

# Pax Germanica

## Projections of the Leaders of the Third Reich and of the German Ethnic Group to Solve the Problem of Transylvania between 1940 and 1944

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A FREQUENTLY USED method in the Third Reich's foreign policy in WWII to reach its objectives in southeast Europe was to exploit the conflicts in this area. A good example is the territorial dispute between Romania and Hungary over Northern Transylvania. Following the Second Vienna Award on 30 August 1940, Romania had to surrender to Hungary<sup>1</sup> a territory of approximately 42,000 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of around 2.5 million inhabitants. Although the German leaders had been previously informed in detail about Transylvania's complicated demographic situation, as well as about Hungary's unsubstantiated territorial claims, they deliberately ignored these realities regarding the ethnic composition of the disputed territories.

Hungary's maximal territorial requests of Romania, amounting to 66,000 km<sup>2</sup>, presented in the Turnu Severin bilateral negotiations, were not justified. According to the Romanian statistical data, the territory granted to Hungary in Vienna was of approximately 42,610 km<sup>2</sup>, with a population of 2,388,774 inhabitants, comprised of 50.2% Romanians, 37.1% Hungarians, and 2.7% Germans.<sup>2</sup> However, according to the Hungarian statistical data, the territory obtained by Hungary was of 43,104 km<sup>2</sup>, inhabited by 2,577,000 people, out of which 52.1% Hungarians (1,343,000), 41.5% Romanians (1,069,000), 1.8 % Germans (47,000), and 4.6% other nationalities (116,000).<sup>3</sup>

The figures presented above clearly show that Hitler's solution to the territorial dispute between Romania and Hungary was to not regulate the complex demographic aspects in the region. On the contrary, the purpose of the border decided after the German and Italian arbitration was to satisfy the political, economic and military interests of the Reich—to subordinate the two states politically, allowing Berlin to manipulate them as it wanted in the future. "The arbitration between Romania and Hungary," as subsequently stated by Eugen Filotti, the Romanian minister in Budapest, in a report submitted to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "seems to be a crafty move on the Reich's part. It tied both states to it: rewarding one, and weakening and isolating the other."<sup>4</sup>

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Consequently, we should not be surprised that despite the hopes Ribbentrop and Ciano expressed at the arbitration, the dispute between Romania and Hungary concerning Transylvania was not solved on 30 August 1940, and that Romanian-Hungarian relations took an irreversible turn for the worse in the following period.<sup>5</sup> The Second Vienna Award was the starting point for a fierce competition between Romania and Hungary, whose aim was to win Germany's good will in order to solve once and for all—one way or another—the problem of Transylvania. Given the hegemony of National Socialist Germany over Europe in 1940–1944, our purpose is to succinctly present Berlin's attitude towards the dispute between Romania and Hungary over Northern Transylvania, the manner in which this conflict was used, as well as the projections of German leaders and prominent members of the German minority in Romania regarding the problem of Transylvania under the auspices of the Third Reich.

The acceptance of the Vienna Award triggered a serious political crisis in Romania, which sealed the fate of Carol II and of the authoritarian regime he had set up in 1938, and determined the rise to power of General Ion Antonescu. At the level of the foreign policy, from the moment it took the power, the new government led by General—since August 1941 Marshal—Ion Antonescu set the recovery of territories lost in the summer of 1940 as its main objective.

For this purpose, the head of state paid visits to Rome and Berlin in the autumn in an attempt to convince the Axis Powers to change the Second Vienna Award. The results obtained in Rome were modest: “Duke” Benito Mussolini and his minister of foreign affairs, Count Galeazzo Ciano, adopted an openly hostile attitude towards General Antonescu's requests.<sup>6</sup> His visit to Berlin (22–23 November 1940) did not pan out as he'd hoped, either. Joachim von Ribbentrop, previously informed of the discussions which had taken place in Rome, insisted that the Romanian head of state avoid the problem of Transylvania during the discussions with the Führer.<sup>7</sup> Despite this warning, the main topic of the meeting between Hitler and Antonescu on 22 November 1940 was the problem of Transylvania and the situation of the Romanian-Hungarian relations. To the surprise of his minister of foreign affairs, Hitler proved to be a much more receptive interlocutor, and quite “generous” with his promises. Impressed by the nationalist pathos and the virulence of the anti-Hungarian attacks launched by the Romanian head of state,<sup>8</sup> Hitler, whose first priorities were the German political, economic, and military interests, skillfully exploited General Ion Antonescu's nationalism. With phrases such as “history will not stop at 1940” and “the Vienna Award was not the ideal solution,”<sup>9</sup> he instilled the conviction—which turned out to be an illusion—that the Vienna decision could be revised if Romania loyally fulfilled its commitments to the Third Reich.<sup>10</sup> In his memoirs, General Ion Gheorghe—military attaché and subsequently plenipotentiary minister to Berlin—alluded to the impact that Hitler's promises of “solving” the Transylvanian problem had on Antonescu's policy in 1940–1944:

*Victim of his own delusion, General Antonescu allowed the spread of the idea that the problem of Transylvania had, in fact, already been decided, and that re-annexation was only a matter of time. He could not break free from this vicious circle. Transylvania had to be reconquered at any cost, and this opened the road for sacrifices.<sup>11</sup>*

In fact, the big winner of the Second Vienna Award was Nazi Germany, and it maintained the advantage in the following years. Through the duplicitous policies it promoted towards Romania and Hungary, it preserved the role of arbiter, manipulating the two countries according to its interests. To that end, the problem of Transylvania continued to be on the agenda of high level political and military discussions between Germany and Romania, and Germany and Hungary in the period 1940–1944; most of these took place at the request of the leaders of the two states in their attempt to resolve the situation in Transylvania once and for all. But the Germans prudently avoided this by making vague promises, linking Berlin's support in the matter to the petitioners' contribution to the "common cause." Thus, cleverly alternating between blackmail and promises, Hitler secured not only the position of arbiter of the Romanian-Hungarian dispute, but, after 22 June 1941, he also convinced both states to participate, with a considerable number of troops, in the "holy crusade against bolshevism."

However, this status of "arbiter" also had visible drawbacks for the leaders of the Third Reich. The paradoxical situation of Nazi Germany, allied in the eastern military campaign with Romania and Hungary—two declared enemy states which often, especially during 1942, were on the brink of starting an open war—was shrewdly described by the plenipotentiary Minister of Switzerland to Bucharest, René de Weck:

*[The Germans] are playing a very dangerous role, but they do not have a choice. By hitching their wagon to two horses [Romania and Hungary] which only think of fighting, they have to alternate between the carrot and the stick. It all depends on knowing how long it could last...<sup>12</sup>*

The repeated defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 meant the total failure of the political line followed by Bucharest and Budapest concerning the solution to the Transylvanian problem. We believe that for both Romania and Hungary the defeats at Stalingrad and Voronezh represented the moment when the competition for Germany's favor turned into the competition to be the first to leave the alliance with the Reich, in the hope of regulating the problem of Transylvania with the help of the Allies. As a result, both Romania and Hungary initiated the gradual separation from the Axis Powers, which translated mainly into a limitation of the military forces made available to the Reich for the operations in the USSR, and resumed diplomatic contacts with the Allies to sign an armistice with the United Nations.<sup>13</sup>

In his attempt to prevent the increasingly visible centrifugal tendencies of the allies/satellites in southeast Europe, Adolf Hitler did not hesitate to resort to the famous principle *divide et impera*. It is true that, given the unfavorable evolution of the military operations, in a context in which the human and material support from Romania and Hungary was vital to the German war machine, Hitler formally avoided favoring one of the parties in the conflict over the other, and postponed the solution to the problem of Transylvania to the end of the war. On the other hand, even if he visibly sympathized with Romania,<sup>14</sup> Hitler wanted to reiterate that Hungary and Romania would be compensated based on their sacrifices. The Swiss diplomat René de Weck, quoted previously,

compared Hitler's promises to the two states in the Transylvanian issue with that of a donkey hitched to a wagon, following a "carrot that it will never reach."<sup>15</sup>

Eventually, in the spring of 1944, in the context of the disastrous defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in all its theaters of military operations, with the Red Army fast approaching the borders of Romania and Hungary, Hitler had to admit that the solution to the territorial dispute between Romania and Hungary no longer depended on Germany, but on the power that would exercise its political and military influence over central and Southeastern Europe instead of Germany, namely the USSR.<sup>16</sup> From this point of view, the Führer's prediction proved correct, because the support offered by the Kremlin would tilt the balance in Romania's favor.

AS MENTIONED previously, Berlin postponed making a decision on the thorny problem of Transylvania for the postwar period; however, we cannot say for sure what concrete solution the Third Reich had in mind in the event of the "final victory." According to the consulted materials, there were several options on the table: either the disputed territory would go to Romania or to Hungary, or it would be placed under German protectorate, or—as Hitler said in 1942<sup>17</sup>—Germany would allow Romania and Hungary to fight it out and reach a military resolution. But German projections for the postwar period drafted by central figures in the Third Reich are mostly ambiguous and often contradictory, and fail to offer significant details concerning the fate of Transylvania.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the Romanian and German archives offer some clues about the projections discussed within certain circles of the Third Reich's leadership, and especially among the main leaders of the German Ethnic Group (GEG), a political organization in charge of the German minority in Romania, as possible solutions to the territorial dispute between Bucharest and Budapest.

Possible solutions to the problem of Transylvania were also proposed within the radical circles of the NSDAP in the Third Reich and, especially, within the German Ethnic Group in Romania. The decision to appoint Andreas Schmidt (1912–1948) as *Volksgruppenführer*<sup>19</sup> was made official on 27 September 1940. Born in Transylvania, Andreas Schmidt was a young man of twenty-eight, a dull personality, of questionable intellectual quality, who did not have the prestige or experience to successfully hold such a position. He had been educated in Berlin in the National Socialist spirit, and he followed the provisions and decisions of the Reich unconditionally. At the same time, Andreas Schmidt was very well connected with the leaders of the SS, because at the time he was engaged to the daughter of *SS-Obergruppenführer* Gottlob Berger, the chief of the SS Main Office (*Chef des SS Hauptamtes*), one of the close collaborators of *Reichsführer-SS* Heinrich Himmler, and, last but not least, he was supported by the feared head of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*—the Reich Security Central Office, *SS-Obergruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich.<sup>20</sup> Under his leadership, the German Ethnic Group in Romania rapidly turned into a totalitarian political organization, inspired by the National Socialist model.

The commitment to the political and military objectives of the Third Reich and the tendencies to turn the German Ethnic Group into a real "state within a state" caused a continuous degradation of the relations with the central and local Romanian authorities,

which was also reflected in the interpersonal relations between the Romanian and the Hungarian population. Thus, in the four years that Andreas Schmidt held this office, the Romanian authorities witnessed many hostile manifestations of the leaders of the German Ethnic Group against the Romanian state, including the request to unite the territories inhabited mostly by Germans (Saxons and Swabians), namely Transylvania and Banat, into an autonomous or independent province, under the protectorate of Nazi Germany. This idea was not new; it had emerged among the members of the German minority in Romania shortly after the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, and was also discussed in the summer of 1940 as a possible way to counterbalance Hungary's territorial claims.<sup>21</sup> At one point in 1940, in a discussion with the state secretary of *Auswärtiges Amt*, Wilhelm Keppler, Adolf Hitler himself had supported the creation of an autonomous Transylvania, but the trust he placed in General Ion Antonescu after the latter's visit to Berlin on 22–23 November 1940, made him drop the plan.<sup>22</sup>

Even though Berlin officially abandoned the idea of creating an autonomous or independent Transylvania under German protectorate, the documents in the Romanian and German archives confirm that until the events of August 1944, the idea was present, in one form or another, among the leaders of the German Ethnic Group, the German minority in Romania, and, implicitly, the SS circles that supported Andreas Schmidt and his team. Accordingly, a note submitted by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning the attitude of the German population in the counties of Arad and Hunedoara, reveals that the German minority “supported the creation of a German protectorate in the south of Transylvania, divided into three districts, namely: Zimerburg [sic—actually Siebenbürgen] with the capital in Sibiu, Bergland with the capital in Deva, and Banatzia [sic—actually Banat] with the capital in Timișoara.”<sup>23</sup> These reactions were not unique. In 1941, the Romanian authorities continued to record similar information at the level of the entire German population in Romania. A 1941 report by the Ministry of Interior regarding the GEG's attitude towards Transylvania highlighted that its “political and administrative actions” were incompatible with “the sovereignty of the Romanian state, with the rule of law, and with the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Romanian people,” including biased political propaganda regarding the “autonomy of Banat,” and the “creation of a German protectorate in Transylvania,” respectively.<sup>24</sup> Along with the autonomy of Transylvania and Banat, the members of the German community in Romania also had plans to relocate the Romanians from these territories to Transnistria but, following the defeat at Stalingrad, these were completely abandoned.<sup>25</sup>

In the following years, the Transylvanian Saxons and the Banat Swabians signaled their aspirations for self-government. For example, several 1942 Special Intelligence Service reports about the German Ethnic Group underlined the Transylvanian Saxons' autonomist tendencies. Other reports described the Banat Swabians' discussions about drafting a memo to Adolf Hitler requesting the union of the Danube Swabians living in Romania, Hungary, and Serbia as part of a German state in Southeastern Europe called “Donauland.”<sup>26</sup> This idea was supported even by Adolf Hitler, motivated by his desire to claim the Danube as German, and given his intention to regulate the situation of the German ethnics in southeast Europe, and especially in Hungary. For instance, during a discussion on the evening of 26 February 1942 at his general headquarters, which was

also attended by *Reichsführer-ss* Heinrich Himmler, Hitler violently attacked the policy of minority assimilation promoted by Budapest:

*The Hungarians are the most exalted nationalists, and they absorb the German ethnics so fast! All prominent Germans are placed in Hungarian settlements. The long-term survival of the German minority can only be ensured if we take control of the Hungarian state, otherwise, we will have to remove the Germans. The small German groups are disappearing as a result of the assimilation, except for those in Transylvania. . . . After all, I believe that if we want to reach an agreement with Hungary, we will have to extract the Germans from there.*<sup>27</sup>

In the same discussion, Hitler also stipulated that a possible solution to turning the Danube into a German river was “to place all the German ethnics in Southeastern Europe along the Danube.”<sup>28</sup>

The wide dissemination of autonomist ideas among the German minority in Romania was a direct consequence of the way the leaders of the German Ethnic Group understood their relation to the Romanian authorities and state. Undoubtedly, in the period following the instauration of Antonescu’s regime, the German minority was privileged in Romania, as stipulated by Decree-Law no. 3884 of 21 November 1940,<sup>29</sup> which also gave Andreas Schmidt and his leading team the necessary means to organize the German Ethnic Group based on the National Socialist model, and to turn it into a political and military instrument of the Third Reich in this area. Paradoxically, despite the concessions made by Antonescu’s regime, in the period 1940–1944, the leaders of the German Ethnic Group grew radical in their perceptions of the Romanian state and population, and overestimated the role of “bastion of Germanism” that the German minority would play not only in Romania, but also in Southeastern Europe in general. This development can be explained by the fanaticism of the leaders of the German Ethnic Group and their total subordination to Berlin, the open hostility towards the Romanian authorities and state, the massive support offered to Andreas Schmidt and his acolytes by prominent *ss* leaders such as Heinrich Himmler, Gottlob Berger, Werner Lorenz and Reinhard Heydrich, as well as by the obvious political, social and military deficiencies of Antonescu’s regime, which called into question its long-term stability.

Thus, it should be no surprise that communications between the GEG and the Reich from 1940–1944 noted the instability of the Romanian state and of the political regime led by Ion Antonescu—who was considered totally dependent on the support of the Reich—and claimed that it was necessary to unite the territories inhabited by ethnic Germans (Transylvania and Banat) within one province under “the protection of the Great German Reich.” These communications also included arguments from the arsenal of Nazi ideology—such as the racial superiority of the German ethnics and, implicitly, the need to protect them from the Romanian and Hungarian population in Transylvania and Banat—and military arguments, for example, turning the Carpathian arc into a safe “bastion” or “outpost” of the Reich in Southeastern Europe.

On the other hand, the exponential increase of Romania’s role in the political and military system of the Axis Powers after Antonescu came to power made the signatories of those documents postpone their desire to have an autonomous Transylvania for after

the war, because an open discussion of this matter during the war would have weakened the Romanian state and, inevitably, Berlin's main interests. Out of the many documents available in the archives, we will refer to those authored by two prominent personalities of the German minority, namely General Artur Phleps and the leader of the German Ethnic Group, Andreas Schmidt.

Artur Phleps (1881–1944), former commander of the Romanian mountain troops and professor at the War Academy in the interwar period, who after his discharge from the army as Major General joined the Waffen-ss<sup>30</sup> and was remarked for his criticism of Antonescu's regime, submitted on 2 December 1940 an elaborate report to the Reich Chancellery entitled "Memoire über die Wahrung deutscher Belange in Rumänien" (Report concerning the preservation of the German interests in Romania). Starting from the geostrategic importance of the Carpathian arc defined as a "bastion" of Southeastern Europe, Phleps states that the influence of the Third Reich in the direction of northeast Ukraine and towards the Balkans, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be ensured if Transylvania "was under the control of the Reich." According to Artur Phleps, turning the Carpathian arc into a German bastion in Southeastern Europe could be achieved only by displacing the Romanian population—considered "inferior" and a "a racial mixture completely opposed to the German population"—from Transylvania to the south of the Carpathians, and by colonizing Germans in the vacated space:

*In any case, the German settlements must be cleaned of Romanians so that they can continue to develop freely, according to the German model, as they did before the Romanian occupation in 1919. . . . The Germans can and should be ruled and governed only by Germans, especially where the ruling people are inferior.*<sup>31</sup>

Regarding Romania, General Artur Phleps supported the idea of maintaining it as a buffer between different interests in the region. He thought that to reach this objective, Nazi Germany had to occupy Romania for a long period and to support the Legionnaire Movement—to consolidate "its spine"—because, despite General Ion Antonescu's professionalism and allegiance, he did not possess the necessary "executive authority." Phelps concluded his report by stating that in order to fulfill the Reich's objectives, Romania must be turned into a protectorate or a puppet state after the model of Slovakia, because, otherwise, it would not be capable of handling "the requirements imposed by the German Reich and act according to German interests."<sup>32</sup> Most of the opinions presented above were reiterated by General Artur Phleps in his report from 28 January 1941, submitted to the leaders of the ss, in which he criticized the Legionnaire Movement's removal from power following the rebellion of 21–24 January 1941. He also expressed his mistrust of General Antonescu's military government, but like his report from 2 December 1940, this second report was also of no consequence.<sup>33</sup>

Between 22 September 1940 and 23 August 1944, many reports and notes about the political, economic and military situation of Romania were submitted to the Third Reich, including by Andreas Schmidt, the leader of the German Ethnic Group. Based on information supplied by an extremely efficient countrywide network of mainly *Sicherheitsdienst* officers who were German ethnics, Schmidt submitted very critical reports

concerning the internal and external policies of Antonescu's regime to the Third Reich during the interval 1940–1944. Despite the presence of ideological and racial clichés—such as the alleged influence of the Jews on the political life in Romania—these reports provided a good insight into the situation in Romania. As for the policies promoted by Antonescu's regime, from the very beginning, Andreas Schmidt, like Phleps, harshly criticized the removal from power of the Legionnaire Movement. He believed that the government, whose makeup of soldiers and specialists did not change much during its rule up to 23 August 1944, was a forced and volatile solution, correctly intuiting that Antonescu's regime ultimately depended on the support of the Third Reich. In this regard, in a secret quarterly report submitted to Berlin on 23 April 1943, Andreas Schmidt claimed that “Marshal Antonescu would not last a day in power without the support of the Reich.”<sup>34</sup> Andreas Schmidt's support of the Legionnaire Movement was not accidental. In his opinion, the green shirts—with the exception of Marshal Antonescu—represented the only political force ready to collaborate unconditionally with Nazi Germany, and willing, in the case of assuming power, “to surrender Transylvania and, if the situation imposed it, to accept the German protectorate.”<sup>35</sup>

The idea of incorporating Transylvania into the Third Reich in the event of a favorable end to the war or turning it into an autonomous province under German protectorate was expressed even more explicitly in Schmidt's reports to Berlin in 1943–1944, when the “final victory” was becoming increasingly unlikely. Thus, in a detailed report from 2 June 1944 to the SS leaders, Andreas Schmidt presented the recent political developments in Romania and suggested the ways in which Germany could maintain the Romanian state under German influence. Starting from the danger of weakening the Romanian army and the possibility of partisan movements emerging behind the German front line, Andreas Schmidt rejected the idea of a military occupation of Romania and proposed an astute political and diplomatic solution: to reshuffle Marshal Ion Antonescu's government by replacing the anti-German ministers with national conservatives and Germanophile military officers, possibly even German experts. In his opinion, in addition to the obvious political advantages, this solution also allowed Germany to mobilize and fully exploit Romania's material and human potential and “thus, weaken it biologically so that after the war it would not be able to invade and conquer the Carpathians.”<sup>36</sup> The opinions put forth by Andreas Schmidt regarding the future of Transylvania remained unchanged even after the events of 23 August 1944, which sealed not only the fate of Antonescu's regime but also that of the German Ethnic Group in Romania. In a letter dated 28 August 1944, sent to SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, about how to counteract Romania's surrender and to identify the Romanian political and military elements willing to continue the war alongside Nazi Germany, Andreas Schmidt claimed that the possibility of withdrawing behind the Carpathian line and forming a Romanian pro-German government in Transylvania would overcomplicate the relationship with Hungary as a result of the territorial dispute between the two states:

*Considering the previous historical events, the problem of Transylvania could only be settled through autonomy. The issue can be solved only when Transylvania and Hungary become, directly or indirectly, territories of the Reich.*<sup>37</sup>



Naturally, the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Soviet occupation of Romania and Hungary killed any hope that Schmidt, Phleps, and other GEG leaders had to settle the Transylvania dispute while protecting the interests of the Third Reich and the area's German minority.

**T**O CONCLUDE our research, we would like to formulate some observations. Undoubtedly, the conflict between Romania and Hungary concerning the problem of Transylvania, through its magnitude and consequences, intensely preoccupied the leaders of the Reich during WWII. Despite several projections proposing various solutions—most of them unrealistic, and some even fanciful—for political and especially military reasons, identifying the final solution to this thorny matter was postponed till the end of the war. At the current stage of the research, we cannot definitively say what Nazi Germany had in store for Transylvania if it had gotten its “final victory.” On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest Hitler was tempted to tip the balance in Romania's favor. This hypothesis is supported by his trust in Marshal Ion Antonescu and his praise of the Romanian army (at least before Stalingrad), and his open hostility towards Hungary and its regent, Miklós Horthy, and the rest of the Budapest government. On the other hand, knowing Berlin's special preoccupation with the ethnic Germans living outside the territory of the Reich, we cannot exclude the possibility that, in the event of victory, Hitler might have chosen to place Transylvania under German protectorate or to support the creation of the so-called Donauland. This latter option had at least three major advantages for the leaders of the Third Reich: it preserved Berlin's interests in Southeastern Europe, it fulfilled the requests of the GEG, and it prevented a war between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania. This option is also supported by the existence of a precedent: in 1941, the Serbian Banat—a territory initially promised to Hungary, but later claimed by Romania as well—was placed under German military administration. In the end, these projections led to no concrete result because of the defeat of Nazi Germany, but, paradoxically, Romania and Hungary's “German experience” around their territorial dispute ultimately played into the hands of the Soviet Union.

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## Notes

1. For the domestic and international context of the Second Vienna Award, see Gvula Juhász, *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája 1939–1941* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1964), 117–211; Loránd Dombrády, *Hadsereg és politika Magyarországon 1938–1944* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1986), 94–148; András Hory, *Bukaresttől Varsóig*, edited by Pál Pritz (Budapest: Gondolat, 1987), 309–348; Manfred Nebelin, *Deutsche Ungarnpolitik 1939–1941* (Opladen: Leske u. Budrich, 1989), 135–153; András Rónai, *Térképezett történelem* (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1989), 203–258; Mihail Manoilescu, *Dictatul de la Viena: Memorii: Iulie-august 1940*, edited, notes, afterword and index by Valeriu Dinu (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1991); Valer Pop, *Bătălia pentru Ardeal*, edited by N. Mareş (Bu-

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2. Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena*, 363.
  3. Árpád E. Varga, *Népszámlálások a jelenkori Erdély területén: Jegyzetek Erdély és a kapcsolt részek XX. századi nemzetiségi statisztikájának történetéhez* (Budapest: Régio, 1992), 144–145.
  4. Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, coll. 71/Germania, vol. 83, fol. 165.
  5. For more information, see Dániel Csatári, *Forgószélben (Magyar-román viszony 1940–1945)* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1968); Holly Case, *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Béni L. Balogh, *The Second Vienna Award and the Hungarian-Romanian Relations 1940–1944*, translated by Andrew Gane (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs; Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications; New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
  6. Central National Historical Archives of Romania (hereafter cited as ANIC), coll. Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri–Cabinet Militar, file 332/1940, fols. 1–23. For the discussions between Ion Antonescu, Benito Mussolini, and Galeazzo Ciano, see Galeazzo Ciano, *Jurnal politic*, translated by Dragoș Nedelescu (Bucharest: Elit Comentator, n.d.), 236, note from 14 Nov.; Mihail Sturduza, *România și sfârșitul Europei: Amintiri din țara pierdută* (Rio de Janeiro–Madrid: Dacia, 1966), 208–209.
  7. *Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945. Serie D: 1937–1945, Band XI, Die Kriegsjahre, Viertes Band, Zweites Halbband, 13. November 1940 bis 21. Januar 1941* (Bonn: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), doc. no. 380, 549–550, Aufzeichnung über die Unterredung zwischen dem RAM und dem Rumänischen Ministerpräsidenten General Antonescu in Berlin am 22 November 1940 (hereafter cited *ADAP*); Gheorghe Barbul, *Memorial Antonescu: Al treilea om al Axei*, edited by V. F. Dobrinescu, translated and notes by Sanda-Maria Ardeleanu and Mihail-Constantin Ardeleanu (Iași: Institutul European, 1992), 24. See also Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas* (Bonn: Athenäum, 1949), 511.
  8. Schmidt, 511–512.
  9. *ADAP, Serie D*, vol. XI/2, doc. no. 381, 556–560, Aufzeichnung über die Unterredung zwischen dem Führer und dem Rumänischen Ministerpräsidenten General Antonescu in Anwesenheit des RAM am 22.11.1940.
  10. Hillgruber, 151.
  11. Ion Gheorghe, *Un dictator nefericit: Mareșalul Antonescu (Calea României spre Statul satelit)*, edited with an introduction by Stelian Neagoe (Bucharest: Machiavelli, 1996), 151.

12. René de Weck, *Jurnal: Jurnalul unui diplomat elvețian în România: 1939–1945*, edited and translated by Viorel Grecu and Claudia Chinezu (Bucharest: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 2000), 122.
13. For more information, see Mario D. Fenyo, *Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941–1944* (New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 1972), 110–147; Jürgen Forster, *Die Auswirkungen der Katastrophe von Stalingrad 1942/1943 auf die europäischen Verbündeten Deutschlands und die Türkei* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1975), 40–96, 107–130; A. Simion, *Preliminarii politico-diplomatice ale insurecției române din august 1944* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1979), 263–278, 337–359, 380–414.
14. For more information, see Adolf Hitler, *Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944*, recordings by Heinrich Heim, edited by Werner Jochmann (Bindlach: Gondrom, 1988), 299, Eintragung vom 26.02.1942, 335, Eintragung vom 09.08.1942.
15. de Weck, 170.
16. Shortly after he assured the Marshal of the frailty of the Second Vienna Award, more precisely on 6 April 1944, during the daily military discussion of the theatres of military operations, with reference to the rivalry between Romania and Hungary, Hitler said the “the problem will sort itself out when the Russians enter the territory.” *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945*, edited by Helmut Heiber (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 555.
17. Hitler, 299, Eintragung vom 26.02.1942; 335, Eintragung vom 09.08.1942.
18. For the postwar German projections, see especially Hans Werner Neulen, *Europa und das 3. Reich: Einigungsbestrebungen im deutschen Machtbereich 1939–45* (Munich: Universitas, 1987); Wilfried Loth, *Der Weg nach Europa: Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939–1957* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990); Ralph Giordano, *Wenn Hitler den Krieg gewonnen hätte: Die Pläne der Nazis nach dem Endsieg* (Munich: Knauer, 1991); Pál Pritz, *Pax Germanica: Német elképzelések Európa jövőjéről a második világháborúban* (Budapest: Osiris, 1999); Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008).
19. Archiv des Siebenbürgen-Instituts Gundelsheim, file AXII-3/5, 12, Interview mit Herrn Dr. Bruckner, dem ehemaligen Volksgruppenführer der deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien von 1939–40, zu dem Thema: “Die Entwicklung des Deutschtums in Rumänien 1933–44” am 11.10.1969; Vasile Ciobanu, *Contribuții la cunoașterea istoriei sașilor transilvăneni 1918–1944* (Sibiu: hora, 2001), 237; Johann Böhm, *Die Gleichschaltung der Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien und das ‘Dritte Reich’ 1941–1944* (Frankfurt am Main etc.: Peter Lang, 2003), 48.
20. See also the Andreas Schmidt’s autobiography from 6 February 1944, published by Paul Milata, “Der Lebenslauf des ‘Volksgruppenführers’ Andreas Schmidt,” *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 28, 1 (2005): 70–76; *Diplomați germani la București 1937–1944: Din memoriile dr. Rolf Pusch, atașat de legăție și dr. Gerhard Stelzer, consilier de legăție*, translated by Ileana Sturdza and Cristian Scarlat, edited with notes, index and selection of the illustrations by Cristian Scarlat (Bucharest: All, 2001), 133. The German historian Heinz Höhne describes Andreas Schmidt as “ultra-Nazi, the prototype of a fanatic, intoxicated by Hitler’s cult.” Heinz Höhne, *Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf: Die Geschichte der SS* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1984), 425.
21. For more information, see Dirk Jachomowski, *Die Umsiedlung der Bessarabien-, Bukovina- und Dobrușchadeutschen: Von der Volksgruppe in Rumänien zur ‘Siedlungsbrücke’*

- an der Reichsgrenze* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1984), 46–52; Michael Kroner, “Prinz Eugen-Vermächtnis in nationalsozialistischer Version: Gerüchte, Wunschvorstellungen, Pläne während des Zweiten Weltkrieges über die Gründung eines deutschen Staates an der unteren Donau und im Karpathenraum,” *Deutsche Ostkunde* 34, 3 (1988): 136–140; id., “Zur politischen Rolle der ‘Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien’ 1940–1944,” in *Minderheit und Nationalstaat: Siebenbürgen seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, edited by Harald Roth (Cologne–Weimar–Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), 141–146; Ciobanu, 254.
22. Hillgruber, 147.
  23. ANIC, coll. Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri–Cabinet Militar, file 82/1941, fols. 35–36, note no. 1201 from 2 April 1941 sent by the Minister of the Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  24. ANIC, coll. Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri–Cabinet Militar, file 591/1941, fols. 1–30.
  25. Ciobanu, 257.
  26. ANIC, coll. Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri–Cabinet Militar, file 390/1942, fols. 354–355, the report of SSI no. 23486 from 24 November 1942 sent to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers–The Military Cabinet of the Head of State (*Cabinetul Militar al Conducătorului Statului*) signed by the SSI Chief Eugen Cristescu; Kroner, “Prinz Eugen-Vermächtnis,” 136–140; Dorel Bancoș, *Social și național în politica guvernului Ion Antonescu* (Bucharest: Eminescu, 2000), 197; Ciobanu, 258.
  27. Hitler, 299, Eintragung vom 26.02.1942. See also Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942*, initiated, commented and edited by Andreas Hillgruber (Munich: DTV Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1968), 198, Eintragung vom 29.06.1942; Ciobanu, 258.
  28. Hitler, 299, Eintragung vom 26.02.1942. See also Picker, 198, Eintragung vom 29.06.1942; Ciobanu, 258.
  29. *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 275, 21 Nov. 1940.
  30. For the military career of General Artur Phleps in the Romanian Army, and in the Waffen-SS, see Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin, file R 102053 Pol. I M Akten betreffend Agenten und Spionagewesen–Nachrichten–Band 22 1 November 1941–September 1944, passim; Romanian Military Archives, coll. Memorii Bătrâni, Generali, P, file 16–Artur Phleps; Ciobanu, 259; Paul Milata, *Zwischen Hitler, Stalin und Antonescu: Rumäniendeutsche in der Waffen-SS* (Cologne–Weimar–Vienna: Böhlau, 2007), 116–117, 130, 259–260, 283–285, 292; Ottmar Trașcă, “Die Deutsche Volksgruppe in Rumänien und die Ereignisse vom 23. August 1944 im Spiegel eines unveröffentlichten Manuskripts,” *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 34, 2 (2011): 186–228.
  31. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter cited as BK), Bestand R 43 II–Reichskanzlei–/file 1486 a. D 674554–674570. Memoire über die Wahrung deutscher Belange in Rumänien, vom 02.12.1940, gez. Artur Phleps. See also Ciobanu, 255.
  32. BK, Bestand R 43 II–Reichskanzlei–/file 1486 a. D 674554–674570, Memoire über die Wahrung deutscher Belange in Rumänien, vom 02.12.1940, gez. Artur Phleps. But the report had no consequences, because the Reich Chancellery reached the conclusion that “in the current situation, we cannot follow the opinions” expressed by General Artur Phleps. BK, D 674571. Vermerk Zu Rk. 19152 A vom 06.01.1941. See also Ciobanu, 255.
  33. Ciobanu, 256.

34. Bundesarchiv Berlin (hereafter cited as BA-B), NS 19–Persönlicher Stab des Reichsführers SS-/file 2859, fols. 151–155, Politischer Vierteljahresbericht der Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien vom 23.04.1943, gez. Andreas Schmidt.
35. BA-B, NS 19–Persönlicher Stab des Reichsführers SS-/2859, fols. 41–42. Tgb. Nr. 3776/42 geh. Schreiben des SS-Obergruppenführers Gottlob Berger an Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler betreffend Rumänien vom 02.10.1942, gez. Gottlob Berger.
36. BA-B, NS 19–Persönlicher Stab des Reichsführers SS-/2146, fols. 1–2, Bericht über die politische Lage in Rumänien, vom 02.06.1944, gez. Andreas Schmidt.
37. BA-B, NS 19–Persönlicher Stab des Reichsführers SS-/2859, fols. 99–101, Schreiben des deutschen Volksgruppenführers Andreas Schmidt an SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger vom 28.08.1944, gez. Andreas Schmidt.

### **Abstract**

**Pax Germanica: Projections of the Leaders of the Third Reich and of the German Ethnic Group to Solve the Problem of Transylvania between 1940 and 1944**

A frequently used method in the Third Reich's foreign policy in WWII to reach its objectives in southeast Europe was to exploit the conflicts in this area. A good example is the territorial dispute between Romania and Hungary over northern Transylvania. Given Nazi Germany's hegemony over continental Europe in 1940–1944, the present article aims to provide a brief overview of Berlin's attitude towards the Romanian-Hungarian dispute, how it instrumentalized the conflict, and the projections of the Nazi leadership as well as of noteworthy figures in the German ethnic minority in Romania regarding the settlement of the Transylvanian problem under the Third Reich.

### **Keywords**

German Ethnic Group in Romania, Transylvania, Nazi Germany, Andreas Schmidt