lebanese eager to attract more capital into their country, so they adopted banking secrecy laws. Concerning the freedom of expression, in the city with a Western air there were a lot of exiled people, so there were some newspapers where one could find the most diverse political ideas, while in the rest of the Middle East censorship was a real government policy. But what was even more surprising was an ethnic and religious pluralism that seemed to work, so it could have been taken as a model for the region. The violence that started in 1975-1976 have shattered any ray of hope, for if the Beirut model did not work anymore, what chance to work could have had the Middle East?

In the depth of the Lebanese life, the clientele system was still working and none of the interest groups could become dominant. Identity based on kinship and religion preceded over national identity. Under these conditions certain groups loyal to one person and created based on ethnic and religious identities have developed. Voice of Maronites was Kataib or the Phalange, founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel. With an air of youth organization, it was not a secret that it found an inspiration source in the European fascist parties of the time. Soon, the organization was transformed into a military force army under the leadership of its founder being always ready to defend the idea that Lebanon was the home of the Maronites, so it rejected any idea of a Lebanon that would have ever been part of an Arab federation. In 1949 the Druze Kamal Jumblatt created the Progressive Socialist Party, managing to unite all leftist coalitions representing a challenge to the Maronites, while they were adherents of pan-Arabism. Lebanese Sunni Muslims were left with very little influence, being fragmented between a number of local leaders, some of whom were followers of nasserism (Sorenson 2008: 295).

Although the Lebanese Constitution established the office of president to six years, Al-Khuri has not carried out his second term, being forced to resign in 1952, and in his placed was elected President Camille Chamoun. He saw himself forced to choose between the West and Arab heritage, so Lebanon joined the Baghdad Pact, but at the same time he maintained close relations with the West. However, his refusal to sever relations with the British and French during the Suez Canal crisis worsened its relations with Nasser (Zahar 2003: 111).

In 1958 Muslim discontent at the prospect of a new term of President Chamoun escalated into a major revolt (Sorenson 2008: 294). The President asked the army to intervene, but its commander, General Fuad Shihib refused to use army in an internal conflict, so Chamoun asked for help from the U.S., which quickly intervened. At the end of his term in September 1958, the general who won the approval of the Muslims and the Christians during the uprising was elected president. During his term relations between Christians and Muslims have improved. Well aware of the fact that the events of 1958 had as cause the grievances of the Muslim population, Shihab initiated a program of reforms meant to modernize Lebanon, reforms that required increased central government power at the expense of clientele system. In addition, the President wanted to ensure that Muslims would be better represented in political terms, so he made sure that the Muslims will occupy more positions in the government than before.

After the Six Days War, the Palestinian guerrilla activity in the refugee camps in southern Lebanon (where Shia Muslims live) has increased. Attacks launched by them on various targets in Israel forced the Israelis to respond with bombing several villages and refugee camps. The Shiite population had to leave their villages, heading towards the outskirts of Beirut. The miserable conditions in which they lived there did no more than to stir resentment against a government that seemed to be indifferent to their situation. In an effort to limit Palestinian guerrilla activity against Israel, in 1969 Lebanese and Palestinian officials signed a document in Cairo which stated that the PLO could continue to operate in southern Lebanon, but needed government permission to strike across the border in Israel. Palestinians have interpreted this agreement as an agreement that they could do whatever they wanted from their bases in southern Lebanon (Felton 2008: 328).

In September 1970 Jordan decided to evacuate the members of Fatah, a new wave of Palestinian refugees arrived in southern Lebanon. All these waves of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have changed even more the demographic composition so that the Muslims had come to represent two-thirds of the total population, while only a third were Christian Maronites, which made the latter feel threatened that they could again be dominated by Muslim Arabs.

On 13 April 1975, an armed man fired on a church in a Christian neighborhood of Beirut, killing four people. The Phalange responded immediately, killing twenty-six Palestinians in a bus. Violence escalated immediately, continuing until October 1976, when, in an attempt to end it, meetings in Riyadh and Cairo were organized. As they failed and the conflict continued to grow, the Lebanese President Sleiman Franjieh called for the help of the Syrian army. In 1978, under the pretext that the PLO had intensified its activity, the Israeli army occupied southern Lebanon, withdrawing in the same year, but not without leaving behind a security zone under the control of the South Lebanon Army. Meanwhile, alarmed by hostilities, the United Nations created the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Terry 2008: 263-264). In 1980 the Gemayel family Phalange had a victory against Chamoun family and other Maronite clans.

On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, having as objective the expulsion of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon. With the help of international mediation, the PLO left Beirut and Bashir Gemayel was elected president. The President was killed in September 1982 and as retaliation the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila were massacred. A multinational peacekeeping force composed of French, Italian, American and British forces was created. It was meant to supervise the PLO evacuation from Lebanon (Calvocoressi 2000: 391-394). As a result of what happened, the PLO had to move its headquarters in Tunis, 3200 kilometers away from territories it planned to liberate. In 1983, the Israelis decided to withdraw from Lebanon, but they extended as much as possible the evacuation of its troops (so not even in 1985 this was completed) and they maintained a security zone in southern Lebanon (approximately ten percent of Lebanese territory). This area was released only in 2000, all this time being the target of attacks by local people who claimed their right to liberate their land under occupation.

In 1985, President Amin Gemayel (Bashir Gemayel's brother) asked again the aid of Syria, which was more than happy to intervene, because it demonstrated that Israel's intervention in Lebanon failed. But not everyone would agree with Lebanese Syrian intervention, and among them was General Michel Aoun, named interim Prime Minister in 1988. He launched a campaign against the Syrians and their Druze allies in 1989, hoping for international support, which never came (Sorenson 2008: 298).

Not represented properly in politics since the independence of Lebanon, the Shiite minority organized into two groups in order to be able to achieve its political and religious objectives: Amal and Hizbollah. In an attempt to reach a compromise in October 1989 under the auspices of the Arab League, the

Lebanese leaders met in Taif (a small town in Saudi Arabia) and signed a document that reflects the reality of the Lebanese population. Thus, Maronite Christians no longer held most of the power, but all the key posts were given based on religious affiliation. Following the Civil War, Maronites came to have a marginal status after the Taif Agreements due to many bad decisions they had taken during the conflict. Maronite Lebanese society would now have three options: the first one would be to continue the policy of isolation and confrontation with the Arab Muslim world, but this policy has already weakened the Maronite community, so it would not be a favorable option; the second would be to make Maronite community a closed, confined one in which the Maronites would be satisfied only by religious freedom; the third option representing a combination of the first two seems most likely. (Zamir 1999: 119-126)

If during the Arab revolutions in 2010-2011 peoples have asked for the change of the regime, in Lebanon the protesters asked for the change of the sectarian regime, adding a sectarian dimension to the protests. This is because the sectarian identities still continue to determine the political allegiances. Therefore, the people in Lebanon protested against a system that created socioeconomic exploitation, unemployment, emigration, poverty, marginalization, unequal regional development, racism and discrimination (Hermez 2011: 527-530).

The Alawis

The name Alawi is an English word, for the followers of this belief were known as Nusairis, after Abu Shu'ayb Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who is said to have attended the circles of the last three Imams of the Prophet Muhammad's line. However, they prefer to be referred to as the Alawis, from Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad so the ties with the Shiites are obvious. However, they do not consider themselves as descendants of the of the family of Ali, but rather gatekeepers, which explains the importance of the *bab* (a word that means *gate*).

But the interesting aspects of the Alawis does not stop here, for, with the arrival of the Crusaders in the eleventh century, they have adopted a series of concepts and practices from Christendom. Thus, they celebrate Christmas, Epiphany and Pentecost. They also believe in the Trinity. Even more than this, the Alawis believe in reincarnation. Thus, one can clearly see why the Alawis are not considered Muslims. This was a real problem for President Hafiz al-Asad, who had to ask Musa al-Sadr (a Shiite cleric in Syria) to declare that the Alawis were Shiite Muslims (Sorenson 2008: 58).

The Alawis in Syria

During the First World War, the population of Syria diminished by 18% due to famine or diseases. But there were not only human losses, but also material ones and, most of all, the imposition of the French imperial rule brought a social trauma that, for the Syrian population meant the destruction of the pattern of life that existed before the war. Because they had self-proclaimed protectors of the Christian communities in the Middle East (namely of the Maronites), the French continued their religious and educational activities in the region. As a consequence of this policy, the Muslim population intensified their alienation towards France. Added to the religious reason, France was aware that it had invested a lot in the economy of the region (in building railways and port facilities or in other commercial activities) during the Ottoman rule. For France, the Syrian possession in the Levant was a matter of prestige in its competition with Great Britain. This led to the military expedition that ousted King Faysal from Damascus, replacing it with a mandate from the League of Nations. France was supposed to encourage the local political elite to create viable government institutions that would prepare Syria for its independence. Instead of this, France tried to apply to Syria the same politics used in its possessions in Maghreb in order to prolong their mandate as much as possible. Thus, the French encouraged a heterogeneous society from a religious and an ethnical point of view. In the 1920's France removed some territories from Syria, giving them to Lebanon and not taking into consideration that, except the Beirut, in those territories the majority of the population was Muslim. But the French did not stop here with their attempt to crush any possible Syrian national identity, but in 1920 they fragmented Syria as mentioned above, so until 1942, when Syria became independent, the Syrian administration was not unitary, except for a short period between 1936 and 1939. In 1924 France decided to unify the city-states of Aleppo and Damascus into one state – Syria – separating even more the Alawite and Druze minoritary communities from the rest of the Muslim population (Cleveland, Bunton 2009: 218-222). It is not difficult to understand why the political life in Syria was dominated by a permanent state of instability after it was granted the independence in 1946.

Between 1925 and 1927 in the Druze state there was a revolt due to the intention of the French governor to restructure the political relations and land ownership. The uprising was led by Sultan Atrash (the leader of the Druzes) and had soon spread to the cities of Syria, looking more and more like a national movement. The French, frustrated because they were unable to withstand the demonstrators, launched an air strike on October 18, 1925,

bombing Damascus for 48 hours. Although the losses were huge (about 1,400 Syrians have died), the revolt lasted until the spring of 1927.

The costs of maintaining their control over Syria were extremely high for the French: they used a lot of bureaucracy which was supported by an espionage service and by 15,000 soldiers who were part of the Army of Levant. In addition, the supreme authority in the French mandatated territories – the High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon - was located in Beirut. France tried to discourage the Syrian people on getting experience in administrative and political accountability. France rather focused on creating a local competent military. Thus, even in the first year in office (1920) a military academy was created, the instructors being French. By 1930, the Syrian army numbered about 6000 people. It is most interestingly to look at the composition of the army because it will have repercussions later. Thus, most Sunni Muslim families from the cities tended to despise a military career, so they did not send their sons to the military academy, which opened the way for other social and religious groups. When Syria gained independence in 1946, the bodies of officers consisted mainly of religious minorities and when the military intervened in the politics of Syria, the Sunni population lost its dominant position (Haklai 2000: 30).

At the end of the 1925-1927 uprising, on the political scene of Syria appears a new party - the National Bloc. It consisted of the same families of notables in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the policy adopted by the National Bloc tends to resemble very much of the one during the Ottoman period, for members of this party were no more and no less than intermediaries between the local people and the French authorities. They actually wanted to keep the old social, economic and political patterns. However, the French were not willing to negotiate the terms of the future independence of Syria, so they rejected the constitution proposed by the local political elite in 1929 and a year later France had imposed its own constitution, which maintained the French mandatory authority. Although the presidents and the prime ministers were Syrians, the French had veto right on legislation. The ascension of Leon Blum to power in France in 1936 gave hope to the Syrians, but a proposal similar to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1930 was rejected when Blum's coalition collapsed. The failure of the National Bloc only proved that the moderate approach which they tried to apply did not work, almost guaranteeing an unstable political legacy in Syria (Cleveland ,Bunton 2009: 223-225).

In 1939, after nearly twenty years in office, the French high commissioner suspend the Syrian constitution, dissolved parliament, restored the autonomy of the Alawite and Druze states and, furthermore, decided to give Turkey the district of Alexandretta, which the Syrians considered as part

of their national territory. During the Second World War, the local population got caught between economic deprivation, military invasion and political repression. The crisis reached its climax when the population took to the streets in a true hunger protest demanding the restoration of the political life (Cleveland, Bunton 2009: 228). The advance of the troops led by Rommel and Rashid Ali's revolt in Iraq made the British realize that the countries of the Levant led the French army of the Republic of Vichy risked being occupied by Nazi armies had it not been restored internal order. So the Brits and the Free French intervened militarily in Syria and Lebanon. De Gaulle decided that the two countries were to achieve independence immediately and unconditionally. The Syrians and the Lebanese were to be disappointed, however, for de Gaulle, a convinced imperialist who believed in the glory of France withdrew its promise made in 1941, restoring the French mandates in the two states. The French came into collision not only with the people of the two countries, but also with the British. In 1943 the French were obliged to take into account public unrest and British pressure, organizing elections and restoring the constitution. The results were clear against the mandatory power, for the population had elected Shukri al-Quwwatli of the National Bloc as the first President of Syria (Sorenson 2008: 277). On May 17, 1945 French troops landed on the Lebanese coast, in order to strengthen the French military garrisons in the Levant. The local population resorted to violence, and in response the French bombarded Damascus, over 400 Syrians being killed. At the intervention of the British, the French agreed to withdraw its troops from the area, so the last French soldiers left Syria in the spring of 1946.

The Syrian army officers put the defeat of the Arab forces in 1948 due to the civil regime, so in March 1949 the army led by Colonel Husni Zaim gave the first in a series of coups. Colonel Adib Shishakli was the one who gave this coup, and he stayed at power until 1954, when, like any dictator, resorted to repressive measures against the population, which destroyed his popularity gained in the first two years of his leadership, when he imposed order and discipline in the Syrian politics.

Between 1954 and 1958 Syria was governed by a civil regime during which a series of political parties emerged. The Syrian People's Party was formed by merchants and landowners in Aleppo, Syria's second largest city. The Party reflected the traditional rivalry between Aleppo and Damascus, for around the latter the economic elite had founded the National Party. But despite the fact that the two parties controlled the parliament and its leaders due to considerable resources, they had no broad base of support: the peasants, the small business owners and the military had been left out.

However these people found a representation in a third party that emerged around this period: the Baath Party. The Baath Party (Baath means resurrection) was founded by Michel Aflaq, an Orthodox Christian and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim. They met as students in Paris and tried to formulate a doctrine which would have combined nationalism with socialism. The party was officially born when Syria became independent in 1946 and focused mainly on the existence of a single Arab nation, which would have meant Arab unity. Nasser was inspired by its ideas later, borrowing the slogan "unity, freedom and socialism". In 1966 Aflaq lost his position in an internal party fight, so he fled to Lebanon and then in Brazil. Two years later Saddam Hussein in Iraq was to seize power in the name of baathism (Seddon 2005: 19). In 1957 the Baath Party merged with the newly Syrian Communist Party and in 1958 the Baath Party signed an Agreement for a union with Nasser's Egypt, known as the United Arab Republic.

This is when the Alawis came in the political life of Syria, for the one was to dominate Syrian politics was an Alawi with modest origins, born in northwest Syria. Hafiz al-Asad was the first member of his family to receive education, and had he not been able to join the military academy in 1951, certainly he could not have continued his ascent because of financial reasons. When he was sixteen years old he joined the Baath Party, like other young people of his generation. The period in which there was the United Arab Republic was a difficult one for Assad because he did not like the fact that Nasser dominated the union and eventually he was sent to Cairo, where, together with other young members of the Baath Party planned the revival of the party to which they belonged. Opportunity would arise faster than they thought, in 1961, during the political chaos caused by Syria leaving the United Arab Republic. In 1963 al-Asad with other young officers gave a coup that brought the Baath Party to power again. The new leadership has adopted a series of social policies, in particular against urban notables, so the new military regime restructured the Syrian political elite by creating an alliance between those who had rural origins and the urban middle class (high school teachers, clerks, students) - all supporters of the Baath Party. In 1966, after an internal party fight some old party supporters were removed (among which were the two founders of the Baath Party mentioned above), and al-Asad was now defense minister and air force commander. The defeat suffered by Syrian troops in the 1967 war with Israel discredited the defense minister, but he was convinced that Israel's victory over Syria was due mainly to the mistakes of those he worked with, so in November 1970 al-Asad took over all the power in his hands, being elected as president of Syria for the next seven years. The new

constitution of 1973 did not state that the elected President to be Muslim, so the majoritary Muslims perceived the Alawi regime of al-Asad as a secular and sectarian one, so protests were held all across the country. Al-Asad responded immediately inserting a clause requiring the need for a Muslim president, but at the same time he ordered the prominent members of the Shiite *ulama* to enter a decree stating that the Alawis were Muslims. The protests and the response of the Syrian President indicated that sectarian tensions still played an important role in Syrian politics (Sorenson 2008: 398-400).

Al-Asad used the Baath Party and army to ensure his personal success and promote the Alawi community members in the highest positions in the army and secret services. The one-party regime focused on Asad's cult of personality has proven to be extremely stable. The infrastructure (including transport communications and systems) has been improved, and the government has invested heavily in education, health care and military. In the 1970s Syria has experienced unprecedented economic growth, followed in 1980 by stagnation, and with the fall of the Soviet bloc Syria lost international military aid that they have enjoyed when it was allied with the Soviet Union. Syria has adopted a nationalist policy in the region, intervening militarily in 1976 in Lebanon, at its request, but retired to end the conflict, thus interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon only in 2005, due to international pressures. However, at the time of the intervention in Lebanon in 1976 Asad managed to create the impression that Syria had been the champion that actually tried to help Lebanon.

Asad was also involved in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 only because of the rivalry between his country and Iraq because both came to be led by factions of the Baath Party and each one said about the other one that is was a deviation from the true Baath principles. That is why when the Iranian-Iraqi conflict broke out Syrian President chose to side with the Iranian Shiite (non-Arab) regime, which put him in opposition with the Arab world who supported Iraq and soon, Syria became quite isolated from the Arab world. Syrian President supported the invasion of Iraq in 1991, partly because of rivalry between him and Saddam Hussein, but his son opposed the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. in 2003.

After Hafiz al-Asad's death in 2000, his son Bashar al-Asad took over the power in Syria. Bashar continued his father's policies, but he granted a greater political freedom encouraging a series of technological developments, specially the use of computers and the Internet. It seems that the latter ones would bring a lot of problems for Hafiz al-Asad's son, for the events of early 2011 used a socialization network on the Internet to call for a "day of anger":

Facebook. The starting protests were small, but they escalated when a group of children in the city of Dar' was arrested for writing graffiti that called for the fall of the regime on their school wall. The citizens of Dar' took to the streets protesting against the brutal treatment of the children by the security forces and soon, incidents like these spread to other localities nearby. The security forces responded with a brutality that included violent crackdowns on public demonstrations, arrests, imprisonment and torture. In the fifteenth week of the protests the news reports stated that the numbers of participants was at over four million. The demonstrators demanded for the release of all political detainees, the removal of the state of emergency and the end of the domination of the Baath Party in the political scene. However, the sectarianism played an important role in the dynamics of the conflict, for it was well known that the army and the security services were controlled by the Alawis. They had brutally repressed any opponents to the regime, but many Syrians still remembered specially the massacre of Hama in 1982, when nearly thirty thousand residents of Hama were killed when the regime tried to eradicate an armed Islamist insurrection. Furthermore, due to the ethnical and religious mosaic there was the fear that things could turn into a civil war, just like the one in Lebanon (Ismail 2011: 539-540).

The Maronites in Lebanon and the Alawis in Syria – a comparative analysis
Historically, the two countries appeared after the First World War and they were the result of the artificial partitioning of the map of the Middle East by the Great Powers. Neither in Syria, nor in Lebanon did the two religious minorities get the political representation according to the demographical reality. However, while in the case of the Maronites this was an advantage in the beginning, the Alawis became a political majority only after the Baath Party and especially Hafez al-Asad came to power.

At some point, the Maronites and the Alawis realized that they needed a coherent and stable government for the country in which they lived and, as the majoritarian population seemed to have been passive, they were forced to seize the power.

The most obvious difference between the two religious minorities is the fact that the Maronites are Christians, while the Alawis are Muslims. But, paradoxically, this brings another major similarity between the two communities: their beliefs are considered a heresy by the religion they are related to.

The clientelism and the sectarianism has always been a problem for the internal security of both countries. The cause behind this was the multiple identities inside the two countries which the people could not surpass. But if in Lebanon the sectarian policy led to a civil war for nearly twenty years, in Syria the dictatorship regime managed to avoid a similar conflict.

Another difference between the two countries would be their leaders: while in Syria the al-Asad family had created some sort of hereditary dictatorship, in Lebanon the free elections kept the rule of law.

During the Arab Spring (2011-2012) both the Syrian people and the Lebanese ones had protested against a system backed by a party and a minority in the first case and in the other case those who held the power were more dispersed, so the Lebanese could not focus on a certain person (as, for example, in Egypt or in Tunisia).

Conclusions

The aftermath of First World War was a period of tremendous change for the Middle East and the society living here. There was nothing comparable until the Jasmine revolution in 2011-2012. The cause of this outburst of violence is said to have been poverty. However we believe that one must look deeper inside the history of the Middle East in order to uncover the roots of the violence that, in some countries of the region has never ceased.

There are always some questions that must be asked: what would happen if the religious and ethnic majorities in the Middle East (that is where the case is so) would seize the power? Would the violence stop? Or this would bring even more violence as the majorities might consider taking reprisals against the minorities who ruled them for so much time and who had even used extreme measures sometimes, as was the case of the thirty thousand people in the city of Hama in 1982, killed because they represented another alternative for the Syrian people.

A political balance of power in the Middle East continues to remain evasive. The risk of replacing the tyranny of minorities with the tyranny of majorities remains high if the law of retaliation continues to rule the relations between the Middle Eastern communities and societies.

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Young Generations, Partnership and Life Stages – Opinions and Attitudes in the Czech Republic [1]

Beatrice Chromková Manea, Kateřina Dvořáková

OPS Office for Population Studies, Faculty of Social Studies, 602 00, Brno, Jostova 10, Czech Republic, +420 549 49 1915, manea@fss.muni.cz, katadvorakova@centrum.cz

Abstract: The sociological, economic and cultural aspects of young generations have changed significantly over the past two decades. Among the central factors that lead to the occurrence of these changes in the Czech Republic are demographic development, individualization and socio-economic transition. Some researchers argue that the transition to adulthood has become less normative, pointing to an accelerating process of individualization of the life course. In this paper, we explore adolescents' attitudes and opinions (12-15 years) on the characteristics of future partner, the ideal age of partner, partnerships and career planning in the sense of the timing of life events - moving away from parental home, living together with a partner, participation in the labour market, entry into marriage and parenthood. Both quantitative and qualitative studies will be employed in the analysis - a quantitative survey carried out in the Czech Republic in 2007 and a qualitative study conducted in schools during 2010-2011. We expect gender differences in opinions and attitudes. The analysis indicates an apparent growth in the diversity of life patterns.

Keywords: partnership, the timing of life events, young generations, transition to adulthood

1. Introduction

The sociological, economic and cultural aspects of young generations have changed significantly over the past two decades. Among the central factors that lead to the occurrence of these changes are demographic development, individualization and socio-economic transition of the Czech society. The nature of the partnership, intimacy and childbearing is being transformed and deeply characterize younger generations in the population. Some scholars argue that the transition to adulthood has become less normative, pointing to an

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accelerating process of individualization of the life course (Jonsson and Mills 2001, Corijn and Klijzing 2001).

The purpose of this paper is to sketch a portrait of young people's attitudes, opinions and experiences on the characteristics of future partner, the ideal age of partner, partnerships and career planning in the sense of the timing of life events - moving away from parental home, living together with a partner, participation in the labour market, entry into marriage and parenthood. The main questions guiding our paper are the following: What are the expectations teenage population has in relation to the selection of a partner? What is the ideal age difference between partners? What are the most important characteristics of a successful marriage/partnership? What are their life paths? Are there gender differences?

The main theoretical framework relevant to the chosen topic is the concept of individualization connected to value shifts in post-modern societies. This article is primarily descriptive and tries to capture the desired/planned life paths of teenage Czech population (13-15 years) and point to the possible differences between boys and girls.

Giving the relevant theoretical framework, we employ two methodological perspectives: one quantitative - survey "Generation", which took place at the end of 2007 and studied population aged 13-18, and one qualitative - within the project "Family through children's eyes", which took place during 2010-2011 and involved research with children in schools (aged 12-13). The first part of the paper will deal with the main theoretical perspectives with focus on the main research dealing with adolescents. Further on, we will deal with the attitudes and opinions on partnership and life-course sequences and point to the possible gender differences. Analytical section will contain respondents' individual biographies based on their expectations concerning the timing of the most important life events (leaving parents' home, living with a partner, entering into a marriage, having first child and having first paid job).

2. Theoretical considerations

Past and present changes in life course and family structures are to a large extent the result of changes at the societal level within the era of modernization and post-modernization. From the structural point of view, modernization implies a diminution of the life constraints and a rise in the choices people have. From the cultural perspective, it is the development of individualization and the lessening of traditional views developed and perpetuated within the traditional family and Christian religion that contribute to these changes (Možný 1990, 2006).

There is quite a numerous body of research that has introduced the notion of changes of values and attitudes in developed societies over the last decades (see Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). The key to understanding preferences and behaviour lies in early childhood socialization, as it has an impact on the process of formation of different value priorities.

The traditional patterns of transitions to different life stages – such as adulthood have become fragmented and broader, making the transition to these stages complicated for young generations.

Hoffman-Nowotny and Fux (2001) talk about a *structure-culture paradigm* in the context of individualization and argue that the relationship between modernization at the macro-level and decisions made at the individual level should be studied using the *resources-restrictions-behaviour approach*. People have a greater control over their lives, while having a relationship and children has become a matter of choice. Also a variety of lifestyles and many opportunities in the labour market or education are offered. Consequently, as Hoffmann-Nowotny and Fux tackled in their work, people are strained to make the best choice according to the situation they find in but not disregarding societal expectations, individual interests and available resources (2001: 24).

In the same line, Giddens (1991) emphasizes that individual life-planning has become a general feature of life in modern societies – young cohorts plan their future life, including education, living arrangements, parenthood or participation in the labour market. Modernity confronts people with a complex set of choices, but they are not provided with guidelines how to select among them. Therefore, *life-planning* is important in a world of alternative lifestyle options and *reflexivity* over it plays an important role. People are under a continuous process of revision in the light of new information and knowledge when deciding to enter into a relationship, to have children or to choose a certain lifestyle model. As Giddens argues, the self, as a reflexive project, and the penetrating effect of the reflexivity of modernity into the core of self can lead to a new sense of self that might have influence on all important life phases. The lifespan becomes more and more freed from externalities associated with pre-established ties to other individuals and groups[2]. Young generations, by planning their life, delay or even refuse to enter into a relationship due to their high expectations about the partner or relationship.

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002), Beck-Gernsheim (2002) discuss the notion of the emergence of a „risk society" in the light of individualization[3],

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[2] In most of the pre-modern societies, kinship ties and relations influenced the decision to marry or have children.

[3] Both authors accentuate the impact of individualization and risk in modern societies on the individuals' life span.

and describe family life as a continuous changing process where men and women are confronted with competing and sometimes incompatible demands. In this line, Beck-Gernsheim examines the impact of conflicting expectations on the relationships between men, women and children, and searches for possible solutions to this conflict (2002: 44). Consequently, the young generations in the population have the tendency to delay some of the stages in their life trajectory – union relationship, marriage, and childbearing.

During the past decades, research with and on young generations has mainly focused on transitions between education and labour market. Devadason (2008) develops a typology of labour market pathways that points to two main aspects related to young generations and the process of transition into the labour market - complexity and variability. In a later paper, Devadson (2010) questions whether labour market uncertainty might inhibit life planning of young generations using a comparative qualitative study in two Western societies[4].

Thomson and Holland (2002, 2004) build a typology of transitions to adulthood and show that young people's values in life did not differ significantly from those documented for adults. A shift from one model to the other characterizes the life of the young generations, while class and gender play a significant role when choosing a specific model (2004: 23)[5].

Adulthood and the process of transition to adult life imply a number of stages each human being has to pass through – school, labour market, and family[6]. Galland (1995, 2000) emphasizes the changes in the timing of each life stages. A comparison of the 1992 and 1997 surveys of young people in France comes to confirm that adulthood is reached at a later age in life. Maybe the most visible delay is observed for childbearing – the age at birth of the first child increases every year. The increase in the time spent in education and the involvement in the labour market are among the main factors that lay behind this increase. The probability of not reaching independence[7] before the age of 23 years increases steadily from generation to generation. Since young people generally enter adult life later, it takes them less time than in the past to move into their own housing

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[4] Her analysis is based on 48 in-depth interviews with young people carried out in two globalizing, post- industrial cities - Bristol and Göteborg.

[5] Working class young women are particularly tied into socialized models – they tend to be economically independent and take also caring responsibilities.

[6] Nowadays, we cannot speak about a certain sequence of passing through these life stages. The traditional sequencing (school, work, family) is replaced by a different model on the basis of the new trends in family structure, education and labour market.

[7] Gallard defines independence as the possibility for young generations to attain stable position in the labour market, housing (own or rented they pay for) , find a partner and live as a couple.

and form a couple once they have finished their studies and found a first job.

Courgeau (2000) talks about three types of departure in the case of young generation (departure from home of their parents): out of marriage, by entry into cohabitation or for professional reasons, while the timing of departure has considerably changed in France. The departures by marriage and due to cohabitation are fluctuating - departure by marriage has a downward tendency for younger cohorts, but a rise in departure due to cohabitation can be observed for the same generations. The departures for professional purposes are determined by the age of graduation and remain at a steady level throughout the 20th century.

Scholars argue that young people do not follow one single life pathway, but they try to explore all the alternatives. After they acquired experience both in the private life and the labour market (emotional and financial readiness), than they are prepare to establish a family. A number of studies dedicated to young generations in the Czech Republic and their attitudes and opinions towards family come to confirm it and indicate that the young Czech generation remains rather traditional in their views on the family (see Paloncyová 2002). However, new forms of living arrangements - single or cohabitation – have found their place in the Czech society during the last two decades.

3. Data and methodology

Two sources of data are used to assess the expectations, attitudes and plans of young generations about life course stages, family formation and employment.

The first is based on the quantitative survey "Generation" carried out at the end of 2007 on a representative cohort of Czech population aged 18-75 and using a quota sampling scheme. Around 2,429 participants in this age group were interviewed face-to-face. An additional sub-sample of 500 adolescents aged 13-18 was included in the survey. The dataset was weighted by sex, age (13-15, 16-18), the size of residence and region. In our paper, we will work with the sub-sample of adolescents aged 13-15 (a total of 244 respondents – 126 boys and 116 girls). Respondents were asked about their views on life planning, employment and intergenerational relations. They gave the ideal age differences between partners, the characteristics a partner should have and the preconditions for a successful marriage/partnership. We work with the mean ideal age and take in consideration the percentage of those who did not offer any information on the age. It is important to mention that in the case of the interviewed population (adolescents) these events have not occurred by the time of the interview. We will further focus on the time interval between these

events and refer to the order in which they are planned. The results of the descriptive analysis are supplemented by qualitative research outputs.

The second study is a qualitative one and is based on the project "Family through children's eyes", which took place during 2010-2011 in two Czech schools. Children aged 8-9 (third grade) and aged 12-13 years (seventh grade) were interviewed. We gathered information about their family background, the importance of family in their life, the current changes in families in the society, the role of family in children's future plans etc. by using different techniques. In our paper, we will make use of data obtained from the older pupils enrolled in two elementary schools. One is located in a suburban area of the Moravian metropolis Brno, where children from this locality and surrounding villages are enrolled. We will refer to this school as rural. We have data from 20 pupils - 8 boys and 12 girls. The second school, designated as urban, lies in an older neighbourhood of the city. It is surrounded by new block of flats and is situated near the city centre. Mainly school pupils from the neighbourhood are enrolled in this school. We interviewed 18 pupils from the 7th grade group - 12 boys and 6 girls. Overall, we use data from 38 children, 20 boys and 18 girls. Children come from both intact and divorced families; they have different social background, and their parents have different educational attainment.

Research was conducted in classrooms during school hours – five non-consecutive sessions took place. Some students did not participate in all sessions because of their absence. As for the research techniques used in the qualitative study, we employed the following ones: *family tree*, by which we surveyed family and socio-economic background of the pupils, *timeline*, where adolescents illustrated the most important events in life and the time they should occur, *essay* on "My future life - my future family" and *age quiz* (only in the rural school), where pupils completed the age when they think it is normal to do certain things. We combined these techniques with personal interviews (they followed these techniques) with the aim to complete and explain the information already gathered. We were interested to see how children see their future – as successive individual events (especially demographic and economic) to be followed, in the light of the family background, gender, place of residence (school) or ambitions to study. Our respondents could write anything they believe it can represent their future life. It does not mean that when one area of life is not mentioned, it doesn't count for them, but rather that is not very important at this stage of their life. In our paper, we call our children respondents "adolescent" and not children[8]. We use gender and

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[8] We were inspired by one of the interviewed girls who asked us to call them "adolescents", as they are no longer small children.

school in quoting our respondents, and preserve the original spelling including errors.

4. Relationships and marriage

The first part of the analysis will deal with the aspirations about forming a relationship, the opinions on the ideal age difference between partners and the precondition for a successful marriage or partnership. The first question concerns the combination of characteristics of a potential partner. Young respondents in our quantitative survey were asked to asses to what extent a certain combination of aspects (education, wealth, and attractiveness) is interesting for them when choosing a partner/spouse for a long-term relationship. Table 1 shows the distribution of answers by sex.

The study revealed that the most interesting model containing the combination of characteristics of a potential partner/spouse wanted for a long-term relationship/marriage is the one where partner/spouse has education, wealth and attractiveness (either attractive or normal) - 80% of all responses. The least interesting model among adolescents is the one where the partner lacks education, wealth and is normally attractive (57% of respondents). Table 1 also shows the responses separately for boys and girls. Except for two combinations - c) and f), there are no significant differences between adolescent boys and girls[9]. More girls than boys considered unattractive a partner who is not educated, wealthy, and is normally attractive. Girls would rather choose partners who are educated, wealthy and normally attractive.

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[9]   We used *adjusted residuals* in contingency tables.

Table 1. The combination of characteristics of a potential partner - extent of interest when choosing a partner/spouse

		Total	Boys	Girls
a) Education (yes), Wealth (no), Attractiveness (attractive)	interesting	65%	69%	62%
	neutral	29%	24%	35%
	not interesting	5%	7%	3%
b) Education (no), Wealth (yes), Attractiveness (normal)	interesting	33%	35%	31%
	neutral	47%	46%	49%
	not interesting	20%	20%	20%
c) Education (no), Wealth (no), Attractiveness (attractive)	interesting	21%	28%	14%
	neutral	34%	37%	30%
	not interesting	45%	35%	55%
d) Education (no), Wealth (no), Attractiveness (normal)	interesting	9%	10%	9%
	neutral	34%	35%	33%
	not interesting	57%	55%	58%
e) Education (yes), Wealth (yes), Attractiveness (attractive)	interesting	87%	85%	90%
	neutral	12%	14%	10%
	not interesting	1%	1%	1%
f) Education (yes), Wealth (yes), Attractiveness (normal)	interesting	80%	75%	86%
	neutral	16%	21%	11%
	not interesting	4%	4%	3%
g) Education (no), Wealth (yes), Attractiveness (attractive)	interesting	52%	56%	49%
	neutral	36%	33%	39%
	not interesting	12%	11%	12%
h) Education (yes), Wealth (no), Attractiveness (normal)	interesting	51%	45%	57%
	neutral	38%	41%	35%
	not interesting	11%	14%	9%

Source: own calculation "Generation 2007"

These results are partly reflected in the qualitative research. The way how the future partner should look like or the characteristics he/she should have, and the way how to find a partner is quite vague for our adolescents. It may be because we ask them to talk, think and refer about a relatively distant point in time – their future. They pay little attention to how their partner will be and just state that they will marry.

„I want to have four kids – 2 boys and 2 girls – Tereza, Ema, Vojta a Ondra. We will live in a big house. Each will have his own room with dependency. I want to have a big garden and swimming pool. We will have two cars. Each summer we will go on vacation to seaside and in winter to the mountains. Girls will take ballet classes and boys will sport .“ 4 (girl, rural school)

„I imagine that I will marry a colleague at work“. 16 (boy, rural school)

Once the idea of a future partner is materialized, a rich person as a partner appears more frequently in girls' discourse:

"My husband will work and earn a lot of money, but he will have time for family too." 8 (girl, rural school)

"In the future, I would like to live in a villa near Prague. I would like to have at least 2 children, a boy and a girl. A rich husband and not few money. " 6 (girl, rural school)

On the contrary, beauty or attractiveness is important for boys:

"I am a wealthy businessman. I have a company operating with computers. I have a beautiful wife and bright children. The company makes a lot of money, children are good at school, my wife is kind and I'm happy. " 29 (boy, city school)

"I meet a beautiful girl and date her. She will be blonde, have green eyes, sweet voice and she will be from Europe… Spanish or French or German or English." 36 (boy, city school)

It seams that adolescents consider less the characteristics of a future partner when they are in their twelve or thirteen's.

"I'll marry a nice responsible man who will work as a manager in a company." 1 (girl, rural school)
Interview – T: interviewer, P: girl from rural school (2)
T: Should be your boyfriend kind and not argue with you? So… it is that your ideal? (interviewer follows the essay)
P: Well, I do not know. I think that it would be ideal for me, I guess that we will argue sometimes, arguments are always in a relationship, it simply cannot be without quarrelling, it should be pleasant, not always quarrelling.
T: And can you imagine how you will find your husband or the ideal man?
P (Shaking her head)
T: No? You draw him at disco…
P: I know…it is hard to say.

As for the ideal age difference between spouses/partners and the possible link to the main characteristics a partner/spouse should have, one explanation is that women not only look for a husband/partner who would be attractive and with whom they would like to share their life, but they also look for someone who can financially provide for them and the children born from this relationship (Buss 1989). Since the ability to earn money increases with age and experience, older men are more likely to correspond to the characteristics required by women than younger men. Therefore, it can be assumed that the ideal age difference between spouses/partners is when man is older than woman in a relationship.

The following table (see Table 2) describes adolescents' opinions about the ideal age difference between partners/spouses. As the results indicate, half of the respondents believe that the ideal age difference is when man is older than the women, while another third thinks that the age is of no importance in a relationship. Only 14 percent reported that between spouses/partners should be no age difference. There are no statistically significant differences in terms of the ideal age difference between boys and girls in our sample.

Table 2. Ideal age difference between partners/spouses by sex

	Total	Boys	Girls
No age difference or less than one year	14%	20%	8%
Man should be older the woman	53%	48%	59%
Woman should be older than the man	1%	2%	0%
It does not matter	32%	31%	33%

Source: own calculation "Generation 2007"

Respondents were also asked to evaluate the ideal age difference from the point of view of the upper and lower limits of this difference (if any). Table 3 shows the mean age difference - the upper and lower limits - if man is older than the woman[10]. We see that the mean age difference when a man is older than the female ranges from 2.80 years to 6 years for both boys and girls as there are no significant differences by sex.

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[10] We did not analyse the data when respondents declared that woman should be older than the man because of the insufficient number of cases.

Table 3. Upper and lower limits of the ideal age difference between partners/spouses by sex – average values in years

	Total	Boys	Girls
Lower limit of the interval	2.83	2.71	2.93
Upper limit of the interval	6.01	6.21	5.83

Source:: own calculation "Generation 2007"

In addition to the ideal age difference between spouses/partners, we also asked our respondents to what extent the same level of education, same income, same social background, same age or close, common interest or similar opinions on the division of gender roles are important for a successful marriage or partnership (see Table 4). While the opinions on the importance of the same education, income or age in a relationship are shared, same interests or ideas about the division of gender roles in marriage/relationship are considered to be important by a large majority of our adolescent sample. On the contrary, nearly 60% of all interviewed adolescents believe that the same social background is not important for a successful marriage or partnership. Boys and girls do not differ in their opinions regarding the prerequisites for a successful marriage or partnership.

Table 4. The precondition for a successful marriage/partnership by sex

		Total	Boys	Girls
Same or similar income	*important*	46%	44%	50%
	not important	49%	51%	46%
Same educational level	*important*	47%	45%	50%
	not important	49%	50%	49%
Same social background	*important*	38%	36%	40%
	not important	58%	60%	55%
Same or very close age	*important*	52%	53%	52%
	not important	44%	43%	44%
Common interests	*important*	92%	94%	90%
	not important	7%	4%	9%
Same or similar opinions about the division of gender roles in a relationship	*important*	88%	84%	92%
	not important	9%	13%	5%

Source:: own calculation "Generation 2007"

5. Timing of main life events

In the following section, we will deal with the timing of main life events as they are portrayed by our adolescents. We asked for their opinions and plans regarding the timing of selected events in their lives. Results from the quantitative study are supplemented by the main outcomes of the qualitative research. Our assumption is that the plans and opinions on the timing of main life events can be different for boys and girls aged 13-15.

a) Moving away from parents' home – gaining independence
Respondents were asked to give the age when they think will move away from their parents' home[11]. The results are presented in the table 5. Both boys and girls reported 22.6 years (a standard deviation of 3.4) as the mean age at moving away from their parents' home with the 18 years old as the lower age to become independent, but no later than 30 years. The difference in the average between adolescent boys and girls is low - less than one year. There are also cases when adolescents said they will never move away from their parents (2.4%) and 17% of all respondents do not know when this event will happen. We can only speculate about the reasons behind the decision to not become independent. It can be a strong family bond between parents and children or economic reasons. It could also indicate a lack of norm for this phase in life.

Table 5. Planned age when moving away from parents' home by sex (in years)

	Lower limit	Upper limit	Mean age
Total	18	30	22.6
Boys	18	30	23.0
Girls	18	30	22.3

Source:: own calculation "Generation 2007"

In the age quiz, which we used in the qualitative research, we asked when it is normal for a young person to become independent: cook himself, do laundry, no longer receive food and pocket money from parents and move away. It turned out that most adolescents perceive as the magical age of becoming adult the interval between 18 and 20 years old. For some of them, college or university graduation is a milestone - around age 23 to 25 years – and they rarely imagine that one could be in some way or another dependent on their parents late in their life.
Autonomy in cooking and washing, taking care of itself are expected earlier in the

[11]The question did not refer to the age when moving out to live in a dormitory.

case of girls and both girls and boys argue that it is normal for women to do laundry and prepare meals already when 12, 15 or a maximum 20 years old. For men, it is assumed that most of them will also be independent by the age of 20, but there also exceptions at a later age, like 25 or 30 years. Adolescents think that for both women and men it is normal to stop ask parents to provide them with money and food, and find their own housing between the age of 18 and 20.

Adolescents are divided into several groups according to the age and circumstances when they want to become independent and move away from their parents. Most are planning to move from their parents after graduation, either high school or university, but at different ages ranging from 18 up to 24 years. It mostly corresponds with time when they find the first permanent job. Other adolescents plan to move from their parents before their studies at the university. Few adolescents want to become independent in their eighteens regardless of circumstances connected with studying at university or employment. A very small group intends to move from their parents when they have a family of their own.

b) Partnership – joint household with a partner
Table 6 illustrates the answers to the question regarding the age at which people plan to live in a household with a partner. Adolescent respondents reported an average age of 24.6 years (a standard deviation of 3.5). There are differences between boys and girls; boys, on average, plan to live in a joint household with a partner nearly two years later than girls. The upper age limit to establish a common household with a partner is around 32 years, while some consider a joint household with a partner as early as in their eighteens. Nearly a quarter of our respondents did not provide any specific age, and only few adolescents do not plan to live with a partner in a common household.

Table 6. Planned age to establish a common household with a partner by sex (in years)

	Lower limit	Upper limit	Average age
Total	18	32	24.6
Boys	18	32	25.8
Girls	18	32	24.0

Source: own calculation "Generation 2007"

When analysing data from the qualitative study with adolescent boys and girls, we came across a few interesting things. Our adolescents believe that they are already or will soon be at the age when it is normal to have a partner and a

relationship. We did not ask how many of them are already dating someone, but most believe that the standard age for entering the first relationship is between 10 and 16 years. They state that they will either date somebody by the age of 16 or after the age of 20, while entering later in a relationship puts the basis for a longer lasting relationship that can end in a marriage or moving in together.

c) Entry into marriage
Results from the quantitative study present the opinions adolescents have on the timing of another important aspect in life - entry into marriage (see Table 7). The mean age to entry into marriage is 27 years, but there are differences between boys and girls - boys plan to marry on average two years later than girls do. The standard deviation is around 3, but for girls is slightly higher than for boys. Only 15% of adolescents do not know when they should enter into marriage, while 7% do not plan marriage in life.

Table 7. Planned age at marriage by sex (in years)

	Lower limit	Upper limit	Mean age
Total	18	48	27.1
Boys	20	36	28.3
Girls	18	48	26.0

Source:: own calculation "Generation 2007"

In addition to dating and first relationships, all teenagers with whom we conducted qualitative research are stronger in favour of establishing a long-term relationship with one person. For some of them, especially girls, is a critical issue in their future that overshadows everything else, while for others, especially boys, this is more of a coulisse for other important events in their life.
For most of the interviewed adolescents, a relationship should be sealed by marriage and talk about their partner as their husband/wife, man/woman, or a person with who they plan to marry. It seems that very often adolescents do not accept or work with other alternative than marriage.

"I would live in a five-room house. With my husband and two children - a boy Tom and a girl Zuzka. " 22 (girl, urban school)

"I'm married, I have 3 children (1 girl, 2 boys)." 14 (boy, urban school)
Interview - T: interviewer, R: a boy from rural school (13)

T: I would like to ask you something … you wrote that there will be you, two children, a woman, and here you write wedding. So you assume that you will have a family. If you find a woman you like, would you take her as a wife?
R: So she should have a good character and care for others, and she could take care of children.
T: And… in that case, if you find one that would have a good character, you like her and knows how to take care of children, would you marry her?
R: Mh…..
T: Would you want to live without been married?
R: No.

Only rarely our respondents do not talk about a husband/wife, but about a boyfriend/girlfriend and they think deeper when marriage is brought in discussion.

"I would definitely like a husband, but without a wedding would probably be possible too. Having a wedding is probably all girls' dream. But above all, to love each other." 3 (girl, rural school)

"I'm not going to marry and I will live with a rich man... Finally, we will marry if something might happen with one of us, to inherit the money." 7 (girl, rural school)

Interview - T: interviewer, P: girl from rural school (divorced family) (2)
T: I want to ask you if you want to get married or do you think it's better without it? (...)
P: Well I do not know.
T: If you would have a nice relationship with someone and think about it?
P: I guess if I was a hundred percent sure that there are no problems in our relationship… or no big issue and problems with the divorce and for the child it would probably not be very good, if we are to have a child.
T: So if you were absolutely sure that it is the right one and nobody else, so….?
P: Yes, I guess, when we would have decided, so I guess yes.

Few adolescents mention living with a partner before wedding. Most of them outline a more traditional path: dating, marriage and then children. About half of our teenagers plan to marry or live together with a partner immediately after graduation or finding a first paid job. The second half, mostly boys, is planning a larger time gap between graduation, starting a career and marriage or common household with a female partner. Consequently, adolescent boys and girls plan to marry at different ages. While girls, both from rural and urban schools, imagine that they marry by the age of 26, mostly around 25 years old,

while boys around 25 years old or even later – age of 30 is not an exception. Approximately half of the adolescents perceive marriage as an event, which normally occurs between 20 and 35 years old and living alone is normally only up to 30 years and only part of them realizes that the wedding may occur later in life or one can be single all life.

The question concerning childbearing and its timing was not part of our quantitative research. Thus, we tried to examine this aspect using qualitative data. All adolescents in our qualitative study imagine that they will have children after establishing a permanent relationship or rather after entering into marriage. However, this wish is not explicitly expressed.

> *"At 28, I will move away abroad. There I will find a wife. In my 35s, I'll go back to the Czech Republic. With my family I will build a house somewhere near the lake where there is swimming pool and private boat (sailboat), and many other useful things. "* 31 (boy, urban school)

The absolutely prevailing ideal number of children is two, while only in few cases would like to have more children (at mostly three), and only rarely would prefer one child. There is no connection between the number of children in the family of origin and the current vision on the future number of children adolescents plan to have. While adolescents boys and girls enrolled in the rural school counted with two or more children and do not think at all to have one child only, in the urban school, the idea of having only one child is quite widespread and very few teenagers want to have more than two children. They would prefer to have both a girl and a boy.

> *"I will have two children, one girl and one boy. Maybe 3 children. I'd rather have more girls than boys. "* 8 (girl, rural school)

The age difference between planned children has no specific pattern. Some adolescents imagine that they will have twins, others would like to have four children at one-year gap, and others also consider a six-year gap between children.

Most of our respondents write more specifically about their planned children than about the partner. They talk about their sex, names, education, interests, activities, future life.

> *"I would like my children to learn from infancy Czech, English, and French .... As my parents offered me dance lessons since childhood, so I want to give my children too. My husband and I would like to sport and later with our children too. "* 3 (girl, rural school)
> *"I want to be a good mom, so I'll go everywhere with my children and devote them my*

time." 8 (girl, rural school)

"Children should have good results in school, and if not, I'd check them!" 37 (boy, urban school)

Some girls would like to have their first child in their twenties (always girls that have no ambition/plans to study at the university), but most prefer the age of 25. The idea that they will give birth to their first child when they are 30 or later occurs only rarely. However, boys postpone having their first child and plan to have it later when they will be around 25 and very often around 30 years old. They have different plans than girls and even than their fathers. The birth of the last child is rather planned by most of the girls around their thirties and rarely up to 35 years, and most of the adolescent boys intend to have their last child when 40 years old and less often in their thirties. Almost half of our adolescents plan to have their first child very soon after the wedding, while mostly boys planned to have the child later after the wedding (but no later than after 4 years). Very few of them indicated that they would have children before marriage.

d) First paid employment
The next issue of interest is the opinions of the young generation about the timing of first paid employment. The answers to this question can be found in the following table (see Table 8). Regardless of sex, our respondents report a mean of 22 years as the age for entry into the labour market (standard deviation is around 3). One out of ten adolescents does not mention any age for this life event.

Table 8. Planned age to enter into the labour market by sex (in years)

	Lower limit	Upper limit	Mean age
Total	18	40	22.1
Boys	18	40	22.1
Girls	18	30	22.1

Source: own calculation "Generation 2007"

In the qualitative research, boys are more career-oriented in their vision of the future than girls. Most boys and half of the girls from urban school, and about half of the boys and few girls from rural school mentioned that they plan to study at the university. Part of the girls (including those who mentioned that

they plan to study at the university) does not talk about their future job. However, some girls included their dreams about career and employment in the timeline and the essays about their future life.

> *"I think when I'm full-age, I will have a driving license. Then, around 20-25 years I'll be married. I will have 1-2 children and I have them around the age of 25-30s. I will graduate in my 25s. I will be a designer of rooms and houses, gardens, etc.. "* 21 (girl, urban school)

> *"Today I celebrate my 22nd anniversary. I finished university and I became a translator and on a part-time base a writer. I work from home. Currently, I live with my parents, but I plan to fly broad. To Africa, America and England. Once I will be back after that year, I work from home. I moved in a great house with a female friend and after one year I find a husband and have 2 children. Alice and Janču. "* 23 (girl, urban school)

Boys, however, address the way of living in their plans. Not always, they imagine that they will work to earn money; some dream that they are simply rich or the owner of some assets which ensure them income.

> *"I will graduate the specialization field architect and I will live in the country side. Probably in Brno. I build houses having interesting shapes and maybe I'll be known in my country. "* 36 (boy, urban school)

> *"My wife is on maternity leave, I own a company specialized on computers, furniture and programming. I own Bugati and Ferari. "* 38 (boy, urban school)

Their first stable job do not plan to get before graduation, whether high school or university. However, some of them plan to work on a part-time or temporary basis during their studies. The completion of the school and first job are usually planned to be right after.

6. The sequencing of the main life events

The last section of this paper deals with the sequencing of the main life events, their distribution in the adolescent population and the extent to which the sequence corresponds to the destandardized post-modern life course model. We are interested to find out how many life paths exist among adolescents. For analysing the quantitative data, we use a similar method as Mouw (2004), where standard or normative life path is as follows: moving away from parents, graduation, the beginning of economic activity - first job, entry into marriage, and parenthood – the born of the first child. It should be noted that we are not

referring to the events that have already taken place, but to planned phases of life, and not all events were examined in our study (e.g. the timing of childbearing or graduation)[12].

We created about 33 models of life paths, but we will mention those with the highest scores[13]:

1) independence from parents, first paid job, living together with a partner and entry into marriage (O, S, P, M)

2) independence from parents, living together with a partner, first paid job, entry into marriage (O, P, Z, M)

3) enter into marriage, independence from parents, living together with a partner, first paid job (M, O, P, Z): the second and third events occur simultaneously

4) first paid job, independence from parents, living together with a partner, entry into marriage (Z, O, P, M)

5) combination of two or more events that occur at the same age.

Table 9 illustrates the frequency of models in the adolescent population using quantitative data (the first eight models). The results show that the most frequently mentioned model is a sequence of "first paid job, independence from parents and living together with a partner at the same time, marriage" (nearly 10% of all adolescents). This indicates that marriage is regarded in many cases as being the last scheduled event in the life path of our adolescents. Having a first paid job or gaining independence from parents - either consecutively or at the same age - are in contrast with the other two life events evaluated in our study - a common living with a partner and marriage. No gender differences emerged in the analysis.

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[12] If we want to analyse already occurred events, and to what extent these events re-occcur throughout life, we need to use longitudinal data.

[13] Of course, we can create other models and work with them, but data does not allow us.

Table 9. The distribution of sequences of life events (in %)

	Total
Z, O=P, M	9.5
O=Z, P, M	7.5
Z, O=P=M	7.5
Z=O=P, M	7.5
Z, O, P, M	7.0
O=Z, P=M	5.0
Z, (O, P, M do not know)	4.0
O, Z, P=M	4.0

Source:: own calculation "Generation 2007"
Note: Z – first paid job, O- independence from parents, P – living with a partner, M – marriage.
„=" means that these events are planned to happen at the same time (age).

From the qualitative data, it appears that our young respondents have a relatively traditional view on the way how life events happen. Firstly, they would like to study, but they are already planning to enter into partnerships and gain sexual experience. Further on, they would like to become independent from their parents (some quite early - when they enter into adulthood, in the course of the study or just after it). The first stable job is to follow after graduation, as well as the establishment of a lasting relationship - either cohabitation or marriage. Children are to be mostly born within married relationships.

7. Conclusions
This article deals with the attitudes and opinions of young people (adolescents) concerning partnership and selection of a partner and the sequencing of the most important events in life. These life events open a new phase in life – adulthood.

Adolescent population (12-15 years) in the Czech Republic sees above-average wealth and education, and at least normal attractiveness as the most important characteristics a future partner/spouse should have. They also believe that a man should be older than a woman in a relationship/marriage and if they want to have a successful relationship/marriage, they should share common interests and attitudes towards the division of gender roles in the family.

Regarding adolescents' ideas about the future and the timing of the main life events, quantitative data suggests an increase in the number of life-

path models and diversity. Also, the absence of some phases in the life path of our respondents could be observed – they either do not know when these events should occur or do not plan them at all. Marriage do not plans 7% of all adolescents and another 15% do not know whether they want to marry. On the other hand, entry into labour market is the event our respondents in most of the cases plan - only 11% of them do not know when it will be. These two phenomena (the absence and diversity) lead to a certain extent to destandardization and weakening in the normalization of life stages. Adolescents expect to become independent and begin to work at the same time or soon after each other. Unfortunately, data from the quantitative research does not say much about the causality between these life events- whether the independence comes as a result of the paid employment (because they have income, they can afford to live away from parents' home) or vice versa. We follow this causality in the qualitative study and its results confirmed some of the facts from the quantitative research.

Independence brings the possibility of cohabiting with a partner and later entering into marriage. At the same time, marriage is postponed to a later age. The qualitative interviews showed that Czech adolescents would like to study, then become independent from their parents and find their first stable paid job, and only after, establish lasting partnerships (even marriage) and have children. The difference between boys and girls is primarily in their opinions about the age of entry into cohabitation/marriage, or childbearing. Boys plan to enter into partnership later than girls and it seems that they also intend to have a first child later in life (postponement of partnership/childbearing).

However, given the aim of our paper, we are aware of the limitations of our studies and the impact on the results and their interpretation. The studies in question focused on the life plans adolescents have and not on the real situation they might be found in. We believe that the only reasonable way how to observe how life-paths evolve is to use *panel data*. Panel data would offer the possibility to observe and study these plans over time and grasp the time effect and circumstances which are very powerful when predicting the extent to which life plans are fulfilled.

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A Terminological Discrimination Against Communes. Inequity of Criteria Used in the Classification of the Territorial-Administrative Units in Romania

Dorina Vicol

Social Services Department, Ministry of Work, Family and Social Protection,
2-4 *Dem. I. Dobrescu St., Sector 1, Bucharest, +40-21-315-7143/761, dorinavicol@mmuncii.ro*

Abstract: Rural/urban and village/town dichotomy is being eroded in the entire world. Romania uses both quantitative and qualitative criteria in establishing the basic typology of the administrative-territorial units. Some of them contain connotations meant to maintain perception gaps on development level between rural and urban localities. The village – meaning rural type, gets a lower grade, and the city/urban type, receives a higher one. Besides, the rural development is treated as "aspiration to move towards urban type settlements", even by the law governing the matter..

This conceptualization - an inequitable one, which can be taken as only a lagging behind in reshaping of this specific typology, can create disadvantages for the population living in the countryside, in terms of economic, social and demographic issues. The arguments that I will bring here are primarily those resulted from a terminological analysis on the very specific legislation.

The hypothesis is that the classification of the settlements and of the residence areas based on qualitative criteria used to compare rural and urban areas, maintains a gap of development between them. Changing the concepts could lead to changing of values and therefore to reshaping the public policies which could become more sustainable from many points of view (environmental, economical) and more equitable from human rights perspective.

Keywords: discrimination, administrative-territorial unit, rural, urban

1. Introduction

If the cow is the nurse of mankind, how have we come to realize that poverty was born in the countryside, as the sociological surveys showed most of the times? According to Bădescu (2004), the share of agriculture in total employment in Romania increased by 40% in just 10 years (since 1989), while the agricultural contribution to GDP in the same period of time decreased by

the same percentage.[1] On the other side, a common criterion for ordinary people to acknowledge a high standard of living is getting a house in a suburban area, near a big city. The rural gentrification[2] process has already structured around the few largest cities in Romania. In the same time, a recent and growing trend is purchasing a home in the rural area, including on coastal zone, as a plan of spending the retirement by the sea (Eurostat 2011: 226).

Therefore, having luxury rural space on the one side and towns evaluated below the standard level of development required by law on the other side, is it justified to maintain the current classification of the two main administrative territorial units - town and village, which are defined using qualitative criteria? Is it fair to maintain the rural/urban dichotomy?

Is it possible to change the values and attitudes through reshaping the concepts? Is it possible to measure the secondary effects of the "positive discrimination" of localities (by declaring them deprived areas), like segregation, economic migration

Without claiming answers to these questions, the paper aims to explore and open up the subject of the "morality" and the risk of discrimination of settlements by using both quantitative and qualitative criteria for defining the basic territorial administrative units, and by using ranks for the classification of localities, too. In this context I try to underline the consequences for the status and public perception of localities or their access to development, but also for the people who are born and/or live there.

I think redefining by eliminating issues related to the level of development reached at some point by a particular locality from the criteria which are used to define the basic administrative territorial unit might be a solution. It is meant to correct the prejudices that the urban areas are superior to rural ones and to reclaim the development potential of the latter.

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[1] We have to consider that during those 10 years there was a high level of out-migration from rural area, the restitution of lands took place and all these were happening in a context of the lack of experience in making public policies. Regarding the high level of net migration rural-urban after 1989 we have to consider the observation of D. Sandu (2004: 1): "The change however, was short term and rather artificial. Before 1989 many people lived as temporary in-migrants in the cities, coming from villages and not having the possibility of getting a permanent residence especially into the large cities. The new context after the political turning point of 1989 allowed them to get official residence into the city".

[2] "(…) there are spaces with attraction potential too, and they may be the reviving centres of the Romanian rural regions. These are the areas where the sub-urbanization, counter-urbanization, and gentrification (less present in rural) take place." (Guran-Nica et al. 2010: 506).

2. Theoretical framework and conceptual explanations

The theoretical approaches of rural research cover a variety of perspectives, from cultural representation (pastoral and spiritual space of human existence), geographic area (protecting the natural environment, rural economy and agro-tourism), economic (agricultural and forest resource exploitation and trade), administrative/legal (regulation of rural communities as entities, the balance between state, local government, landowners and forest) to the socio-demographic (ageing rural population, poverty, gender equality, access to public services, etc.) and the typology of classification of rural settlements, including changing the connotation of the areas considered as rural or urban.

In 1984, the rural was defined mainly by the three following elements: large areas used for agriculture, small settlements having a strong link between them and open spaces, and a lifestyle based on respect for nature, as part of it (Cloke 2006). At this time, the classical connection between the rural and agricultural activities is not shared by specialists.

Regarding the clarity of the distinction between rural and urban, Mormont (1990, apud Cloke 2006) emphasized that the changing relationship between *space* and *society* has rendered traditional divisions between rural and urban increasingly indistinct. Changing the rural does not mean just borrowing from the urban values. For the first time Wilson (1992, quoted by Cloke 2006: 19) opened a debate on the hybrid structure of the "country city", which became a new theme as a result of the processes of "bringing nature-into-the-city" and "spreading-the-city-into-the-country". Also, Urbain (2002, quoted by Cloke 2006) speaks about ruralisation of metropolis not only in terms of counter-urbanization, but also in terms of the city that spreads out into the country.

A less discussed aspect is that of rural citizenship. Parker (2002, cited by Woods 2006) includes the concept of citizenship in the analysis of the rural transformation process in connection with the right of the state/local government/public ownership to own land, forests. Perhaps this approach leads to the debate including restricting access to the landscape. Romanian legislation regulated public property of the state and administrative-territorial units for the same reasons.

Michael Woods (2006) addresses in a unique way the *rural citizenship* in terms of civil rights, seen as a relationship between the individual and the state. A perspective absolutely justified because economic approaches, ensuring food, sustainable development, globalization and europeanisation, alter the state's role. This transformation of relationships is a challenge for Member States because they are forced to find ways of reconciling not only between the

economic and traditional relations in rural communities and the state, but also between restrictions or commitments of economic, social, political relationships with other Member States.

The tendency is to move from the traditional approach of the rural space, where people had been "on the second place" after nature or economic objectives, compared with the assessment of urban areas, where the first place is always kept by citizen and every decision should be taken just in relationship with people's needs and their civil rights, to a new approach that arose mainly based on the studies of the out-migration phenomenon from rural area.

The "emotional attractiveness" level of a certain locality should be more analysed and taken into account by the local government in their public policy to keep their own citizens "at home" and to meet the needs of newcomers and making them to stay (von Reichert 2006).

Besides the above mentioned theoretical approaches I propose a different point of view. I try to identify delays in reshaping of rural/urban typology, the effect of discrimination of rural communities compared to those classified as urban based on qualitative criteria, and the transfer of this inequity on the population who could become stigmatized.

It is remarkable the observation made by Rotariu (2010: 284): "The changing of behaviour comes before changing values and attitudes regarding family and children", which, in the theme that I addressed in this paper, encourages me to formulate the following hypothesis: changing concepts could lead to changing values and attitudes.

3. Brief history of basic categories of administrative-territorial units in Romania

According to the Law on communes from 1864, the administrative structure had included both rural and urban communes in a county. In 1875, one was talking about the *Bucharest commune*, although in 1883 the Law on amendment of some articles of the county councils of cities mentioned *towns* also (Bujoreanu 1885). The 1923 the Constitution established the commune, which could be *rural* or *urban,* and the county as ATU.

The current definition and classification of basic administrative-territorial units are regulated by the Law no.2/1968 on administrative organization of the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania, republished in 1981. It defines the *city* as a centre of population that is more developed economically, socio-cultural, as well as in terms of public services of local concern. The *commune* is defined as a territorial-administrative unit comprising rural population united by community of interests and traditions, which is

composed of one or more villages, according to their economic, social, cultural, geographic and demographic conditions.

In 2001, the law on approval of national plan on territorial organization keeps almost the entire definition for the commune, but several expressions such as "more developed population centre ... " and "a special significance in the life of ... socio-political, cultural and scientific ..." were removed from the definition of the city. This means a terminological improvement from the perspective of hypothesis approached in this paper.

The existence, in 1981, of a distinct category of *suburban communes* is an interesting issue that deserves a thorough examination. The qualitative component which is included in a distinct category of rural area, alleged located in town proximity - the *suburban village*, could cover socio-economic structure of the population, living standards, lower level of employment in agricultural activities, accessibility to services and jobs in the city located nearby.

It is however important to distinguish between the suburban village in the 1980s, when we cannot take into account the existence of housing developers, purchasing a weekend-house or even changing the residence in those areas, diversification of services, infrastructure, leisure and all other topics which have been brought into discussion in the last few years, when these suburban areas became eligible to be included in *metropolitan areas*.

We appreciate that in Romania in the 1980s demographers had identified a third category of locality - *suburban commune*, which could not be classified as 100% rural or urban. Although I cannot agree with the typology of rural/urban localities established by the law adopted in 2001, I have to recognize the merit of mentioning a specific locality which could not be classified neither as rural or urban one.

4. Definitions of the rural/urban

The most widely used criterion at the international level for classifying people as belonging to the "urban" or "rural" environment is the number of inhabitants. If a settlement or a community has a population of at least 2,000 inhabitants we are talking about urban area (Haupt and Kane 2006).

UN Statistical Yearbook (2000-2008) states that there is not an international standard to define urban / rural categories and summarizes three types of classifications that would fit with most definitions used by countries: 1. Classification of localities based on size; 2. Classification of basic administrative centres as urban, and what remains belongs to the rural; 3. Using a set of criteria, which may include the type of local government,

number of inhabitants or proportion of population engaged in agriculture.

Methodological note from above mentioned yearbook refers to the disadvantages of defining the concepts of both urban and rural areas based on qualitative and quantitative criteria that may include combinations of the following items: population size and density, the distance between built-up areas, predominant type of economic activity, conformity to legal or administrative status and urban characteristics, such as specific services and facilities, drawbacks identified in the assessment and comparison of communities.

The European Union urban-rural typology is built on a simple two-step approach to identify population in urban area: a population density threshold of 300 inhabitants per km^2, applied to grid cells of 1 km^2; a minimum size threshold of 5,000 inhabitants, applied to grouped grid cells above the density threshold. The population living in rural areas is the population living outside the urban areas[3].

There are also some new approaches regarding the definition of urban/rural localities brought in Romania by the law from 2001, the most important being the identification of a new category of rural locality meant to become urban. Even so, the law still remains blocked in the traditional dichotomy rural-urban:

a) *Urban locality* - the locality in which the highest share of the resources is employed in non agricultural activities with a diversified and high level of equipment, exerting a steady and significant socio-economic impact on the surrounding area.

b) *Rural locality* (village) – locality where:
   ✓ most jobs are concentrated in agriculture, forestry, fishing, offering a specific and viable life to its inhabitants; through policies of modernization it will keep the specificity of a rural area in the future, too;
   ✓ the majority of the workforce is located in other domains than farming, forestry, fishing, but which currently offers an insufficient endowment required in order to be recognized as a city and which, through development policies and modernization of equipment, will be able to evolve toward a locality of urban type.

Although the law from 2001 has eliminated the expressions "more developed", "a special significance" from the city's definition, the discrimination between rural and urban has been kept by using the expression

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[3] http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Urban-rural_typology

"can develop into urban-type settlement", in the definition of rural locality.

We can see also a contradiction between the two elements that define rural locality: on the one hand "... through the policies of modernization will keep the specifics of rural area in the future", and on the other hand, "... through equipping and the modernization policies will evolve to an urban-type settlement".

The ranking of settlements is not based on specific and measurable indicators (for example "city of European/national importance"). The villages belonging to municipalities and cities are established as being of rank V (the last in the hierarchy) although, in terms of equipping and modernization, especially the potential to "move towards urban-type settlements" are "superior" to those of lower rank.

This latter classification is in contradiction with the definition of the rank, which, as it is regulated in the mentioned law, would be the expression of the importance of a locality now or in the very next future, in terms of administrative, political, social, economic, cultural issues, taking into account also the level of decision regarding the allocation of resources. The level of importance of a locality should be, of course, in harmony with the level of modernization.

There are five main criteria used to classify localities into two main groups: urban and rural areas: 1. types and weight of economic activities; 2. number of inhabitants; 3. types of buildings; 4. population and housing density;, 5. level of endowment with technical equipment and socio-cultural level of development. Areas with no single city within a radius of about 25-30 km were identified at the time of the 2001 law. These zones included 452 communes and 2534 villages. They need priority actions for the development of localities meant to assure the linkage between the villages which constitute a commune or between communes. The law also had mentioned a list of 704 communes with a decreasing number of inhabitants during 1966-1998, which need specific actions for revitalization.

We can observe that a quantitative criterion - most jobs in agricultural/non-agricultural sector - is used for the first step of classification, while a qualitative criterion - insufficient endowment - is used for the second.. It appears possible to change the type of a locality from one category to another, just due to underdevelopment reasons.

5. Rural and urban development
Rural/urban or commune/town dichotomy has always been used in the classification and evaluation of communities, the city having a "dominant

position in relation to the village, being more financially potent and having a more developed economy" (Frank 1966, cited by Voicu 2002: 268). Various theories have been developed on this basis the theory of industrialization, dependency theory, regional development theory, etc. According to WA Schultze (1974, cited by Dan 2002: 563) the main elements of urban development policies are: tax policies, policies to spend funds to different sectors, educational policies, policies on public urban transports, anti-poverty and urban planning policies.

All these elements are the summary of the tasks of local authorities in managing local public services, regulated in Romania by the local government law (Law 215/2001, republished, with subsequent amendments). It does not "discriminate" the administrative-territorial units: municipalities and towns as urban areas, and communes as rural areas. In the same way, the Law no.350/2001 regulates the improvement of living conditions for both urban and rural areas, without discrimination. Its goals are to eliminate dysfunctions, to ensure the access to infrastructure, public services and affordable housing for all people, to create conditions for meeting the special needs of children, elderly and persons with disabilities, efficient use of land, controlled expansion of built-up areas, to protect and enhance the built and natural heritage, to ensure the buildings quality, and to protect settlements against natural disasters. In this context we can see a conceptual inequity, a discrepancy in the attention paid by sociologists, economists, etc. to clarifying, defining and debating the terms *urban development* and *rural development*. While urban development is widely discussed and is the subject of many studies, public policy proposals, etc.., rural development does not enjoy the same attention in conceptualization, which actually could help the public policies makers to identify effective measures addressed to rural communities.

The *Dictionary of Social Policy*[4] presents various definitions and approaches for the *urban development* policies, both in terms of the spatial criteria, management of the settlements and the effects of these policies on population. *Rural development* means "on the one hand, to bring the living conditions in villages at the level of those in the cities, in terms of housing, infrastructure and related facilities. On the other hand, it means to reform the agricultural production by increasing labour productivity in this sector and ensuring a high quality of agricultural products" (Voicu 2002: 274). The explanation is that the problems of communities are higher in urban than in rural areas and "urban areas could thus be a starting point for developing such policies" (Dan 2002: 562). The author calls attention that, when the term urban

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[4] Pop, L. (Ed.) (2002). Dicționar de Politici Sociale. București: Expert.

development is used, there is the risk to exclude the development action of the space built in rural areas.

The law from 2001 underlines the fact that a rural locality could be part of the city, together with other localities, if at least one of them is recognized as urban one. In this case, should they struggle to become more and more urbanized, losing their traditions? Or is it possible to increase the level of *urban development* in a rural space, without the fear that they must throw away their history and purchase a new life style?

6. Demographic and socio-economic situation of rural areas

Looking through the prism of the migration balance, it appears that rural has exceeded the stage of "unconditionally love", when the ideological cultural messages urging the "green grass from home" and so called "healthy origins brand" (meaning to be born in a peasants family) did not actually meet the expected result of discouraging population to migrate to the city.

Figure 1. Net migration in rural areas

Source: NIS, Yearbook cap.2.26, Internal migration determined on changes of residence. Author's calculations

According to the graph above, for the last years, the rural areas regain their place in people's options, through a positive balance of migration, even if the reasons for this change are polarized. On the one hand it was the increasing level of urban poverty that pushed people towards rural areas (Sandu 2010)

and, on the other hand, it was the economic growth from 2008 and the emergence of the model of residential districts developed in rural areas near the cities that have attracted people.

According to the study on the economic and social situation in Romania (INS 2010), the population structure by age and residential areas confirm that population ageing is more marked in rural areas, where the elderly population is 1.4 times higher than in urban areas. Compared with 2008, there were significant changes in age and sex structure of the elderly population in both areas of residence. The number of the "young" elderly (65-74 years) decreased by over 71 thousand people. The group of 80-84 years increased with 24 000 persons and the number of "old" elderly, 85 years and over, increased with nearly 35 000 people. The elderly people at 80 years and over hold 3.2% of the total population, the proportion being higher for elderly women (3.9% to 2.3% in women vs. men), especially in rural areas. Analysing the exchange of population between rural and urban, T. Rotariu (2010: 243) appreciates that a strong rural ageing was an immediate demographic consequence, as a direct effect of the departure of young people and, indirectly, by decreasing the number of births as a result of demographic gap caused by migration at the fertile ages.

In rural households, most of the expenses are for food consumption (52.1%) and lowest for services (16.6%). Structure of consumption expenditure of urban households is more balanced, less absorbing food consumption (40.1%) and significantly more for services (28.3%) of total consumer spending (INS 2010: 138).

Unfortunately, in a context of social and economic insecurity, the traditionalism can be viewed as social capital (Hîrtopanu 2010). Therefore, there is temptation to postpone the concerns for personal development. It means to use minimum resources to solve the problems within the extended family, such as raising children without access to day care centres or nursery, informal care services for the elderly, or keeping the household without investing in endowment.

Education and human capital are key factors in developing of communities. But "the *poverty of goods* and *poverty in education,* which D. Bell is talking about, have both rural profiles", according to Bădescu (2004: 92). He found that 72% of rural areas are marked by at least one type of school gaps.

7. Conclusions, personal reflections and recommendations
From my point of view, the revision of the classification established by the Law no.2/1968 was not sufficiently "cleaned up" of the messages that states

the city's "special significance in the economic life" or that establish that rural locality should aspire "to overcome its condition" and become an urban one.

Imprecise definition of rural / urban is underlined by Traian Rotariu (2010: 237): "Even in a country like Romania, with significant remnants of deep rural life, one cannot speak of an opposition between the two environments: there is a relatively urbanized rural, just as there are many small towns that do not differ in their characteristics of some larger communes. But due the lack of a finer classification, simple distinction in two categories remains relevant because it allows, through the study of migration flows, to highlight important macro-social processes."

But having this uncertain category of localities, not enough rural, but not sufficient equipped to be urban, a simply reading of statistical data could lead us to errors in interpretation of the out migrations from rural areas. Worst, most of the public policies regarding rural society and economy, most of the rural development strategies will continue to be built on inequitable conceptualization. This could obviously lead to unrealistic development objectives, with repercussions on people and on the level of attractiveness that these localities could have for the economical operators, investors, tourists and for those who choose as a life plan to live in a rural area, including after retirement.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Les grands-parents constituent une partie significative de l'histoire individuelle d'une personne. Même s'ils ont disparu avant la naissance de leurs petits-fils ou si les relations entre les parents, les enfants et les grands-parents ne sont pas toujours les meilleures, ces derniers continuent à rester tout aussi importants, ne fût-ce que par leur

qualité «d'anneau» qui relie les individus à la chaîne infinie des ancêtres, où chacun puise son héritage culturel et social.

En dépit de leur importance dans la société, les grands-parents n'ont pas joui d'une attention particulière de la part des historiens; sans être tout à fait absentes, les études qu'on leur avait dédiées visaient surtout le cadre plus large de l'histoire de la famille. Une première tentative collective d'analyser ce sujet de manière unitaire et cohérente est représentée par le numéro de 1991 des *Annales de Démographie Historique*, revue francophone fondée en 1964 et dédiée à l'étude historique de la population.

L'ouvrage soumis à notre analyse, *Histoire des grands-parents*, paru aux Éditions Perrin en 2012 (avec une première édition en 2001), est destiné à couvrir partiellement cette absence, au moins pour l'espace français. Le livre se propose d'aborder le sujet d'un point de vue pluridisciplinaire: démographique, juridique, littéraire, «savoir-vivre» etc.

Vincent Gourdon, chercheur au «Centre national de la recherche scientifique », est un historien spécialiste de la démographie historique et de l'histoire de la famille, la sphère de son intérêt couvrant l'histoire de la vieillesse, les relations parentales et la ritualisation de la vie familiale. À partir de 2010, il est rédacteur en chef des *Annales de Démographie Historique*.

L'auteur examine l'histoire des grands-parents sous l'angle des pratiques sociales et des représentations culturelles depuis l'époque du Vieux Régime à nos jours. Il part de la prémisse que les grands-parents ont été des personnages importants au sein de la famille durant toute la période cible et que certaines attitudes remarquées dans les relations entre les grands-parents et leurs petits-fils remontent loin dans le temps.

Structuré en onze chapitres, le livre met en évidence différents aspects liés à cette problématique : le rôle des grands-parents au sein de la famille (éventuellement de tuteurs des leurs petits-fils dans le cas du décès des parents), le soutien financier ou physique qu'ils peuvent offrir (par exemple, pour surveiller leurs petits-fils). La vie ensemble sous le même toit (grands-parents, parents et enfants) ou les relations affectives établies entre les différents membres de la famille sont étudiées au niveau de différentes couches sociales. L'auteur souligne aussi l'importance des grands-parents dans la préservation des valeurs sociales, leur fonction de «mémoire» de la famille, de repères indispensables à la formation de l'identité personnelle. Toutes ces hypostases des grands-parents sont analysées en profondeur, à l'aide de témoignages des plus divers, avec beaucoup de souci pour les détails et les exemples. Parmi, les sources utilisées, nous mentionnons les registres paroissiaux et d'état civil, les recensements (notamment pour la période de 1800 à 1930), les actes de tutelle, les biographies et les mémoires, les livres de bonnes manières, les codes et les articles de loi, les écrits à caractère religieux, les essais sur la famille écrits à différentes époques, les ouvrages littéraires etc.

Du point de vue démographique, la recherche a été effectuée sur un échantillon représenté par une région – cible, formée du village Vernon et de 15 villages environnants, situés entre la Normandie et l'Ile-de-France et constituant une zone cohérente du point de vue géographique et économique. Grâce à la migration faible, l'auteur a pu suivre les histoires des familles au niveau de trois générations.

Poussant la recherche jusqu'à nos jours, l'auteur surprend aussi les modifications subies par le statut de grand-père, au moins dans les sociétés occidentales : jouissant d'une bonne santé, indépendants du point de vue financier et actifs du point de vue physique jusqu'à un âge avancé, les grands-pères s'éloignent de plus en plus de leur rôle « traditionnel », s'engageant dans des activités qui leur permettent de vivre leur vie et s'occupant moins de leurs petits-fils. Cela n'empêche que les grands-parents restent, aux yeux de l'auteur, un facteur important dans la construction de l'identité personnelle, de ses aspects inter-générationnelles.

Très précis et riche en informations des plus diverses, le présent ouvrage est une lecture agréable, intéressante par les informations relatives à l'histoire des grands-parents de l'espace français et pouvant servir de modèle à tout chercheur roumain intéressé à étendre l'analyse du sujet à l'espace roumain.

Daniela Mârza

Romanian Academy, *Centre for Transylvanian Studies, daniela_marza@yahoo.com*