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Some Considerations on the End of the Demographic Transition and Post-Transitional Processes

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Abstract: The discussions on the demographic transition have focused more on the starting process (particularly aimed at fertility transition) as well on the explanatory factors and their combination in theories and much less on its terminal moment. Usually, it is argued that the demographic transition was over in Western societies in the mid seventies of the last century, with the end of the *baby boom*, and after the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern European countries. I shall start out with some consideration on the process called "demographic transition", highlighting its unique and unrepeatable character in the history of population but also the diversity of the theoretical description, explanation and interpretation of the process. I will try to argue that it is preferable, in terms of explanations, to assume that in many Western countries the transition was complete in the interwar years, and in some countries from the Eastern part of Europe, including Romania, in the 1960s. In other words, in my view, the periods with high fertility specific to the *baby boom* era and also specific to the communist countries until 1989 should be interpreted as post-transitional sequences, combined with sequences of intense subfertility or closed to the reproduction level. In conclusion, we do not have another transition after the demographic transition but a movement of population for which, at least for the moment, we do not see a convergence of patterns; it is just about a change whose trends, structures, steps and rhythms can not be predicted.

Keywords: demographic transition, fertility evolution, end of transition, Europe, post-transition period

1. A few clarifications on the concept of “demographic transition”

This brief introduction¹ has a very simple and clear purpose, namely, I will try to emphasize that, in order to frame the real phenomenon of transition, it is essential to contain the content of the concept to what it strictly concerns, by separating its defining features from subsequent additions, which are inevitable when *describing* various particular manifestations of the process or when trying to *explain* its more general or more specific features. In addition, I believe that such a distinction would help us differentiate the phenomenon from others seemingly part of the same category, such as that often referred to as the “second demographic transition”, a concept which, as I will mention later, unjustifiably lives at the expense of the former.

I would like to start with a confession: I do not claim that I have covered all the specialist literature on transition, nor do I intend to carry out its exegesis. I have explored some fundamental works from various periods, starting with the 1940s, written both by classical authors (such as the Princeton group: Notestein, Kirk, Davis) or their followers, and by critics or researchers who have wanted to downplay the importance of a construct that has proved so fertile for the understanding and forecasting of demographic phenomena of the modern era. Following an approach meant to be detached, objective and avoiding bias, my understanding of the various points of view regarding the transition will be summed up in several key ideas outlined below.

At first, the term *transition* was used by those who utilized it with its proper meaning, namely a “*shift from a state (situation) to another*”, i.e. *a movement taking place in a period when the system (in our case, the population) is unbalanced; therefore, during transition an initial state is surpassed and a final state has not been reached yet*. In other words, a *transition* is something unquestionably different from a *change* or a *revolution*, with the latter becoming transitions only when or to the extent to which we can define the state to which that change or revolution leads. For this reason, I consider pointless the French demographers’ attempt to challenge the merits of the Princeton group in developing the concept and attribute it to Landry.² In a similar vein, the English-speaking demographers can

¹ I will not elaborate extensively on these ideas in this part of my study because some of them have been developed in my more or less recent works: Rotariu (2010: 43-61; 2009a: 216-249; 2009b; 2006a; 2006b)

² I believe that the most radical position in this respect belongs to J. Vallin (2000: 203), who thinks that the American researchers Davis, Kirk and Notestein only rebaptized Landry’s “demographic revolution” by naming it “demographic transition”, even though

use the name of Warren Thompson as a precursor and not as a founder of the concept. Neither Thompson nor Landry treated transition properly; both wanted to say more, but eventually said less.

Secondly, the *demographic transition*, as it is understood by most researchers and especially by those who launched this concept, means the population shift from a state of equilibrium in terms of its growth, namely when birth and death rates were high, to another state of equilibrium, when these two phenomena experience a significant decline, recording low levels³. It should be noted that this shift has occurred in the modern era (i.e. since eighteenth century). This latter observation can fulfil only *a minimal function in relation to the context*, indicating the period in which things occurred, so as to exclude from the argument any important changes from other periods. It may also perform a *theoretical function*, suggesting that the transition is caused by (generated by, produced by etc.) or simply linked to the modernization of human society. Similarly, it is also customary to state that, in the vast majority of cases, the onset of transition is characterized by the significant and irreversible decrease of death rates to earlier levels, while fertility remains high for a time; this gap causes a sharp population increase, which will diminish its intensity only when the two curves of the birth and death rates approach each other again in the final part of the transition. The former considerations lead to an intellectual construct of a *scheme* or *pattern* of transition, which involves these basic theoretical acknowledgements. It is precisely because of such content “scarcity” that a general approach is possible from the perspective of the concept.

At a closer look, we can see that actually, the content of the concept consists of several basic principles, of *empirical origin*:

the terms cover “the same historical process”.

³ For instance, in a relatively recent study, D. Kirk (1996: 361) stated: “What is demographic transition theory? Stripped to essentials, it states that societies that experience modernization progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern one in which both are low. The term 'modernization', is not defined, nor does it include the crucial questions about causation that form the subject of much modern demographic literature.” C. Chesnais (1986: 18), in his classic work on transition, affirms: “En fait, dans l'esprit de ses auteurs, le concept de transition démographique désigne le passage, à l'occasion d'un processus de „modernisation” globale, et au bout d'un certain délai, d'un régime traditionnel d'équilibre démographique à une mortalité et fécondité fortes, à un régime moderne d'équilibre, à mortalité et fécondité basses.”

- During the “old demographic regime” birth and death rates remained high;

- Social and economic development (though slow at start) and the experience in controlling infectious diseases with great social impact (even if initially devoid of scientific foundation and, consequently, lacking efficiency in terms of intervention means) led to a gradual decrease of mortality, first by eliminating catastrophic mortality episodes, then by the gradual improvement of living conditions and, finally, by the contribution of the great medical breakthroughs, starting with vaccines;

- The lack of birth control within marriages caused overall fertility to stay high, even in Western societies, where, following the Middle Ages, a certain decline was registered, due to changes in marriage timing.

Secondly, the content includes a *logical* principle:

- A society where there is a large gap between birth and death rates is subject to an accelerated demographic growth rate, a process that can not be maintained indefinitely.⁴

Therefore, a means to intervene effectively to reduce fertility, capable of surpassing previous regulatory methods, is needed; that is the use of contraception in relationships. Simply put, the theory of transition in its most general and simple form, starts from the observation that modern society (in some formulations, industrialization) leads to lower mortality, which ultimately must be reflected in reduced fertility, because otherwise we would have an unlimited exponential population growth, which is impossible in a closed universe.

Even if general and abstract, the transition model does not meet the needs of all countries; for instance, in countries where population pressure was initially very high, it is possible that fertility begins to decline almost simultaneously with mortality, as is the case of France,

⁴ This is a principle formally equivalent to that of Malthus but is somehow considered in reverse. Thus, if we assume that the death rate decreases to 10‰ and the birth rate stays at 50‰, the annual population growth rate will be 4%, which would lead to population doubling in 18 years; if such an increase mechanism had been triggered worldwide, let us say, 180 years ago, when the population reached one billion, today the world population would comprise 1024 billion inhabitants! In such a situation, Malthus proposed the intervention of mortality (positive restraint) for slowing down the growth whereas this situation requires a strong fertility reduction. However, fertility can keep the pace with such mortality decrease only by voluntary birth control, even within marriages.

or, on the contrary, if the relief valve of migration is present, it will occur much later, as is the case of Great Britain. Similarly, given the overlapping of social and economic development triggered by modernization and the transition, the latter may engender a higher or lesser population growth (induced by the rate of population growth and by the length of the transition period), depending on the pace of economic growth, particularly on the development of means of subsistence. It has been noticed that, before decreasing, fertility increases for a short while, which is possible because of the very improvement of living conditions. Moreover, if other important elements are taken into consideration, such as the starting point of mortality or of the fertility decline, not to mention other details, we will notice that virtually all countries (and, at the country level, each zone such as the historical regions of Romania, for example) have their own transition pattern.

On the other hand, the transition pattern description and the macro-structural elements mentioned above are sufficient, in the first instance, to understand transition and identify its empirical reality. However, staying at this level generates a kind of intellectual dissatisfaction, which ultimately leads to attempting to build a theory, richer and more substantial, to account for a correlation, between the evolution of the two basic demographic phenomena and other social phenomena (in particular those related to family) and, on the other hand, between macro- and micro- social phenomena. The latter are particularly significant when we realize that, in fact, fertility control by preventing pregnancy - i.e. the only mechanism that can truly reduce population growth in modern societies - is a conscious action of individuals and couples. However, for this to occur, certain conditions need to be fulfilled, among which those set by Coale (1973), which are very well known and often mentioned:

- People should be aware that fertility can be controlled (meaning that, in principle, this is not only technically feasible but that such conduct is socially acceptable);
- People should have access to means of fertility control;
- People should be interested in reducing their descendants.

I have evoked these conditions because each provides arguments to help us understand that explaining what happens in the transition is not always an easy thing. For example, among other things, the first condition shows that ideational factors (beliefs, values, etc.) need to be

brought into play. The second condition points to the fact that, in order to accelerate transition, it is possible to appeal to the intervention of policy makers that should facilitate, for example, the improvement of contraceptive methods and facilitate access to them; the third condition suggests that the available descriptions of social structure should be able to explain why families have the interest to reduce their descendants (in any case, couples will not think to use contraception to prevent their country from becoming overpopulated!). Furthermore, I want to bring forth a fact often omitted for the sake of a net demarcation of different social theories, namely that even when adopting an individualist-rationalist explanatory paradigm, as is often the case in transition theories, we need to resort to extremely various macro-structural explanatory factors (cultural, structural, institutional, political, etc.), which are generally helpful in contextualizing the particular situations of human communities and in giving meaning to individual actions, particularly to the type of choices made by masses of individuals.

These explanatory factors are also effectual in the understanding of how it was possible for such a large number of theories of transition to have been developed. Simplifying, we can say that these theories differ by the nature of the factors taken into account and the specific manner in which they are linked to each other. For instance, some theories are based on the primacy of economic factors, considering that changes in attitudes and mentalities derive from or accompany changes in demographic behaviour (if it is not economically advantageous for a family to have many children, then the attitude towards them and even towards contraception changes). Other theories consider the ideational factors as the driving force of behaviour change. It is not my intention to go into this long discussion in more depth but to emphasize that the same general transition may be covered by a countless number of explanatory theories and that demographic literature is not short of such attempts.

Another important observation, which needs to be taken into account when analysing the contribution of various authors to the theoretical construction of transition, is that *in the first half of the twentieth century, it was still fashionable to find general laws of the evolution of the population* (even in mathematical form, as was the case of the rediscovery of the logistic curve) or even to delineate phases that demographic changes must necessarily undergo. In this context, illustrated by the attempts of A. Landry, in France, and Warren Thompson, in America, it was natural

that, in one form or another, a certain stage in the history of Western countries' population would be selected and overlap to some extent with the transition phase, whose main feature was the drastic decline of fertility by means of birth control. However, as said from the outset, neither Thompson nor Landry offered a definition of transition similar to that given by the Princeton group. It is true that members of this group were also tributary to a certain extent to the ideas of their time but, even if they included the demographic transition in a long chain of historical stages of population evolution, eventually they ended up by focusing only on it. Yet, their effort was probably not enough because the concept was then ambiguous and, what I find most difficult to understand, this ambiguity has lasted to this day. For example, as mentioned in Chesnais (1986: 7), C.P. Blacker, in a 1949 article, inserted transition (split into two stages) in a series of "Stages in Population Growth" (the title of his work); two such "stages" are subsequent to the transition and one precedes it; this idea of the five phases is then resumed in a 1950 paper of K. Davis. Despite some clear explanations made by renowned demographers⁵, even recent demographic works mention this flawed formula of the concept, namely that demographic transition consists of three, four or five phases, out of which at least one precedes or follows the transition⁶.

Obviously, accepting the reality of transition and that it occupies a well defined temporal area makes it clear that we should talk about a period before it (pre-transitional) or following it (post-transitional). Only that neither the transition pattern nor its theoretical description state anything about these two periods; the balance refers strictly to a short period around the time of the beginning, respectively of the completion of the transition. The pre-transitional period is very long⁷ and comprised many changes (including those sometimes called transition or revolution, such as the Upper Palaeolithic, those corresponding to the invention of agriculture and to the domestication of animals or that, mentioned by Coale, when Western countries came

⁵ I must mention Paul Demeny's well known words (1968: 502), an excellent summary of the contents of the concept of demographic transition: "In traditional societies, fertility and mortality are high. In modern societies, fertility and mortality are low. In between, there is demographic transition."

⁶ We can see how ingrained this mistake is, however elementary, when consulting various materials on the Internet. An example is the Wikipedia English page on demographic transition where a "splendid" graph of the five stages of transition is on display!

⁷ See, for example, Cliquet (1991).

out of the Middle Ages), but the concept established by Notestein and his collaborators does not refer to them. Similarly, events occurring after the transition are beyond its scope and critics of the theory of transition on grounds that it does not correctly predict the post-transitional events, obviously do so without any basis. For example, the balance between birth and death marking the end of the transition does not mean a zero population growth or even less an indefinite zero growth. Coming up with such criticism (that the population does not remain stable after the transition) is to misunderstand the essence of the concept of transition and of basic facts pertaining to population dynamics. None of the founders of the transition supported such an assertion, even if their works still show, as I said, the temptation to talk about the general trend of the population; yet, when it comes to predicting what will happen after the transition, their assumptions are cautious and, as far as I know, none relies on long-term zero growth⁸. Rather, even Notestein puts forth the hypothesis regarding a possible negative natural increase, but - I emphasize once again - such considerations are already beyond the scope of the transition.

Obviously, extending the transition pattern to a general model of population growth induces another major confusion commonly found in the texts of demographers, namely that *between the transition theories and general theories of population trends*. This approximation is probably due to the fact that some of these theories stress the importance of or deal exclusively with the phenomenon of fertility, which is illustrated, for example, by the minute searches for explanatory mechanisms for decreased fertility, in the case of the transition theories. Or, the transition scheme or pattern takes equally into account the two phenomena, or even emphasizes the primacy of mortality, not just in terms of precedence on the temporal sequence, but as a decisive and final cause (according to the logic mentioned above).

⁸The impression that the transition theory would support such an idea was facilitated by the fact that the population projections carried out until the 1980s, primarily done by the UN, for countries in transition - and the world's population in general - used zero growth as an endpoint. This choice only represented a simple and convenient calculation method or, if we were to consider some critics, this hypothesis would have been more attractive than others, facilitating the acceptance by developing countries of birth control policies, suggested and supported by international organizations, controlled by Western countries.

2. On completion of the demographic transition

Whatever method is used to reach an operational definition of demographic transition, setting the onset and end moments proves to be a difficult task; more specifically, researchers should accept that, rather than based on definitive arguments, these limits will rely on conventions, which commonly may bring about disputes. However, such debates are not necessarily sterile, since adopting a position may entail the understanding of other phenomena, as we shall see below. The difficulty of establishing starting and end points is also due to the fact that, as it has frequently been observed⁹, the demographic transition can be broken down into three transitions: that of the mortality, that of the fertility and that of natural growth. While there seems to be a higher consensus concerning the beginning of transition, with researchers looking for the period when mortality starts decreasing without returning to previous high values, there is, at least in principle, a dilemma in what concerns the end of this process: the transition is completed when fertility approaches the threshold for replacement of generations or when population growth comes close to zero¹⁰. It is clear that the two moments do not coincide because, for example, in young populations (who went through the fertility transition period in a more alert pace), population growth remains positive for a longer time, even if short term indicators show below replacement fertility rates (see, for example the case of China).

I consider that elaborating on the issue of the starting time would not be an opportune discussion because, when reference is made to all peoples of the world, this issue requires a huge amount of historical data, which I do not master; on the other hand, the information available for Romania, at least at the aggregate level of the entire country, is insufficient, both in terms of nuances and historical period¹¹; moreover, some of the figures related to the interval 1860-1880

⁹ This idea is mentioned, for example, in the study on transition by V. Trebici, in Trebici and Ghinoiu (1986: 40).

¹⁰ It is a “dilemma” and not a “trilemma” because, as it can be noticed, I have left aside the issue of mortality. This is for a simple reason: there is no “natural” threshold for this phenomenon that would mark the transition. Using values for life expectancy at birth or infant mortality is not only conventional but also arbitrary. For the other two issues we do not have such a threshold: zero growth for natural growth, and value one of the net reproduction index (i.e. the level of current fertility that, assumed stable over time, ensures the reproduction of female generations).

¹¹ The oldest data on the principality of Wallachia stop in 1859. For more details on these demographic series, see Cornelia Muresan’s study (1999).

seem to me very questionable. Then, I believe that, due to particular circumstances, the timing of the onset cannot be established as accurately as the final moment; this is not only - or primarily - because the beginning is lost somewhere in the mists of time (we need to go back a century, perhaps two or three ago, when everything was less clear and harder to explain), but because the transition onset was a slow process over a long period of time, which was indispensable to render evident the irreversible progress in reducing mortality due to developments in various areas with impact on this aspect (including the changing attitudes towards death). Therefore, a detailed discussion on this issue is in danger of never ending.

Instead, a discussion about the end of the transition seems more interesting not only for reasons of symmetry in reverse, but because the final timing of the transition is essential to our understanding of the meaning of the processes occurring in recent past, at present or in the near future. Indeed, the importance of the transition model used during the past half century lies in the fact that it has provided a conceptual basis for choosing short-term or even medium-term projections (for several decades) of the population across large regions of the globe. Simply put, *whereas for populations in transition projection assumptions with high degree of validity can be found, for those that finished the transition, such support is lacking, despite the intricate theories that current demographics puts forth.*

I illustrated this elsewhere (Rotariu 2009a, 2009b), and the example I used seems even now so appropriate that I cannot refrain from repeating it. It was a brief analysis of the global population forecasting attempts successively carried out by the UN Population Division, since 1950, targeting the year 2000.

Comparing results from Figures 1 and 2, where the situation is displayed separately for developed and developing countries, it is obvious that the prognosis was very accurate for the latter and inaccurate for the former. Surely this is a counter-intuitive finding, with most people probably thinking that more reliable and long-term demographic data for the developed countries would have allowed for a better prediction. In fact, the reason why things are the other way round is simple: developing countries were in transition during this period (some had not begun transition but it was assumed, on reasonable grounds, that they would enter this process as well) and the transition model could be applied to them, while developed countries had in most

cases completed their transition and did not allow for any subsequent evolutionary milestones to be analysed.

Figure 1. Values for the population of developed countries in 2000, as they appear into three successive versions of the UN projections





Figure 2. Values for the population of developing countries in 2000, as they appear into three successive versions of the UN projections



In relation with the suggestive situation in Figure 1 showing that the developed countries have completed their transition, I refer to the whole range marked there, including 1950. This may raise some objections, as most authors place the end of the transition for Western countries in the mid-1960s, when fertility rates plummeted after the amazing episode of the baby boom. Personally, I think that Western countries transition (at least in Northern, Western and Central Europe, but also in the United States and Australia) ended during the interwar period, in the first half of the 1930s. I will try to argue this briefly.

First of all, we need to decide which of the indicators under consideration - birth rate, death rate or natural growth – should be used and what value should be taken as a benchmark. Mortality is excluded for two reasons. Firstly because, as mentioned above, it experiences a steady decline in terms of life expectancy, and therefore there is no reason to proclaim it a limit of this indicator (65, 70 or 75 years), showing that the transition is complete. Secondly, when measured by the gross rate, mortality shows fluctuations and even significant increases during the very period that could be considered as the end of the transition, which is caused not so much by the intensity of the phenomenon, but by changes in population age structure.

The natural growth indicator seems the most suitable to describe the transition end because its values drawing near zero point to that famous equilibrium so often mentioned and evoked in this study for the purpose of defining transition. Regrettably, this indicator loses some of its significance if one of its two characteristic dimensions, namely the crude death rate, says almost nothing¹² about the population in terms of mortality. Or, more explicitly, it appears that, at a certain level of fertility, natural population growth becomes dependent on the death rate, which in turn depends on the age structure, namely on the population ageing level; in its turn, the latter depends to a great extent on the population trajectory during transition, particularly on the duration of the fertility downward trajectory, i.e. on the speed with which it has declined until the respective moment. Indeed, in the cases where decline lasts for a longer time, older generations become elderly and cause an increased death rate, while in countries where fertility

¹² Considering the synthetic table put forth by G. Pison (2009), we can notice that, for instance, a crude death rate of 10‰ characterizes a big number of countries of amazing diversity from all continents, ranging from developed European states such as Sweden, Denmark or Germany to African countries such as Ghana, Senegal or Gabon.

decline is more recent, even if it gets very low values, the death rate is still low and the natural growth is positive.

I believe that, in addition to this, we need to take into account the fact that the end-of-transition equilibrium, often mentioned by researchers, is relative when referring strictly to the value of natural growth or is only a metaphor suggesting that birth and death rates reached a low level, a situation that can not generate a population increase similar to that registered during the transition. These facts entitle us to say that *the end of transition is reached when fertility attains the level of a net reproduction index close to one*. Naturally, as I have mentioned before, there are not and can not be decisive arguments in favour of such a solution; yet, its explanation is grounded in the fact that, even when both demographic phenomena involved here - fertility and mortality - have completed their transition, the value of natural growth can stay positive for quite long (at a level significantly different from zero), mainly because of circumstantial causes, related to the age structure of the population.

Current examples supporting this position are two important countries in East Asia: China and South Korea. In completely different ways, the two countries have since long gotten to a fertility under the replacement level but, due to their age structure, both countries have a positive natural growth, which is currently somewhere around 0.4 -0.5%. My opinion, which is shared by other analysts more familiar with the demographics of the area, is that the two countries (and there are others in that part of the world) have already completed their demographic transition (see, for example, Attané and Barbieri 2009).

However, if we accept such a solution for now, then I do not see why we would not accept it for the past. Indeed, returning to the Western culture countries and considering the figures of interwar fertility, it is apparent that many of them had reached the replacement level, and some had fallen far below it. According to D. Kirk's 1946 evaluation, during the interval 1920-1930 more than half of the European population had fertility levels above 1 for the net reproduction index (cf. Frejka and Calot 2001: 397). Table 1 shows some figures taken from J.-C. Chesnais's synthetic work (1986), representing *the net reproduction index* (R_0) for 12 countries, ten situated in Western and Central Europe, and two overseas, indicating the lowest value in the interval 1930-1939. Let us add that the values in the table are not accidental and that, except for some cases (namely some

countries in some years), all values are below one throughout the decade, whereas the exceptions mentioned above do not exceed 1.13 and appear after one or two years from the beginning of the interval. Similarly, in Germany, due to Nazi pro-natalist policies, the indicator rose in 1939 to the value of one child per woman and in Austria, to 1.04.

Table 1. Examples of Western countries that came to a proper fraction of net reproduction index (R_0) during the interwar period

Country	Year	R_0	Country	Year	R_0
Germany	1933	0.70	Great Britain	1933	0.77
Austria	1934	0.65	Belgium	1936	0.85
Denmark	1934	0.93	Finland	1933	0.88
France	1935	0.87	Norway	1936	0.75
Sweden	1934	0.74	Switzerland	1937	0.76
Australia	1934	0.94	United States	1933	0.94

Source: J.-C. Chesnais (1986: 212-213)


The picture is very clear. Data in Table 1 show not only that there are many countries characterized by subfertility, but that there are several in which the low birth rate is very significant, ranging between 25 and 35%, which means that the equilibrium (in the sense adopted here, namely the replacement of generations) was reached long ago and was followed by a trend leading to a more pronounced state of disequilibrium. But, apart for such details, the conclusion seems very plausible: *these countries completed their fertility transition in the interwar period and, consequently, reached the end of their demographic transition.* Subsequent developments represent elements of the post-transitional evolution.

Researchers have highlighted quite a lot of times the importance of a thorough and reliable analysis of the situation of fertility in Central and Western Europe during the interwar period, pointing out that, rather than an accidental episode (or directly linked to an event of the era, such as the Great Depression), as commonly believed, this situation was the result of a trend reaching a turning point. Moreover, the very explanatory factors (see, for example, Van Bavel 2010) are similar to those that are invoked to account for changes in the 1960s. However, no significant voices are known to have clearly argued that the transition

was completed then, which is why I would like to dwell a moment on a few details.

In this respect, in order to illustrate better the evolution of fertility in Western countries over a century (1910-2009), we have chosen three cases, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom, for which we have complete data (taken from Chesnais 1986, and for more recent years, the Eurostat database), including the period of the two world wars.


Figure 3. Evolution of total fertility rate in France (metropolitan), Sweden and the United Kingdom between 1910-2009



Firstly, Figure 3 shows the values of the total fertility rate (TFR) for the whole period; then, the following figures represent selected sequences from this period of time. Thus, Figure 4 shows the period up to the beginning of World War II. The lines in Figure 4 clearly illustrate the long trend of declining fertility mentioned earlier (if we omit the effect of World War I) and the fact that, when approaching the replacement level of generations, the transition can be said to reach its closing phase around the mid-1930s. Indeed, if it were not for the “trough” during the war (deeper for France, medium for the United Kingdom and shallow for Sweden), followed by the 1920 “peak”, we could imagine for each

country (even for France, where the fertility level was already very low in 1910) an almost linear declining sequence ending in the middle of the fourth decade with a TFR below 2 children for Sweden and the United Kingdom and slightly above for France; yet, given the mortality of the era¹³, the value of the net reproduction index was below 1, as seen in Table 1.

Figure 4. Evolution of total fertility rate in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the period 1910-1939




There is almost unanimous consensus on Romania and most East European countries ending their transition in the aftermath of the fall of the communist regimes, namely in the early 1990s. I believe that this is a somewhat hasty and superficial approach and a more substantial analysis would show that it is more reasonable to set the end of the transition during the 1960s. In fact, if we refer to fertility, we find that in Romania the period synthetic indicator (TFR) reaches 2.04 children per woman in 1962 and decreases¹⁴ to 1.90 in 1966 (see J.-C. Chesnais 1986: 521,

¹³ Indeed, by my calculations, for the Western populations to achieve the generation replacement level ($R_0 = 1$) a value of TFR of 2.4 children per woman was needed at that time, a level below which all three countries had declined since 1925.

¹⁴ Obviously, this decline of fertility in Romania and other former Soviet bloc countries was facilitated by the liberalization of abortion, which became in the period 1957-1966 a

which is also the source of data for the countries mentioned below). Briefly, we can say that this process includes at least five consecutive years of net reproduction index with value below 1. According to the criterion adopted here, this fact clearly signifies the end of the transition. The decrease is obvious in Figure 5 where, alongside Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria appear with plotted RTF values from 1950 to 2009.

Figure 5. Evolution of total fertility rate (TFR) in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania between 1950 and 2009



What happened in Romania in the coming years is the result of *coercive* political¹⁵ measures, which sharply raised the fertility rate in 1967 to 3.66 children per woman, then later return to around 2.5, with higher or lower values, depending on subsequent interventions of the repressive apparatus. In neighbouring Hungary, fertility dropped to below 2.1 children per woman in 1959 and practically remained at this

means frequently used to restrict the number of descendants within marriage but also to avoid births by unmarried women.

¹⁵ The decree no. 770, from 1 October 1966, practically prohibited abortion; then, until 1989 several other decisions were enforced that will further restrict the access to this means and will also prohibit the production and sale of contraceptives. Details about the effects of this decree and, in general, on the Romanian communist policies on the control of reproduction are found in Gail Kligman's book (1998).

critical level and even below until 1989, except for a few years when some soft measures, which were generally stimulating, caused the value to reach about 2.3. Similarly, in Bulgaria, TFR reached 2.1 in 1966 and subsequent values above this level were few and did not exceed 2.3 either. Probably similar situations occurred in some Soviet republics or Yugoslavia, but they are not evident in the overall data aggregated at the level of the respective states. Out of the former socialist countries that were divided, Czechoslovakia was in a very special situation. Indeed, calculated figures for the whole territory show that during the interwar period, it was in a situation similar to that of Western countries mentioned in Table 1, because in the 1930s fertility had declined here as well - it is true that in a very short time and much faster, but most evidently - below the replacement level; therefore, Czechoslovakia can be added to the group of countries that had completed their transition.

In conclusion, except for Czechoslovakia and East Germany, we can say that there are some former Communist countries, including Romania, where the transition ended during the 1960s; next, only the more or less brutal interventions of authoritarian regimes maintained fertility above the replacement level in some years until 1989. We could call the interval between 1970 and 1980 a forced transition extension. That this is so was apparent immediately after 1989; in a few years, the reproduction indices dropped from values slightly above 1 at the lowest levels in the world. It is obvious that such a development is not “normal”, being a “liberating” effect produced by the regime change; the values reached by the mid-1990s are probably those that would have been reached “naturally”, if the evolution after the 1960s had not been disturbed by the political decisions of the regimes of the time. In other words, I claim that it was not the economic crisis undergone by these countries in the first years after their regimes collapsed that caused fertility to decrease, even if it is reasonable to suppose that it could have influenced to some extent - and perhaps only in some countries - the level reached. Indeed, if we analyse what happened in Romania, we see that the current fertility level has remained virtually unchanged since 1994 or, at any rate, the fluctuations have been so insignificant that it is risky to suggest there has been a trend; in other words, it is clear that fertility was indifferent to the various economic situations from this period¹⁶.

¹⁶ Indeed, Romania is a counterexample that disproves the argument that the crisis following the fall of communism has created a drastic decrease in fertility. For some

3. And after the transition ...


Following the formula previously proposed, the delineation of transition by setting its end in the period when, pursuing a clear downward course, fertility has approached the minimum required for the replacement of generations, is advantageous in the sense that it helps us better understand the post-transitional phenomena that can be integrated in a long series of events, which will soon cover a century for the first group of countries that have completed the transition and half a century for Hungary, Romania and other East European countries.

First, I will present briefly the situation of Western countries. The first important finding, which has not been sufficiently acknowledged, is *that countries that have completed the transition during the interwar period witnessed the return of fertility just before the start of World War II or, in any case, before the end of the conflagration.* This is suggested by the annual data for several countries¹⁷, and the graphic presentation of this period for the three selected countries (including information for the war years), as shown in Figure 6, confirms without any doubt the trend mentioned above. In fact, it is obvious for all three countries, that the minimum values reached during 1933-1935 were followed by a slight rebound in 1939, the year the war began, and then by a small decrease in 1940-41, probably a consequence of the conflict onset; in 1942, while the war was at its peak, it resumed its growth in a much more clearer manner than in the pre-war years. Of course, situations are not identical in all three countries, which went through completely different developments during the war. It is clear that in Sweden the said decrease was minimal, or rather a brief stagnation interrupting the growth (1939-1941) while in France, the decrease was more marked and the recovery slower.

former communist countries, the approximate coincidence of the decline and the crisis happened at random; in Romania the crisis lasted much longer and this has allowed for a better distinction between the two processes, both in time and as a dependent relationship.


¹⁷ See also the graphs in Van Bavel (2010).

Figure 6. Evolution of total fertility rate (TFR) in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the period 1930-1949



The countries mentioned previously are not the only ones to have resumed their growth before the war ended. Germany apart, where Hitler's government clearly intervened in 1930 to increase the birth rate (as well as the annexed Austria), we will notice that fertility started to increase before or during the war in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Canada, the US and Australia. In other words, *the well known period of baby boom did not start after the war* (thus, it was not the result of enthusiasm generated by the signing of peace treaties), *but during its time or even before it*. Consequently, the explanation of that sudden demographic explosion is still being awaited. Similarly, we are still looking forward to an explanation of the relatively sudden end of Western demographic boom during the 1960s. Indeed, Figure 7 shows fertility decreasing dramatically in the three countries within 10 to 12 years after 1964.

Figure 7. Evolution of total fertility rate in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the period 1960-2009



It is common knowledge that during these years the contraceptive pill started to be used on a large scale; however, besides the fact that the pill was a means and not a cause, it is apparent that, at least for some populations, the decline preceded its mass usage. For example, in France its use was permitted only in late 1967 (the Neuwirth Act) and it was sold without restrictions only starting with 1974. Even if used illegally before 1967, I do not believe that the pill was so extensively used so as to account for the French women's fertility decline, at least not until early 1970. There was a definitely similar situation in the United States, where fertility dropped before 1960, namely before the moment the pill invented by Dr. Pincus was approved by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration).

In the same vein, other political and social events, such as the 1968 social movements cannot be said to have originated this change, given that fertility decline started in Western European countries several years earlier, while in other major countries, such as the U.S., even before 1960, as mentioned above. In other words, it is very difficult to link the beginning and end of the baby boom to a particular event, no matter how important that might seem to us from today's perspective.

Referring to the subsequent development of fertility, things are even more complicated. Considering only those three countries, whose current indicator is shown in Figure 7, we can notice that while until the early 1980s the evolution was synchronous (this is apparent in the trend: reaching the peak, followed by decrease and a slight recovery in the first part of the 1990s), afterwards oscillations are no longer synchronous, nor is their magnitude the same (for example, they are much higher in Sweden); the only similitude is a slight increase in recent years, leading to equalized values close to 2 children per woman.

Leaving aside the differences between the three countries, the graph in Figure 7 shows a basic fact: *in the second half of the 1970s the downward trend in fertility stopped*, and the level of the total fertility rate, since then until now is similar to the one reached in the 1930s (somewhere between 1.75 and 2.1 children per woman). In other words, in recent years nothing essentially different - from this point of view - from the era preceding World War II happened in these three countries. Consequently, the recent situation of these countries, located at the heart of Western civilization, invalidates categorically the theses of the so-called “second demographic transition” theory and, in general, culturalist theories on the impact of major value changes on fertility occurred after 1960.

Invalidation comes, as I said, first in terms of development of fertility indicators that, according to theoretical tenets, ought to have descended to much lower levels, namely below 1.5 children per woman, similarly to the evolutions in the southern and eastern countries; or, just in the regions where ideas and behaviour changes (in areas such as marriage, divorce, cohabitation, etc.) are more numerous and more important, we find countries – important and very different in terms of social policy systems - in which fertility did not fall to very low levels. Secondly, as Van Bavel tries to demonstrate in his recent study (2010), the value system allegedly underlying procreative behaviour (individualism, self-realization, consumerism, etc.) has not changed much since the 1930s because the same reasons accounting for families bringing less children into the world were often invoked then as now.

Despite these denials, the proponents of the so-called theory of the second demographic transition are trying to promote the idea that such a change has occurred or is about to occur not only in North-Western European countries, but across the continent and even worldwide. Such a pathetic effort is illustrated in one of the most recent

studies of the Belgian demographer Ron Lesthaeghe (2010), who aims to convince us of the universality of a model that has not worked, not even for its original area and which, to be kept alive, needs more “epicycles” than the Ptolemaic theory.

I do not want to insist on the weaknesses of this theory, about which I have written on several occasions (Rotariu 2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2009b). The analysis of fertility in all populations that completed classical transition shows clearly that, after the most recent moment of decline stopping (which in some countries took place in the late 1970s, more than three decades ago, while in Romania it occurred in 1994-95), no definite evolutionary tendency is visible that can be demonstrated empirically or with logical arguments. Under these circumstances, the “theory” supported by Lesthaeghe is even less able to indicate any future developments, namely to advance a hypothesis on fertility that would allow population planning, at least for a short term, in countries that are in the post-transitional stage.

Therefore, our conclusion may be expressed through the very fine formulation of Jacques Vallin (2000), who stated that *the end of the historical process of transition is also the death of an explanatory paradigm*, meaning that henceforth researchers will be devoid of such a tool to help them glimpse the future. And there is no mystery in this fact: *the real process behind the demographic transition model was unique - so never to be repeated - in the history of human populations and its conclusion opens the future to an infinite range of possibilities*. That does not mean that the trends highlighted by Lesthaeghe and other researchers in the recent evolution of demographic phenomena (concerning marriage, divorce, non-marital births, cohabitation, etc.) or having an impact on this field (women's work, couple relationships, etc.) are not real. Nevertheless, no matter how hard we try, they are unable to account for - and even less to predict - the evolution of fertility. It is in this respect that I was talking about an open future because, ultimately, fertility is the fundamental component of the population evolution.

In its content and its demographic and social substance, the demographic transition process was unique and unrepeatable, for the same population, just like many other changes in the life of societies. Yet, at the same time, it was special in terms of form, mode of expression, and meaning; it also had features that allowed researchers to describe it easily and understand its direction, given the inevitability of its end. Let us not exaggerate, however, demographers' ability to

anticipate things. Our claim that the end of this process occurred for the most advanced countries during the interwar period will significantly reduce the merits of those who, in the early 1940s, built for it a coherent theoretical framework. Though, it is much less interesting to observe the whole process once it has ended than to anticipate its course before it reaches the final stage!

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Is Social Policy Part of the Decision Making Process about Motherhood in the Czech Republic?

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Abstract: Social policy has played an important factor in discussions about birth rates in European countries. Focusing on the motherhood decision-making, we used qualitative interviews with two groups of women (mothers after age of thirty and women who were childless after age of thirty) to determine whether external conditions - mainly social policies and standards - were affecting this process. It revealed an indirect influence of social policies on this decision-making process, demonstrated by, among other things, how the respondents anticipated and depicted the transition to motherhood and how they would prepare themselves materially and psychologically for it.

Keywords: social policy, parenthood decision making, transition to motherhood, Czech Republic

1. Introduction

In the Czech context social experts are critical to the lack of an implemented overall concept for family social policy that would allow men and women to combine work and child care according to their own ideas and preferences (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2007, Křížková, Dudová, Hašková, Maříková and Uhde 2008). Uncoordinated family policy is unable to maintain and solidify the position and security of women on the labour market, and create the kind of environment in society that would lead to the possibility of a more balanced distribution of responsibilities between the two sexes.² Czech women are forced to deal with the dilemma of production

¹ The study was supported by The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic – research project „Social Reproduction and Integration“ (MSM0021622408).

² Family policies comprise a multitude of policies in many different areas, such as health-care and social-security policies, labor-market policies, housing policies, educational policies, taxation rules, family law, and so forth. Some family policy measures target family issues

(participation in paid work) and reproduction (parenthood) as the harmonization of both spheres is very difficult to achieve in the existing system. Recent demographical behaviour of the Czech population – declining fertility, postponing parenthood and increasing proportion of women who remain childless – is perceived by social politics experts as an answer of Czech women to this dilemma, because – in contrast to fertility rates – participation in labour market remains significant for Czech women (Bartáková 2008).

From the standpoint of sociological theory there are two different perspectives on the issue. One of them denies that there is a strong connection between macro-structural factors (the influence of social institutions and public politics) and childbearing decisions, and emphasis is placed on the choices of individuals – women and their individual goals, values, motivations, and how these are different from men’s attitudes and values (Hakim 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006). According to the other theory, the behaviour of women on the labour market and the decision to have children may be determined by free choice, but “is a reflection of the manner in which women actively construct their career biography in terms of historically available opportunities and pressures” (Crompton and Harris 1998: 119). Women focus on what is realistically available to them, and adapt their aspirations and values to their anticipated position on the labour market. They shape their biographies in relation to the opportunities they are aware of, but meanwhile these opportunities vary culturally and historically. National variations in women’s status are also linked to different behaviour in the sphere of division of labour within the household. The employment structure plays a large role in creating more or less stereotyped gender identities. Employment experience stimulates changes not only in paid

directly, others are part of policies that concern matters not primarily related to the family. Viewed together these policies may complement each other and form a coordinated or holistic set of family policies; or they may be disjoint elements with no apparent coherent policy direction. In some cases the policies may even offset or contradict each other. There are indications that the effectiveness of a particular family-policy measure depends on the degree to which it is aligned with other family-policy provisions (Neyer 2006: 8). Despite the fact that support of families and harmonization of work and family life is a declared goal of every Czech government, the long-term and conceptual family policy is lacking and only particular measures that are not evaluated are taken. For example the introduced opportunity to choose the length of parental leave was not followed by the changes in the area of institutional support. The lack of institutions providing care for children under 3 years prevents parents to choose the length of parental leave according to their wish.

employment, but in the sphere of unpaid work in the household, where the division of roles may end up being repeatedly renegotiated (Crompton and Harris 1997, Crompton and Harris 1998).

The analysis of the Czech social policy and its connections with demographic behaviour are usually based on the statistical data on the population or large surveys. The main goal of our research is to focus on the relation between decision making about motherhood and social policy regulations as seen from the actors' point of view and patterns of their decision making. On the basis of our qualitative research we want to describe, if and how external conditions, particularly the setting of family policy and family social standards, play a role in women's decisions about whether and when to have children, and what effect they have on their decision-making. We are also interested in the strategies that women engage in, when coping with the latest social and family policy arrangements and with various burdens that the unpaid labour in a private sphere provides women and men with.

2. Social family policy and inequalities in the labour market in the Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic a several-week maternity leave is followed by a parental leave. The most common length of this parenthood leave is three years.³ During this time a parent can draw benefits which are slightly less than the minimum wage, and parents are guaranteed their jobs back after returning from leave. Although parental leave is offered to both mothers and fathers, only about 1 % of fathers take advantage of it (Nešporová 2005).

If parents do not wish to take advantage of the entire length of the parental leave (or chooses the shorter, two-year option), they deal with the absence of child care facilities for children up to 3 years old. The nurseries once run by the Ministry of Health were almost all closed after 1989, and pre-school is designed for children 3 years and up. At present when there are many Czech children of this age who were born to parents from the baby-boom under Communism, the pre-schools suffer from insufficient capacity. Individual care that is financially available in a form of organized nannies does not exist in Czech


³ Despite the introduction of a three-tier parental leave in 2008, during which parents draw benefits depending on whether they chose two, three, or four years of leave, the three-year leave continues to be the most popular, partly because the choice is limited on the basis of previous income and type of employment.

Republic; also the services of paid baby-sitters (au-pair) are used in our country very rarely due to both cultural and financial reasons (Bartáková 2008). The number of company nurseries is very low and state does not support their foundation by any means (for example in a form of tax benefits). Simultaneously, returning to employment after parental leave, regardless of its length, is difficult in part because the formal return-to-work guarantee often fails to work in practice (for example the original job may no longer exist or a woman after maternity leave is offered officially similar position that she used to maintain before maternity leave, however not as prestigious as before). In some professions women are unable to resume their original workload. The situation is also complicated by a major shortage of part-time jobs⁴, and discrimination by employers who avoid hiring women with small children or those of child-bearing age who as yet have no children, but anticipate that they will soon depart on parental leave anyway, or that their work commitment will be insufficient because of child-care responsibilities.

In addition, Czech women participating in paid jobs receive lower salaries than their male counterparts who are equally qualified (Figure 1). Women's status on the labour market is not affected only by lower salaries, compared to those of men, but also by under-representation in leading and executive positions, lower prestige and higher unemployment risk, or even their marginalization on secondary labour market (Fischlová 2002:15). The reason for this state lies in an ongoing and repetitive interruption of women's occupational paths due to engagement in maternal and carrying role in the family as well as their concentration in low pay and unemployment sensitive spheres such as services, health care, education or textile industry.⁵

⁴ In the Czech Republic only 9 % of women work part-time, while the EU average is 31 %. Even the existing part-time jobs are usually situated on the secondary labor market, consisting of unqualified positions, irregular shifts, and low job security.

⁵ Reproduction of vertical and horizontal segmentation of labour market can already be spotted during the preparation for future occupation time. Considering Čermáková (2000) or Hatt (1997), gender based choices towards educational directions reflect on one hand preference patterns of women and girls and on the other hand anticipation of chances on the labor market in the role of mothers (Hatt 1997).

Figure 1. Average salaries based on sex and education in 2009 (in CZK)

Source: Employees salary structure in 2009, Czech Statistical Office

Employment position of Czech women appears then to be in a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies – employers expect women to be less motivated in their jobs and to have long outages from the labour market due to maternal leave or acute care for ill children and therefore discriminate them in selection to more demanding, responsible and better paid position. Aspirations of women in regard to harmonizing work and personal life are decreasing and women tend to accept long term absences on the labour market due to carrying role or inferior work position, because they are aware of the fact that, given the income from paid job, they cannot compete with their male counterparts. This also weakens their position in partner negotiations on participation in public and private sphere and strengthens their responsibility for private sphere operation. This responsibility exists as a traditional component of woman's identity and is in contrast to man's concentration on performance in public sphere (Bierzová 2006)⁶. This situation applies to

⁶ Gender gap in housework is described from two different perspectives. The economic dependence model proposes an inverse relationship between a partner's share of the couple's total income and the time the partner spends on domestic labour. The partner with lower earnings is viewed as being economically dependent on the other and may spend more time doing household chores out of a reciprocal obligation to the partner with

both roles – mothers and women in general. Not only real, but also potential (expected in the future) motherhood appears to be an unambiguous handicap factor of woman's integration on the labour market.⁷

Giving up the paid employment at all is not an acceptable strategy for Czech mothers, as an average Czech family exists on two incomes, Czech women have the same (or higher) education as their husbands and traditionally view paid work as an important value in their lives (Čermáková 2000).

From social policy experts point of view it is the current social policy, what is leading to the isolation of Czech women within the private sphere, and to a reinforcement of the traditional division of roles into women-caretakers (although having paid employment) and men-providers. According to Czech social scientists (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2007, Sirovátka and Bartáková 2008), the Czech Republic has moved from the state-socialist model of the communist era based on a 'gendered de-familisation', where women are expected to work but not to have career, toward the conservative path of 'refamilisation', where women are not expected to work when taking care of children under 4 years or to have a career, but rather are induced to neglect any possible career aspirations and return to the home when their child are young.⁸

higher earnings (Godwin 1991, Ross 1987, Shelton 1992). By contrast, the gender display argument theorizes gender-specific departures from economic dependence. Individuals use housework to affirm gender identity in the face of gender-atypical economic circumstances: partners with income shares that are unusually high or low for their gender are predicted to compensate by exaggerating their gender-normative housework performance (West and Zimmerman 1987, Brines 1994, Hochschild 2003). Gupta (2007) criticises both models and shows that women's housework is affected only by their own earnings, not by their husbands', and not by their earnings compared to their husbands'.

⁷ Parenthood also affects male work load, but in a different direction – while employment of women decreases with the growing number of children, parenthood of men helps to secure and stabilize their position on the labour market as well as improves their salary conditions (Bartáková 2008).


⁸ The most suitable type of familialistic policy as defined by Leitner (2003) is in the case of Czech Republic (together with Slovakia and Slovenia) the explicit familialism. In this model the state pursues active policies to support the traditional family model. Women are perceived through their role as carers; there are incentives for exercising the task of care at home (long periods of paid leave). Low accessibility of childcare for children under three years accompanied by extensive support for domestic care during the first years of a child's life suggests shifting the locus of care to family (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008).

3. Gender inequalities in a private sphere

Czech women have very limited opportunities for combining career and motherhood, both during the first years after the child is born, and later as well. Also influential are the preferences of Czech men, who are rather satisfied with the traditional role arrangements, and whose share in taking care of children and domestic labour is consistently low (Nešporová 2005, Ettlerová 2007, Bartáková and Kulhavý 2007).

Analysis of labour division in households among Czech men and women older than 18 years of age (Figure 2) (Bierzová 2006) shows that women spend significantly larger amount of time than men taking care of the household, children and other disabled members of the family regardless of education, age, part time or full time employment, having one or several children. The main responsibility for household work\chores are carried out also by women who have highly qualified jobs, entrepreneurs or women in professions that require long working hours and time spent in a workplace.

Figure 2. The division of daily activities of parents with child/children under 18



Source: Bierzová 2006

According to the other Czech research (Höhne, Kuchařová, Svobodová, Šťastná and Žáčková 2010) women are especially aware of the impact of parenthood on their professional careers, and it is women who are expressing greater dissatisfaction with family gender roles dealing with care for children and the household. Advocates of equal division of responsibilities in the household exceed representation of 90% young, single women as oppose to “only” 65% single men. (Ettlerová 2007). Based on a different research (Bartáková and Kulhavý 2007), it is shown that young women put more stress on the importance of man’s help in doing housework, rather than child care. In the first year of a child’s life, according to attitudes of men and women, it is a mother who should take care of the baby and only after the first year more women are willing to share the care for the child or leave care to the man. Regardless of the attitudes that are presented by men and women, it is eventually a woman who takes care of the baby in the first three year of its life.

The demand for intensive motherhood in the form of all-day exclusive care for the child during the early years of its life (including several months of breast feeding) and a gender stereotypical division of roles as male-breadwinner and female-caretaker is also accentuated in the public discourse (Hašková and Zamykalová 2006), and women who fail to meet this (for example by going back to work earlier) must deal often with the prejudices of society against “bad mothers”.⁹

4. Our research

In our research we inquire about the link between the decision to become a mother and external conditions in the form of social policy: Do external conditions, and above all social policies and standards, affect the process of decision making about motherhood? We look whether women mention the influence of social on their decision making, or whether this influence is present at all in this process.

We will seek answers to the research question by means of partial analysis of data from research dealing with the transition to parenthood as experienced by two groups of women: first-time mothers

⁹ Janoušková and Sedláček (2005) who studied this issue found out that negative reactions against the mothers who leave child care to fathers and return to work soon after the birth of the child were mainly coming from the mothers who were on maternity leave. They conclude, along with Arendell (1999), that reproduction of intensive motherhood ideology which is considered as hegemonic towards alternative motherhood discourses is created by mothers alone.

over thirty and childless women over thirty¹⁰. The data was collected by means of in-depth interview. This method of collecting data provides qualitative research with a number of advantages: flexibility, needed for the development of the theory, partial control over the production of data (Charmaz 2003), the amount of information in the context and the chance to reveal discrepancies or conflicting attitudes held by participants (Johnson 2002). The open format of interviews allow participants to formulate their own opinions/attitudes and connect them with what they regard as important without being limited by the categories offered by the researcher.

Overall, 50 interviews with Czech women of child-bearing age were conducted. The analysis of data was based on a constructivist version of grounded theory, as formulated by Charmaz (2003, 2005). This version of grounded theory emphasizes the connection between what the observer sees and hears, his/her previous experience, biography, interests, and the context of research, on his relationship to the participants and experience in the field.

4.1. Time for work, time for motherhood

Several authors who focus on the theory and research of life course assume that since the sixties of the last century, life course is being gradually de-standardized (du Bois-Reymond 1998, Elchardus and Smits 2006, Vinken 2007). In addition to loosening of the transitions between individual life stages and their reversion ability (they may be reversed or not happen), a new emerging life period is talked about (post-adolescence, late youth, or young adulthood). It is placed in between the period of adolescence and adulthood and is characterized by the absence of some features that were formerly associated with adulthood – matrimony and parenthood. Since 1990s similar changes in life trajectories were also indicated in Czech society (e.g. Tomášek 2006).

The research interviews showed that for most women, maternity (at least planned maternity) is preceded by a childless period. Women describe this period ambiguously: as a preparation for future long term obligations connected with matrimony and motherhood and as a room for achievement of personal, individual goals. Both conclude that even

¹⁰ The childlessness of these women were caused by various factors – lack of stable relationship, infertility, or decision to postpone motherhood or no intentions for it. For many of them it was the combination of factors mentioned above what caused their childlessness. When it is relevant, we provide the context of the situation of particular women together with the results of analysis.

though a woman reached adulthood and is autonomous and economically independent, she alone does not consider herself to be ready for motherhood or even long term, perspective relationship:

“...my priority was to, I don’t know, go hiking for instance and to truly have fun, no strings attached. I had no urges to settle down and have a family, I was satisfied until I was about thirty ...The problem was that I tended to choose or had an affection for those types of men who I had no future with. For example they were womanizers ...I guess if I tried to engage in a relationship in order to plan something, I would definitely avoid these men.”

Soňa, high school education, 38 years, childless.

“If I’d had kids earlier, I would have felt that I haven’t yet enjoyed my life very much and would probably have the kids with a partner whom I wouldn’t probably last... So I guess I’d be divorced with several older kids and would feel that I’m almost forty and that’s even worse. I just wasn’t ready for that. It’s also an individual thing. There are mothers who are born to be mothers. I wasn’t one of them, I thought about having kids then, but just platonically...”

Dagmar, university education, 34 years old when having first child

Research shows that the period without children is becoming a norm. Conversational partners consider themselves during this period as “childish” or “premature”, however these characteristics are not perceived as stigmatizing. From the life course point of view, if connected with motherhood or perhaps partnership (but not for example with employment), they are considered legitimate.

Many of the women focused intensively on paid employment during this period. Work has become one of the main life achievements and they devote most of their time to it. However, in retrospective, despite the great importance of achieving long term work experience before motherhood, intensive focus on a career during this period may be considered as ambivalent:

“I could say that my job was career oriented, very strongly, because I used to meet with tons of people from my field and I was a star for them and I absolutely enjoyed it, in fact in the beginning I used to be an awful workaholic. It was crazy, I used to spend 11 hours at work and perhaps it sort of had a negative effect on my relationships at first. It’s true though, that when I was 25 and until I was about 29 I would regret it if I would have to leave my office ...”

Evelína, university education, 32 years old when having a first child.

Even though Evelína thinks of her job as a “career”, on her further accounts she puts this term in question and explains:

“...I’m not that type of a person that takes pride in their career, I did it rather incalculably, the fact that I worked overtime, though unnecessarily, it wasn’t like I got paid for it, I just felt responsible for the clients ...”

While work often is aimed at founding a career (promotion, increasing wages, increasing competences and responsibilities), this framing is explicitly rejected in the interviews – employment is presented as a preparation for motherhood in a pragmatic sense, as a necessity, an effort to build up a position at work consistently for several years after finishing school and before taking parental leave; in other words, an effort to achieve a certain plateau and living standard. An explanation for why women seem to reject the term “career” might be its negative connotation in public discourse – a woman who does not want a family is labelled as careerist, selfish, and materialistic. In addition, meaning of the term career relates to work continuity and ascending work position. Maternity leave in the Czech context, however, often means long term and cardinal discontinuance of work experience. Even when the given fact is taken into account it may be difficult for women to define employment in terms of career.

Intensive work load is concentrated into the childless period which is replaced in women’s accounts with maternal phase during which they concentrate on (future) parenthood. If conceiving a child during the period defined as “high time for motherhood” is unsuccessful, coming back to “career” period is problematic – work motivation vanishes, work is not perceived as fulfilling, but as a necessity, or an activity that saturates time until becoming pregnant and until childbirth. Some conversational partners described their ambition to start preparing themselves already during childless period on the effects that maternity will have on their work participation (decline participation in long term, time consuming projects; before becoming pregnant move to position that will allow to combine work and care after the return from maternal leave; choose a job that is near kindergarten; obtain a work agreement that will be the most favourable in reference to maternal or parental benefits, etc.). These arrangements may be however, in connection with work activity and goals, viewed as loses, given the scenario that the childless period is involuntarily extended.

Interviews showed that Czech women perceive the period devoted to career and the period devoted to parenthood as two contradictory and radically distinct life phases. Their ambition to acquire sufficiently long work experience is connected with future motherhood both directly through necessary economical guarantees, and indirectly through an effort to fulfil a life experience which excludes motherhood. Anticipation of motherhood as a radical life disruption and termination of a career, in some cases limits their work participation. Intensive attention paid to work may on the contrary block motherhood – it disqualifies women as partners who are fulfilling the norm of dependent and subordinate womanhood and thus complicates their search for a spouse, or/and at the same time causes indecisiveness whether the right time for motherhood or for postponing parenthood (as we will see in the next section) has already come.

4.2. The transition to motherhood

In the women's responses, the transition to motherhood is described as a radical breaking point, impacting life in a number of dimensions. The interviews with women reflect the prevailing norms of intensive motherhood (Arendell 1999), and women's aspirations to become good mothers; that is, to give up paid employment during the first years of motherhood, and focus exclusively on the child (see Hašková and Zamykalová 2006). But an important, though indirect, influence comes from family policy and institutional support for reconciling motherhood and employment. Women do partly base their choices on what the social state offers them, but they adapt these choices to their real opportunities which, however, are formed by the social state. They consider the system of care for small children as being highly incompatible with other activities, specifically one's original employment. Although women do give up their previous jobs voluntarily and do not see going on maternity leave as a blow, it appears from some responses that they would not give up their jobs completely if they had the chance. At the same time a certain "imperative satisfaction" is detectable as a prerequisite for "pleasure" from intensive motherhood, especially among women who have long wished to have children and became mothers relatively late.

Two different approaches to motherhood can be discerned among women who want (or wanted) to become mothers. The first emphasizes the positive aspects of the changes involved in going onto

maternal leave: the chance to leave work, rest, to generally change their lives, and concentrate on the child. However, this attitude may be influenced by the fact that the path of many of these women to maternity was complicated by some factor: either they had no partner at the time they began wishing for a child, or they were being treated for infertility. Motherhood represented a long-expected source of change and a break from employment for them.

“After I turned thirty I realized that it’s mostly outside pressure, that everyone’s looking at me and my parents are reminding me that I should have a child and that there’s this medical complication, or that I actually wanted to run away from work for awhile, take a break, but that I would have an actual yearning to have a child, I can’t say that.”

Evelina, university education, 32 years old when having a first child

Nevertheless it may have been dissatisfaction in private life, for example in the form of treatment for infertility or prolonged single status, which amplified dissatisfaction elsewhere. Preconceptions about maternity and age norms for motherhood may cause dissatisfaction in one’s job and a desire for change, especially where a woman fears that she will be unable to fulfil her maternal aspirations. Feelings of non-fulfilment in relations with one’s partner and family life are reflected in the work sphere, and amplify its negative aspects, which the other group of women might not feel.

The second group of women expressed directly their fear of losing their job because of maternity, of having to accept a lower standard of living, lower status, and loss of social contacts. They look on motherhood with ambivalence: on one hand they look forward to it and expect to be focusing on the child to the maximum possible extent; on the other hand they keep postponing their maternity, sometimes with insecurity, and are concerned about whether they will be able to adapt to the change in their lives. It cannot be said that women cling to their employment as a career (in the form of high income and professional advancement); instead it is more of a long-term habituation to a lifestyle connected to their employment that they do not wish to completely abandon.

“...I would not like to be childless, but if it were possible to put off children until 45, and at the age of 45 start a family and drop out; so I would certainly not rush into it; I like the life I am living. But I am going to be 35, which is a

kind of a boundary, I hear from all sides, from television; everywhere it comes at you. My gynaecologist told me that I'd better hurry, so that fact is pushing me – my age.”

Slávka, secondary education, childless, 34 years old

Transition to motherhood is postponed depending on age norms of motherhood which are conditioned by social and biological discourses. It is characteristic that most of these women do not think of coming back to a current job position soon after the child birth and leave the care for a child to somebody else. On the contrary, they assume that they will spend the standard term on maternal leave (it is 3 years in Czech Republic) and they would lose the current job position. To interconnect the two spheres is considered to be too complicated and therefore not taken into account. Latest cited conversational partner described managerial and personal practices in a global corporation and their impact on maternity decision-making of women in reference to their expected professional future as follows:

“...it (decision-making about maternity – author’s note) has a great impact, depending where you work; simply, if you work in a corporation and move up the ladder, you start thinking about how long can you keep on going, should I wait a year or two, while I’m at this position? Because there is an immense pressure in these capitalistic corporations, insane pressure on production, insane pressure ... you’re being reminded, very obviously, that you’re old, you’re going to go, you have kids, you’re going to go, everyone wants young and ambitious people, it’s like you have a tendency to try to persevere, because once you’re gone on a maternity leave, you will definitely not be wanted back (on the same position – author’s note).”

However, women’s preferences may change in time and with gaining maternal experience, and they do in particular for university educated women who tend to return to employment even during the period of the first three years after birth of a child. In the following section we will show the possible methods of combining both spheres and their (dis)advantages.

4.3. Balancing work and family

Hašková (2009) in her qualitative research distinguishes childless women as those who are considering future combination of both spheres and those so-called “staging”, who are considering employment and

motherhood as two different life stages which cannot be combined. If we focus in our research only on women that already had a child at the time of the interview, we can find a significant group of those that did not try to combine both spheres, nor considered it for the future. Substantial group of women, however, returned to work process, even during the first three year after the birth of a child. A return to employment is not described primarily as a necessity to support family financially, but rather as a source of alternative identity existing next to motherhood, source of retaining social contacts¹¹, contacts with an employer and connection with professional trajectory and last, but not least as a responsibility towards the employer, or society in general¹². Regarding the absence of institutional support when trying to combine motherhood and employment, women were obliged to use own resources and opportunities. Managing both spheres is therefore individual and single strategies differ depending on the preferences and opportunities of women.

Some women deal with the conflict between work and motherhood by *changing their original profession*. One interviewee, originally working in the area of science and research, studied a different field before becoming a mother so as to better combine family and work, and to be able to work at home and set her own working hours. The new job was not as prestigious as her original job, but it gave her social contacts, and an important source of income during her maternity leave. Another interviewee, soon after the birth of her first child, began working part-time in a lower position and less-prestigious job than before; also in order to maintain social contacts, and to make extra income during her maternity leave. She ruled out returning to her original employment, which required full commitment, and offered little opportunity to work part-time. It would also have been a problem for her to obtain childcare:

¹¹ Bailey (2000) on an example of women from middle class described various motivations for returning to employment soon after birth of a child. Alongside the financial reward, maintaining the status and social integration, women constructed the importance of a job also as a source of alternative identity aside from motherhood, as a “psychic stimulation”, a device for strengthening self esteem in front of one’s self and the society, as well as a vehicle of value contribution to society and as an expression of ethical aspect of own self.

¹² University educated women especially do not perceive employment mainly as a “possibility” or “right” but often in terms of “responsibility” (Statham, Vaughan and Houseknecht 1987).

"I came to ask if they don't need someone for computers, and they were just getting courses for young mothers started, so I got a lot out of it; it was enough for me, because I couldn't do it more than once a week in the morning because of the law, and finding a lady to babysit, that would have taken some time... I can't go back (to my original job), I spoke to the personnel director, who's the same age as me, she has a child now, but she goes to work from morning till evening. So I told her that if there were some part-time position open I would take it, but I'm not counting on it..."

Markéta, university education, 38 years old when having a first child

The examples of these women show how the nature of their paid employment can change during the course of their lives. While the childless phase of their lives consisted mainly of their careers, during the following maternal phase the career dimension of their lives might be abandoned entirely, with employment becoming a place for maintaining social contact and alternative forms of self-realization besides motherhood. The choice to take a lower-placed job than the one a woman has before the birth of a child is presented as entirely voluntary. Even so, some of the responses indicate the fact that this was not so much a choice, but more like the woman's only avenue for combining motherhood and employment.

The example of some university-educated mothers who decided to *return to their original jobs* soon after the birth of their child, illustrates the dilemma this choice brings:

"I took Anna to Grandma's, in the morning I breast fed her, then went travelling on business and in the afternoon I was back breast feeding her. It was kind of guerilla, terrible at the beginning. I worked when she slept, or at night; later a girl came to watch her, and now we do it like this: Anička goes to preschool 3 days out of the week and the girl comes and watches her 2 days. In April she'll probably start going to the preschool every day, because there's a lot of work right now, I have to work weekends and nights, and it makes my husband nervous and he says "On the weekend you should spend time with us", and it's true. So I'd like to get rid of the working weekends and do that even though I lose my maternity benefits. So it's always a terrible decision, and when you have a kid, work, and the household, and some hobbies or something, and you get the feeling you're neglecting one thing when you're dealing with the other, it's always hard to balance."

Marie, university education, 34 years old when having a first child

How to combine the varying demands of the private and public spheres is up to the individual women to manage: it depends entirely on their abilities and resources to negotiate room for activity in both spheres. It is not just a matter of obtaining care for a small child, but also the ability to convince a partner to take a regular part in caring for the child and the household, and convince an employer to tolerate the woman's dual commitment (for example by allowing breaks for breast feeding, or allowing her to work from home). Given the norms of motherhood and the ideal of intensive motherhood prevalent in Czech society, these women take upon themselves the risk that they will be labelled "bad mothers" who place their careers ahead of their children. As seen by the examples of the woman above, this fact, combined with time pressures, can produce feelings of guilt and irresponsibility in the very areas they are attempting to combine.

Some women *return to previous employment as part time employees*. This strategy is more characteristic of university educated women, because their employer partially meets their requirement for a part time job:

"I went back to work after a year. But I wouldn't accept a full time job, definitely not, I said to myself that it would be nice to have two days at work, just for change, my employer wanted me to work for three days, so we compromised on two and a half, but I can say that this is the maximum. I don't want to be in a hurry all the time. I don't care for the money that much. And because my mom is already retired and she offered me that she can take care of the baby, that she's retired, at home, and pretty much has nothings else to do, so I said yes. And after a year at home I felt like I'm getting bored, I just spent money buying things for the baby, so I thought I may as well make some money. I was also done breastfeeding, so it was possible."

Kamila, university education, 33 years old when having a first child

Women's accounts showed that one of the possible acceptable arrangements of how to care for a child younger than three years is to leave the watch over them to grand parent or grandmother. Although more options like pre-school nurseries for children younger than three years are practically missing, at the same time women do not consider such options for their children as acceptable. Same conversational partner answered the question whether she would leave the watch over the child to an unknown person (i.e. not a member of the family) as follows:

“No, no, definitely not. I think she’s still too little for that. I wouldn’t trust a stranger. If grandma wouldn’t be able to take care of her, I would stay at home, for sure. Perhaps I would have a good neighbour that I know for 20 years and knew that she’s great, maybe she would offer herself that she could take care of her, than yes ...Kindergarten yes, definitely, at the age of three, I think, the child is old enough...”

Possibilities to combine work and motherhood in Czech Republic correspond so far with expectations and conceptions of women on how to take care of a small child. Care of the mother is preferred, in exceptional cases it is her mother or mother in law. Importance of grandparents support or support from the extended kin in care for a child that is younger than three years is remarked also by Křížková and Hašková (2003). Hereby they point out that this type of care is not accessible to all families.

Arrangements that were mentioned above and serve to help women to return back to employment during the period of concurrent care for a child younger than three years require accommodation and cooperation of various types of actors: employers willingness to make adjustments based on changed requirements of the employee during this period, spouse’s (partner) participation in care for a child and household, relatives (especially grandmothers) helping with care for a child when mother is away from home. None of these forms of “help” are however automatic and the amount of energy that woman has to accumulate when trying to mobilize all the available resources of support may evoke a strong persuasion to remain in a strictly private sphere. Also, these women often find themselves in contradiction with the ideal of intensive motherhood, which they are aware of, when putting stress on responsibility for their children and putting the children first when making decisions.

5. Conclusions

The issue of harmonizing paid employment in a public sphere and unpaid work in private sphere has become a central topic in numerous social science studies. Based on qualitative researches, we tried to observe this association through perception of individual actors and through patterns of their actions determined by conditions of formally and informally existing norms of Czech society. On one hand we noticed how external conditions, particularly the setting of family policy and family social standards, play a role in women’s decisions about

whether and when to have children, and what impact they have on the decision-making. On the other hand we were also interested in what strategies are characteristic of women who already entered the maternal sphere and decided to return to work process earlier than it is usually common in Czech Republic.

The research showed that anticipation of motherhood and the associated long term absence from the work sphere assumed by Czech social policy and arrangements in the labour market fundamentally influence a woman's career and her decision to become a mother. Another value factor that strongly influences women's decision-making about parenthood is closely related to these factors – almost exclusive responsibility of women for family private sphere work and assumption of women's focus on this sphere, at least in the first years of child's life. At the same time, however, it is not possible to give up an effort to combine family and work obligations, because work activity of a women is important source of income for the Czech family and an important source of identity for a women herself.

Despite the assumption that stands at the heart of the popular typology of women classifying them according to their focus on either work or the private sphere (according to Hakim), our research has shown that the meaning and importance of work varies during the course of a woman's life. Postponement of motherhood is a common reaction to the consciousness of fundamental life change that will occur and the effort to prepare for it both materially and psychologically. The awareness of these issues can lead also to the lifelong childlessness - a lot of postponed children are never born. Women with the intention of maintaining their job and not giving up on work after becoming mothers, are hard-pressed because they have to deal with the discrepancy between the requirements of the public and private spheres (Beck 1992), and with the problem of traditional gender roles, both of which persist after parental leave ends. The minimal variability and flexibility of life at the parental level strengthens these gender roles and the dependency of women on men.

Insufficient institutional support for combining employment and motherhood is present in the accounts of women in a form of differentiation of the maternity and employment phases when talking about life trajectories. These two life periods are perceived as fundamentally different and contradicting – for most women, taking maternity leave ends the period during which they could concentrate on

participation in the labour market and benefit from it in the same amount as men. The new life phase that is starting shifts priority on parenthood. From there on, everything has to adapt to this priority. Regardless of individual strategies for combination of work and care, women reproduce in their accounts the ideal intensive motherhood, which they measure their decisions to.

On the basis of our data, we can draw a picture of Czech women as lonely artistes who endeavour to balance social expectations with their own ambitions and external conditions, shaped to a great extent by a very one-sided and inflexible social policy. Their effectiveness is limited by the burdens of taking care of children and the household, which they must carry almost by themselves. And it is women who are forced to mobilize all available resources to manage this situation. Women's partners are somehow absent not only in these responses, but from the research agenda as well, and this is a major blank spot in Czech sociological research.

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Women's Work: Female Labour Practices and their Normative Context among Ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania

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Abstract: The paper analyses work-related gender inequalities among the ethnic Hungarian population of Transylvania, and in parallel focuses on the social and cultural norms and values regarding the nature of “female” and “male” work practices. Most of the sociological and gender studies literature dealing with women’s transformed status after the fall of communism describes women’s opportunities in rather gloomy terms, emphasising not only unemployment and widening wage gaps as especially threatening women, but the upsurge of traditional values, too. Traditional and patriarchal value orientations play a major role in redefining role expectations towards women, emphasising motherhood and household duties at the expense of paid work careers. The basic research question the paper is built around concerns the state-of-the-art of paid and unpaid work opportunities Hungarian women and men have in the Transylvanian labour market, as well as the understandings and meanings attached to work itself by both men and women. After the description of the relative labour market advantages and disadvantages of the two sexes, the analysis turns to those commonly shared values and norms that shape gendered social actors’ understandings of their own work and aspirations. Throughout the paper data of the 2010 survey “Kárpát Panel” are used, complemented, when necessary, with the results of a research conducted in 2006 within the first wave of the Gender and Generations Survey (called “The Turning Points in Our Lives”).

Keywords: gender, work, labour market, inequalities, values, attitudes towards gender roles.

1. Introduction

Social scientific analyses that render gender inequalities historically and culturally universal (see for instance Bourdieu 2000, Moore 2005, Ortner 2003) consider the subordination of women strongly connected to the

private/public dichotomy that separates the social world into two spheres. This opposition places men and women into different and separate spheres of lower and higher ranks. Whereas the public sphere is the locus of the higher status “masculine” cultural activities, it is mainly the biological and social reproductive functions that are being performed by women in the private realm of life. As childbearing and education, as well as caring and socialisation are seen closer to nature than to culture, the private sphere is universally defined as having lower status. However, assigning men and women different places and duties has its own political stake and legitimising function, as women’s assumed and perpetuated “closeness” to nature comes to support their exclusion from the public – political, wage earning, decision making and other – activities (Ortner 2003: 203). Put in Marxist terms, women’s exclusion from the labour market, specific especially to early capitalism, is a means of perpetuating their economic subordination and dependency to and from men (Engels 1972, as cited in Moore 2005: 62–63). Within this conceptual framework women’s economic inactivity became a key indicator of patriarchy. However, beyond activity there are several other indices and dimensions along which women’s and men’s economic and social status can be described: unemployment rates, occupational and sectoral segregation and the wage gap are the most widely used.

The present article tries to make sense of *patriarchy* within the contemporary society of ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania. In our view, the gender sensitive analysis of the Hungarian population of Transylvania has been rather overlooked over the past two decades of social scientific analysis¹. However, the present paper does not attempt to uncover all aspects and dimensions of patriarchy, rather to understand how gender is to be seen as a social variable creating a stratified and unequal society. As much as we agree that social inequalities can be best understood at the crossroads of gender, ethnicity, class and other forms of social group membership, within the framework of the present analysis we mainly focus on the gender regimes of the Transylvanian society. Through its approach the present paper attempts to challenge the hegemony of the *ethnic variable* by pointing to a different type of inequality characterising the Hungarian population of Transylvania that has been neglected so far.

¹ One of the recent exceptions under this rule is the research report by Kiss, Barna and Sólyom (2008).

The present endeavour sets a double goal. First, it provides empirical data for describing and quantifying the nature of the inequalities Hungarian men and women face on the Transylvanian labour market. Second, it sets out to understand subjective attitudes towards gender roles and inequalities among the same population. In other words, it attempts to reveal the social and cultural embeddedness of the previously described “hard” economic data. In this respect, the most important value orientations and sets of attitudes concerning gender roles are presented. In other words, the article contains a “harder” and a “softer” chapter, in order to not only present the gendered characteristics of the Transylvanian labour market, but at the same time to be able to understand social actors’ attitudes towards the inequalities they are affected by. As our data will show, women employees do suffer from the gendered stratification of the labour market – both as the occupational segregation and the wage gap is concerned. The present paper analyses the extent to which the inequalities coincide with women’s social and cultural value systems concerning gender roles. Put differently, the paper’s goal is to measure “objective” and “subjective patriarchy” (sometimes also called public and private patriarchies) against each other.

Empirical data are used from mainly one study carried out in Transylvania in 2010. It is entitled “Kárpát Panel” and it was carried out on a sample of 890 persons, representative for the adult Hungarian speaking population of Transylvania². Since this dataset does not contain several important variables of women’s and men’s labour market positions – such as previous experiences of unemployment, or sectoral distribution of the working population – complementary to the “Kárpát Panel” survey data from another research are quoted, too. The second study was conducted in 2006 and is entitled “Turning points of our lives – Transylvania”³. It surveyed the age groups 21–44 of Hungarian

² The panel research was conducted in 2010 by the “Max Weber” Centre for Sociological Studies with the financial support of the “Homeland Fund” (Szülőföld Alap). Throughout the data gathering 890 persons were interviewed. The sampling method used was a combination of the multi-stage and stratified sampling. The sample was initially selected in 2007 when the first stage of the data gathering was carried out. After selecting the households, interviewees were chosen according pre-defined gender and age group quotas. Those respondents who could not be contacted again in 2010 were replaced by new ones.

³ The survey studied the demographic behaviour of the Hungarians from Transylvania. It was carried out in 2006 by the “Max Weber” Centre for Sociological Studies, the Research Centre on Inter-Ethnic Relations (CCRIT) and the Demographic Working Group of the

speaking individuals living in Transylvania.

The paper consists of two major chapters: while the first one describes the several dimensions of women's work in every of its aspects in social and economic terms, the second focuses on the normative context the practices are embedded in. Both chapters are organised around three focal points. In the first part 1) the working actors, 2) the loci and objects of work, 3) the most significant work practices, as well as its determinants are described, creating the basis for the second to discuss the major sets of attitudes and values regarding the three dimensions. However, before embarking on the analysis proper let us give a short historical overview of the effects and consequences of the gender egalitarian policies of the socialist period upon the post-socialist gender regimes.

2. The socialist heritage: gender inequalities from a historical perspective

Gender inequalities in today's Central and Eastern European societies cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the effects of the socialist equalising project. The following chapter describes not only the extent to which gender equality was or was not accomplished during socialism, but the pre- and post-1989 state of the art of the Romanian labour market, too.

Marxism considered gender, as well as other forms of inequality inextricably linked to capitalism. The creation of the necessary conditions for women to enter labour market was seen as one of the most important means to liberate them under economic dependency (Meyer 1985: 14, Pasti 2003: 105). However, women's widespread economic activity during the socialist regime was not only ideologically, but pragmatically and economically motivated, too: the overarching socialist modernisation project with its utmost emphasis on industrialisation accentuated the need for (female) labour. Women's share of the economically active population in Romania was 36% in 1975, growing to 40% by 1981. By the end of the communist regime the proportion of women within the economically active population reached the average of the CEE region, i.e. around 46% (UN 1975 and

Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians from Romania (DAHR) in cooperation with the Faculty of Sociology of the "Babeş-Bolyai" University and the Demographic Research Institute of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. The sample is representative for the 20–45 year-old Hungarian population of Transylvania.

1984, ILO 1991, as all cited by Nagy 2001: 24–25). According to the statistical data provided by the Romanian government by 1990 the share of women within those employed in the industrial sector reached as high as 42%, whereas they made up the majority of the employees working in agriculture (56.4%). In the service sector, by that time underdeveloped, most women were working in health and social care (75.4%), in education and culture (67.6), in the commercial sector (62.5), as well as in the financial and communication sectors (making up 60.9% and 53.4% of the labour force, respectively) (Łobodzińska 1995: 210).

Creating equal social conditions for both sexes was just one of the grandiose socialist egalitarian objectives, which eventually did not materialise. In the second part of the 20th Century not only the differences between men and women, but the borders and hierarchies between workers and the intelligentsia, as well between peasants and urbanites were expected to be deconstructed (Kligman 2000: 29–33). As the equal opportunities for men and women are concerned, policy makers were not able to tackle one of the major contradictions of the period: whereas women's opportunities and status did improve as a result of their newly acquired roles on the labour market, policies were not implemented to counterbalance their suddenly doubled or tripled load of duties. Female and male social roles normatively imposed upon the members of society differed to a significant extent. Whereas the normative texts ascribing certain roles and duties to the newly created "Socialist Man" defined men in terms of workers and implicitly, the holder of political power, women were – on the other side – seen and represented by and within the official policy not only as "producers", but as "reproducers", too (Einhorn 1993: 39–40). Although it has been widely accepted that women's emancipation cannot be considered fully accomplished unless their household workload is diminished either by their partners' contribution or through state provided social services, this issue was forgotten or marginalised throughout the decades of socialism (Meyer 1985: 14, Einhorn 1993: 18–19). Women were thus carrying a double or triple burden (triple, if we think of the political representation they were expected to fulfil⁴), as in the context of scarce

⁴ Strengthening women's political participation was one of the period's most important ideological goals, meant to be accomplished through the introduction of the so-called "quota system" (Feischmidt, Magyari-Vincze, Zentai 1997: 11). However, women were encouraged to enter politics in a regime in which political action and the political sphere themselves became highly devalued (Šiklová 1997: 38). Unlike in Western Europe, in the socialist countries the redefinition of women's roles in politics was not a result of a

and low quality social services they were in charge of running the household and taking care of the family. The state's attitudes towards women's roles were built upon a basic contradiction: whereas according to the official ideology the eradication of the hierarchical relations between men and women was a central goal, widespread industrialisation could not have been accomplished, especially after the losses caused by the war, without the female labour force. Moreover, besides the already mentioned macro-economic reasons, families and households could have been hardly getting by without women's income⁵.

The gradual involvement of women's into the paid labour market made it necessary to provide them access to all levels of education, theoretical and professional alike. As a result of the educational policy most often materialised in gender quotas, women made up the half of higher education students a decade earlier in the socialist block than in the Western societies (cf. Einhorn 1993: 118). Women's participation in all forms of education was successfully accomplished, as by the early 1990s CEE women were on an average more highly educated than their Western counterparts. However, this aspect alone could not guarantee equality of chances on the labour market. First, in the socialist countries women graduated from theoretical schools in a higher proportion than men which made their knowledge and expertise less suitable for the highly industrialised labour market. The mostly feminised white collar jobs were less prestigious and less remunerated (Fodor 1997: 484–486). Second, differential values attached to theoretical and technological studies, seen as female vs. male "specialities" proved perseverant enough to split not only labour, but educational market into two⁶ (Einhorn 1993: 118).

It might even be rendered paradoxical that in spite of the ambitious gender equality policies by 1989 the gender regimes of the

bottom-up social movement, but it followed the state's top-down coercion. Moreover, the meanings attached to the private and public spheres were the exact opposites of the ways these concepts were defined in the West. Whereas Western feminism assigned a major liberating role to the public sphere, this was hardly conceivable in a totalitarian regime where in times of the "anti-politics" the public sphere was the rotten, corrupt, immoral and ideological opposite of the pure, moral and protected private life (György Konrád's concept of "anti-politics" is cited by Einhorn 1993: 3).

⁵ This is especially true for the so-called matrifocal families which became more widespread in this period due to, among others, the simplified divorce procedure.

⁶ One exception is though important to be mentioned, that of the GDR, where the education gender quotas were designed in such a manner to assure equal participation in technological studies for both sexes.

socialist countries have been characterised by the same patterns of inequalities as the Western ones (Frey 1998, 2002, Pasti 2003).

As much as they resembled each other, the pathways leading towards these gender inequality patterns were significantly different. First, in one case the labour market was organised by a market, the other bared the consequences of state intervention. Part time work arrangements, completely missing from CEE countries, represented another important difference between the two regimes' labour markets, as women's status was concerned. In the Western European capitalist societies the 20th Century was, from this point of view, the period of re-segregation, with *vertical segregation* replacing the *horizontal* one. The disappearance of exclusively male occupations was paralleled by the full access granted to women to all occupations on the labour market. While masculine occupations did not disappear altogether, many of them did however lose their exclusive masculine character. Vertical segregation primarily referred to the differential positioning of women and men employees in mixed gender occupations, with men mostly at the top and women at the bottom of the hierarchies. In other words, the major processes of transformation in the two sexes' labour market roles affected the nature and the functions of segregation. In fact, women's growing participation in the paid labour affected men's statuses to a minor degree, as the former mainly occupied those part time jobs which were created especially for them (Hakim 1996: 170). Their access onto the (secondary) labour market did in no respect challenge the segregation specific to the primary labour market. Gender inequalities have not completely reduced throughout the past century, in spite of the many developments that improved women's lives and chances: the opportunity to take up paid jobs, the diminishing role of marriage in terminating labour market presence (González, Jurado and Naldini 2000: 12), as well as women's growing levels of education. Wage gaps proved to be of lasting presence, too. Consequently, in capitalist societies, women's paid labour did not fundamentally challenge social and economic inequalities of the two sexes. Employed mainly in the secondary, seasonal, part-time sector, or often in family businesses, women maintained their secondary and almost dependent roles within the household economies. Their income was typically complementary to the partner's wage. In spite of the processes mentioned above, women's labour never ceased to be seen as a *reserve army of labour* to be used when in times of economic growth and disposed of during recession (Fodor 1997: 71).

Wage gaps showed the same resistance to any forms of improvement of women's labour market participation, whether we refer to growing levels of education or formal laws prohibiting differential remuneration. On the contrary, throughout the capitalist economies, wage differences tended to grow with every new level of education (Roos and Gatta 1999: 192). According to Sorensen's 1989-analysis (as cited in Hakim 1996: 179), 25% of the wage gap could be explained by the differences in the levels of education and length of experience, by factors related to the sector and other contextual variables, like the share of women in the occupation, as well as by the employees' position within the company, his/her motivation and future aspirations. Several analyses have proved that as important as they are, equal treatment and non-discriminatory laws raise women's wages by only 10%.

Beginning with the 1950s, the development of labour market takes different turns in Central and Eastern Europe compared to the Western capitalist societies. The results, nevertheless, show great similitude with the Western countries, in spite of the powerful state control over the socialist economies.

In both cases the hierarchical boundaries between "women's" and "men's" work perpetuated. Women, in spite of their higher level of education were employed in positions below their degrees to a much higher extent than men. The former were mainly working in the light industry, as well as in the administrative departments of the heavy industrial factories. Just as in the Western societies, "white collar" jobs were the ones primarily open to women. While the masculinity of several of the formerly high prestige intellectual jobs as physicians, teachers or lawyers were challenged, women's access was mainly possible at the bottom ranks, to so-called "feminine enclaves" of these occupations. Through these processes occupations like that of the primary school teachers or nurses become highly feminised, as opposed to doctors and lawyers.

After the end of socialism women's political and labour market positions were influenced by many factors: the development of the economy in general, demographic policies, the elimination of the quota system, as well as the overall evolution of the social value system. That is to say, post-socialist trends in women's employment can not in any form be exclusively reduced to socialist policies. The post-1990 growing weight of traditional and conservative norms and values challenged and re-evaluated the former roles ascribed to women by the emancipatory

policies. On whatever grounds did the traditional role expectations towards women strengthen, re-considering their labour market participation was a core issue. After 1990, women's status as paid labourers weakened, partly as a result of the growing emphasis on traditional values (e.g. Frey 2002).

According to the data provided by the National Statistical Institute employment rates have fallen throughout the 1990s in the case of both sexes. After its lowest values recorded in 1999, employment rates began to significantly rise only in 2005. It is worth noting that beginning with 1998, the difference in employment rates between men and women started diminishing until it turned in 2004. By 1997, unemployment affected women to a greater degree. After reaching similar values in 1998, up to 2007 female unemployment rates maintained lower than male ones.

There are several common features of the evolution of the labour markets in the post-socialist region. Among these, the most significant is the lower share of women in the private sector (Frey 2002), as well as the female unemployment rates showing higher values at the beginning, but decreasing by the mid-2000s. In spite of their continually growing level of education, women's access to managerial positions has been restricted all over the region⁷, while wage gaps kept characterising all occupational categories (Oprică 2008, Miroiu and Popescu 2004, Pasti 2003).

3. Women's works: chances and inequalities within and outside the labour market

There are several evidences of gender inequalities in the world of labour across the literature most of which has not undergone any serious scrutiny in the case of Hungarians living in Transylvania. First section is thus looking to the available data in order to map the most important aspects of the (un)equal participation of women in the several activities. First, it will insist upon the social and demographic description of the women involved in any kinds of activities, focusing especially on their age, education, type of residence, as well as marital status. The primary focus of the following section is the differences of the two sexes' participation in the wage labour market.

⁷ According to the EUROSTAT in 2005 the number of men working as CEOs was 1.4 times higher than that of women, while 2.5 times more men managed smaller companies than women. Hungarian data are quite similar for the same year (with 1.5 and 2.6 times higher rates, respectively). In Poland the relevant values are 1.7 and 1.8, whereas in Bulgaria 2.5 and 2.5, respectively (EUROSTAT Statistical Books 2008).

3.1. Working actors: the social and demographic characteristics of working men and women

In 2010 in Transylvania, according to the survey's results, only 41.6% of the interviewees (48.4% of men and 35.9% of women) were involved in some kind of a wage earning economic activity. The employment rate calculated according to the ILO methodology as the percentage of the employed against the 15–64 year-old active population was 58.9 % (66.7 for men, 51.6 for women)⁸.

The following table displays the economically active population's distribution by the form of employment.

Table 1. Employed men and women by the form of their employment (N=365) (%)

	Men	Women
Full time employee	72.1	80.5
Entrepreneur, self-employed	10.4	7.9
Working within a family enterprise	0.5	0.6
Performing occasional and contractual intellectual jobs	0.5	1.2
Farmer	8.0	4.3
Casual blue collar worker	5.0	0.6
Informal worker	3.0	0
On paternal leave and working at the same time	0.5	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0

The most important difference between employed men and women is related to the form of the employment, whether an employee or an entrepreneur. Following the international and European trends, Transylvanian women prefer jobs seen as “safer”, working as employees, opposed to men who work on their own at a rate twice as higher. In the rural areas self-employment is even more popular among men than in towns and cities. According to EUROSTAT data the gap has not been decreasing between women's and men's entrepreneurship rate over time. In 2005, for example, in the industrial and the service sector 3.5% of women were working as entrepreneurs, owning companies with employees and 8% as self-employed, without employees. As a comparison, the same rates for men were 7.1% and 11.6%, respectively.

⁸ In the second trimester of 2010 when the study was being conducted the official occupation rates on national level were 57.9%: 64.7 for men, 51.0 for women.

Table 2 contains the distribution of the economically inactive population: 40% of these women were homemakers, ten times as many as men. One fifth of non-active women were on some sort of a parental leave. Unemployment, however, affected men to a greater extent than women.

During the socialist period, in order to achieve full employment, providing access to women to all forms and levels of education played a crucial role. However, as a significant segment of the population studied began schooling after 1990, the present analysis reflects the effects of the socialist educational policy only partially. Nevertheless, for a better understanding of the labour market inequalities, education must be taken into account. This is especially true within the framework of the human capital-paradigm which explains labour market inequalities by the characteristics of the labour supply. It argues that women (or other disadvantaged groups like ethnic minorities, immigrants or the young), as well the (lack of) human capital they dispose of are directly responsible for their labour market disadvantages. Besides education, experience, motivation and willingness to perform extra tasks is counted as human capital (Crompton and Sanderson 1990: 27–28, Roos and Gatta 1999: 106).


Table 2. The distribution of the non-active men and women by the form of inactivity (N=501) (%)

	Men	Women
Student	9.5	8.3
On parental leave and not working	0	1.7
Homemaker	2.4	16.2
Retired	65.1	58.8
Retired for invalidity	13.2	8.0
Person of retired age, but not receiving pension	0	.3
On welfare benefit	0.9	.3
Other inactive	0	1.4
Unemployed (with allowance)	3.8	3.5
Unemployed (without allowance)	5.2	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Women’s and men’s education differs sharply on most levels. Women are generally over-represented among the low skilled and the secondary graduates. Although relatively insignificant, but women slightly

outnumber men in the higher education group, too. As expected, professional and vocational school has proven more popular among men, at least partly as a result of the socialist industrialisation project and masculine character of the technical education. Similarly to the other post-socialist countries, in our case too, have women accumulated a slight disadvantage at the lower end of the educational scale, while at the same time they are over-represented among the secondary and tertiary graduates. Men compensate this by having attended professional and vocational schools in higher rates. As already mentioned, this is mainly due to women's higher preference for less prestigious and valued, but more theoretical forms of education.

Figure 1. The educational level of Hungarian speaking men and women from Transylvania (%) (N=844)



Source: "Kárpát Panel" Survey, 2010

Although the relatively small sample we are working on makes it only partially possible to see clear cut tendencies in the age structure of the

women and men performing different activities, it can be seen that slightly more women than men below 30 still study. However, an important share of women in their active ages are homemakers⁹. More than 30% of homemaker women are aged 30–39 and another 30% are over 50 years. Lastly, unemployment affects men more in their younger lives (between 20–34 years), whereas women are much more affected by losing their jobs and receiving social care after 40 years.

Finally, there are still two other variables that need to be taken into account when attempting to draw the profile of the working men and women, variables that at the same time work as factors enhancing or hindering employment. The first one, type of residence seems to affect women's and men's chances of employment in a differentiated way: whereas initially we could have expected to be less employment in the rural areas, it only tends to work that way in women's case. As expected, the lack of jobs in the countryside leads to an over 90% share of rural women in the total female homemaker category. An important process pertaining to women's improved labour market participation throughout the 20th Century was the decreasing role of marriage in excluding women from paid work (Hakim 1996: 61). The role of marital status in women's employment is in fact inversed: the share of married women among those working is higher than the ratio of the ones not working. Parenthood does not influence economic activity either, although in both men's and women's case people with more children are to be found outside the labour market.

3.2. The loci and objects of work: work inside and outside the household

One of the most important critiques formulated by the advocates of gender studies, against classical economical approach towards work is the gender-biased definition of work. It is very commonly assumed by the latter that both as the input and the outputs are concerned, only those forms of activities are and should be accounted for that are performed outside the household, for either a wage or a profit. This way of conceptualising work leads to an unbalanced emphasis of productive work at the expense of the (social and biological) reproductive work

⁹ We have analysed the differences between the meanings attached to “homemaking” in Hungary and by ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania somewhere else and we have pointed to the fact that whereas in Hungary it is more the chosen status of well-to-do women, in Transylvania it ends up being associated with poverty and lack of opportunities on the labour market (Geambaşu 2008).

mostly done by women.

Women and men have, as shown above, unequal access to the different types of work. But, as the following table demonstrates, the lower amount of time spent on the labour market is compensated for by the housekeeping and child caring work.

Data included in Table 3 show a highly disproportionate use of time for the different types of work and activities between men and women. While acknowledging that the time use data are based only on self-estimation (which makes room for both inaccuracy and social desirability effects), gender gaps seem relatively deep. The powerful boundary between “women’s” and “men’s” work has not vanished, and as several pieces of the literature underline it (see for example Blaskó 2005), gender roles have not been fundamentally re-considered. Although women’s growing role on the labour market contributed to the re-evaluation of women’s work, the basic assumptions regarding “female” and “male” duties have been perpetuated. The data displayed in Table 3 basically confirm the “double burden” theory: paid work does not relieve women under the housework and does not result in a more equilibrated share of the child care duties. Nevertheless, one should note that both during the week and in the week-end, men tend to work on an average 2 hours longer than women.

Table 3. The allocation of time for different activities, by gender (number of average hours)

		Total (N=879)			Employed population (N=309)		
		Men	Women	Difference	Men	Women	Difference
Paid work	Weekdays	6.75	4.36	2.39	8.90	7.21	1.69
	Week-end days	4.23	2.23	2	5.90	3.83	2.07
Housework	Weekdays	2.9	4.68	-1.78	2.21	3.81	-1.6
	Week-end days	3.3	5.11	-1.81	3.10	5.09	-1.99
Childcare	Weekdays	1.35	2.61	-1.26	1.73	2.92	-1.19
	Week-end days	2.20	3.06	-0.86	2.90	3.76	-0.86
Relaxation	Weekdays	6.37	5.83	0.54	4.95	4.29	0.66
	Week-end days	8.14	7.26	0.88	7.46	6.29	1.17

Source: “Kárpát Panel” Survey, 2010

Table 3 also allows for two additional conclusions, based on the data concerning time budgets of employed men and women. First, the average 1.7 hours difference in the time allocated for paid work by men and women confirms human capital explanation of gender inequalities that stress uneven motivation and (time) investment as a major factor determining unequal outcomes (prestige and wage) (see for instance Crompton and Sanderson 1990: 27–29). The discrepancies in the working hours might also be attributable to the higher share of men among the self-employed and entrepreneurs who usually don't organise their work according to very tight schedules. Second, women's participation in the labour market does not prevent them for continuously taking up an averagely 2 hours longer "shift" in the domestic work. In other words, as several other studies have shown, paid work does not level men's and women's household and care responsibilities.

Men are not only working more hours, but they accept jobs outside their settlements to a greater extent: whereas 84% of women work in the same locality as they live in, only 69% of men have the same type of jobs, while nearly one quarter of men need to commute on a daily basis less than 50 km to their workplace. The differences in distances to be overcome might also be connected to the sector the job is in: men are more likely to work in the construction industry or in the transport sector. Women, on the other hand, are employed mainly in education, service and banking sector.

3.3. Work practices and the context and determinants of work

After the two previous sections which sought to describe *who's working where and what kinds of works they perform*, the third part one focuses on common practices of women's work. In other words, the presentation of the social and demographic characteristics of women's labour, the most important elements of the female labour market context are taken under scrutiny.

An important factor determining working conditions, as well as the level of the wage is *working time arrangements*. In the second half of the 20th Century in Western Europe part-time work has been one of the most important means of providing working women with the opportunity to "reconcile" paid employment with household responsibilities. In fact, women's inclusion into the labour market mostly targeted the secondary part-time labour market in the Western capitalist

societies, creating genuine “female ghettos” of employment within this segment. Part-timers’ labour market segments are relatively closed, as they lack upward mobility trajectories, have no access to workers’ representation and are at the same time much less secure and worse paid than jobs in the full time segment. As in the case of other groups seen as “reserve army of labour”, part-time workers are the first to be made redundant (Fodor 1997: 477–480). This form of employment is significantly less popular in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as it has been fairly missing from the socialist labour market. According to the EUROSTAT in 2005 in the states of the European Union 6.4% of the employed women were working for less than 15 hours a week and another 20.8% more than 15, but less than 29 hours. The corresponding rates for Romania were 0 and 3.8%, respectively (EUROSTAT 2008).

Table 4 contains data that show the most important gender based differences between working times. According to our data there is a quite significant difference between the shares of women and men working part time. Whereas approximately 8 out of 10 men and women are employed in a full time job, women are more likely to have a part time tenure, as opposed to men who outnumber women in other non-standard working time arrangements¹⁰. According to our findings based on the survey conducted in 2006, these data seem to differ from the official ones mainly because many of the women from this working time category was working in fact between 35 and 39 hours, which can almost be considered full time employment.

Table 4. Employed women and men by different working time arrangements (N=347) (%)

	Men	Women	Total
Full time	80.1	82.6	81.3
Part time	7.0	12.4	9.5
Other working hours arrangement	12.9	5.0	9.2
Total	100	100	100

Source: “Kárpát Panel” Survey, 2010

¹⁰ This does not necessarily mean flexible working time, but moreover schedules like 24 hours work followed by 72 hours off, for example.

Also, data gathered in 2006 demonstrate that the large majority of the women in part-time employment are mostly urban, public sector and white collar employees, high school or university graduates, married and raising children younger than 18 years.

A significant part of the gender studies literature rendered women one of the principal risks groups of post-socialist transformations (see among others Einhorn 1993, Pasca Harsanyi 1995, Pasti 2003, Miroiu and Popescu 2004, Oprică 2008, Łobodzińska 1995). Analyses carried out at the beginning of the nineties projected the powerful deterioration of women's status as a result of the transition to capitalism and democratic organisation. This sceptical prognosis came to underline the fact that by the fall of communism women's economic, political and social status has lagged far behind the ideals of the socialist egalitarian project. Nonetheless, gender differences were to be deepened by forthcoming social and economic transformation, affecting men and women differently. Major post-1990 social, economic and political processes were thought to shatter women's labour market, political and even private statuses. However, there have been voices that argued for a more nuanced interpretation of the consequences post-socialist transformations had for women previously seen as losers. Two authors, for instance, Szalai and Fodor sustained that women's post-socialist experiences would be and have been much more stratified than to integrate them within one overall image. Szalai studied Hungarian women, while Fodor compared several cases from Eastern Europe. Both authors concluded that the re-structuring of former socialist economies leads, among others, to the enlargement of the service sector which provides new job opportunities especially for women. In her paper Szalai described how in targeting newly created service jobs women make use of their previous skills and experience developed in the secondary economy (Szalai 2003). On a slightly different note Fodor emphasised that women's positions occupied in the vertically segregated labour market grant them the necessary protection against unemployment (Fodor 1997).

Unemployment is certainly one of the most widely used, though not the only, nor the best indicator of the effect post-socialist transformations have upon certain social groups. Miroiu and Popescu, in one of their articles published in 2004 argue that among women the young are especially vulnerable in the face of unemployment (Miroiu and Popescu 2004). Vladimir Pasti considers unemployment a key aspect

of women's post-socialist losses (Pasti 2003). However, Romanian official statistical data do not support this thesis: by 1998 female unemployment rate has indeed been higher than that of men's, but after 1999 they remained constantly lower than male unemployment rates (Statistical Yearbook 2007).

As it may be seen in Table 5, among the Hungarians living in Transylvania, unemployment affected men and women approximately to a similar extent. Most analysts agree that women's lower or identical exposure to unemployment than that of men's is mainly the result of their higher propensity to tackle job loss by turning to other forms of inactivity than unemployment. Becoming a homemaker has proved one of the most widely used strategies, especially after losing the right for unemployment allowance.

Table 5. Men and women having experienced unemployment in the past (N=2117) (%)

	Men	Women	Total
Ever unemployed before	27.1	29.4	28.3
Never unemployed before	72.9	70.6	71.7
Total	100	100	100

Source: "Turning Points of Our Lives – Transylvania" Survey, 2006

Nevertheless, gender differences can be found in the lengths of unemployment. On an average, for women it took 13 months longer than men to find another job over the past two decades.

Table 6. The average length of unemployment (in average number of months), by gender (N=158)

	Transylvania		
	Men	Women	Total
Length of unemployment (months)	19.61	32.31	25.74

Source: "Turning Points of Our Lives – Transylvania" Survey, 2006

Even though according to official statistical data women have been affected by unemployment to a lesser degree in the second decade of transition, most specialists warn from being excessively optimistic about women's labour market positions. Lower levels of unemployment do not

necessarily mean better protection and stable positions, but higher likelihood for women to adopt different strategies of tackling inactivity: maternal leave, early retirement and homemaking, with the latter especially characteristic to the (Hungarian speaking) Transylvanian population.

4. The social construction of women's work

The gender inequalities described and quantified above may, of course, be determined by a range of factors and processes besides discrimination. Women's unequal positions on the labour market are inextricably linked to the larger social and cultural context in which certain choices are made and which at the same time works as a set of structural processes determining each social actor's place.

The traditionalism and patriarchalism of the Central and Eastern European societies has been addressed in several analyses, in different approaches and from varying normative perspectives over the past years. Vladimir Pasti, in his paper based on the Gender Barometer survey (2000) describes Romanian gender regimes in terms of hierarchical power relations built upon the remnants of the socialist period and the emergent traditionalism of the post-socialist development (Pasti 2003).

The double or triple duties women were burdened with during socialism have not disappeared over the past years, but moreover strengthened by the revival of the traditional and patriarchal norms and values. Whereas before 1989 women's paid and unpaid domestic labour served the building of socialism and that of "the new socialist man", in the new political and economic system this ideology has been replaced by the national ideal women are supposed to obey to. However, the concept of the "heroines" expected to provide the nation with "new members" has not been new to the Romanian society, as it proved to be a powerful normative image during socialism. Additionally, the childbearing and home nurturing image of women re-discovered and re-fuelled after the 1990s is not the only normative expectation women have to face. In parallel, they are viewed and defined as consumers of the constantly growing cosmetic industry, expected to care for their bodies. After their official socialist representation as producers women and all members of society have become consumers in the post-socialist period. Femininity, just like masculinity, had been placed under severe normative control in every social and political system. The post-1990 CEE set of expectations towards womanhood bears a fundamental

contradiction, between servers of the national ideal and the embodied representations of beauty (for these contradictory norms see Marody and Giza Poleszczuk 2003).

While the dominance of the single political party was abolished in 1989, the political changes have not brought any liberation for women in the form of grass root social movements, but a new form of “fatherless patriarchy”. This concept has been best described by Miroiu and Popescu in their paper tackling the issue of feminisms’ lack of popularity in the post-socialist region (2004). Feminism has not gained in acceptance in spite of women’s growing vulnerability in face of the social and economic changes (Frey 1999: 19–25), and although formal rights would this time allow for social and political organisation around shared values. The most important ground for legitimation for the post-socialist state is defining the social actor in terms of a free citizen and drawing borders between itself, the local and the private in the name of “civic minimalism”. Not even these conditions have proved sufficient for women to articulate their particular interests politically (Miroiu and Popescu 2004: 298). Among the many authors attempting to understand the lack of popularity of feminism, Acsády (2001), Neményi (1994), Smejkalová (1997) and others emphasise the socialist legacy of the emancipation coerced upon the members of society (Smejkalová 1997: 27). Through rejecting the ideal of emancipation women and men not only denied or fought against state mingling into their lives, but expressed their attempt to protect their private lives through forming coalition with each other rather than the state (Acsády 2001: 16–17). Finally, the lack of appeal for the ideal of liberation is attributable to the aggressive and fake representations of Western feminism (Smejkalová 1997: 26), as well as to the revitalisation of the traditional (Christian) values (Acsády 2001: 16, Neményi 1994: 238).

As we were able to see from the data presented above, women’s labour market positions are in many respects unequal to that of men’s. Although the questionnaire did not contain any questions regarding sectoral or occupational segregation, according to official statistical data in Romania women’s share among the different economic sectors’ employees is highest in the health, bank and financial sectors, followed by education, tourism and administration. In each case women’s rate exceeds 50%. Correspondingly, in each sector mentioned above – except for tourism – average wage are higher than the national average, but at the same time they are characterised by relatively deep gender pay gaps.

The most feminised sectors are on the one hand characterised by the lowest gross wages and on the other by the highest gender wage differences. That is to say, women's lower wages are not necessarily the result of overt discrimination, but moreover, they are the consequences of the female and male labour's unequal access to the different economic sectors. According to the cultural explanations of the human capital paradigm the options for certain professions are strongly embedded into the social and cultural definitions and representations of "feminine" and "masculine" work. Through this mechanism and due to the cultural norm of caring and educating work seen as best suitable for women do especially certain service sectors and jobs become "feminized". Put differently, women themselves accept low paid jobs in low paid but highly segregated sectors by complying with the gender definitions of the several types of work (Crompton and Sanderson 1990: 28).

There are several factors and mechanisms that lead to labour market inequalities, therefore determining the extent to which discrimination and structural conditions, as well as personal decisions are responsible for unequal access to highly paid and well respected jobs, is difficult. In the remaining sections an attempt will be made to reveal and understand the social and cultural norms and values behind the inequalities of the labour market. Central to the present analytic endeavour is the attempt to depict the *most widely shared meanings attached to women's work* and *the major terms in which women's paid and unpaid jobs and works are defined in*. An additional question is whether and to what extent objective and public inequalities reflect traditional and patriarchal beliefs and value orientations.

One of the present paper's most important conclusions may be seen at this point already: there seems to be no significant conflict between facts and opinions, between the status quo of the labour market and social realities on the one hand and the attitudes and opinions on the other.

The function of the next section will in fact be that of a "mirror" of opinions against the facts described in the above pages. The first part focuses on public opinions concerning women's and men's characteristics, then it is followed by attitudes towards the places and objects of women's work and finally, the paper is closed by the presentation of values and norms concerning the types of works women are performing.

4.1. Public perceptions of the working actors

Women consider work and money equally important in life as men (approximately 80% in both cases). However, professional success is less valuable for women: men striving for it are 10% as many as women (78% against 68%). According to their own personal estimation, women work less than men in daily number of hours. Nevertheless, the latter takes only the restricted interpretation of work into account, counting only the productive paid activity.


The present section aims at revealing the stereotypical images of men and women in order to draw the normative context of gender work inequalities. The basic assumption of the present analytic endeavour is frameworked by the human capital theories which sustain that workers are remunerated according to their personal qualities, as well as the effort they invest into their work. Moreover, occupational segregation and labour market inequalities are often explained by men's and women's *inalienable* traits that are supposed to predestine them for certain jobs and activities. Advocates of this paradigm often claim that work performed in the public sphere are nothing more than a prolongation of women's "natural" functions, that is caring and educating. In the questionnaire used in the 2010 "Kárpát Panel" survey a semantic differential scale¹¹ was used in order to test people's attitudes towards *naturalising and essentialist approaches* to gender differences.

As the figure below shows, there is a high level of consensus between the two sexes regarding each other's stereotypical traits. Both men and women share the view according to which women are more rational, gentle, trustworthy and caring, whereas men argue women's opinion that they are more determinate and purposeful. It is also worth noting that disagreement only arises when it comes to deciding about women's and men's "competitive" qualities, determinacy and straightforward action. However, men's representations of women's and men's characteristics seem to coincide more with women's own value orientations. When asked about preferences for certain values women find both professional achievement and straightforward, purposeful action less important than men.


¹¹ The question designed as an Osgood differential scale asked respondents to place women and men separately on six 7 step scales. These scales reproduced seven bipolar adjectives, all of them considered (un)typical for men and women, and at the same time, crucial in the inequality legitimizing strategy.

Figure 2. Women's and men's perceptions of the two sexes' typical traits

Female respondents



Male respondents



All in all, women's image seems much more positive based on the interviewees' perceptions, nonetheless, traits like gentleness and caring are often the most important grounds for placing women in educating and caring jobs – which most of the time are the worst paid sectors, too.

4.2. The desirable places and objects of women's work

While many of the studies conducted during the past two decades point to a growing traditionalism in the attitudes towards gender roles (e.g. Szalma 2010), women's special proneness towards conservative values has only been rarely documented. When asked about priorities in a woman's life, more women than men regard the private sphere as their (almost) exclusive field of competencies. In other words, paid work must and should be performed as long as housework and the caring duties are not neglected. Tables 7 and 8 display women's and men's agreement with the relevant affirmations.

Women are drawn to self-fulfilment through their careers and to leadership to a lower extent than men, but at the same time they consider work equally important in their lives. The meanings attached to work by women are much more inclusive, they cover private sphere reproductive work, too. Moreover, there is a clear tendency, especially among the older and lower educated women to overrate traditional gender roles to paid work.

Table 7. Attitudes towards gender roles, male respondents

	Men				
	Agree	Un-decided	Dis-agree	Total (%)	N
Housework is primarily the woman's responsibility even if she is working, too.**	43.2	32.2	24.7	100	373
After the children's birth women should be the ones adapting their working schedule to the children's needs.	66.3	21.7	12.0	100	368
A woman has the right to spend the money she earned.	26.1	24.0	49.9	100	371
The family members should decide together how to spend important sums of money.*	82.1	15.7	2.2	100	369
It's not natural for the father to take parental leave after the mother has returned to work.	33.8	36.1	30.1	100	346
If a family can afford that the woman should stay at home to care for the home, the children and the family.*	67.1	24.0	8.9	100	371
Women's character makes them less prone to become politicians.	18.8	27.2	53.9	100	356
If a woman gets assaulted on the street one should always see how provocative she was dressed.	30.0	27.2	42.8	100	360
Violence within a family is a private matter.*	17.8	21.1	61.1	100	365

Note: ** gender differences are significant at $p < 0.001$

* gender differences are significant at $p < 0.05$

Source: "Kárpát Panel" Survey, 2010

Table 8. Attitudes towards gender roles, female respondents

	Women				
	Agree	Un-decided	Dis-agree	Total (%)	N
Housework is primarily the woman's responsibility even if she is working, too.**	54.1	24.8	21.0	100	423
After the children's birth women should be the ones adapting their working schedule to the children's needs.	71.9	20.0	8.1	100	420
A woman has the right to spend the money she earned.	30.0	24.2	45.8	100	417
The family members should decide together how to spend important sums of money.*	89.2	8.9	1.9	100	417
It's not natural for the father to take parental leave after the mother has returned to work.	34.3	37.1	28.6	100	385
If a family can afford that the woman should stay at home to care for the home, the children and the family.*	67.5	19.6	12.9	100	418
Women's character makes them less prone to become politicians.	18.0	21.9	60.1	100	401
If a woman gets assaulted on the street one should always see how provocative she was dressed.	33.1	21.1	45.9	100	399
Violence within a family is a private matter.*	25.0	15.8	59.2	100	404

Note: ** gender differences are significant at $p < 0.001$

* gender differences are significant at $p < 0.05$

Source: "Kárpát Panel" Survey, 2010

4.3. The culturally regulated concept of women's work

Revealing the cultural and social construction of (female) work is a good ground for understanding the cultural and social embeddedness of (unequal) labour market practices. While we do not argue that inequalities would either be the result of overt discrimination or, on the contrary, a mere consequence of social actors' rational choices, the presentation of people's value orientations and attitudes gives the

opportunity to see how the members of society deal with all those structural conditions that shape their everyday lives.

Ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania do most certainly think about gender roles in traditional terms, while there are signs of distancing themselves from conservative values especially among the young and the better educated. We have shown somewhere else (Geambaşu 2009) that the most important difference between women's and men's traditionalism is the latter's proneness to authoritarian views. The present data make it possible to distinguish between the two sets of attitudes in a new way. In the present article we argue that women's support for traditional gender roles is not so much an ideological affinity towards conservatism and traditions, but moreover a pragmatic orientation towards the resources the private sphere can offer.

Table 9. Decision making competencies among men

	Men					
	Myself	My partner	Together	Varies	Total	N
Food**	10.3	47.4	38.5	3.8	100	291
Furniture**	7.0	16.5	72.3	4.2	100	285
Expensive electronic devices	16.0	8.7	70.4	4.9	100	287
Car purchase**	24.8	4.9	66.7	3.7	100	256
Holiday*	5.9	6.4	81.4	6.4	100	236
Decisions regarding children's school**	3.1	8.5	79.5	8.9	100	258

Source: "Kárpát Panel" Survey, 2010

As the table below shows, decision making patterns within the families further confirm "female" and "male" spheres of competencies. However, a relatively strong inconsistency may be observed between men and women concerning the ways responsibilities are shared: whereas women tend to overemphasise their decision making roles in almost all aspects of the household management, the majority of men consider that decisions are taken in collaboration. This is especially interesting if we take into account the general attitudes towards decision making patterns: a higher share of women consider shared and consensual decision making a basic condition for a good relationship than men.

Table 10. Decision making competencies among women

	Women					
	Myself	My partner	Together	Varies	Total	N
Food**	64.9	5.1	26.0	4.1	100	296
Furniture**	21.7	5.1	65.6	7.6	100	276
Expensive electronic devices	14.7	13.6	65.6	6.1	100	279
Car purchase**	7.5	25.3	61.4	5.8	100	241
Holiday*	10.0	5.4	72.5	12.1	100	240
Decisions regarding children's school**	16.9	3.1	69.4	10.6	100	255

Source: "Kárpát Panel" Survey, 2010

Although our data do not directly support this explanation, they offer the ground for building the hypothesis: women's commitment to their (almost) exclusive roles in the private sphere is not so much the result of a certain value orientation, but moreover of a pragmatic (re)discovery of the fulfilment one can find outside the (over)competitive labour market. Although it would have been common sense for women to more categorically reject violence, they seem to value more the protection of the private sphere.

5. Conclusions

Ethnic Hungarian women experience labour market inequalities in its several facets. Threatened by unemployment to a greater deal than men, working in less paid and more segregated economic sectors, and spending at the same time twice as many hours doing housekeeping work as their partners, they relate in a rather ambivalent manner to these differentiated positions. While they admit they don't earn as much as they would like and deserve to (the share of those disappointed is double than in the men's case), only a small minority recognises sexual discrimination (though significantly more women than men). All these experiences are backed up by women's attitudes and convictions that ascribe themselves a primary role as care takers and homemakers. As long as no significant difference may be found between men and women in their commitment to traditional values, the high stake put by women on family chores and duties makes the interpretation according to which

this is – at least partly – attributable to necessity and to the lack (or scarcity) of fulfilment and success provided by the labour market, a plausible one.

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The Ties between Adult Generations in Family

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Abstract: The paper analyse the subject of multigenerational bonds in contemporary family who are obviously growing in importance, fact who are reflected in increasing number of empirical findings. The *social-demographic evolution* of societies conduct to a longer life span that has resulted in potentially more years being spent in multigenerational families, greater family structure diversity, and more numerous demands being placed on households and families to fulfil the emotional, physical, and interpersonal needs of family members. Different types of exchanges between parents and children are embedded in family and kinship relationships. One of the most salient aspects of the relationship between ageing parents and their adult children are the transmission of goods, services and support behaviour. Reasons may differ: by *utilitarian (functionalist)* point of view, at different ages, it different ways, parents and children occasionally need, offer and receive help; other scholars explain the exchanges as a *function of intergenerational solidarity*, in which transfers are based on family obligation norms, affection and emotional attachments, an opportunity structure that facilitates interaction between generations, and perceptions that intergenerational exchanges have been reciprocal; and others explanations had focused on *altruism based on kinship*, based on evolutionary theory who pointed that is a genetic predisposition to help those with whom one is genetically related and from economic theories that propose that resources are transferred because it makes the donor happier than alternative uses of those resources would. Based on literature, the diachronic research (realized in 2003, and 2010 respectively) aimed at the study of intra-familial intergenerational exchange models, focused on routine or normative models of exchanges between two sample of Romanian adult parents and adult children, from urban and rural Transylvanian areas. Our results suggests that the patterns of intergenerational transmission behaviour is more consistent with the social exchange model than the altruistical model, with significant increase of ambivalence behaviour and attitudes in 2010.

Keywords: intergenerational transmission (support, transfer, solidarity), bonding social capital, social exchange theory, intergenerational solidarity theory, ambivalence explanatory model.

Introduction

Given the contemporary importance of intergenerational ties, generally focused on support, exchanges, and assistance between family members, it is not surprising that many sociologists have attempted to explain why individuals do or do not make intergenerational transfers of resources. Despite that the structure of intergenerational ties are highly adaptive across sweeping demographic and social structural changes, throughout the life course the intergenerational ties remain important, playing an important role in developed and developing nations, Eastern and Western cultures, and have, more or less, implications for the surviving, health and well-being of each generation involved.

1. Demographical and social challenges for intergenerational ties in contemporary families

Western scholars have become interested with intergenerational ties mostly because there have been a series of social changes that have transformed the “traditional” context of relations between parents and children after the World War II in developed countries (see Cooney and Uhlenberg 1992, Eggebeen 1992, Logan and Spitze 1996, Bengtson, Giarrusso, Silverstein and Wang 2000, Harper 2004). Analyses of the transformations which modernity engendered in family life were a major focus of mid-twentieth century family sociology (Litwak 1960, Parsons 1949, *apud* Harris 1969), debates about the ways in which the changing employment structure altered the division of labour and the allocation of resources within households having also a long history. In contemporary Western Countries, the complex of social and economical factors (increase in standard of living, education, public health, and medical advances) contribute to declines in mortality – *demographic ageing phenomenon* – resulting the *delay of certain major life-transition* (more years spend in educational system, first marriage, first childbirth, and even remarriage). The fact that individuals are living longer conduct to several important changes to family relationships (largely, to family life). This lead to the potential for long-lasting family relationships who has greatly increased; in the same time, increase the chances for long-lasting

marriages, despite the other tendency due by this situation: the sharp rise in divorce.

Considerable changes in family structures along twentieth century conduct to transformation of living arrangements, divorce and remarriage, decrease in fertility, and increases in women's labor force participation. Each of these has the potential to affect intergenerational ties (in terms of *support*, *transfer*, and *solidarity* between familial generations). The other family relationship that has been profoundly affected by declines in mortality has been *parent-child relationships*. For many western adults (adult parent - adult child), fifty years or more of their lives are spend "together". Whereas relationships with minor children last until the children are 18 years old, relationships with adult children can last 30 to 60 years, with ample opportunities for the relationship between adult children and their parents to change over time. In ageing societies like the United States or Western European countries, Japan etc., parents and children share adulthood transitions such as work, parenthood, retirement, and, eventually, grandparenthood (see Rossi and Rossi 1990). Comparing this situation (the extended years of shared lives) with the first half of the twentieth century one, it's obviously that create a very different context for exchanges of support in this kind of contemporary societies. Finally, increases in longevity have changed the *experience of grandparenthood*, for both generations. Grandparents are much more likely to be alive and in good health for a significant part of their (grand) grandchildren's lives. Grandparenthood is also much more likely to be part of the life course of aging adults (see Ikkink, van Tilburg and Knipscheer 1999, Giarrusso, Feng and Bengtson 2004).

The importance of *living arrangements patterns* are obvious: they affect the exchange of help and support, reflecting cultural preferences also. For instance, parent-child proximity in the United Kingdom may be more likely to arise from the needs of the older generation, whereas in Italy strong cultural norms pertaining to mutual aid between parents and children may be rationale for cultural proximity and-often-coresidence (see Glaser and Tomassini 2000, apud Davey, Savla and Belliston 2003).

Over the life course, intergenerational transmission¹ vary in patterned ways of both parents and children. One of the surest ways to receive parental support is to have a child. Giving to children is also affected by changes in the lives of parents. Most significantly, as parent's age, they tend to give less to their children. Much of this decline in giving can be explained by factors associated with ageing (e.g., declines in health, death of spouse, changing needs of children). Yet, there is evidence that this gradual decline in the likelihood of giving help to children persists even when these other factors are taken into account. Finally, and inevitably, the death of the parent leads to an inheritance of the parent's estate. This "final" intergenerational transfer has received significantly less attention from researchers. Available evidence indicates that parents typically treat their children equally in bequests (see Cooney and Uhlenberg 1992).

In developed societies, across the life course, the increasing of equal exchanges of support and aid or role reversal as parent's age is a common model. Adult children and parents preserve contacts with one other, feel affection and closeness to one another, and engage in a fairly equal exchange of support and services, as social support exchanges and help with different tasks (see Rossi and Rossi 1990). Overall, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that most adult children and their parents remain involved with one another throughout the life course (see also Umberson and Slaten 2000).

In Romanian society, the family evolution are described in terms of moving from traditional extended family model to a kind of pseudo-modernization, in fact the rural-urban migration of labour force in communist regime decades conduct to different patterns of attitudes and behaviour than in western countries. In the recent years, the massive migration of labour force in other countries (see Rotariu 2009) affect the Romanian family sphere in many aspects, starting with increased relatives involvement (especially grandparents) in children

¹ One dimension of the larger concept of intergenerational relations, the term "describes a wide range of patterns of interactions among individuals indifferent generations of a family (...) between those in older generations (...) and those in younger generations. In the context of family lives, intergenerational transmission refers to the movement, passage, or exchange of some good or services between one generation to another"; may include "values, norms and beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours specific to that family, or that reflect sociocultural, religious, and ethnically relevant practices and beliefs (...) or the provision of resources and services or assistance by one generation to another" (Martin-Matthews and Kobayashi 2003: 922-923).

care, and finishing with distribution of labour by gender in household and at workplace, under the democratic challenges and economic pressure. This contemporary tendencies are described also among family relations, values and attitudes toward the sense of interpersonal ties and community (see Iluț 2005), and in demographical and values system trends in fertility, marriage, divorce, single parent family, cohabitation etc. (see Iluț 2005, 2009, Rotariu 2010). Since the extended family importance in daily life as cultural argue still have a main component in the mentality of Romanian citizens (especially in rural communities), its foundations and principles in contemporary social picture is more and more dispersed, forced to be reconsidered through rational constraints/functional reasons.

The main variables of intergenerational ties reflected in empirical findings configure a picture of complex set of tendencies:

i) It's a significant difference in the relationships that parents have with adult children by *gender*: it seems that mothers' greater investment in parenting of minor children, even with its attendant demands, may contribute to closer and more positive relationships between children and their mothers later in life. The different roles of mothers and fathers and gendered meanings of parenthood are reflected in many studies (despite both parents had similar views of how their adult children have turned out in the interpersonal lives, inner qualities, and educational career attainment, the mothers felt responsible than the fathers for how their children turned out), as well as may differ the adult children's motivation for contact with their mothers and father (their affection for their mothers is positively associated with the frequency with which they visit their mothers comparing with fathers – perhaps out of obligation more than affection) (see Lawson, Silverstein and Bengtson 1996, *apud* Umberson and Slaten 2000). The studies show gender differences also in adult children's views of intergenerational ties: daughters report greater closeness to their parents that do sons (see Rossi and Rossi 1990). Although gender clearly shapes intergenerational experiences, its effects are not uniform within groups of men and women, being differentiated on the basis of marital status, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, as well as other social parameters (including sexual orientation);

ii) Researches on *coresidential status* of parents and adult children suggests that parents and adult children are more likely to coreside because of the adult children's, rather than the parents' needs (Speare and Avery 1993,

apud Umberson and Slaten 2000). Poor social categories or members of ethnic communities with strong traditional familial ties (Latinos, Asians in United States, Muslims living in Europe or Roma in Eastern Europe) experience more frequently coresidence than white Americans or than typical European families (see Speare and Avery 1993, *apud* Umberson and Slaten 2000, Ruijter, van der Lippe and Raub 2003). So, these coresidential patterns may reflect the needs or values of the two generations, both. Similar studies conduct to conclusion that parents whose adult children return to live in their parental homes are generally satisfied with this situation, as are the adult children. In this kind of household, unlike most other aspects of intergenerational relationships, gender differences are minimal. Both sons and daughters provide only modest housework and financial contribution to their parents' households, although daughters do somewhat more housework, and sons are somewhat more likely to pay room and board. These contributions, or the lack thereof, do not affect the overall quality of their relationships with their parents (see Ward and Spitze 1996, *apud* Umberson and Slaten 2000, Ruijter, van der Lippe and Raub 2003). In Romania, mostly because of economic difficulties, we have many situations the coresidence of two or three adult family generation, constituting the permanent or intermittent extended family (see Iluț 2005). This situation is a response to insufficient resources for separate residence. If in Romanian traditional model, the extended family cohabitation was an optimal one, having a positive function, in contemporary Romanian society is not desirable, and even necessary, to live together with the parents or parents-in-law. This is done by the discomfort of the cohabitation of several generations (usually associated with insufficient living space, limited resources and significant mentality differences between younger and older family members). On the other hand, with or without cohabitation, for many members, the extended family continued to assure the survival in a difficult and unfavourable economic context, by "functional" dimensions of intergenerational exchange: money, goods and food, housekeeping, farm work, care of children (see Tîrhaș 2008).

iii) Examining the *race-ethnicity* as a variable from the viewpoints of either parents and adult children in the studies of intergenerational relations, the results have pointed that, although much ethnographic research has suggested that some ethnic groups as African American and Latino families in US are characterized by larger and more supportive kin

networks, empirical comparison of these groups with white families have provided little support for cultural differences once socioeconomic differences are taken into account (see Hogan, Eggebeen and Clogg 1993). The apparent greater involvement of African American and Latino families is attributed sometimes to greater structural need and sometimes to stronger cultural and familial values (and similar, the lower rate of institutionalization of the elderly among this ethnic groups are explained by greater family support, but also by financial constraints, especially by lack of social assurance, a base condition in accept the elderly from most of this kind of institution in US).

iv) One important subject related with intergenerational ties involved the manner in which the support is given and received, especially the consequences for the *mental health and well-being* of older adults. One extensive research in US found that older adults who were overbenefited in relationships with an adult child reported greater depression than would be expected based on their previous levels of functioning (Davey and Eggebeen 1998). These findings come, somehow, in contradiction to social exchange theory assumption, but correspond partially with the equity theory (suggesting that both underbenefit and overbenefit will be psychologically detrimental in terms of self-esteem parameters). Authors found evidence that the contingent exchange is more important than seems: although receipt of contingent assistance is beneficial, there may be negative psychological consequences of providing assistance around one's own needs. In other cultures (e.g. China, Japan), but mostly in developing countries, the opportunity for receiving support in old age from adult children is crucial for parental happiness. Emotional and financial support from adult children is a benefit for older parents, giving back to children only the provision of instrumental support (not financial). The childcare and household services from old parents in exchange of financial resources derived from adult children is a common model in intergenerational exchange (Chen and Silverstein 2000, *apud* Davey, Savla and Belliston 2003), and both generations are morally improving by this path of exchange. Despite those cultural differences in the nature of intergenerational exchanges, we can conclude that supportive relationships between parents and adult children seem to enhance the *psychological well-being* of both generations, while strained relationships contribute to psychological distress for both parents and adult children. The empirical findings for Romania's older adults converge to the same

general conclusion, with expected particularities given by four set of variables (educational level, residence area / rural-urban, income, extended family coresidence) recorded both from older parents and adult children (see Tırhaş 2009).

2. Theorizing intergenerational ties

An significant explicative model who incorporate intergenerational norms and exchanges are Bengtson's *intergenerational solidarity theory* (Mangen, Bengtson and Landry 1988, *apud* Davey, Savla and Belliston 2003) who describe the many ways in which generations relate to one other in terms of living arrangements (*structural*), shared values (*normative*), norms (*consensual*), contact (*associational*), closeness (*affectual*), and instrumental support (*functional*). At common sense level, older generations are generally perceived to invest in younger generations (*generational stake*) because resources are often seen to flow down from an older to younger generations. But systematic researches prove that the key of intergenerational relations are the differences in needs and resources of each generation, showing positive and negative, conflictual and consensual attitudes and behaviour in ties between generations (see Achenbaum 2004). *Ambivalence explanatory model* try to incorporate this kind of intergenerational relationships. In the same time, *norms and culture* play an important role in generational relations and exchanges (see Eggebeen and Davey 1998, Glaser and Tomassini 2000, *apud* Davey, Savla and Belliston 2003).

There are two main theoretical explanations for *why individuals give*. Some scholars argue that intergenerational support can best be understood by using *social exchange theory* (Homans, 1958, *apud* Harper 2004). A basic premise is that social exchanges and interactions will continue as long as they are seen as beneficial. Intergenerational exchanges of support happen where perceived rewards are seen to offset the costs to an individual. In other words, parents give help to children with the understanding that they will get something back that is "worth" the costs of what they give. Several studies have found patterns in data on routine assistance that are consistent with this theory. For example, Spitze and Logan (1989) found that women's investment in caregiving (direct and intensive care to a family member in need) and kin keeping activities (a range of activities from keeping in touch, relating news, or visiting, to activities that encompass exchanges of help like babysitting, loaning money, or providing emotional support) in their early and

middle life course creates obligations in men and children that lead to assistance in later life. However, conclusive tests of hypotheses drawn from this theory have not yet happened, in part due to the great demands on data a careful test would require.

A second explanation of patterns of inter-generational support suggests they are largely explained by *altruism* as the key theoretical construct (see Deutsch 1975). The idea is that parents and children care about each other, or at least feel some sense of responsibility toward each other, and this concern motivates parents to monitor the well-being of their children (and children to monitor the well-being of their parents) and offer assistance when they perceive that there is a need. This theoretical approach has been behind a good deal of the quantitative models of assistance rendered across generations; that is, the modelling intergenerational resource flows is largely built around variables measuring the resources and needs of each generation. However, despite the intuitive appeal of this theory, the empirical support is mixed. Some of models explain bi-directional exchanges and some focus primarily on exchanges from older to younger kin or from younger to older family members. Research to date indicates that needs are certainly an important part of the explanation of exchanges, but providing support, and the motives behind these acts, appear to be more complex than this theory would suggest.

Summarizing the concrete explanatory models used in findings interpretations, we have: a *norm of family obligation*, *altruism based on kinship*, *altruism based on ageing and generational placement*, a *norm of reciprocity*, *intergenerational transfers as a moral duty*, *emotional attachments explanation*, and a *function of intergenerational solidarity* (for an enlarged approach, see Ganong and Coleman 2006). Most of these explanatory arguments for intergenerational exchanges share the assumption that parents take care of and nurture children when the children are young, behaviours that later elicit aid as a repayment of debt from the younger generation when they become adults and the older generation is more dependent. This repayment or reciprocity assumption is explicit in many of these explanatory models (i.e., reciprocity, solidarity), and implicit in others (i.e., emotional attachment). For example, attachments are stronger when children's needs have been met by parents throughout the life course. An adult child who is securely attached to a parent who has been a supportive caretaker is more likely to allocate resources to that parent than a less-securely attached adult is likely to help an unsupportive

parent. Only in the normative family obligations, altruism, and moral duty arguments is the assumption of reciprocity absent. Much of the critics of these models has been directed toward the solidarity and normative family obligations models, but the critique also applies to other explanations that have taken what critics have argued are oversimplified views of intergenerational transfers. In short, no unified theoretical explanation for intergenerational exchanges has emerged. Instead of seeing exchanges as the outcome of uni-dimensional phenomena such as solidarity or attachment, with more solidarity or attachment leading to greater likelihood of exchanges, *the ambivalence model* argues that intergenerational relationships are characterized by both positive and negative sentiments and motivations to help or withhold aid (see Connidis and McMullin 2002). Together with these explanations, we also take into account the *bonding social capital* assumptions (Putnam 2000) on our theoretical frame, looking at kinship networks function, and used in research hypothesis construction.

3. A diachronic analysis of the hierarchy of exchange types: adult generations of Transylvanian families

In the followings I am going to present an exploratory research which had a diachronic pattern (2003, 2010) and which aimed to investigate if there is possible to establish certain models of inter-generational exchange within the Transylvanian family, respectively if there occur any changes on the longitudinal in terms of the structure and the direction of these exchanges. Based on these purposes we initiated to study the following aspects: the prevalence of some forms of inter-generational exchange according to socio-demographical categories; the possibility to draw some explanations rooted in the specificities of the Romanian family environment; the provide some interpretation based on the role of the informal social capital of the kinship networks. In accordance with these objectives, the empirical strategy was directed towards the investigation of the linkages between the model of reciprocity and the model of altruism. In order to realize longitudinal comparisons, two investigations were conducted, one of them in 2003 and the other in 2010.

3.1. Methodological background and theoretical assumptions

Regarding the first investigation (in 2003), the general hypothesis of the research was that in the case of those families which are economically

pauper, intergenerational exchanges are directed especially towards an easier and in the same time more functional aspect, that is towards inter-generational service-providing. Consequently, we presupposed that goods and finance-based exchanges are more typical in the case of the economically better off families of the middle and upper-middle class. This hypothesis was rooted not only in the fact that poor families usually have extremely low wages, but also in the macro-social fact that in the case of Romania social security allowances and transfers are, in turn, very problematic. Afterwards, this hypothesis has reduced its consistency, due to the fact that after the European integration in 2007, and especially in the case of the lower and lower-middle class rural families, labour migration to abroad began to constitute a modality for economical recovery. Those family members who were working abroad became sources for remittances for their family members remained at home. Consequently, the amount of service-based exchanges from younger family members towards their older parents has diminished and it was compensated, on the same direction, by financial advantages and also by the extension of social capital networks, both formal and informal.

The diachronic research (realized both in 2003 and 2010) aimed at the study of intra-familial inter-generational exchange models in 16 villages from Alba, Bihor and Cluj counties, respectively in 4 urban contexts (Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, Aleşd, Huedin). Constructed in such a manner the study intended to provide a comparative approach on inter-generational familial exchanges between rural and urban settings and between periods of time.

The main research hypotheses has emerged and has diversified based on the results of a previous (Tîrhaş 2003) study (which was realized between 1998 and 2003 in the urban and rural settlements of the Apuseni Mountains and Cluj-Napoca) and assumed the followings: a) there exist structural differences in inter-generational exchanges according to parents', respectively grandparents' age, gender, residence, household structure, physical proximity of the kinship networks (e.g. whether members of an enlarged family corresponding to different generations live or not together in the same household or settlement) and socio-economical status. Through the thematic analysis of the oral histories collected between 1998-2003, we also hypothesized the existence of some forms of exchange which are intrinsically linked to lifestyles (utilitarianism, but also altruism); b) the receiving of the

transfer is greater in the case of children, respectively in the case of third generations and in both of the cases the origin of the transfer is located in the middle generation (familial obligation norm); c) in spite of these, older members of the household are still offering a lot of support for their adult children, even if the content of this support is different from that of the support they receive from their children (reciprocity model, cultural explanation).

We relied on theoretical sampling and ensured in both samples (2003 and 2010) that the socio-demographical characteristics of the individuals in the samples to be similar to that of the urban and rural population. In both surveys in the first phase we selected a non-probabilistic sample of 200 individuals, comprising both parents and children. We succeed to complete 180 questionnaires in 2003 (87 in the urban and 93 in the rural), respectively 198 questionnaires in 2010 (101 in the urban and 97 in the rural). In the case of the rural sample the ratio of females was 55% in 2003 and 56% in 2010. In the urban samples, the corresponding percent was around 52% in the case of both research. Respondents with higher education degrees accounted for 22% of the sample in 2003 and 27% in 2010.

3.2. Results and discussions

The table below summarizes the items which were investigated (without presenting however the items aiming at describing the socio-demographical background), the mean scores and the relative frequencies of the responses obtained. The actors involved in intergenerational exchange were named in the following manner: first generation – *grandparents*; second generation – *parents*; third generation – *grandchildren*. In the case of the variables corresponding to the category of *'effective and perceived linkages with the grandparents'* we formulated questions about the density and quality of these relations in forms of evaluation scales. These questions are designed to sustain or contradict the affirmations corresponding to the variables of the category called *'forms of support exchange'*.

Table 1. Variables regarding the nature and forms of exchange. Cumulative results obtained on both kinds of residence environments (rural + urban) (Mean, percent)

Variables	2003	2010
Effective and perceived linkages with the grandparents		
Contacts (the frequency of visits, letters, phone calls between the parents and the most frequently contacted grandparent: 1=not at al..., 6=a few times a week). The question was asked only in the case of those parents who do not live in the same households with the grandparents.	2.8	3.3
Distance (in the same household, in the same locality, in different locality, in different city of the same county, different county, different country on a scale ranging from 1 to 6)	4.1	5
Quality of the relation (1 = very weak ..., 7=excellent). If both parents were alive and if there were differences regarding the mother and the father the mean score was used.	5.3	5.1
Co-residence in the past (the parent has lived with the grandparents at least one year in the past)	17.2%	16.8%
Forms of support in exchange		
Money and material goods - giving (the parent gives money, long term usable goods, gifts, alimentary products to the grandparents)	23%	44%
Money and material goods - receiving (the parent receives money, long term usable goods, gifts, alimentary products from the grandparents)	26%	22%
Advice - giving (the parent gave advice, moral and affective support to the grandparents during the last month)	14%	16%
Advice - receiving (the parent received advice, moral and affective support from the grandparents during the last month)	25%	28%
Care - giving (the parent cares for grandparents minor children, if any, or offers care for the sick parent, if any)	20%	16%
Care - receiving (the parent receives care from the grandparents regarding he raising of his/her children)	32%	51%
Practical services - giving (help-providing in the case of household related issues like repairing, agricultural work, etc. at least once a time in the past two months)	43%	18%
Practical services - receiving (receives help in the case of household related issues like repairing, agricultural work, etc. at least once a time in the past month)	13%	21%

A central importance was given to the delimitation of the concrete forms of exchange (i.e. reciprocal exchange), which were divided in four categories: *money*, *advice*, *care* and *services*. The questions about intergenerational support were concerned only with two adult generations, that of the parents (called grandparents) and that of the children with children (called parents). Another demarcation was that of *the types of services*. Besides the types included in the questionnaires and interview guides, we let the respondents to name other types of services too.

The results signal some essential differences in the case of three aspects of the inter-generational exchange. We observe a growing frequency in the case of contacts (from 2.8 to 3.3). Our results suggested that this is due to the more frequent phone calls in 2010. In parallel, the distance between the parents and grandparents becomes greater (from 4.1 to 5 on a 6-point scale). This is explainable through the labour migration to abroad from the part of the parents. There occurs a small decrease in the declared quality of the relationship between the adult generations of the family.

The most important difference in the responses which occurred during the seven year interval between the two investigations regards the forms of exchange. Thus, money and material goods-based exchanges, respectively exchanges in the domain of services are deeply modified and even reversed. Compared to 2003, in 2010 the frequency of parents who declare the giving of money and material goods towards the grandparents has grown with 21%, while the percent of those parents who receive such kinds of transfers from the grandparents has lowered with 4%. In parallel with the growing distance between the generations there occurs also the decreasing of care giving towards grandparents, however there is also a slight increase in advice transfers (both in terms of giving and receiving).

There are relevant modifications (however in a different direction compared with the case of money and goods) in the case of services. In 2010, a greater percent of parents receive services from the grandparents compared with 2003: 19% of the parents are helped by the grandparents in child raising and childcare. In 2010 the percent of parents providing practical services for grandparents lowers with 25% compared to 2003. Similarly, those who receive practical services from the part of their old parents (i.e. grandparents) are more numerous in 2010. We explain these differences especially through the phenomenon

of external migration which became accentuated especially after 2007. It should be mentioned that compared to 2003, in 2010 the percent of those adults who declared that they were abroad for working reasons was with 42% higher.

The distribution of individuals according to the generation of the grandparents in the types of exchanges suggests two models and two means (depending on the rural and the urban). There are also important differences in accordance to the age of the grandparents, according to which there are four categories: those aged 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and older than 75. The most relevant results are the following:

Regarding the *content and the hierarchy* of intergenerational exchange there were revealed differences as a function of the age (generation) of the grandparents. Our results suggested that in spite of the fact that ageing leads to a diversification of needs, so towards a change in lifestyle, the practice of exchange remains active and the sole aspect which suffers modification is the nature of the exchange. Parents' effort in supporting the grandparents and that of the grandparents in supporting the parents are significantly different only after the age of 75.

In both years, those who live in *marginal rural settlements* usually show a reduced exchange regarding each type of exchanges, except services (usually in form of help in agricultural activities. *Economically poor* – those with low wages, pensions, unemployed, those who are employed in the black market, families with many children, etc. – are also very weakly involved in the process of intergenerational exchanges. In the case of this type of respondents the most frequent type of exchange consist in services (grandparents are offering help in child raising and in childcare, parents are offering help for agricultural activities, etc.). Money and goods bases exchanges and the exchange of symbolic support (phone calls, gifts, etc.) are extremely reduced or absent in the case of this category.

Those who are *socio-economically better off*, no matter which is their environment of residence, are the most involved group in finance and goods-based exchanges (they give/receive apartments, long term usable goods, money) but they are also very active in service and advice-based exchanges. Another important difference occurs on the basis of the educational level of the respondents, but only in situations when education is associated with the economical status of the respondents.

Compared to the results obtained in 2003, in 2010 the *differences between urban and rural* are not so evident and this aspect indicates the

homogenization of the support capacity in these two environments, probably due to the emigration which constitutes in the case of both settings a typical phenomenon.

Compared to 2003, in 2010 grandparents receive more consistent *financial transfers* from the part of their children working abroad. No matter which is the residence environment of those involved in the exchange, the most frequent way of reciprocity from the part of the grandparents are service providing, especially in terms of helping the raising of the grandchildren or in taking care or administrating the properties of the parents in cases when they are working abroad.

By *gender*, adult daughters are offering mostly care for their old parents, while sons are more involved in helping in the household work and they are also providing material transfers towards their parents.

Regarding *the manifestations and the structure of the intergenerational exchanges as a form of informal social capital* our research in 2010 has re-confirmed a number of findings obtained in similar studies in the US and France, that is in the case of poor, socially marginal categories which have also weak communitarian linkages intergenerational exchanges tend to be inconsistent. In the case of lower educated people this tendency is even more accentuated (see Achenbaum 2004, Bengtson and Harroten 1994, Hagestad 1995).

3.3. Concluding remarks

The main assumption which was verified in our study is that wealthier and more educated is the social category the more frequent involved in the symbolic exchange and the more consistent is the material transfer to close relatives from them (parents or grandparents). Obviously, the dynamics of the intergenerational exchange overcomes in its manifestation the logic of simple utilitarianism and the classical postulates of the social capital. Socio-cultural variables (e.g. the norms of reciprocity, the value of altruism, the norm of familial responsibility, etc.) are all important components of the exchange. But, based on our results, as a general conclusion it can be formulated that altruistic and custom based models (moral duty, familial responsibility, intergenerational solidarity) are less frequent than the “functional” models (norms of reciprocity, contextual utilitarianism) and the ambivalent models. The later are significantly more frequent in 2010 than in 2003. This finding was demonstrated also by the results of factor analysis which regarded the types of exchange as a function of socio-

demographical categories. Regarding the subject of *density of the social-communitarian networks*, we noticed differences in the functioning of the exchange depending on the social cohesion of the groups (the literature mentions for such cases the situations of minority groups like that of immigrant Chinese and Mexican families in the US – see Hogan, Eggebeen and Clogg 1993, Rossi and Rossi 1990). We observed the positive effect of the communitarian and familial cohesion on exchange practice, especially in terms of its practical variants (service and help transfers). This intra-familial practice seems, however, to have a detrimental role on formal social capital and in some extent also on the informal social capital, on bonding social capital other than the family and kinship network (see Iluț and Tîrhaș 2010).

Our results need a cautious extrapolation due to the major limit of the research consisting in the theoretical sampling, also derived from diachronic research exigencies. We suggest that the results to be considered in the light of a pilot (exploratory) investigation which in the future must receive additional data in order to establish clearer the interaction's patterns between social-demographical parameters and motivations of the intergenerational exchange.

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Le mouvement naturel de la population rurale de la Bessarabie de l'entre-deux-guerres

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Abstract. The aim of this study is to analyse the rural population from the point of view of the mortality, natality and natural growth, as a part of a larger investigation project of the traditional and modern elements in interwar Bessarabia. It is based on a vast and varied demographical and statistical documentation and it reveals the main characteristic demographical features of the rural population in interbellic Bessarabia: a) a very high crude rate of mortality (20,7 deceases at 1.000 inhabitants or approximately 58.000 in absolute numbers in 1939); b) a crude rate of natality (of above 30,0 live-born children at 1.000 inhabitants) with a significant decreasing tendency which started after the First World War and was maintained until the end of examined period of time; c) a relative high natural growth (18,7 at 1.000 inhabitants in 1933), yet affected by a ceaseless decreasing process, because of the fact that this growth was developing in the circumstances of a low rate of natality, while the general mortality was characterized by an insignificant tendency of reducing.

Keywords: rural population, population natural movement, mortality, infant mortality, late fetal death, natality, natural growth.

1. Le nom de la Bessarabie. Aperçu historique.

Jusqu'à la fin de la première guerre mondiale, la Bessarabie – avec une superficie de 44.422 km² et un population total de 2.642.000 habitants (Babel 1926: 7) – été une province de l'Empire russe, située entre le Pruth, qui la sépare à l'Ouest du reste de la Moldavie; le Danube, depuis l'embouchure du Pruth jusqu'à la Mer Noire, qui la sépare de la Dobroudja roumaine; la Mer Noire au Sud et le Dniéster à l'Est, qui la sépare de l'Ukraine (Murgoci 1920: 1).

Mais cette acception du mot n'est pas ancienne, elle date du XIX^e siècle, exactement de l'année 1812, où le territoire qui faisait jusque-là partie intégrante de la principauté de Moldavie, a été annexé par la Russie. Le nom de Bessarabie a été d'abord appliqué à la région qui s'allonge, entre le Pruth et le Dniéster, au bord du Danube et de la Mer Noire, devenue à la fin du XIV^e siècle propriété des Bassarabs, princes de Valachie, tandis que le centre et le nord de la région étaient sous l'autorité des princes de Moldavie. Les Turcs ayant établi leur domination d'abord sur la Valachie, disputent la Bessarabie aux Moldaves, puis aux Russes. Ceux-ci visent à l'expulsion des Ottomans et à la conquête des principautés danubiennes (Martonne 1919: 3).

En 1812, à la suite d'une guerre qui durait depuis 1806, la Russie menacée par Napoléon I^{er} se décide à signer le traité de paix selon lequel „La Sublime Porte ottomane renonce, en faveur de la Russie, aux pays situés à la rive gauche du Pruth, à toutes les forteresses, villes et habitations qui s'y trouvent, ainsi qu'à la moitié du fleuve Pruth qui forme la limite des deux Empires” (Babel 1926: 109-110). Ainsi, contrairement aux obligations assumées lorsque la Sublime Porte avait accepté la suzeraineté sur la Moldavie, - entre autres, de protéger et de défendre le pays et son intégrité territoriale - les Turcs livrèrent aux Russes la moitié la plus fertile et la plus riche de la Moldavie (Murgoci 1920: 10).

Pour mieux isoler et différencier cette région moldave du reste de la Moldavie, la Russie a appliqué le nom de „Bessarabie” – qui ne s'appliquait jusqu'alors qu'à la partie méridionale, à une partie du Budgeac – à toute la contrée comprise entre Pruth et Dniéster, cherchant à accréditer l'idée de l'existence d'un pays bessarabien historiquement séparé de la Moldavie proprement dite (Babel 1926: 8-9).

2. La population de la Bessarabie dans le cadre de la nouvelle Roumanie d'après 1918

Le mouvement général des nationalités de l'ancien Empire des Tsars vers l'indépendance ne pouvait pas ne pas atteindre la Bessarabie. Ainsi, à la fin d'octobre 1917, le Congrès des soldats moldaves de toute la Russie proclame l'autonomie de la „République Démocratique Moldave” (Bessarabie) et décide la formation d'une assemblée nationale, „Sfatul Țării”. Pour échapper à l'anarchie du bolchévisme, cette assemblée fait appel aux troupes roumaines qui franchissent le Pruth en janvier 1918 et rétablissent l'ordre. De ce moment, l'évolution naturelle des événements

se précipite: l'indépendance complète de la République Démocratique Moldave (Bessarabie) est proclamée le 24 janvier 1918, et le 9 avril „Sfatul Țării”, „au nom du peuple de Bessarabie”, déclare „la République Démocratique Moldave (Bessarabie), dans ses limites d'entre le Pruth, le Dniéster, le Danube, la mer Noire et les anciennes frontières avec l'Autriche, arrachée par la Russie, il y a plus de cent ans, au corps de la vieille Moldavie, en raison du droit historique et du droit national, sur la base du principe que les peuples seuls doivent décider de leur sort, dorénavant et pour toujours, s'unit à sa mère patrie, la Roumanie” (Martonne 1919: 17-18).

Entre 1918 et 1940, la Bessarabie a été une des 9 provinces historiques de la Roumanie (Olténie, Munténie, Dobrogea, Moldavie, Bessarabie, Bucovine, Transylvanie et Crișana-Maranureș), ayant les proportions suivantes de la population des villages (Manuilă 1940: 17):

Roumanie entière	79,8 %
Olténie	86,9 %
Munténie	72,7 %
Dobrogea	75,9 %
Moldavie	75,7 %
Bessarabie	87,9 %
Bucovine	73,3 %
Transylvanie	83,9 %
Banat	82,2 %
Crișana-Maranureș	80,1 %

Les principales indices démographiques et socio-économiques représentatives de la Roumanie de l'entre-deux-guerres par les provinces historiques ont été les suivants:

Tableau 1. Indices démographiques et socio-économiques représentatives par les provinces historiques de la Roumanie

	Superficie, population et densité			Accroissement annuel de la population, %	Taux moyens de reproduction, 1930-1931		
	Superficie, milles km ²	Population, milles	Densité par km ²		naissances	morts	accroissement naturel
Roumanie	295.0	18.057	61	1.27	34.2	20.1	14.1
Olténie	24.1	1.513	63	1.44	33.7	20.4	13.3
Munténie	52.5	4.029	77	2.33	35.4	20.1	15.3
Dobrogea	23.3	815	35	0.64	39.2	23.7	15.5
Moldavie	38.0	2.434	64	1.66	39.9	21.4	18.5
Bessarabie	44.4	2.864	64	1.09	38.3	20.8	17.5
Bucovine	10.4	853	82	-	31.3	19.0	12.3
Transylvanie	62.2	3.218	52	-	30.1	18.5	11.6
Banat	18.7	940	50	1.05	21.3	18.7	2.6
Crişana-Maranureş	21.3	1.390	65	-	28.8	19.1	9.7

	Taux de reproduction, 1930		Indices socio-économiques, 1930			
	Brut	Net	Mortalité infantile, 1930-1931	Illettrés, 10 ans et plus	Pourcentage des dépendants de l'agriculture	Productivité dans l'agriculture, per capita
Roumanie	2.16	1.40	178	43	72	48
Olténie	2.11	1.37	166	50	86	-
Munténie	2.22	1.44	181	42	64	-
Dobrogea	2.70	1.75	204	47	79	48
Moldavie	2.48	1.61	182	43	75	-
Bessarabie	2.57	1.67	181	62	86	45
Bucovine	1.88	1.22	188	34	70	45
Transylvanie	2.01	1.30	158	32	67	-
Banat	1.25	1.81	168	28	57	51
Crişana-Maranureş	1.77	1.15	190	38	69	-

Source: Kirk 1946: 271

3. La mortalité de la population rurale de la Bessarabie

Les années immédiatement suivant d'après 1918 ont été marqué d'une diminution comparative de la mortalité dans le milieu rural de la Bessarabie. Ainsi, en 1919 ont été attesté 66.916 décès dans le milieu rural, tandis qu'en 1910 le même indicateur à été de 77.356 décès et 74.093 décès en 1911. Si l'on rapporte à un millier habitants, le taux de mortalité a été moins de 30,0 ‰ et, selon les estimations de Chr. Staicovici et P. Iconomu, de 26,0 ‰ (Staicovici, Iconomu 1923: 12-13). Mais la Bessarabie à conservé, pratiquement, la vieille structure de mortalité par âge, qui est resté invariable jusqu'à la fin des années 1930. Ainsi, en 1919, 12.162 décès ou 18 % de celles de 66.916 décès total enregistrées dans le milieu rural, ont constitué la mortalité infantile, et, avec les décès des enfants de l'âge jusqu'à 5 ans, la mortalité infantile a constitué en 1919 environ 30 % du total des décès (Staicovici, Iconomu 1923: 12-13). Le taux respectif de mortalité été sous le niveau de l'avant première guerre mondiale (Raşin 1956: 249) et même si l'on rapport aux taux de la Roumanie, - où la mortalité infantile dans le milieu rural été de 22 % et la mortalité des enfants de l'âge entre 1-5 ans, de 34,0 ‰ (Staicovici, Iconomu 1923: 12-13) - et pourtant il est resté à un niveau exagéré.

Après 1919, la mortalité de la population rurale de la Bessarabie à évolué de la façon suivante.

Tableau 2. La mortalité de la population rurale de la Bessarabie après 1919 (nombre de décès)

Districts	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
1. Bălţi	7.173	8.516	6.505	5.473	6.307	8.179	5.958
2. Cahul	3.281	3.839	3.155	3.419	3.818	3.269	4.004
3. Cetatea Albă	8.181	10.399	8.676	7.482	8.619	8.102	5.775
4. Lăpuşna	7.193	7.555	6.230	5.700	6.645	7.465	6.802
5. Hotin	7.314	7.066	7.577	7.588	7.735	7.756	6.047
6. Ismail	4.069	3.592	3.693	2.728	3.687	3.647	2.816
7. Orhei	8.239	6.014	5.352	5.256	6.486	6.832	4.869
8. Sorooca	6.259	7.661	5.898	5.555	6.686	7.236	6.048
9. Tighina	6.772	8.350	6.276	6.096	6.690	6.156	5.702
Total décès dans le milieu rural	58.481	62.992	53.360	49.297	56.673	58.638	48.021

Source: Cazacu 1928: 12

Selon les données du Tableau 1, pendant les années '20 la mortalité de la population rurale de Bessarabie à manifesté un tendance léger de diminuation, quand, après un taux maximum de 62.992 décès en 1921, l'indicateur minimum à été attesté en 1926, avec 48.021 décès. Mais c'est un constatation trop générale, c'est pourquoi il nécessite des details et des concrétisation. En dépit du caractère fragmentaire de l'information sur le mouvement naturel de la population rurale de Bessarabie dans les années '20, nous essayons de faire cette analyse en utilisant les données de la mortalité de la population pour les années 1924-1925, quand a été enregistrée un taux moyen typique de la mortalité de population, et les phénomènes démographiques se sont stabilisés.

Tableau 3. Le mouvement naturel de la population rurale de Bessarabie pendant les années 1924-1925

Districts	Naissances vivantes		Décès (sans mortinatalité)		Mortinatalité		Excédent des naissances sur les décès	
	1924	1925	1924	1925	1924	1925	1924	1925
1. Bălți	11.946	11.792	6.307	8.179	18	74	5.639	3.613
2. Cahul	6.724	5.866	3.818	3.269	24	33	2.906	2.597
3. Cetatea Albă	15.150	12.973	8.619	8.102	39	58	6.531	4.871
4. Lăpușna	11.015	10.433	6.645	7.465	25	103	4.370	2.968
5. Hotin	13.549	13.424	7.735	7.756	52	138	5.814	5.668
6. Ismail	6.297	5.612	3.683	3.643	16	39	2.610	1.969
7. Orhei	10.375	10.665	6.486	6.832	19	77	3.889	3.833
8. Soroca	11.974	12.147	6.686	7.236	19	92	5.288	4.911
9. Tighina	12.880	17.894	6.690	6.156	35	89	6.190	4.538
Total	99.910	93.606	56.673	58.638	247	703	43.237	34.968

Source: ANRM, fond 1416, inv. 1, dos. 6, f.24, 25, 36

On peut constater pour l'année 1924 un croissance sensible de la mortalité de population rurale comparativement à l'année précédent: de 49.297 décès en 1923 à 56.673 en 1924 et à 58.638 décès en 1925. D'une manière identique avec les années antérieures, en 1924 et 1925 les décès les plus nombreux ont été attestés parmi les enfants de moins d'un an, notamment 21.634 décès, tandis que parmi les adultes de plus de 40 ans ont été attestés 15.312 décès, parmi les personnes de 1-5 ans – 10.038 décès, parmi les personnes de 20-40 ans – 5.222 décès et parmi les

personnes de 5-20 ans – 4.467 décès (ANRM, fond 1416, inv. 1, dos. 6, f.22). On constate aussi une croissance considérable de morts-nés: de 82 des cas en 1923 jusqu'à 247 cas en 1924 et 703 cas de morts-nés en 1925.

Un taux si haut de la mortalité dans le milieu rural de la Bessarabie était déterminé par des innombrables maladies épidémiques, caractéristiques pour les années d'après la première guerre mondiale. Si dans le milieu urbain les cas des décès causés par les maladies épidémiques se sont diminués de 186 en 1923 à 70 en 1924, dans le milieu rural se produit un croissance de 603 décès en 1923 à 667 en 1924 (ANRM, fond 1416, inv. 1, dos. 6, f.4, 31). Parmi les maladies les plus répandues dans le milieu rural était: la fièvre typhoïde (225 cas létaux en 1924), typhus exanthématique (213 cas létaux), la rougeole (137 cas létaux), scarlatine (82 cas), dysenterie (45 cas), coqueluche (19), diphtérie (13 cas), la fièvre récurrente (2 cas létaux) et la variole avec un cas létaux (ANRM, fond 1416, inv. 1, dos. 6, f.31). En 1924, 36,2 % de tout les décès provoqués par les maladies épidémiques ont été attestés dans le district Lăpuşna, 15,2 % dans le district Tighina, 9,8 % dans le district Hotin et seulement 1 % dans le district Ismail.

Le docteur T. Vicol, qui à étudié spécialement la mortalité infantile dans le milieu rural de Bessarabie, à invoqué les données suivants concernant ce phénomène démographique par les district.

Tableau 4. La mortalité infantile dans le milieu rural de Bessarabie, par les districts

Districts	Taux de nés vivants (‰)	Taux de décès d'enfants de moins d'un an (%)	Taux de décès d'enfants jusqu'à 14 ans (%)	Taux de mort-nés (%)
1. Bălţi	43,0	19,8	29,4	1,2
2. Cahul	49,2	21,4	32,1	2,0
3. Cetatea Albă	32,7	16,9	28,6	1,4
4. Hotin	33,5	18,3	31,2	1,7
5. Ismail	31,1	16,7	22,9	2,0
6. Lăpuşna	39,9	22,2	33,6	3,5
7. Orhei	39,8	20,5	31,1	1,6
8. Soroca	35,7	16,4	23,8	1,5
9. Tighina	41,7	21,3	38,5	2,5
Total	38,2	19,5	30,0	1,9

Le même auteur, après avoir analysé les données ci-dessus, a conclu que, „de toute façon on analyse les cas de mortalité infantile, - pendant un an, par les districts ou pour la province dans son ensemble, pour un mois ou pour quelques mois, - on peut varier les chiffres, mais les rapports restent toujours excessives pour conclure que la mortalité infantile en Bessarabie est excessive” (Vicol 1933: 37).

En fait, on ne peut pas considérer normal un taux de 30,0 % de décès dans le groupe d'âge de 1-14 ans en Bessarabie, ou de 19,5 % de décès parmi les enfants d'un an. Dr. M. M. Vainselboim a mentionné à cet égard, que „le chiffre de la mortalité infantile est un critère infailible d'appréciation de la civilisation et de l'état économique de chaque pays”. Un taux de mortalité infantile si haut a été caractéristique aux pays européens au milieu du XIXe siècle, quand il a été de 22-25 pour cent des nouveaux-nés (Vainselboim 1930: 99).

Cependant, il n'y avait aucune différence entre la mortalité générale de la population rurale de la Bessarabie et la mortalité dans d'autres régions et provinces du pays; elle ne dépasse pas plus que dans certains districts la mortalité moyenne de la Roumanie, qui était d'environ 22,3 % (Vainselboim 1930: 99).

Particulièrement alarmant dans la Bessarabie était en fait très fort le taux de mortalité des enfants âgés d'un an, qui atteint 20,0 % par rapport à la moyenne générale de 18,4 % par pays. Parmi les causes d'un tel taux de mortalité infantile en Bessarabie, ont été: la faible vitalité héritée des enfants; les maladies héréditaires et acquises pendant la vie intra-utérine; l'insuffisance des soins médicaux; la mauvaise nutrition et la faible résistance aux maladies infectieuses (Vainselboim 1930: 100). L'expérience de la plupart des pays européens dans la période d'entre deux guerres a démontré que, lorsque ont été accomplis de réels progrès sanitaires, la mortalité infantile pourrait être réduite à un tiers (Manuilă 1940: 20), ce que nous ne pouvons pas dire de la Bessarabie ou de l'ensemble du pays.

Un même taux très élevé de la mortalité dans les zones rurales de la Bessarabie a été maintenu pendant les années '30, témoignant une visible tendance à la baisse vers la fin de la décennie. Si en 1931 a été attesté un taux de mortalité de 23,0 pour mille habitants, alors en 1933 le même taux a baissé pour la première fois ci-dessous la proportion de 20,0 pour mille habitants, plus précis – 19,2 ‰ (Mișcarea populației României în anul 1933: 82, 84). Il est intéressant de noter que, dans la même année, pour la première fois depuis 1918, le taux de mortalité

dans le milieu rural a été égal au milieu urbain, et en 1936 ce chiffre était encore plus faible par rapport à la proportion des zones rurales et urbaines remplies, bien que le taux de mortalité pour les deux milieux de vie a été plus de 20,0 pour mille habitants.

En 1934, le taux de mortalité dans le milieu rural était déjà égale à 24,5 pour mille habitants, pour atteindre en 1935 un taux maximum de 26,7 pour mille habitants ou 71.908 décès (*Mișcarea populației României în anul 1934*: 4, 6; *Mișcarea populației României în anul 1935*: 6, 8). Après 1935, le taux de mortalité prouvent à nouveau une tendance à la baisse, tend à devenir constant. Ainsi, en 1936 le taux de mortalité a été de 22,4 pour mille habitants ou 60.937 décès, en 1937 – 21,7 ‰ ou 59.143 décès et en 1939 – 20,7 ‰ ou 57.631 décès (*Mișcarea populației României în anul 1936*: 6, 8; *Mișcarea populației României în anul 1937*: 6, 8; *Mișcarea populației României în anul 1939*: 2, 4).

4. L'évolution de la natalité dans le milieu rural

Expliquant le phénomène de la mortalité de la population rurale de la Roumanie de l'entre-deux-guerres, Sabin Manuila a mentionné à cet égard que „seulement un taux de natalité très élevé comme la nôtre est en mesure de compenser un mortalité unique dans tous les pays civilisés de l'Europe et de donner un tel excédent naturel comme valeur absolue (...)” (*Mișcarea populației României în anul 1932*: 5). Entre les deux guerres mondiales la Roumanie a enregistré la plus forte natalité en Europe: de 32,0 pour mille habitants (Manuilă 1940a: 38, 39). Le taux de natalité en Roumanie a été presque deux fois plus élevé qu'en Belgique, Allemagne, France, Norvège, Suisse, Autriche, Angleterre et en Suède, étant dépassé de ce point de vue seulement en 1924 par Yougoslavie, qui avait cette année-là un taux de natalité de 38,6 ‰, par rapport à 37,9 pour mille habitants dans la Roumanie (Șandru 1980: 14-15; *Bréviaire statistique* 1940: 48).

En termes de phénomènes démographiques, dans la Roumanie de l'entre-deux-guerres se sont révélé deux groupes de provinces: l'Ancien Royaume – Bessarabie et Transylvanie – Bucovine. Dans le groupe l'Ancien Royaume – Bessarabie, „presque tous les phénomènes démographiques sont plus marqués, la vie elle-même de ce groupe semble être plus active que celui de groupe de Transylvanie – Bucovine. Les naissances, les décès, les mariages etc., tant en chiffres absolus et les proportions sont plus élevés dans le premier groupe” (*Mișcarea populației României în anul 1934*: XV; Chibulcuteanu 1941: 100). Alors, la

Bessarabie de l'entre-deux-guerres a été l'une des provinces avec un taux de natalité élevé.

Bien que dans les années 1861-1913 a été enregistrée une tendance à la baisse du taux de natalité dans le milieu rural, le niveau moyen de natalité était toutefois assez élevé – de 43,4 pour mille habitants (Raşin 1956: 167). La natalité dans le milieu rural de la Bessarabie a été profondément affecté par les conséquences de la Première Guerre Mondiale et les événements révolutionnaires de 1917. En 1919, dans les villages en Bessarabie ont été enregistrés seulement 71.391 nouveaux-nés, comparativement à 80.000 nouveau-nés chaque année dans la période d'avant-guerre (Cazacu 1928: 12; Staicovici, Iconomu 1923: 12-13).

À titre de compensation, dans les années qui ont suivi, le nombre de nouveaux-nés dans le milieu rural n'a pas cessé d'augmenter, à proximité constamment de chiffre impressionnant de 100.000. Voilà les données des nouveaux-nés dans le milieu rural de Bessarabie pendant la première décennie d'après-guerre (Cazacu 1928: 12).

Tableau 5. Naissances vivantes dans le milieu rural de Bessarabie entre 1920-1926 (nombre de nés vivants)

Districts	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
1. Bălţi	10.285	13.236	12.184	12.058	11.946	11.792	9.935
2. Cahul	5.668	6.767	6.350	6.733	6.724	5.866	6.447
3. Cetatea Albă	12.926	16.537	12.791	14.279	15.150	12.973	10.634
4. Lăpuşna	9.095	11.552	10.744	11.164	11.015	10.433	11.528
5. Hotin	10.053	13.672	12.977	13.143	13.549	13.424	12.023
6. Ismail	5.910	7.102	5.351	5.855	6.297	5.612	5.457
7. Orhei	9.695	11.801	10.678	11.221	10.375	10.665	9.168
8. Soroca	10.245	12.799	12.206	12.330	11.974	12.147	9.576
9. Tighina	10.482	13.925	11.579	13.087	12.880	10.694	8.767
Total naissances vivantes dans le milieu rural	84.359	107.391	94.869	99.870	99.910	93.606	83.435

Comme on peut le voir, en 1921, dans le milieu rural le nombre des naissances vivantes a dépassé même le chiffre de 100.000, et en 1923 et 1924 a été près du chiffre indiqué. À noter que dans la même période, dans le milieu rural de la Roumanie entière sont nés chaque année plus de 500.000 enfants, ce qui correspond à une moyenne d'environ ou au-dessus de 40,0 pour mille habitants (Şandru 1980: 15). À l'égard de la

Bessarabie, au cours de la même décennie le taux moyen de natalité a été constamment de plus de 40,0 pour mille habitants.

Bien qu'il soit resté à un haut niveau, dans les années '30 le taux moyen de natalité dans le milieu rural de la Bessarabie a montré, cependant, une tendance à la baisse prononcée. Ainsi, au cours de cette décennie, seulement en 1923 a été attesté un taux de natalité de plus de 40,0 - 42,5 pour mille habitants ou de 109.624 naissances vivantes (*Mișcarea populației României în anul 1933*: 66, 68), - tandis que dans toutes les autres années le taux de natalité a été constamment inférieur aux taux de 40,0 pour mille habitants, pour atteindre en 1939 le taux minimal de 30,6 pour mille habitants ou de 85.336 naissances vivantes (*Mișcarea populației României în anul 1939*: 2, 4).

Bien qu'à diminuer constamment, les villages de Bessarabie et de l'Ancien Royaume ont eu pratiquement jusqu'à la fin des années '30 le taux de natalité en moyenne deux fois plus élevé que les villages du Banat et de plus de 10,0 ‰ que les villages de Transylvanie, de Bucovine et Crisana-Maramures (Chibulcuteanu 1941: 101).

5. L'excédent des naissances sur les décès

Comme une conséquence d'un taux de natalité tellement élevé dans le milieu rural, l'excédent naturel de la population est resté stable à des taux assez grand. Voici comment a évolué l'excédent naturel de la population rurale de la Bessarabie au cours de la première décennie d'après-guerre.

De telle manière, pendant les années 1919-1926 l'excédent naturel de la population rurale de la Bessarabie a été autour de 287.000 habitants, alors que la population urbaine au cours de la même période a augmenté avec seulement 20.497 habitants. Par conséquent, la part de la population rurale dans la population totale de Bessarabie a été en constante croissance. Ainsi, en 1897 la population rurale de la Bessarabie a été de 1.642.080 habitants ou de 84,8 % de la population totale; vers le recensement de 29 décembre 1930 elle a augmenté jusqu'à 2.493.431 habitants ou de 87,1 % de la population totale (*Pervaia vseobščiaia perepisi naselenia Rossijskoi imperii*, 1897: XIII; RGPR 1930: 2, 4, 8; Georgescu 1937: 77), pour enregistrer à la date d'inventaire des personnes et des biens de Gouvernement de la Bessarabie (août 1941) l'impressionnant taux de 91,9 % (ANRM, fond 706, inv. 1, dos. 555, partea I, f. 37).

Tableau 6. L'Excédent des naissances sur les décès dans le milieu rural de Bessarabie après 1918 (chiffres absolues)

Districts	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
1. Bălți	3.112	4.720	5.679	6.585	5.639	3.613	3.977
2. Cahul	2.387	2.928	3.195	3.314	2.906	2.597	2.443
3. Cetatea Albă	4.745	6.138	4.115	6.797	6.531	4.871	4.859
4. Lăpușna	1.902	3.997	4.514	5.464	4.370	2.968	4.726
5. Hotin	2.739	6.606	5.400	5.555	5.814	5.668	5.976
6. Ismail	1.841	3.510	1.658	3.127	2.610	1.969	2.541
7. Orhei	1.456	5.787	5.935	3.865	3.889	3.833	3.299
8. Soroca	3.986	5.138	6.308	6.775	5.288	4.911	3.528
9. Tighina	3.710	5.575	5.303	6.991	6.190	4.538	3.065
Total excédent des naissances sur les décès	25.878	42.399	42.507	50.573	43.237	34.968	25.414

Source: Cazacu 1928: 13

On retrouve la même régularité en rapportant le nombre de population de la Bessarabie à l'ensemble de la population de la Roumanie. Si la superficie de la Bessarabie était de 15,1 % de la superficie totale de la Roumanie, alors la part de la population de cette province, selon les données du recensement de 1930, était de 15,86 % du total, pour surmonter à la fin des années '30, la proportion de 16,0 % (Manuilă, Georgescu 1938: 134, 160). La part de la population de la Bessarabie dans la population totale de la Roumanie entre les deux guerres mondiales n'a été dépassé que par la Valachie, avec 22,3 % du total et la Transylvanie, avec 17,8 % (Șandru 1980: 39).

Une si grande part de la population de la Bessarabie à la population de la Roumanie a été rendue possible par le maintien d'un excédent naturel aussi élevé de la population rurale. Ainsi, en 1931 le taux d'excédent naturel de la population rurale de la Bessarabie a été de 15,8 par millier habitants ou de 40.108 en chiffres absolues, en 1932 – de 17,6 % ou 45.516 habitants, en 1933 – de 18,7 % ou 48.904. Toutefois, l'excédent naturel de la population rurale était obtenu dans les conditions quand le taux de natalité a montré une réduction significative, tandis que la mortalité générale a attesté seulement une très petite baisse. Ces deux processus biologiques ont déterminé le taux de l'excédent naturel de la population rurale à une baisse continue. Déjà en 1934, le taux d'excédent naturel de la population rurale à été de 14,7

pour mille habitants, en 1935 – de 9,0 ‰, en 1936 – de 10,4 ‰, abaissant en 1939 à un taux de 9,9 pour mille habitants.

6. En guise de conclusion

Les phénomènes démographiques analysées preuvent sans aucun doute que la population rurale de la Bessarabie de l'entre-deux-guerres a prouvé des tendances claires de transition d'un modèle démographique de type oriental, dans lequel a évolué pendant une période de 106 années, vers un modèle démographique de type européen. L'application de la théorie du C. P. Blacker à la caractérisation des processus démographiques de la Bessarabie de l'entre-deux-guerres montre, qu'à la fin des années '30, la population rurale de la province s'est trouvée en phase de transition à partir de l'étape d'expansion incipient, avec des taux élevés de natalité et mortalité, - celles-ci enregistrant une tendance à la baisse, - à l'étape d'expansion finale, quand la natalité diminue avec la mortalité, mais ce dernier se réduit plus rapidement (Trebici 1975: 363-364).

L'analyse des principaux phénomènes démographiques de la population rurale de la Bessarabie de l'entre-deux-guerres confirme la vérité que, dans les régions ou les pays développés en termes de politiques industrielles, les taux de natalité sont plus faibles que dans les pays avec économie essentiellement agraire et que, généralement, la natalité et la mortalité sont directement liés au relèvement du niveau de vie, et que, enfin, là où le niveau de vie est plus élevé, ces deux phénomènes biologiques sont plus faibles (Șandru 1980: 17; Manuilă 1940b: 17).

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Die Bevölkerung der Bukowina (von Besetzung im Jahr 1774 bis zur Revolution 1848)

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Abstract: The anthroponomical analysis of the Russian census of the population of Moldova in 1774 made possible a more objective determination of the national structure of the inhabitants of Bukovina on the threshold of the occupation of this region by Austria. According to the mentioned census in 1774 there were living approximately 68.700 persons (nearly 40.920 Rumanians, 59,6%, and nearly 22.810 Ukrainians (Ruthenians and Hutsulians), 33,2%) in the area of future Bukovina. The Ruthenians lived more densely in the north-west of Bukovina, especially in the zone between Prut and Nistru and the hutsulians were concentrated in the mountain zone in the west of the province, especially in the zone of the rivers Ceremus and Putila. In 1774 there were living as well about 475 Jewish families (mostly in Cernauti, Suceava and Vijnita), about 420 Gypsy families (mostly in the south of Bukovina near the monasteries), and in Suceava was an Armenian community that was formed of 58 families.

During the military administration (1774-1786) the population of Bukovina was practically doubled, predominantly because of the intensive emigration from Galitsia, Moldova and Transylvania. But those processes had not changed crucially the national structure of the population. The transferring of Bukovina under Galitsian administration had negative consequences for the population of Bukovina. In result of an intensive emigration to Moldova (especially during the period of time 1786-1816) the rate of Romanians had decreased but the rate of Ukrainians and of representatives of other nationalities had increased. The most drastic decrease of population of Bukovina occurred in 1814 – 1816, when the number of inhabitants registered a decrease of 28.453 of individuals or about 12,4% of the total population.

In the period of the military and Galitsian administration 5 Hungarian colonials were founded in Bukovina, 3 Lippovan colonials, 3 Slovak colonials and many peasants, miners and German glass blowers colonials. Little by little, Jews, Polish and Armenians came to Bukovina,

that were mainly settled in the towns. The German, Hungarian, Lippovan and Slovak colonists lived prevalently in the villages and dealt with agriculture, and the Jews, Polish and Armenians lived mainly in towns and dealt with commerce, trades and they used to be land agents or office workers.

The first official statistic data on the ethnic structure of the Austrian provinces at the middle of the XIX century are very contradictory for Bukovina. After a comparative verification and analyse of the statistical data from the middle of the 19th century, I came to the conclusion, that the statistic data of 1850 are the most realistic. According to official statistical data in 1850 there were in Bukovina 380.826 inhabitants, inclusive 184.718 Romanians (48,5%), 142.682 Ukrainians (37,5%), 25.592 Germans (6,7%), 11.856 Jews (3,1%), 5.586 Hungarians (1,5%), 4008 Polish (1,05%), 2.300 Lipovenians, 2.240 Armenians and 1.844 Czechs and Slovaks.

Keywords: Bukowina, census, military administration, Galitsian administration, Ruthenians, Hutsulians, Jews

1. Bevölkerungsanzahl der Bukowina zur Zeit der Besetzung in den Jahren 1774-1776

Die Besetzung des nordwestlichen Teils des Fürstentums Moldova von der österreichischen Armee hat einen Wendepunkt für die weitere Entwicklung dieses Territoriums gebildet. Unter der österreichischen Herrschaft hat Bukowina eine ganz verschiedene ethno - demographische Entwicklung der Bevölkerung im Vergleich mit der übrigen Moldova gehabt, die weiter unter der ottomanischen Suzeranität geblieben ist.

Die Anzahl der Bevölkerung von Bukowina im Jahr 1774-1775 wird von Forschern verschieden abgeschätzt – von 11.421 Familien (Zieglauer 1893: 13) für das Jahr 1774 bis zur 17.047 Familien (Werenka 1895: 137) für Jahren 1775-1776. Diese sich unterscheidenden Würdigungen betreffs der damaligen Bevölkerungszahl lassen sich durch mehreren Ursachen erklären. Wegen den Krieg und der Besetzung der Bukowina von Österreich war die Lage der Bewohnern dieser Gegend noch sehr unsicher und unklar. Die statistischen Daten über die Bevölkerung dieses Gebiets waren unvollständig und ungenau durchgeführt. Teile der Bewohner haben diese Zählungen, wegen der Angst angesichts der möglichen Rekrutierungen ins Armee oder der neuen Besteuerungen, ausgeweicht. In diesem Territorium gab es damals intensiven Wanderungsprozessen, ermöglicht auch durch den Lebensart

und Weise der hiesigen Bewohner. In den Jahren 1774-1776 war das zukünftige Statut des nordwestlichen Teils der Moldova noch ganz unsicher.

Die vergleichende Analyse der verschiedenen Erkundigungen bezüglich der Bevölkerungszahl der Bukowina erlauben uns zu behaupten, dass zu Beginn der österreichischen Herrschaftsperiode die Bevölkerung der Bukowina zwischen 67.000 und 73.000 Menschen entsprach.

2. Schätzungen über die ethnische Bevölkerungsstruktur der Bukowina am Anfang der österreichischen Herrschaft

Noch schwieriger ist die ethnische Bevölkerungsstruktur der Bukowina zur Zeit ihrer Angleichung im Jahre 1774 zu schätzen. Bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts wurden keine Volkszählungen durchgeführt, die auch die ethnische Bevölkerungsstruktur der Bukowina in Erwähnung gezogen hatten. Auch einige Schätzungen sind nur schwer zu machen, weil fast alle Rumänen und die überwiegende Mehrheit der Ukrainern (Ruthenen) Orthodoxen waren und in vielen Ortschaften die Bevölkerung gemischt war oder zwei Sprachen benutzt wurden.

Die Mehrheit der österreichischen Forschern aus dem 19. Jahrhundert stellte trotzdem fest, hervorgehend aus den in der Bukowina gemachten Bemerkungen und von einigen statistischen Abschätzungen, dass anfänglich die Rumänen die Mehrheit in der Bukowina bildeten. Zum Beispiel, Major Mieg, der bei der Feststellung neuer Grenze zwischen Österreich und Ottomanischen Reich teilgenommen hat, behauptete das „die Bevölkerung besteht aus disunirten Wallachen, etwas wenig Hungarn, Rosniaken, worunter ein grosser Teil Emigranten aus Polen, in Marmoros und Siebenbürgen befindlich, ingleichen Ziegeuner, welche mehrentheils Leibeigene von denen griechischen Monchsklöstern sind ...; auch fangen nunmehr die Juden an, sich in diesen Theilen mehr und mehr einzunehmen“ (Polek 1897: 11-12). Der Historiker J.V.Goehlert hinterlegte in seinem Artikel „*Die Bukowina*“ folgendes: „Der Grundstock der Bevölkerung war ursprünglich Rumänisch; doch bald nach der Occupation des Landes wurde dasselbe der Tummelplatz für beinahe alle österreichischen Völker ...“ (Goehlert 1875: 114).

General Spleny in „*Beschreibung des Bukoviner Districts*“ erwähnt die Ruthenen oder Huzulen nicht. Darüber schrieb Johann Polek folgendes: „Es fällt auf, das Spleny nur von Moldauern spricht, obwohl

schon damals nicht nur im Russisch Kimpolunger Bezirk, sondern auch in den Gebiete zwischen Pruth und Dniester viele Ruthenen wohnten“ (Grigorovici 1997: 510). In „*Anmerkungen über die Beschreibung des Bukoviner Districts*“ wurde doch betont, das „Bei den Talenten und Gemütsgaben des Landesvolkes, sowie auch bei ihren Sitten und Gebräuchen sollte man ein Unterschied zwischen den Rusniaken und Moldauern machen. Beide Nationen sind Graeci Ritus non uniti, von beiden Nationen gibt es Untertanen in dem neuen kaiserlichen Anteil der Moldau. Die Zahl der Ersten ist minder beträchtlich, sie haben meist die Gegenden an den polnischen Gränzen im Besitz, wovon es vermutet ist, dass sie auch vormals herübergekommen sind. Die Moldauer haben mehr aufgeweckten Geist, sind aber auch arglistiger als die Rusniaken; hingegen sind sie mehr mit dem Feldbau beschäftigt, besonders da sie sich nicht mit Kukuruz als die gemeine Nahrungsgattung der Moldau und Wallachey ernähren, sondern mit Körndel“ (Grigorovici 1998: 200).

Johann Polek stellte in einen anderen Artikel fest, dass „zur Zeit der Besitzergreifung bestand die Bevölkerung der Bukowina aus ungefähr 11 bis 12 tausend Familien oder 60 bis 70 tausend Köpfen. Die Mehrzahl der Bewohner gehörte dem rumänischen Volksstamm an. Dieser Volksstamm war über dem ganzen Land verbreitet. Nur der Russisch-Kimpolunger Bezirk (heute Gerichtsbezirke Wiznitz und Putilla) hatte fast ausschließlich Ruthenen innen...“ (Polek 1900: 53-54). Nach der Meinung des Historikers Emanuel Turczynski „die ethnische Bevölkerungsstruktur zu Beginn der österreichischen Herrschaftsperiode ergab ungefähr folgendes Bild: Der meist bergige Nordwesten war von dem ruthenischen Bergstamm der Huzulen besiedelt. Ein Teil der Ebene zwischen Pruth und Dnjestr im Norden wurde überwiegend von Ruthenen bewohnt. Im Karpatenvorland sowie in den fruchtbaren Ebenen im Osten und Südosten, wo die ersten Moldauischen Wojwoden ihre Herrschersitze gehabt hatten, lebten Rumänen, damals „Moldauer“ (Moldoveni) genannt. Die Grundschichten der Rumänen und Ruthenen waren überwiegend Robotpflichtige der Bojaren“ (Turczynski 1993: 29-30).

Dementsprechend wurde in allen diesen Berichten und Schätzungen festgestellt, dass zu Beginn der österreichischen Herrschaftsperiode, die Rumänen die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung der Bukowina bildeten, aber es gibt keine gegenständlichere Zahlen über die Anzahl der Rumänen und Ukrainern in dieser Provinz.

Mit genauerer Information über das Verhältnis zwischen Rumänen, Ruthenen und die anderen Ethnien kommt der österreichische Historiker V.F.Klun, der im Jahr 1876 folgendes schrieb: „Bei der Besitznahme des Landes von Österreich vor hundert Jahren zählte man 50.000 Rumänen und etwa 20.000 Ruthenen. Die fünfzigjährige Recrutierungsfreiheit und förmliche Colonisation führten galizische und Marmaroser Ruthenen, dann Gross-Russen, Armenier, Israeliten, Magyaren und Deutschen ins Land. Nach und nach verschwand das Übergewicht der Rumänen unter den Ruthenen...“ (Klun 1876: 333).

Von Interesse sind auch die statistischen Schätzungen vom Sekretär der Bukowiner Handels- und Gewerbekammer Andreas Mikulicz, der im Jahre 1875 stellte fest: „Zur Zeit der Vereinigung mit Österreich zählte Bukowina 75.000 Einwohner, welche 12.000 Familien bildeten und in 3 Städten und 229 Dörfern 12.000 Häuser bewohnten. Die Basis der Bevölkerung wurde von 55.000 Rumänen und 12.000 Ruthenen gebildet; überdies wohnten zerstreut in einzelnen Orten, etwa 8.000 Seelen, Israeliten, Armenier, Zigeuner, und in den drei Städten wenige Deutsche“ (Mikulicz 1878).

3. Bevölkerung der Bukowina nach den russischen Volkszählungen

Die Veröffentlichung der russischen Volkszählungen von Jahren 1772-1773 und 1774, in Donauischen Fürstentümer Moldau und Walachei durchgeführt, hat die Verwirklichung neuen Nachforschungen in diesem Bereich und die Vorstellung viel objektiver und korrekter der ethnischen Bevölkerungsstruktur der Bukowina zur Zeitspanne der Besetzung erlaubt. Durch die Benützung der anthroponimischen Methode wurden drei verschiedene Schätzungen über die damalige Bevölkerung geschafft, die aber sich nicht so wesentlich von einander unterschieden (Siehe Tab. 1).

Die wesentliche Unterscheidungen bezüglich der gesamten Bevölkerungsanzahl erklärten sich dadurch, dass der rumänische Forscher Pavel Țugui und der Sozi-Sprachforscher Ion Popescu die Zahlen der Volkszählung für alle Dörfern analysiert haben, welche in Jahren 1774-1776 von Österreich besetzt wurden. Eigentlich wurde die anthroponimische Analyse nur für tatsächlich unter österreichischer Verwaltung nach dem Jahr 1776 eingetretenen Ortschaften ausgeführt.

Tabelle 1. Die ethnische Bevölkerungsstruktur der Bukowina im Jahr 1774

Nationalität	Pavel Țugui		Ion Popescu		Constantin Ungureanu	
	Anzahl	%	Anzahl	%	Anzahl	%
Rumänen	54284	64,23	54174	65,42	40924	59,56
Ruthenen	17125	20,26	17400	21,01	15690	22,84
Huzulen	5975	7,07	5225	6,31	5715	8,32
Russen	1065	1,26	-	-	1405	2,04
Juden	2425	2,87	2425	2,93	2375	3,46
Armenier	435	0,51	400	0,48	275	0,4
Polen	460	0,54	460	0,56	-	-
Deutschen	20	0,02	20	0,02	110	0,16
Zigeuner	2655	3,14	2635	3,18	2100	3,06
Anderen	70	0,08	70	0,08	110	0,16
Gesamt	84514	100	82809	100	68704	100

Quelle: Țugui 1992: 4-5; Popescu 1994: 17; Ungureanu 2003: 239.

Selbstverständlich, die anthroponimische Methode hat einige quantitativen Fehlern und einen annähernden Charakter, aber die russischen Volkszählungen legen doch die Vorherrschen der Rumänen in der Bukowina am Anfang der österreichischen Herrschaft dar. Im Jahr 1774 die Rumänen bildeten die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung und waren auf die ganze Fläche der Bukowina verbreitet. Ruthenen bewohnten überwiegend die Gegend zwischen Pruth und Dnjestr und einigen Dörfern auf dem Tal der Czeremosch, und die Huzulen lebten kompakt in der bergigen Gegend von Russisch-Kimpolung. Die Juden bildeten drei bedeutenden Gemeinden bei Czernowitz, Suczawa und Wiznitz, und die übrigen lebten vorwiegend in Dörfern der Czernowitzer Gegend. Die Mehrheit der Zigeuner wohnte in dem südlichen Teil der Bukowina, hauptsächlich neben den Klöstern, und bei *Suczawa* bestand vor mehreren Jahrhunderte eine armenische Gemeinschaft.

4. Wanderungsprozessen während der militärischen Verwaltung (1774-1786)

Die neue österreichische militärische Verwaltung hat zur Ansiedlung in Bukowina einer großen Anzahl von Einwandern aus den benachbarten Provinzen (aus Galizien, Siebenbürgen, Maramuresch und aus Moldova)

beigetragen. Der österreichische Historiker Raimund Kaindl schrieb in einem Artikel: „Doch vermehrte sich die Einwohnerzahl sehr rasch infolge der Rückwanderung der durch den Krieg verscheuchten Bewohner; durch die zahlreiche Einwanderung der Juden und Armenier; durch Zuwanderung von Moldauern „aus dem jenseitig türkisch und moldauischen Gebiete“ welche „das harte türkische Joch“ zur Auswanderung bewog; besonders aber durch das Herbeiziehen von Ruthenen aus Galizien, welche wegen der harten Unterthanenverhältnisse trotz aller Verbote ihre Heimat verließen; auch aus Polen, der ungarischen Marmaros und aus Siebenbürgen kamen zahlreiche Einwanderer herein“. J.V.Gohlert legte unter anderen fest: „Aus dem benachbarten Galizien flüchteten Ruthenen und Polen aus Furcht vor dem Militärdienst in das von der Rekrutierung verschonte Land, und aus der Moldau und Türkei (aus dem Kreise Chotyń) zogen die bedrückten und rechtlosen Bewohner mit Hab und Gut ins Land...“ (Kaindl 1896: 18).

Im Jahr 1779 hatten die wichtigsten Einwanderungen aus dem Galizien stattgefunden. Ion Nistor behauptete, dass im Jahr 1779 14.114 Flüchtlingsruthenen in der Bukowina bestanden hätten (Nistor 1918: 103). Gleichzeitig, Daniel Werenka benachrichtigte: „Nach den Berichten des Generalmajors Baron Enzenberg fand man in Bukowina (1774) 11.421 Familien vor, welche Zahl im Jahr 1778 auf 23.154 Familien stieg. In vier Jahren erhielt also das Land einen Zuwachs von 11.733 Familien. Nach den Berichten desselben betrug die Summe der vor und nach der Erwerbung des Landes Eingewanderten (bis 1779) 14.114 Familien. Nach Nationen eingeteilt, gehörten die Eingewanderten hauptsächlich dem slawischen Stamme der „Rusniaken“ (aus Galizien), dann dem der Rumänen (aus Siebenbürgen und der Moldau) und Ungarn an. Auch Polen, Armenier, Griechen, Juden, später auch Deutsche u.s.w. waren im Land vertreten“ (Werenka 1888).

General Enzenberg berichtete am 14. Februar 1781 an galizischen Generalcommandos, unter anderen, folgendes: „Das in diesem Bucoviner District befindliche Volk besteht meistens aus flüchtig und anderen verschiedenen anhern gelosenen Volk, und ich werde nicht irren, so ich sage, dass aus die existierenden (23.000) Familien schwerlich 6.000 wahre Moldauern Familien sich vorfinden werden“ (Polek 1891: 43). Enzenberg betrachtete als „wahre Moldauern Familien“ jene Familien, die dieses Land seit alters siedelten, ohne sich

von außen der Grenzen der Bukowina hier anzusiedeln. Von demselben Bericht geht deutlich hervor, dass die übrigen 17.000 Familien Flüchtlinge oder Vertretern verschiedenen Völkern (einschließlich Rumänen) waren, die sich später in Bukowina ansiedelten.

Das Problem den galizischen Flüchtlingen ist im Jahr 1779 wichtig geworden, als der Gouverneur des Galiziens, der Graf Auersperg, diese den alten Besitzern gewendet werden wollte. Da aber auch in der Bukowina die Bevölkerung sehr dünn gesetzt war, so widersetzte sich Enzenberg der verlangten Auslieferung der galizischen Flüchtlinge. Enzenberg selbst war der Ansicht, dass nur jene Flüchtlinge ausgeliefert werden sollen, welche erst seit der Einverleibung Galiziens in die Bukowina geflohen waren.

Die militärische Verwaltung war unmittelbar in der Zunahme der Bevölkerungszahl in Bukowina mitbeteiligt, um einen Höchstgewinn von den eingenommenen Steuern zu erlangen. Aber es war nicht im Interesse des Reiches, dass die Zunahme der Bevölkerungszahl in Bukowina im Nachteil der anderen österreichischen Provinzen, nämlich auf Kosten des Galiziens, auftritt. Aus diesem Grund wurden mehrere kaiserliche Proklamationen erlassen, durch welche es versucht wurde, die massiven Auswanderungen der galizischen Bauern in Bukowina aufzuhalten (Kaindl 1902: 114). Deswegen wurde die Möglichkeit der Ruthenen in Bukowina zu flüchten nach dem Jahr 1779 empfindlich beschränkt. Johann Budinszky, der in den Jahr 1782 40 Dörfern zwischen Pruth und Dnjestr kartengezeichnet hat, schrieb in einem Bericht vom 22. Mai 1783, „dass aus Galizien nur jenen Einwanderer zu übernehmen wären, die eigenes Vermögen besitzen, da Leute aus der Moldau kommen und ohne jedweden Auslagen nach Verlauf dreier Jahre nützliche Steuerzahler abgeben“ (Wickenhauser 1886: 79; Nistor 1918: 132). Also, nach dem Jahr 1779 ist die Bevölkerungszunahme der Bukowina hauptsächlich auf Kosten des Einwanderens aus Moldova erfolgt.

Infolge der Einwanderungen aus der Periode der militärischen Verwaltung, aber auch durch die natürliche Zunahme, wurde die Bevölkerungszahl in Bukowina im Jahr 1786 auf 29.102 Familien oder 135.494 Menschen erhöht (Nistor 1915: 94), nämlich, nur in 12 Jahren, ist die Bevölkerung dieser Provinz praktisch verdoppelt. Die starken und unkontrollierten Einwanderungen aus dem betreffenden Zeitraum könnten das Verhältnis zwischen Rumänen und Ruthenen aus dem Bukowina nicht bezeichnend verändern, weil die kräftige Einwanderung

der Ruthenen aus Galizien (besonders bis zum Jahr 1779) durch eine ungefähr gleichartige Einwanderung der Rumänen aus Fürstentum Moldova und aus Siebenbürgen kompensiert wurde. Wanderungsprozessen fanden von selbst statt, hatten hauptsächlich ökonomischen und sozialen Gründe, waren von religiöser Freiheit und von Erlass der hiesigen Bewohner von militärischen Dienst begünstigt. Die Zunahme der Bevölkerung ist bedeutender im ehemaligen Kreis Berhomet (etwa 177,5%) und in der Gegend zwischen Pruth und Dnjestr (etwa 131,8%) und weniger bezeichnend in den bergigen Gegenden der Moldauisch-Kimpolung (etwa 32,6%) und Russisch-Kimpolung (etwa 56%) gewesen (Ungureanu 1997: 13).

5. Wanderungsprozessen während der galizischen Verwaltung (1786-1849)

Am Ende der militärischen Verwaltung wurde eine Verlangsamung des Rhythmus der Bevölkerungszunahme in Bukowina festgestellt, teilweise wegen der großen Anzahl der Bewohner, die zwischen 1785-1786 nach Moldau ausgewandert sind. Die Auflösung der Autonomie der Bukowina und ihre Umfassung im Jahr 1786 unter der galizischen Verwaltung ist eine wichtige Ursache für die sich verstärkende Auswanderung der bukowinaer Bauern in der Moldova gewesen. Diese Prozesse haben besonders in den ersten drei Jahrzehnten der galizischen Verwaltung fortgesetzt. Gleichzeitig mit dem Abzug der Rumänen aus dieser Gegend fand ein fortdauerndes Eindringen der Flüchtlingsruthenen aus dem Galizien, besonders im nördlichen Teil der Bukowina statt. Während die Möglichkeit der Einwanderung der Ruthenen in Bukowina in der Zeit der militärischen Verwaltung beschränkt wurde, jetzt könnten sie sich viel leichter in diesem Land niederlassen, weil Galizien und Bukowina eine einzige Provinz bildete.

V.Battyani, der im Jahr 1805 durch die Bukowina gereist ist, schrieb über die Bevölkerung dieses Landes: „Die Bevölkerung dieses Ländchens hat sich sehr vermehrt, wozu die Niederlassung vieler Colonisten, die Freiheit von der Rekrutierung und die Fruchtbarkeit des Bodens beitragen. Das Geschenk der Natur wird jedoch von ihren Bewohnern moldauischer Ankunft zu wenig benützt“ (Battyani 1811: 129). Fr. Lindner schrieb am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts über die Beschäftigungen der hiesigen Bewohner folgendes: „Die Bukowiner sind mehr Hirten als Ackerbauern, und es ist hier sogar als Grundsatz angenommen, die Agrikultur nicht auf Kosten der Viehzucht zu

befördern. Indessen erfährt man häufig, dass der Staat bei dieser Einrichtung leidet. An ein Nomadenleben gewöhnt, hat der Hirte keine Anhänglichkeit an den Boden; es geschieht daher nicht selten, dass der Bukowiner seine Hütte abbrennt und zugleich mit seinem Vieh in die Moldau wandert...“ (Lindner 1808: 279).

Der Bevölkerungszug aus der Bukowina hat in den Jahren 1814-1816 gegipfelt, als die Anzahl der Bevölkerung sich mit 28.453 Menschen oder mit 12,4% (von 229.195 Personen in 1814 auf 200.742 (Arh.SRC, fond 1, inv.4, dosar 656) in 1816) vermindert hat. Diese Auswanderungen haben am stärksten die Bezirke Kuczurmare, Berhometh und Sereth im Zentrum der Bukowina betroffen, wo damals schon eine bedeutende ruthenische Minderheit bestand, sowie den Südosten der Bukowina, bewohnt von Rumänen. Gleichzeitig, die Gegend zwischen Pruth und Dnjestr, aus dem Tal der Czeremosch und aus dem bergigen Nordwesten, wo die Ruthenen und Huzulen schon in Mehrheit waren, ist am wenigsten von diesen Prozessen gezielt worden (Ungureanu 1998: 12-30).

Versuchen zur Katholisierung der Bevölkerung und der Ausführung einiger Rekrutierungen ins Armee, sowie unzählige Missbrauchen den Pächtern und der hiesigen Beamter sind wahrscheinlich einige Ursache gewesen, welche die Auswanderungen aus den Jahren 1814-1816 herausgefordert haben. Ohne Zweifel, die bedeutende Auswanderungen der Bewohner aus diesen Jahren hat zur Minderung der Anzahl der Rumänen zugunsten der Ruthenen beigetragen, weil die wichtigste Verringerung der Bevölkerung in Ortschaften mit gemischter Bevölkerung im Norden und Zentrum der Bukowina stattgefunden hat, welche später sich ukrainisierten.

Nach diesen starken Auswanderungen ist eine Periode der raschen Zunahme der Bevölkerungsanzahl gefolgt, infolge auch der großen Anzahl der Einwanderer, welche aus der Moldova in Bukowina zurück kehrten. Allmählich hat sich die Tragweite den Wanderungsprozessen empfindlich vermindert, und die Zahl der Bewohner vermehrte sich besonders auf natürlichen Weg. Bis zum Mitte der 19.Jahrhundert wurde die Bevölkerungsanzahl des Landes hauptsächlich von den Choleraepidemien beeinflusst, wie es in Jahren 1831 und 1848 gewesen ist.

6. Kolonisierung der Bukowina bis zum Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts

Während der militärischen (1774-1786) und der galizischen (1786-1849) Verwaltungen wurden in der Bukowina auch mehrere Kolonien mit Vertretern verschiedenen Nationalitäten gegründet. Noch im ersten Jahrzehnt der österreichischen Herrschaft sind in Bukowina viele ungarische Einwanderer aus Moldova gekommen. Sie haben 5 Kolonien (*Andreasfalva*, *Fogodisten*, *Hadikfalva*, *Istensegits* und *Joseffalva*) gegründet. Im Jahr 1786 gab es in Bukowina 775 Familien oder 2350 ungarische Einwanderer, einschließlich 121 Calvinisten (Ungureanu 2003: 72), welche zuerst im Dorf *Rarancze*, und dann in *Andreasfalva* angesiedelt wurden. Später sind in der Bukowina keine anderen ungarischen Ansiedlungen gegründet und der Anzahl der Ungarn ist nur auf natürlichen Weg allmählich gestiegen. In *Fogodisten* (*Iacobesti*) und *Joseffalva* (*Vorniceni*) lebten zusammen mit Ungarn auch viele rumänische Bewohner.

Lippowaner haben im Territorium der Bukowina noch vor Besetzung im Jahr 1774 gelebt, aber während der russisch-türkischen Krieg sind in Moldova ausgewandert. In ersten Jahren der österreichischen Herrschaft sind ein Teil dieser Lippowaner in Bukowina zurückgekommen und in den Ortschaften *Mitoka-Dragomirna* und *Klimoutz* niederlassen. Im Jahr 1784 wurde eine dritte Kolonie der Lippowaner in *Fontina Alba* gegründet. In 1786 lebten in diesen drei Ortschaften 83 Familien oder etwa 400 Lippowaner (Ungureanu 2003: 76).

In April 1787 sind alle Lippowaner von *Mitoka-Dragomirna* in Moldova ausgewandert. Doch, ein Teil von diesen Lippowaner sind zurückgekommen und haben in der Nähe von *Mitoka-Dragomirna* die Kolonie *Lipoveni* gegründet. Allmählich ist die Anzahl der Lippowaner gestiegen (von etwa 637 Personen in Jahr 1816 auf fast 2000 in Jahr 1844). Im Jahr 1837 wurde die vierte Kolonie der Lippowaner in Dorf *Mihodra* und an der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts noch eine Kolonie *Kosovanka* gegründet. In Jahr 1850 lebten in diesen 5 Ortschaften etwa 2110 Lippowaner (Ungureanu 2003: 104-105), welche zu verschiedenen Sekten gehörten. Einer Teil dieser Sekten hatten Priestern, anderen hatten keine Priestern.

Die ersten Slowaken sind am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts von nördlichem Ungarn in Bukowina gekommen. Für lange Zeit haben sie keine Ortschaften gegründet und waren in verschiedenen Dörfern (*Krasna*, *Czudin*, *Hliboka*, *Terescheny*, *Tereblestie*) zerstreut, sowie in

Vorstädten *Kaliczanka* und *Klokuczka* von Stadt *Czernowitz*, wo sie zusammen mit Rumänen und Ruthenen gelebt haben.

In die Dreißiger des 19. Jahrhunderts haben die Slowaken von Bukowina drei neue Kolonien in südlicher Bukowina gegründet. In *Neu Solonetz* und *Plesch* haben sich nur Slowaken niedergelassen, während in *Pojana Mikului* ein Teil Slowaken und die andere Teil Deutsche waren. An der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts gab es in Bukowina 1.844 Tschechen und Slowaken, welche hauptsächlich in diesen drei Kolonien und in anderen Ortschaften zerstreut lebten.

Doch, die meisten Kolonien von Bukowina wurden von Deutschen Einwanderern gegründet. Mehrere deutsche Kolonien mit Bergarbeitern sind in südwestliche Bukowina gegründet. Die ersten Deutschen haben sich in Jahr 1784 in *Iakobeni* niedergelassen. Am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts haben die deutschen Bergarbeiten andere Kolonien (*Kirlibaba*, *Eisenau*, *Louisenthal* und *Freudenthal*) in dieser Gegend von Bukowina gegründet. Die meisten dieser Deutschen kamen von Region Zips (heutige Slowakei) und waren Lutheraner nach der Konfession. Stufenweise haben sich viele deutsche Einwanderern auch in anderen Ortschaften des Bezirks Kimpolung angesiedelt. Im Jahr 1842 lebten in dieser Gegend der Bukowina 2487 Katholiken und 1598 Protestanten (Ungureanu 2003: 245), welche hauptsächlich Deutsche waren.

Am Ende der 18.- Anfang der 19. Jahrhundert wurden auch einige Kolonien mit deutschen Glasern gegründet. In den Dörfern *Krasna* und *Czudin* wurden Kolonien *Alt-* und *Neubütte* gebildet. Andere zwei Glashütten haben in *Karlsberg* und *Fürstenthal* (Bezirk Radautz) funktioniert. Fast alle deutschen Kolonisten von diesen Ortschaften waren Katholiken und sind von Böhmen (heutige Republik Tschechien) gekommen.

Im Jahr 1787, gleich nach der Einschließung der Bukowina unter galizische Verwaltung, wurden auch mehrere Kolonien mit deutschen Bauern gegründet. Trotzdem haben diese Einwanderern keine neue Siedlungen ausgebildet, sondern sich in den von Rumänen bewohnten Dörfern (*Arbore*, *Badetz*, *Fratautz*, *Illisbestie*, *Itzkanj*, *Milleschoutz*, *Satul Mare*, *St. Onufrie* und *Tereblestie*) niedergelassen. Die meisten dieser Kolonisten waren Schwaben aus einigen südlichen deutschen Ländern und gehörten zur lutherischen Konfession.

In die Dreißiger des 19. Jahrhunderts wurden in südliche Bukowina einige einzelnen Kolonien mit deutschen Bauern in *Bori*, *Glitt*,

Lichtenberg, Pojana Mikuli und *Schwarzthal* gegründet. Alle diese Kolonisten kamen aus Böhmen und waren Katholiken nach der Konfession. Bis zum Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts haben sich viele deutsche Einwanderer besonders in Städten (*Czernowitz, Suczawa, Sereth, Radautz*) und Märkten (*Kimpolung, Dorna Watra, Gurahumora, Solka*) niedergelassen. Deutsche Einwohner lebten zerstreut auch in viele andere Dörfer, besonders in südlichem Teil der Bukowina. Nach amtlichen Daten, gegen das Jahr 1850 lebten in Bukowina über 25.000 Deutschen.

Die deutschen, ungarischen, lippowanischen und slowakischen Siedler lebten hauptsächlich in den Dörfern und betrieben Landwirtschaft, während die Mehrheit der Juden, Polen und Armenier in den Städten wohnte und Handel oder verschiedene Handwerke betrieben bzw. als Beamte in der Verwaltung arbeiteten und eine große Anzahl der Landgüter verpachten.

7. Berichten über Bewohner der Bukowina in die erste Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts

Bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts wurden keine statistischen amtlichen Daten veröffentlicht und keine offiziellen Volkszählungen geleistet, die auch die ethnische Bevölkerungsstruktur der Bukowina hinterlegt hätten. Trotzdem stellte die Mehrheit der damaligen echten Quellen fest, dass die Rumänen noch die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in diese Provinz bildeten. Zum Beispiel, Luca Ignaz schrieb im Jahr 1781 über die hiesigen Bewohner folgendes: „Die heutigen Einwohner in dieser Landesstrecke teilen sich in alte und neue. Zu den ersteren gehören jene, die von Walachen abstammen. Außer dieser Nation leben hier noch Griechen, Ungaren, Armenier, und die Deutschen fangen auch an, zahlreicher zu werden. Bei Juden gibt es kein Abgang; die Bauern stammten entweder aus Siebenbürgen, Polen, oder Reussen... Der Adel ist größtenteils aus der Klasse der Moldauer“ (Luca 1791: 324-325).

Adolf Ficker schrieb in 1875: „Die Romanen, deren Sprache noch in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten des vorigen Jahrhunderts fast ausschließlich in Bukowina herrschte, wurden durch das rasche Vordringen der Ruthenen im Norden und Westen des Landes auf den Süden und Osten beschränkt, so dass selbst viele ihren Stammgenossen, namentlich zwischen dem Dnestr und Pruth, von den Ruthenen umflutet, sich der ruthenischen Nationalität anschlossen“ (Ficker 1875: 406).

Für die Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts sind die Berichten von Ioan Budai-Deleanu sehr wertvoll, weil er, als Ratgeber und Übersetzer bei der galizischen Regierung von Lemberg, häufig nach Czernowitz und in der Bukowina gereist ist. Er hat im Jahr 1803 „*Kurzgefasste Bemerkungen über Bukowina*“ geschrieben, die eine kostbare Beschreibung der ethnographischen, sozialen, politischen und religiösen Zustand des Landes bildet. In diesem Werk stellte Ioan Budai-Deleanu fest: „Obwohl die Zahl der Moldauer seit der Revindizierung sehr abgenommen hat, weil viele von ihnen ihren alten Gebräuchen getreu sich nach Türkisch-Moldau begaben, kann man dennoch dasselbe für die Hauptvölkerschaft in dieser Provinz annehmen... seitdem sie aber unter der Röm. Kais. Verwaltung stehen, sind viele ausgewandert und so, dass die aus Galizien ausgewanderten Russniaken ihnen an Menge fast das Gleichgewicht halten“ (Grigorovici 1998: 380).

Über die Ruthenen betonte Ioan Budai-Deleanu das „Alle die Russniaken, welche sich in der Bukowina und Moldau befinden, sind galizische oder russische Untertanen. Die aus Bukowina sind fast alle Galizianer, haben auch galizische Sitten, reden die nämliche Sprache, nur mit dem Unterschied, dass sie durch den Umgang mit den Moldauern viele moldauische Wörter in ihre Sprache mischen...“ (Grigorovici 1998: 388). Emanuel Turczynski hinterlegte, das „gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts dürfte ein Drittel der Bukowiner Bevölkerung aus Galizien gestammt haben“ (Turczynski 1993: 28).

Joseph Rohrer, der in Jahr 1802 durch die Bukowina gereist ist, und von Jahr 1806 als Professor der politischen Wissenschaften und Statistik bei einer Oberschule in Lemberg gearbeitet hat, hat später einige Artikel über Bukowina und einige Werken über die slawischen, jüdischen, deutschen und walachischen Bewohner der österreichischen Monarchie veröffentlicht. Über die Rumänen der Bukowina schrieb er folgendes: „Sollte man nun auch annehmen wollen, das von den im Jahre 1803 in der Bukowina befindlichen 189.481 (so ist geschrieben, richtig ist 198.481 – u.n.) Christen (denn die übrigen 3.349 Einwohner waren Juden), 48.481 Menschen entweder Russniaken oder Polen, Deutsche und Szekler waren; so bleibt noch immer ein Rest von ein hundert fünfzig Tausend christlichen Einwohnern, welche wahrscheinlich zum moldauischen, mit dem walachischen einförmigen Volksstamme gehören. Mir ist diese Summe um so wahrscheinlicher, als der Serether Bezirk, welcher größten Theils aus Moldauern besteht, im Jahre 1803 bereits 106.600 Seelen auswies; als man ferner in der

Kreisstadt Czernowitz geht, dem Hauptorte des auf 95.230 Seelen gerechneten so genannten Czernowitzer Bezirkes, häufig unter der mindern Volksklasse moldauisch reden hört. Nur längs der russischen Gränze um Wisznicze (richtig, längst der galizischen Grenze – u.n.) herrscht einzig die rußniakische Sprache“ (Rohrer 1810: 312).

Ein unbekannter Wanderer, der in 1808 während einer Reise von Bistritz nach Lemberg die Bukowina durchquert hat, schrieb über die Bukowina: „Die größere Masse der Bewohner dieser Provinz (Bucovina) besteht aus Moldauern oder Walachen, doch sind auch diese nicht Ureinwohner des Landes, sondern nur Ankömmlinge der neueren Zeit. Im nördlichen Theile der Bukowina wohnen schon mehr Russnanken als Walachen...“ (*Beschreibung* 1819: 332-333).

M.F.Stöger, der seit 1827 als Professor der Statistik bei Hochschule von Lemberg gearbeitet hat, schrieb über Bukowina folgendes: „Hier ist der Moldauer heimlich, wozu der Landmann wie der Adel gehört. Diese Donauvölkerschaft findet hier am Pruth und Czeremosch ihre nördlichste Gränze; stark geschieden von den nördlicheren slawischen Nachbarn durch die griechische Religion und durch die wallachische Sprache, die übrigens durch den fortdauernden Verkehr mit jenen auch viele slawische Wörter aufnahm, so wie das Land ruthenische Ansiedler. Die Dörfer der letzteren zeichnen sich schon durch ihre Namen aus“ (Stöger 1832: 274). Dieser Artikel stellt das Interesse dadurch vor, dass die nördliche ruthenische – rumänische Sprachgrenze auf die Flüsse Pruth und Czeremosch und nicht auf den Fluss Dnjestr, der Verwaltungsgrenze der Bukowina, geschätzt ist.

Johann Springer stellte in einem Werk fest, herausgegeben im Jahr 1840 in Wien, dass im Jahr 1837 242.000 Rumänen in Galizien (nämlich in der Bukowina) wohnten (Springer 1840: 140). Doch, gemäß der amtlichen Statistik, lebten im Jahr 1837 in der Bukowina insgesamt nur 314.057 Menschen (Hain 1852: 189), und die Schätzungen bezüglich der Anzahl der Rumänen sind in diesem Fall übertrieben.

Der Reisender J.Kohl behauptete, dass „die Einwohner sind, wie gesagt, durchweg Walachen oder Dako-Romanen, und mit ihnen sind die fremdartigen Elemente ganz eben so gemischt wie in der ganzen übrigen Moldau... Eben so besteht die walachische Grundbevölkerung, wie überall in der Moldau, aus „Bauern“, „Masil“, „Resesch“, „Bojaren“ und „Kalugern“... Zu dieser alten Stammbevölkerung kommen nun aber noch als bukowinische Besonderheiten die Deutschen, welche sich als Beamte und Handwerker in der Städten ausgebreitet haben, so dass

die Hauptstadt des Landes, Czernowitz, eigentlich ganz deutsch ist, einige magyrische Ansiedlungen an der siebenbürgischen Grenze und einige russische Colonien am Pruth, die von schismatisch-religiösen Auswanderern gestiftet wurden, und endlich in den Bergen ... die „Huzulen“, eine slawische Bergvolk, die sich in allen Stücken von der walachischen Bevölkerung unterscheidet und auch noch tief nach Siebenbürgen hineingeht“ (Kohl 1841: 6-7).

Theophil Bendella, damals der Rektor des Bischofsseminarium von Czernowitz, der später zum Metropolit der Bukowina geworden ist, hat im Jahr 1845 einen Artikel über Bukowina herausgegeben, der auch wertvolle Informationen über die Bewohner des Landes umfasste. Er stellte fest, dass „die Verschiedenheit der Nationen in der Bukowina, die teils aus dem Land ursprünglich, teils später eingewandert sind, bedingt auch die Verschiedenheit der Sprachen, Sitten und Trachten, die nur dort vorherrschend sind. Moldauern, Ruthenen, Deutsche, Ungarn, Huzulen, Lippowaner, Armenier, Zigeuner und Juden bewohnen die Ländchen. Die Moldauern machen zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung aus“ (Bendella 1993: 287). Auch Hippolyt Stupnicki stellte Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts fest, dass „die Moldauern (bloss in Bukowina, wo sie 2/3 der Bevölkerung ausmachten), Abkömmlinge der schon im II Jahrhundert dort bestandenen römischen Kolonisten sind und ernähren sich von Viehzucht und Feldbau“ (Stupnicki 1853: 19).

Gegenständlichere Daten über die Anzahl der Rumänen und Ruthenen aus Bukowina stellte Ion Nistor vor, der behauptete, dass im Jahr 1848 in diesem Land 209.293 Rumänen und 108.907 Ruthenen wohnten. Er erhalte auch, dass damals in 183 Ortschaften mit Mehrheit rumänischen Bewohner 190.077 Rumänen, in 87 Dörfern mit Mehrheit ruthenischen Bewohner 90.692 Ruthenen und in 35 gemischten Dörfern 19.216 Rumänen und 18.215 Ruthenen lebten (Nistor 1918: 190). Diese Information bestimmte aber nicht, welche Ortschaften als rumänisch, als ruthenisch und als gemischt berücksichtigt wurden.

Verschiedene Historiker, Wanderer, Beamter haben festgestellt, dass die Bevölkerung der Bukowina, wegen der Einwanderungen und der Kolonisierung dieser Gegend, rasch gestiegen ist, aber gleichzeitig waren einstimmig überzeugt, dass bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts die Rumänen, obwohl ihre Anzahl sich vermindert, noch die Mehrheit in diesem Provinz bildeten. Gleichzeitig ist zu bemerken, dass einige von diesen Informationen gewisse Fehlern umfassen, manchmal

übertriebene Daten darstellen und bestimmt kein amtlicher Charakter haben.

8. Bevölkerung der Bukowina nach den Konfessionen

Am Anfang der österreichischen Herrschaft, die überwiegende Mehrheit der Bewohner von Bukowina waren Orthodoxen. Nicht nur die Rumänen, aber auch fast alle Ukrainern (Ruthenen und Huzulen), Zigeuner und die armenische Gemeinschaft von *Suczawa* gehörten zum orthodoxen Konfession. Deutsche und Polen gab es damals fast keinen in Bukowina. Die wichtigste konfessionelle Minderheit von Bukowina waren die Juden, die hauptsächlich in *Czernowitz*, *Suczawa* und *Wiznitz* lebten und etwa 3,5% der gesamten Bevölkerung bildeten.

Nach der Besetzung der Bukowina hat sich wesentlich nicht nur die ethnische, aber auch die konfessionelle Struktur der Bevölkerung dieses Landes verändert. In Bukowina sind viele Beamten, Militär, Handwerker, Kaufmänner und anderen Arbeiter gekommen, die Meisten von welchen Katholiken waren. In diesem Land sind auch sehr viele Einwanderer und Kolonisten verschiedenen Nationalitäten angesiedelt, welche wenig überraschend keine Orthodoxen waren. Fast alle Polen, Slowaken und Ungarn, aber auch ein Teil der Deutschen waren Römisch-Katholiken. Andere Teile der deutschen Kolonisten gehörten dem lutheranischen Bekenntnis der Protestanten. Eine kleine kalvinische Gemeinschaft der Protestanten gab es in ungarische Kolonie *Andreasfalva*. Die Lippowaner waren eine Sekte der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche. In diese Periode sind auch viele katholische Armenier von Galizien gekommen. Selbst die ruthenischen Einwanderer von Galizien waren meistens Griechisch-Katholiken, aber viele in Bukowina kamen zur orthodoxen Kirche zurück.

In ersten Hälfte des 19.Jahrhunderts hat sich die konfessionelle Struktur der Bevölkerung von Bukowina in folgendermaßen entwickelt:

In die erste Hälfte des 19.Jahrhunderts hat sich die Anteil der Orthodoxen aus Bukowina von fast 90% im Jahr 1816 auf etwa 80% im Jahr 1850 verringert. In derselben Zeit ist der Anteil der Protestanten fast gleich geblieben (unter 2%), während der Anteil der Lippowaner und besonders der Juden ist allmählich gestiegen. In diese Periode hat sich besonders der Anteil der Katholiken von Bukowina vermehrt (von 5,1% im Jahr 1816 auf etwa 12,6% im Jahr 1850).

Tabelle 2. Bevölkerung der Bukowina nach den Konfessionen

Konfessionen	1816		1823		1850	
Römisch-Katholiken	10284	5,12%	14540	5,97%	32673	8,62%
Griechisch-Katholiken					13453	3,55%
Armenisch-Katholiken			1808	0,74%	1629	0,43%
Orthodoxen	180094	89,7%	213924	87,8%	307450	81,1%
Armenisch-Orthodoxen	1654	0,8%	2021	0,83%		
Lutheranern	3662	1,8%	4107	1,69%	6672	1,76%
Kalvinisten	251	0,13%	277	0,11%	574	0,15%
Juden	4160	2,07%	6282	2,56%	14618	3,85%
Lippowaner	637	0,32%	710	0,29%	2110	0,56%
Gesamt	200742	100	243669	100	379179	100

Quelle: Ungureanu 2003: 252.

9. Ruthenisch-rumänische Sprachgrenze in der Bukowina an Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts

In Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bestanden auch die ersten detaillierten Informationen über die ruthenisch-rumänische Sprachgrenze und ruthenischen Sprachinseln in Bukowina.

Gemäß den Schätzungen von Karl Czoernig „Hier zieht die ruthenisch-romanische Grenze von Kirlibaba, das gemischte Gebiet von Moldawa, Breaza, Russ pe Boul und beiden Moldawitza umfangend, nach der Moldawitza, an deren linkem Ufer sie bis zur Wasserscheide zwischen der Czomorna und Suczawitza aufsteigt. Die Bäche Brodinora und Brodina führen nun nach Frasin und Sadeu an der Suczawa herab, der Falkeu-Bach wieder nach den Höhen hinauf, welche den Seretschel und kleinen Sereth von grossen Sereth trennen. Diesen letzteren überschreitet die Sprachgränze oberhalb Storoszinetz, umschliesst das gemischte Gebiet von Panka, Broskoutz und Kamenna, und kommt über die Höhe des Czecina nach Czernowitz. Nördlich der Pruth durchschneidet sie das Territorium von Sadagora und endet jenseits Czernauka an der Grenze von Bessarabien, wobei sie abermals das gemischte Gebiet von Wasloutz, Werboutz und Dobronoutz umfängt“ (Czoernig 1857: 52).

Ruthenische Sprachinseln in der Bukowina sind von Karl Czoernig durch folgendes charakterisiert: „In Bukowina zieht eine ruthenische Sprachinsel längst der östlichen Reichsgränze von Mamornica über Lucawica, Terescheni, Unter-Stanestie, Pojenille, Unter Sinoutz (mit Rogoszestie und Kindestie), Negosztina, Gropana bis Scherboutz herab und macht mit Hliboka, Kamenka und Fontina Alba (Biala Kiernica) ihre grössten westlichen Ausbuchtungen. Doch wohnen innerhalb dieses Landstriches zu Terescheni, Prevorokie, Unter-Stanestie, Oprischeni, Tereblestie, Kamenka, Bahrinestie, Baintze, Sereth, Botoschenitza und Scherboutz auch Romanen in grösserer Anzahl, in Tereblestie und Sereth noch dazu Deutsche neben den Ruthenen; Ober-Stanestie und Ober-Sinoutz sind ganz romanisch. Eine zweite ruthenische Sprachinsel liegt an der südlichen Gränze der Bukowina gegen die Moldau, und umfasst die rein ruthenischen Orte Slatiora, Dzemine und Ostra. Auch in Czernowitz und Suczawa (und in der Umgebung des letzteren, namentlich zu Petroutz, Boninze und Ipotestie) findet sich dieser Sprachstamm stark verbreitet. Demselben wurden hier dritthalbtausend Gross-Russen (von der Sekte der Lippowaner) beigerechnet, welche die Ortschaften Fontina Alba (Biala Kiernica), Klimoutz und Lippoweni ausschliessend bewohnen“ (Czoernig 1857: 54).

Diese Informationen können mit jene zwei ethnographischen Karten der Österreichischen Monarchie vergleichen und untersucht werden, die bei Maßstab 1:864000 und 1:1584000 zusammengestellt wurden, und von Karl Czoernig, auf Grund seines ethnographischen Studiums, in Wien in Jahren 1855 und 1856 herausgegeben wurden.

Joseph Hain stellt auch einige Umreibungen über die von Rumänen und Ruthenen gewohnten Gebieten in Bukowina dar. Er stellte fest, dass „das östliche romanische Sprachgebiet... nimmt den östlichen Teil der Bukowina (fast die Hälfte)... und die Linie der Ostgrenze, zwischen dem Dniestr und Pruth (und zwar dem ersteren näher) beginnend, bezeichnet die Reichsgrenze gegen Russland und gegen die Moldau“ (Hain 1852: 196). Der Verfasser bestimmte, dass „Innerhalb des moldauischen Sprachgebietes liegt aber noch ein bedeutender ruthenischer Bezirk, welcher vom rechten Ufer des Pruth als schmaler Oststreifen an der Reichsgrenze bis an die Suczawa südwärts zieht. Auf demselben leben die Ruthenen teils unvermischt, teils unter Moldauern und auch unter Deutschen. Übrigens ist dieser Bezirk durch die moldauischen Orte Kalafindestie und Grainitschestie,

sowie durch die magyarischen Istensegits und Fogodisten unterbrochen und endet mit dem moldauisch-ruthenischen Kalinestie (Kuparenko) an der Reichsgrenze, im Inneren aber am linken Ufer der Suczawa. Östlich von Moldauisch-Kimpolung ist noch ein grösser ruthenisch-moldauischer Sprachbezirk, welcher mit der Reichsgrenze abschliesst, im Norden aber die Moldawa nicht erreicht“ (Hain 1852: 241-242).

Gemäß den Schätzungen von Joseph Hain, von den 181 Quadratmeilen der gesamten Fläche von Bukowina, waren 97 Meilen überwiegend von Ruthenen, 73 Meilen von Rumänen, 8 Meilen von Deutschen und 3 Meilen von Ungarn bewohnt (Hain 1852: 242). Die Tatsache, dass von Ruthenen bewohnten Gebiet das größte war, erklärt sich dadurch, dass die Ruthenen und Huzulen besonders im westlichen Teil der Bukowina, nämlich in dem größten Teil der bergigen Gegend, lebten, wo eine geringere Bevölkerungsdichte herrscht als im Südost der Bukowina, wo die Rumänen wohnten.

Auch wenn nur in einer allgemeinen Gestalt, sind jene zwei ruthenischen Sprachinseln von Joseph Hain fast gleich wie ins Studium von Karl Czoernig lokalisiert und vorgestellt. Gleichzeitig stellt großen Interesse die Umreißen der Joseph Hain dar, dass die ruthenisch-romanische Sprachgrenze zwischen dem Dnjestr und Pruth, zwar dem Dnjestr näher, nämlich ungefähr in der Nähe von Dorf *Czernauka*, begann (genau so wie bei Darstellung der Sprachgrenze von Karl Czoernig). Von diesen Information geht mittelbar hervor, dass die links von Pruth befindlichen Dörfern *Czernauka*, *Toporoutz*, *Rarancze*, *Slobodzia*, *Rarancze*, *Lebuczenie* noch als rein rumänischen Ortschaften berücksichtigt waren, nämlich gleich wie in das Werk und in ethnographischen Karten von Karl Czoernig festgestellt wurde.

10. Bevölkerung der Bukowina in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts

Die ersten amtlichen statistischen Daten über die Nationalitäten der Provinzen der Habsburgermonarchie wurden Mitte der 19. Jahrhundert von Joseph Hain und Karl Czoernig veröffentlicht. Joseph Hain arbeitete damals als Ministerialsekretär in der Dienstleistung bei der k.k. Direktion der administrativen Statistik. Die zweibändige Arbeit von Joseph Hain wurde in Jahren 1852-1853 herausgegeben und umfasste die Informationen über die ethnische Struktur der österreichischen Provinzen für das Jahr 1846, ohne ergänzende Erklärungen darzustellen.

Karl Czoernig hat sein ethnographisches Werk als Herausgeber der k.k. Direktion der administrativen Statistik veröffentlicht. Die ethnographische Arbeit, veröffentlicht im 1857 unter der Entwerfung von Karl Czoernig, stellt viel größere Wert und Interesse dar, weil sie ein amtlichen Charakter hatte und sehr ausführliche Informationen über die Sprachgrenzen und Sprachinseln der verschiedenen Nationalitäten der österreichischen Monarchie enthält. Die statistischen Daten von Karl Czoernig sind für das Jahr 1850 gültig und, auf Grund dieses Studiums wurde, auch unter der Entwerfung der Karl Czoernig, eine ausführliche Ethnographische Karte der Österreichischen Monarchie zusammengestellt.

Doch, die veröffentlichten Daten von Joseph Hain und Karl Czoernig bezüglich der Anzahl der Rumänen und Ruthenen aus der Bukowina sind völlig entgegengesetzt. Gemäß den Schätzungen von Joseph Hain, war im Jahr 1846 die Anzahl der Ruthenen in der Bukowina 180.417 Menschen (einschließlich 2.016 Lippowaner) und die der Rumänen nur 140.626 Personen (Hain 1852: 240). In Gegenteil, schätzte Karl Czoernig die Anzahl der Rumänen für das Jahr 1850 auf 184.718 Personen und nur auf 142.682 die Anzahl der Ruthenen (Czoernig 1857: 74-80). Die statistischen Daten von Karl Czoernig treffen mit den amtlichen Mitteilungen zusammen, die jährlich von der k.k. Direktion der administrativen Statistik veröffentlicht wurden (*Tafeln* 1849-1851: 6). Auch F.Schmitt, der damals als Ministerialkonzipist in der Dienstleistung bei der k.k. Direktion der administrativen Statistik arbeitete, hat im Jahr 1854 eine statistische Arbeit herausgegeben, deren Daten bezüglich der Bukowina für das Jahr 1851 mit den veröffentlichten Daten von Karl Czoernig zustimmen (Schmitt 1854: 46).

Doch stellten Joseph Hain und Karl Czoernig in ihren Werken nicht sehr verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten über den von Rumänen und Ruthenen bewohnten Gebieten in der Bukowina vor. Weder Joseph Hain, noch Karl Czoernig gibt eine Erklärung betreffs der Ursache dieser widersprüchliche Abschätzung, die einfach nicht bemerkt ist. Um so mehr, ihre statistischen Daten über die verschiedenen Nationalitäten bezüglich der anderen österreichischen Provinzen fast zusammentreffen.

Joseph Hain war eine Subalterne der Karl Czoernig an Direktion der administrativen Statistik und zusammen mit anderen Spezialisten hat bei Ausarbeitung dieser statistischen Daten mitgearbeitet. Selbst Joseph Hain bestimmt in einleitender Kapitel seines Werkes, dass „Durch

eine Reihe von Jahren habe ich unter der belehrenden und anregenden Leitung des k.k. Sectionsschefs und Direktors der administrativen Statistik, Her Dr. Carl Czoernig, die Art der practischen Benützung statistischer Nachweisungen, deren Sichtung und Prüfung kennen gelernt...“ (Hain 1852: XI).

Die statistischen Daten, veröffentlichten von Joseph Hain, sind in Widerspruch nicht nur mit den Schlussfolgerungen der Fachmänner bezüglich der Bevölkerung der Bukowina bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, aber auch mit den Mehrheitsinformationen über die Bewohner dieses Landes bis zum Jahr 1880 (*Hauptbericht* 1862: 104-105; *Hauptbericht* 1872: 65-67). Mihai Ștefan Ceașu hat eine wertvolle Urkunde in Nationale Archiv von Bukarest entdeckt, in der das Verhältnis zwischen Rumänen, Ruthenen und Deutschen in verschiedenen Bezirken von Bukowina, gültig für das Jahr 1846, dargestellt ist. Auf Grund dieser Urkunde stellte M. Șt. Ceașu fest, dass „gegen die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts die Konskription von dem Jahr 1846 eine Bevölkerung von 370.673 Bewohnern hinterlegte. In jenen 12 Gerichtsbezirken, in der die Bukowina geteilt war, die Nationalitäten nahmen folgendes Verhältnis in der Gesamtheit der Bevölkerung ein: in Bezirken Czernowitz und Storoșinetz, 4/5 Rumänen und 1/5 Deutsche und Ruthenen; in Sadagora – 1/2 Rumänen und 1/2 Ruthenen; die Bezirken Zastawna, Kotzmann, Wisniza und Waszkoutz waren überwiegend von Ruthenen bewohnt; in Bezirken Suczawa und Kimpolung die Rumänen stellten mehr als 3/5 und die Deutschen und Ruthenen etwa weniger als 2/5 von Gesamtbevölkerung dar; im Bezirk Gurahumora 4/5 waren Rumänen und 1/5 Deutsche und Ruthenen und endlich im Bezirk Sereth 2/5 waren Rumänen, 2/5 Ruthenen und 1/5 Deutsche“ (Ceașu 1997-1998: 103).

Gmäß dieser Quelle, bildeten die Rumänen gegen die Mitte der 19. Jahrhundert noch etwa 80% der Bevölkerung von Bezirken Czernowitz und Storoșinetz, und im Bezirk Sadagora links der Pruth war das Verhältnis zwischen Rumänen und Ruthenen noch ungefähr gleich. In derselben Zeit, waren die Ruthenen noch in großer Zahl in übrigen Bezirken im Süden der Bukowina anwesend. Die Schätzungen von diesem Dokument sind nicht in Widerspruch mit den veröffentlichten statistischen Daten von Karl Czoernig. Nach diesen Informationen, gegen das Jahr 1850 waren mehrere große Dörfern in der Nähe von *Czernowitz* und *Storoșinetz*, wie *Kuczurmare*, *Mihalcze*, *Toporoutz*, *Rarancze*, *Slobodzia Rarancze*, *Czernauka*, *Lehuczenie*, *Moldanisch*

Banilla noch als Ortschaften mit einer rumänischen Mehrheit betrachtet. Ein bedeutender Teil der Bewohner war rumänisch auch in mehreren gemischten Dörfern wie *Kamenna*, *Panka*, *Broszkoutz*, oder in dem gemischten Gebiet von *Wasloutz*, *Werboutz* und *Dobronoutz* in nördliche Bukowina, welche auch die Dörfern *Kuczurmik*, *Bojanczuk*, *Horoschoutz* und *Iurkoutz* umfasste.

Die Lage hat sich ab dem Jahr 1880 verändert, als die österreichischen Volkszählungen die Bevölkerung nach dem Kriterium der Umgangssprache eingetragen haben. Infolge dieser Volkszählungen ist sich eine barsche Verminderung der Anzahl der Rumänen zugute der Ruthenen in allen oben genannten Dörfern, aber auch in anderen Ortschaften in Bukowina festgestellt.

Hervorgehend aus den erwähnten Beweisen, ich drücke mich die Ansicht aus, dass betreffs den statistischen Daten von Joseph Hain, wahrscheinlich ein Fehler gemacht wurde und die Daten bezüglich den Rumänen und Ruthenen von Bukowina wurden umgekehrt. Wenn eine solche Version annehmen worden wäre, dann würde es zu folgenden Zahlen erlangen:

Tabelle 3. Bevölkerung der Bukowina an Mitte der 19. Jahrhundert

Nationalitäten	Daten von Joseph Hain (1846)				Daten von Karl Czoernig (1850)	
	Veröffentlichte		Umgekehrte			
Rumänen	140626	37,89%	180417	48,61%	184718	48,51%
Ruthenen	180417	48,61%	138610	37,25%	142682	37,47%
Lippowaner	-	-	2016	0,54%	2300	0,6%
Deutschen	25000	6,74%	25000	6,74%	25592	6,72%
Juden	11581	3,12%	11581	3,12%	11856	3,11%
Ungarn	5446	1,47%	5446	1,47%	5586	1,47%
Polen	4000	1,08%	4000	1,08%	4008	1,05%
Tschechen, Slowaken	1837	0,49%	1837	0,49%	1844	0,48%
Armenier	2224	0,6%	2224	0,6%	2240	0,59%
Gesamt	371131	100	371131	100	380826	100

Quelle: Hain 1852: 240, Czoernig 1857: 74-80, Ungureanu 2003: 247.

Die umgekehrte Darstellung dieser statistischen Daten würde eine natürliche Zunahme der verschiedenen Nationalitäten der Bukowina in

den Jahren 1846-1850 wiedergeben. Die statistischen Zahlen der Karl Czoernig sind auf Grund den statistischen Ergebnissen für das Jahr 1846 zusammengestellt und sie berücksichtigten gleichzeitig die natürliche Zunahme der Bevölkerung bis zum Jahr 1850. Dementsprechend, während der vier Jahren hat die Zahl der Rumänen mit 4.301 Personen, der Ruthenen und Huzulen – mit 4.072 und der Lippowaner mit 284 Personen zugenommen.

Also, hervorgehend aus den Schätzungen verschiedener österreichischen Historikern, Wanderern, Beamter oder Bildungsmenschen, aber auch aus den ersten amtlichen statistischen Zahlen von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, kann man schließen, dass damals die Rumänen aus Bukowina noch eine relative Mehrheit bildeten. Trotzdem war ein Teil der Einwohnern, besonders in nördliche Bukowina, noch von ihre rumänische Ursprung bewusst, aber erkannten nicht mehr ihre mütterliche Sprache und sprachen ukrainisch. Gleichzeitig ist zu erwähnen, dass bis zur Revolution im Jahr 1848 der ethnische Ursprung der Bewohner eine nebensächliche Bedeutung gehabt hat, das nationale Bewusstsein der Rumänen und Ruthenen der Bukowina war noch schwach entwickelt und die Einwohner benützten in gesprochene Sprache viele fremde Wörter. Die revolutionäre Ereignisse von 1848 haben die Entwicklung des nationalen Lebens der verschiedener Völker Österreichischen Monarchie im Allgemeinen und der Bukowina im speziell angeregt, wo besonders die ukrainischen Bauern, die im Vergleich mit Rumänen bis zum Jahr 1848 keine nationale Oberschicht gehabt hatten, wurden bewusst, dass sie den ukrainischen Nationalität gehören.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Eugen Constantin Ghiță. (2011). *Evoluția demografică a comitatului Arad în secolul al XVIII-lea și la începutul secolului al XIX-lea* (L'Évolution démographique du comitat de Arad au XVIII^e siècle et au début du XIX^e), Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 368 pp., ISBN: 978-973-595-252-5

La recherche des réalités démographiques de l'époque moderne est le dernier temps devenue une préoccupation constante des historiens, des géographes et des démographes, étant donné la nécessité d'une interrogation plus profonde, et donc d'une explication plus compréhensive des transformations majeures que la société transylvaine a connues après le milieu du XIX^e siècle. Eugen Constantin Ghiță réalise dans l'ouvrage ci-présent une investigation minutieuse des modifications démographiques survenues dans l'un des comitats transylvains les plus importants au XVIII^e et au début du XIX^e siècle. Il continue et développe en fait des études élaborées antérieurement, d'un point de vue unilatéral, par des démographes, des géographes ou des historiens roumains, hongrois, allemands et serbes, en leur ajoutant les nouvelles acquisitions de la démographie et de l'anthropologie historique et réussissant de la sorte à offrir au lecteur une image synthétique et complexe du thème analysé. La reconstitution de l'auteur respecte tant le critère chronologique que celui logique, thématique, retraçant l'histoire de la population d'un comitat et d'une ville dont le rôle a été essentiel dans le processus d'urbanisation développé en Transylvanie aux époques pré-moderne, moderne et contemporaine. Eugen Constantin Ghiță transforme un sujet apparemment d'histoire locale en objet d'étude des tendances visibles au niveau de l'évolution démographique d'un comitat et d'un centre urbain représentatifs pour les parties occidentales de la Transylvanie, ses conclusions pouvant s'appliquer à d'autres comitats et localités ayant rempli dans ces temps-là les conditions exigées par le statut d'agglomération urbaine.

La structure de l'ouvrage est généralement équilibrée; un chapitre supplémentaire ou, éventuellement, un sous-chapitre inclus dans le 5^e aurait toutefois été bien venu, pouvant mettre en évidence les facteurs positifs et négatifs ou, pour employer les termes déjà consacrés par Massimo Livi Bacci, les forces de la contrainte et de la coercition ayant modelé la dynamique et le comportement démographique des habitants du comitat de Arad à l'époque pré-moderne. La dimension de la terre,

source de nourriture, l'impact des calamités naturelles sur l'alimentation, l'assaut des maladies, la lutte contre les épidémies etc. constituent des aspects qui auraient, peut-être, exigé un traitement unitaire dans un seul chapitre. Néanmoins, la répartition des chapitres, les annexes finales, les tableaux et les graphiques insérés sont autrement suffisamment convaincants.

Nous tenons à souligner l'effort de l'auteur de valoriser dans cet ouvrage d'importantes sources documentaires inédites ou déjà publiées, des collections d'actes normatifs, la presse du temps, des Mémoires etc. qui lui ont fourni des renseignements complexes et extrêmement précieux pour sa démarche. Le nombre de sources statistiques et cartographiques inédites provenant des archives de Arad, Budapest et Vienne, ainsi que leur grande diversité (urbariums, conscriptions, enregistrements fiscaux et militaires, contrats de mariage, registres paroissiaux d'état civil etc.) est impressionnant. Une meilleure mise en valeur des sources cartographiques de l'époque aurait, à notre avis, offert à l'auteur des arguments supplémentaires quant à l'évolution et la typologie de l'habitat.

Loin de se contenter de mettre devant le lecteur une quantité immense d'informations statistiques brutes, l'auteur a cherché à systématiser les données, à offrir le plus souvent des explications pertinentes des phénomènes démographiques analysés (qu'il s'agisse de natalité, mortalité ou nuptialité), à encadrer les transformations survenues à Arad dans un contexte général socioéconomique et politique, à présenter le niveau de l'urbanisation de cette ville. Sous aspect méthodologique, nous remarquons l'alliance heureuse entre des approches interdisciplinaires différentes (des méthodes propres à la démographie historique, à l'anthropologie, à la sociologie historique etc.). La liste bibliographique consistante (contenant des ouvrages en roumain, en hongrois, en français et en anglais provenant de l'historiographie roumaine et universelle ancienne et récente) et les notes en bas de la page attestent d'ailleurs une telle approche de l'histoire de la population du comitat et de la ville de Arad pour une période de plus d'un siècle. Le livre de Eugen Constantin Ghiță a toutes les qualités d'un ouvrage scientifique, qui enrichit la bibliographie de l'histoire de la population de la Roumanie.

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Liliana Andreea Vasile, *Să nu audă lumea. Familia românească în Vechiul Regat* [*Don't tell a soul. The Romanian Family from Old Kingdom of Romania*], București: Tritonic Publishing, 2009, 304 pp., ISBN 978-606-92289-6-8

It is a well known fact that the Romanian historical writing has produced some influential works in the field of family history during the recent years. A search in any historical database proves to be very conclusive when it comes to finding articles, studies, books, proceedings related to the Romanian family. *The people shouldn't know* has its roots in a doctoral research at București University, Faculty of History and represents a welcome addition to the researches in the history of the Romanian family, researches that, after a slow start a few decades ago, came to gain a lot during the past 10 years. While the researches conducted inside the Carpathians became more substantial, as the author of the present books admits herself, Liliana Vasile's work completes what used to be until now a blurred image of the Romanian family, both inside and outside the Carpathians. For a much too long period, the historians chose to present separate pieces of history, micro-history; it is also true that the peculiarities of the Romanian historical provinces, reunited in 1918 in the Great Romania, require separate researches of their history, not just when it comes to the family. However, this separated approaches led to realities from one area to be much too less known in other areas and therefore to a rupture from the point of view of knowledge. The family from Transylvania, the family from the Old Kingdom... they seem to be pieces of a puzzle still missing its last piece: the one that completes the overall image. Liliana Vasile's book is a fortunate completion of the image.

The book belongs to the category of social history researches, the author recreating the legal universe in which the life of Romanians went on during second half of the 19th Century and using it to family life aspects drawn from court halls, dowry papers, donation papers. Liliana Andreea Vasile conducts her work in three directions: the legal economical aspects of matrimonial institutions, marriage and divorce. The whole discourse is preceded by a wide review of the history of researches on family, in order to reveal sources, methods and concepts that would enlighten the research. From the methodological point of view the author places the analyse of the legal text in all the three chapters, giving it the main role. In the first chapter, she analyses from the point of view of legal evolution the engagement and the dowry,

namely “the first deal of the wedding” (p. 37). In chapters 2 and 3 she approaches the laws on marriage and divorce, chapter 2 also comprising two discussions on the moral and habits of family life and on hygiene and the health status of the Romanian families.

We consider that, apart from being the first systematic approach on the Romanian family outside the Carpathians during the second half of the 19th century, Liliana Vasile's book – following the model launched by Constanța Ghițulescu for the 18th Century – excels through the insertion in the otherwise monotonous discourse – given by the analyse of a serious source such as the text of the law – of fragments from the court, from dowry contracts, from health registers and other descriptive sources that have the advantage of revealing how the law was applied in everyday life. In the period Liliana Vasile focused on, the legal text is relatively unitary – a few years when the old laws still survived – The Caragea Law and the Calimachi Code, replaced in 1865 by the Civil Code of Al. I. Cuza, the main source of the Romanian private law. If the text of the law is accessible and relatively easy to interpret, we cannot say the same about the real life situations, taken from various sources, mainly from the court archives. The book is trustworthy moreover since it presents typical situations, taken from everyday life, to illustrate each problem that is discussed.

The reform of the state – through institutions and laws – also brings the reform of marriage but, as Liliana Vasile shows, the relation between law and practice is often flawed by the old moral and social practices. The author points out the contradictory character of family life in the second half of the 19th Century: intimate, private statute for family members, a place to set laws and intervene – for the state. The author finds an abyss between the law and the social habits, an abyss made deeper by the continuation of the same behaviours – including the hygienic and sanitary ones – that characterized the society at the beginning of the Century. Seen from this point of view, the world revealed by Liliana Vasile bears few differences from the one in Constanța Vintila Ghițulescu's books (*În șalvari și cu ișlic* or *Focul Amоруlui. Despre dragoste și sexualitate în societatea românească*); only the law is different, people remained the same!

From the perspective of the clarification of the evolution of laws regarding marriage in the Old Kingdom, we consider the scientific approach of Liliana Vasile to be very useful. Joining the older researches on family history in Transylvania, this work completes the picture of the

history of Romanian family – a book that is a must in the bibliography of any future works on the 19th Century family.

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Dennis Broeders, *Breaking Down Anonymity. Digital Surveillance of Irregular Migrants in Germany and the Netherlands*. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2009, 231 pp., ISBN 9089641599

Irregular migration, or undocumented migration are largely used as synonymous and represents the term preferred by the specialized literature to define the illegal migration in the proper way. The present book, signed by Dennis Broeders, focuses on the phenomenon of irregular migration, analysing the cases of two western European countries Germany and the Netherlands. The book represents the result of a PhD research, conducted by the author at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Also the research was introduced in the IMISCOE network of excellence which unites over 500 researchers from European institutes specializing in studies of international migration.

Before going deep in the chapters of the book, we should underline few directions of this research. In the last decade, irregular migration captured the attention of many European countries, especially those from Western Europe. Both political body and society, are feeling insecure being aware of the presence of irregular migrants inside the borders of their countries, which can generate great negative transformation in the middle of society. The socio-economic and politic climate has a major role on the positioning of these two actors in direct relation with the irregular migrants. In the last years the deterioration of the economic climate in the European Union transformed the immigrants from being a solution to becoming a problem for the authorities. From this point of view the author starts his research, trying to focus on the phenomenon of the irregular migration and the particularities of the two countries Germany and the Netherlands regarding irregular migration.

The irregular migration has not appeared just in the last decade, it's a phenomenon present in Europe at least since the middle of the XX century. Since the 1970's the western European countries have increasingly implemented restrictive immigration policies for people from non-western countries. The role of these immigration policies was to discourage the waves of irregular migrants from Eastern Europe. In short time these actions create a new image to Europe, it became a fortress, rising walls in front of the movement of people. In time, migration policies have shifted inwards and are now regarding internal institutions, trying to discourage the irregulars from the inside. States are now trying to shut the doors to the education system, work, housing as well as to welfare state and other institutions in order to decrease the number of irregular migrants.

The author motivate the election of those two countries for their particularities among other European Union member states but also because of the similarities between these two. Dennis Broeders presents both Germany and the Netherlands as being the countries with the most development system of internal migration control and information on illegal aliens. Beside this, the Netherlands and Germany share a basic common political approach towards the phenomenon of immigration. Also those two countries negotiated the Schengen Agreement and Convention, border control and immigration policy through the multilateral negotiation of Schengen such as Dublin Convention and Schengen III. Those similarities make Germany and the Netherlands the perfect candidates for the research proposed by the author.

The book is structured on six chapters which are trying to cover all the aspects related to irregular migrants and the state surveillance. The author starts from the theoretical perspectives of irregular migration and goes through the problems of police surveillance and European solutions for domestic problems. The first chapter has the role to introduce the readers in the context of irregular migration face to face with political an institutional control. The major thesis of this first chapter is that the walls, the border control system by itself, reached a dead end in this moment. So the solution for the political body is to combine the border control system with the internal control which requires increased surveillance and surveillance power. The policy sector responsible for the surveillance has two approaches, the first one is guarding the access to the labour market and the second one regards detention and expulsion.

The second chapter of the book offers a perspectives having as background both migration literature and surveillance studies. It focuses on the exclusion of irregular migration in two ways. First the author speaks about the societal and institutional exclusion as a consequence of the lack of documents which means, as the author says – denial of access. In the second way exclusion is related to the ultimate aim of expulsion by the authorities, as a result of the illegal status of migrants.

Third chapter of the book, deals with the aim of rising walls in front of the irregular migrants to the labour market. In the migration logic, every migrant search for better life, and most of them are trying to reach it through work. In this way demanding all sorts of documentation, represent a first step in avoiding irregular settlement. Chapter four underline the major role of coercive state, the governmental agencies/institutions in order to control the immigration. The author refers here to the police, the detention system, immigration authorities which together make a chain around irregular migrants. The fifth chapter of the book starts from pointing that an European Union without internal borders cannot deal with migration just at the level of national borders. In this way, the national state has to turn to the European level to construct the necessary tools for their migration policies. So the author presents in this chapter how the policies and instruments developed by the EU agencies can help the member states in the fight against illegal aliens. In this manner the author present a few systems such as *Schengen Information System*, *EURODAC* database and *Visa Information System* which are very helpful database, aimed at controlling migration flows and identifying legal and irregular migrants. The book ends with a conclusive chapter where the author, underline the necessity of registrations, internal control and surveillance in order to be sure that irregular migrants fulfil their legal obligations.

Breaking down anonymity, is a valuable book in the specialized literature of the delicate field - irregular migration. The author point of view stresses on the relation state vs. irregular migrant. The fact that in northern member state irregular migrants are considered a problematic presence while in southern member states irregular migrants are much more tolerated being part of informal economy, explain the positioning of the author in relation with the irregular migration problem. But we should not forget the Human Rights Imperative when we discuss about irregular migrants. Most of the time, immigration control prevails over the social protection interests, in this way the irregular migrant became a

victim. The will to control the frontiers led to criminalization of the irregular migrants, and also means exploitation of migrants by making them more dependent on their illegal employers. So in this way besides the positive effect for the states in the process of combating the irregular migration there is also a negative effect on the migrants themselves being stigmatized and marginalized. In this context we consider that it's not insignificant the relation state vs. irregular migration vs. human rights, regarding Germany and the Netherlands.

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