TRANSYLVANIAN REVIEW

Vol. XXI, Supplement No. 4, 2012

History, Philosophy and Politics
(10th–21th Centuries)

Edited by
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Publication indexed and abstracted in the
Thomson Reuters Social Sciences Citation Index®
and in Arts & Humanities Citation Index ®,
and included in EBSCO's library products.

On the cover:
Densuş (Hunedoara county),
Orthodox church, 13th century, general view,
photo by ŞTEFAN SOCACIU

Printed in Romania by Color Print Zalău
66, 22 Decembrie 1989 St.,
Zalău 450031, Romania
Tel. (0040)260-660598;
(0040)260-661752
www.colorprint.ro

Transylvanian Review continues the tradition of **Revue de Transylvanie**, founded by Silviu Dragomir, which was published in Cluj and then in Sibiu between 1934 and 1944.

Transylvanian Review is published 4 times a year by the **Center for Transylvanian Studies** and the **Romanian Academy**.

Correspondence, manuscripts and books should be sent to: **Transylvanian Review, Centrul de Studii Transilvane** (Center for Transylvanian Studies)
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Contents

Protectorates and International Guarantees in South-Eastern Europe (1774–1878)

Gheorghe Cliveti

The themes of protectorates and guarantees understandably imply multidisciplinary references. They have received the attention of several specialists in international law who excelled in definitions. Historians in turn have been concerned with factual reconstructions and with interpretations which highlighted the differences between the cases of protectorates and guarantees as revealed by international relations in modern times.

Protectorates are forms of domination or control exerted by a great power over smaller state entities, over certain territories, ethnic or religious communities within other neighboring or "overseas" countries. Protectorates arose from an exercise of power turned into rights. They were usually imposed by "protectors."

However, by definition, guarantees concern securities or rights of the guaranteed parties. They are rather granted than imposed. The guarantee terms reinforce the practical dimension, the binding nature of international instruments (treaties, conventions, agreements). They are *in spe* provisions, with explicit reference to their object, be it simple or multiple[1].

In South-Eastern Europe, protectorates existed in the 18th century, but in the 19th century the guarantors came into view as well. The geographical area of the so-called "eastern question" includes South-Eastern Europe, parts of "near" Asia and North Africa. In political-diplomatic terms, the beginnings of the "question" can be traced to the end of the 17th century, after the failure of the Turkish siege of Vienna. In the 18th and 19th centuries, "the question" loaded with data and significance. The primary meaning of "the question" was given by the Christian powers' dispute over "the heritage" of the decadent Ottoman Empire. An additional meaning was given

* This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/21/1.5/G/14722.

by the Christian peoples fighting for liberation from the domination of Muslim power. And perhaps the most strained meaning of "the question" was given by the European concern, especially after 1815, to stem the Russian offensive into the Balkans, the Straits and Constantinople.

Russia sought to extend its protectorate over the Orthodox Christians subjects of the Sultan. Its protectorate was meant to cover territories, provinces, inhabitants, the Orthodox Church with the Constantinople patriarchate. The "Great Northern Court" initially relied upon the French protectorate of the Christian Catholics and Holy Places as a pretext. Nevertheless, the goal of the Russian protectorate was one of actual domination and territorial acquisition. It is well known that Russia started its protectorate "program" towards the Danube and the Balkans during its 1768-1774 war with the Porte. Its intention was to annex the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and to impose its protectorate over the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire.

The resistance of the Porte and the reactions of the European powers, especially of Austria, made the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji confer Russia only a right to "talk" ("*de parler*") "for" the Principalities and the Orthodox Church of Constantinople. Russia sought afterward to turn the right "to speak" into the right "to interfere," with connotations of protectorate[2]. It did impose its *de jure* protectorate over the Romanian Principalities only in 1829, following the Treaty of Adrianople. The treaty did not explicitly stipulate it, yet it validated the Russian-Turkish agreement of Akkerman, which mentioned the protectorate.

Also under a protectorate were the Ionian Islands. After having taken them away from Venice in 1797, Napoleon's armies remained in the islands until 1798, when the Turks allied with the Russians conquered them. The islands were organized as a republic, tributary to the Porte and "protected" by Russia (at that moment the term *protectorate* actually corresponded to the actual situations more than the term *guarantee*). Following the Peace of Tilsit, the Islands were returned to Napoleon, but starting with 1814/1815 until 1863, they were a British overseas protectorate.

Instead, Russia's protectorate policy targeted territories and populations in the direction of Constantinople and the Straits. Understanding the "stakes of the Russian protection," the Romanians appealed to other powers, first Austria and Prussia, and especially France and Britain, for *European guarantees*. The British and the Austrians intended to offer a similar guarantee to the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Russia opposed. Russia's high ambitions, betrayed by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) forced on the Porte, drew European reactions resulting in the London Convention on July 13, 1841. Also known as the London Straits Convention, it accepted the principle of security, territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. Autonomous Greece was placed under European guarantee assumed by France, Britain and Russia in 1827. The London Protocol issued in January 1830 would recognize Greece as an independent nation.

The Romanian Principalities were at the heart of the dispute between the Russian protectorate ambitions and the European security rationale. When Russia occupied the Principalities in 1853, the European diplomacy considered the act a *casus belli*. Due to Russia's defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), the "first basis for peace" was to replace the Russian protectorate with the European collective guarantees over the Romanian Principalities and Serbia. Russia's objection that it had actually exercised "protection" and not a protectorate was superfluous. The Ottoman Empire was clearly the object of collective guarantees. Hence certain contradictions between concepts and facts to which we intend to direct our attention further on.

In the treaty of Paris, signed on March 30, 1856, such clauses distinctly concern the Ottoman Empire, the Romanian Principalities and Serbia. In each "case" the European powers assumed *collective guarantees* through *special provisions*. Therefore, any "questioning," in relation to historiography, of one or another of the three guarantees, might appear purely rhetorical, since it should have a pre-existing answer, expressed *stricto sensu* by the terms of the treaty of March 30, 1856 and its subsequent acts. But all these acts, and especially the most important of them—the Treaty of March 30—do not really give the impression that they excel in clarity, as they contain contradictory formulations apparently meant to convince us once again that political-diplomatic deliberations stood, as a rule, under the auspices of compromise.

Of the formulations (expressions) that allow a first instance assessment of the quality the Ottoman power was allotted as compared to the state of affairs established politically and diplomatically in 1856, one should consider those contained in Articles 7, 22, 25 and 28 of the Treaty. Article 7 provided that the Sublime Porte be admitted to participate in "the benefits of public law and European agreement," while the other signatory powers (France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Sardinia) engaged "each to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire" and "jointly guarantee the strict observance of this commitment, consequently considering any act likely to affect this principle a matter of general interest ...."

Under the same article, the High Porte was explicitly allocated the status of a guaranteed party that was recognized, implicitly this time, by Articles 22 and 28. The first of these stipulated that "the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia will continue to enjoy, under Ottoman suzerainty and guaranteed by the contracting powers, the privileges and immunities which they already have. No exclusive protection shall be exerted on them by one of the guarantor powers. There will be no private right to interfere with their internal affairs." As for the 28th article, it stipulated that "the Principality of Serbia will continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities established by the Sublime Porte and determined by the hatisherifs placed hereafter under the collective guarantee of the contracting powers." It follows from the content of both articles that the Ottoman power was guaranteed "suzerain rights" over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, while the three "provinces" were guaranteed, as appropriate, autonomy confined to a range of "privileges and immunities." As

stipulated by Articles 22 and 28, let alone Article 7, already presented above, nothing suggests that Turkey, one of the *guaranteed parties*, possessed any attributes of a *guaranteeing power*.

Something could be inferred, indeed, if Article 25 of the Treaty of Paris was read separately. In accordance to it, "the final agreement with the suzerain power" (an agreement concerning the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia) would be "consecrated by a convention concluded in Paris[3] between the High Contracting Parties"; "a hatisherif according to its stipulations" was going to shape "the final organization of the two provinces, placed henceforth *under the collective guarantee of all the signatory powers* "(*our italics—G. C.*). This last formulation (expression) has determined quite many reputable specialists in international relations[4] to argue that Turkey had the status of a guarantor, at least over the Romanian Principalities and Serbia. In several studies belonging to these experts, we actually find the expression "seven guarantor powers," an expression which, interestingly, was appropriated by Romanian militants as early as the "era of the Unification of the Principalities." For G. Zion, for example, the European guarantee means neither more nor less than that "Seven kings of the world want to know what we want."[5] Naturally, the *national cause* animated such spirits, as well as the acts and actions aimed at the consecration of its *triumph*, "a circumstance of utmost edification regarding the law of nations," for which the great powers would have assumed in the form and content of collective guarantee the role of a *European Areopagus*, with a moral, generous-intentional rather than political-legal connotation[6], marked by obligations and deliberative responsibilities.

The fervent plea on behalf of the Romanian national cause instantiated the "collective rationale" of the great powers in a manner such as shown and to whose imperatives the Porte had, it was believed, to subscribe, in order to certify its placement under the auspices of the European public law[7]. A plea whose content, given the state of mind "in 1857," incited by "the desire" to prove "in the eyes of Europe" the *internal unanimity* concerning the union, could not to give way to the achievement of the guarantor powers—suzerain power (court) binomial. And that generated a certain instability in the perception of the applied part of the collective guarantee regime, an instability that reverberated with time in almost all the historiographical endeavors regarding the issues of the relationship between the obligated and the guarantor parties[8], so that there was by no accident that the obligations of "the high courts" in 1856 concerning the Romanian party—and not only—came to be understood in terms of a protectorate[9]. The situation might be attributed to the fragmented assessments of the Treaty of Paris, with separate reference to the Romanian, the Serbian, the Ottoman Empire issues or to any other that might be placed under that international Act. It could also be explained by an interpretative juridical insufficiency of the guarantee "value" in the development of the relations between states, which made Frederick the Great of Prussia, about a century before the events under discussion and due to his familiarity with the clarification process of the principles

and norms of modern public law, to record that "toutes les garanties sont comme l'ouvrage de filigrane, plus propre à satisfaire les yeux qu'a être de quelque utilité"[10].

Understandably, it would be too much to aim to elucidate everything related to the guarantee issues. For something like that it would be necessary to create an extensive debate able to entail specialists in various fields, mainly in the "law of nations" and in the history of international relations. We tried to decide whether Turkey was a guarantor power by starting from a *sans oeillèrs* reading of the European political and diplomatic texts of the years 1856-1878 that dealt with the status of the Sublime Porte as a deliberating or a contracting party. A status that the Ottoman diplomacy fully displayed on the occasion of the Paris Peace Congress of 1856 and, to varying degrees, during the meetings or negotiations that took place in its subsequence.

Since the first meetings (25 and 28 February)[11], the atmosphere of the congress, which was far from a simple "recording room" for the "five points" of the *preliminary draft of the peace*[12], had heated due to the discussions concerning exactly the meaning of "solidary obligations" of the powers participating in the deliberations. After the Russian representative, Baron Brunnow, had resumed "the observations of Petersburg"—formulated at the Vienna Conference, in 1855—on the use of the term *protectorate* for the arrangements which "the great northern court" had instrumented on the Romanian Principalities under the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 and after the "clarifications" made by Count Buol, the Austrian Chancellor, who maintained that the "protectorate existed in fact," Aali Pasha, the Ottoman plenipotentiary, advanced the proposition that "termination of any *particular protectorate* should naturally exclude any idea of a *collective protectorate*" and that the "powers' intervention" should be "nothing more than a simple guarantee."[13]. In letter and, especially, in spirit, based on the "Romanian issue" and, implicitly, on the Serbian as well, the proposal revealed right from the beginning the separation between the statuses of the Ottoman Empire and of the guarantor powers, who have assumed *collective commitments* under the auspices of the European concert. These were based not on the isolated obligations of each of them, but on "une seule obligation solidaire et indivise qu'elles se sont engagées d'observer non seulement à son égard mais en commun l'un envers l'autre, de sorte que chaque puissance était responsable devant les autres"[14]. As for an analogous separation following the Treaty, taken as a whole, it was out of question because, as it handled active obligations par excellence, a passive guarantor would have been unnatural. The collective guarantee applied, first, to the Ottoman Empire, with explicit reference to its integrity and independence; further on, to the Romanian Principalities and Serbia, and to the relationships of these "provinces" with the Sublime Porte. It was therefore a "complicated game of guarantees," which, under the clauses of the treaty of March 30, 1856, placed in profound dissonance the intention to "strengthen the Ottoman Empire" assumed by the plenary of the congress and the Romanians and Serbs' ambitions of complete autonomy. Rightly guessing that such a dissonance was inexorably going to result in the weakening of the Porte's suzerain powers, Stratford Canning, the English Ambassador in Constantinople warned, not only on behalf of his reputation as a supporter of the "Ottoman cause," that he would

rather cut off his right hand than sign the Treaty.[15]. And indeed, in order to settle some of the complaints and fears of the Porte and its supporters, a special security convention was needed, concerning the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, agreed upon by England, France and Austria in Paris, on the penultimate day of the Congress (April 15) [16], yet not in the same frame, but in parallel with it, after the peace treaty had already been signed.

It thus follows from the diplomatic documents produced in 1856 in Paris, and actually from the logic of the active (contractual, synalagmatical) stipulations, that Turkey could not be its own guarantor (in the passive!). And such a result depletes the meaning in the synonymic relation between the guarantor powers and the signatory (contracting) powers of the Treaty from March 30. That synonymy "misled" almost all those who advanced the expression "seven guarantor powers."

We are then left to investigate on the thread of sources and background facts whether the expression had or did not have coverage in the political and legal reality with reference to the Romanian Principalities (the United Principalities, according to the Convention of 19 August 1858), whose relationships with the "high courts," not infrequently tense, have moments of particularly clear relevance in the sense we have planned to observe. For the sake of edification, we deem it sufficient to invoke the fact that, while for Serbia such relations only involved conferences in Constantinople between the "six" ambassadors and the Ottoman ministers, for Moldo-Wallachia they implied (in 1858, 1859, 1866) large scale European conferences in Paris, where the quality of the deliberating parties was illustrated more accurately.

As is well known, the Treaty of March 30, 1856 did not consecrate "the final solution"[17] for the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, a "solution" that was to not only redesign the international political status of the two small Romanian states, but also "their future organization." The Treaty of March 30 anticipated the termination of the *exclusive Russian protectorate* and the placement of Moldavia and Wallachia under the collective guarantee of the European powers, with the two principalities still remaining under Ottoman suzerainty[18]. At the same time, regarding their "future organization," the same international act only outlined the manner in which a "solution" was to be reached. In this respect, in Iasi and Bucharest were to be held ad hoc meetings convened by the Sultan's firman and "called to express the will of the people relative to the final organization of the Principalities," a "reference" that was to become the subject of the report of a special commission "sitting immediately in the capital of Wallachia" and composed of representatives of all "contracting parties," whose "... final agreement will be consecrated by a convention in Paris" applied to "the two provinces" through a hatisherif of the Porte.[19]. From all these provisions, the Porte's status against the collective guarantee system is not clearly apparent, let us admit, so that it was possible to include the "suzerain court" as an active part of that system, if only by taking in letter the above-mentioned conclusion of Article 25 of the Treaty of Paris, according to which "the provinces" were "placed from now on under the collective guarantee of *all the signatory powers*."

The impression that the High Porte was included as a *subject* by the collective guarantee system emerges, true enough, from the intermingling attitudes and mentalities that had had to express "the will of the population related to the final organization of the Principalities." Relying on *their sovereign rights* in a manner that actually obnubilated the clauses in the Treaty of Paris—that only granted them the possibility "to enjoy privileges and immunities under the Ottoman suzerainty"—the Romanians gave the ad hoc meetings of 1857 a deliberative-representative character instead of an advisory one, confined to the prescribed limits of the *Instructions Issued by the Congress of Paris to the Special Commission for the Principalities, 1856*[20]. "The foremost, biggest, broadest and most national wishes of the country," proclaimed by the ad hoc meetings, could take, therefore, the shape of a *fait accompli*[21]. The "desires" concerning their autonomy, union, a foreign prince and a representative government were proclaimed then as landmarks of the national program, and "all these—mention should be made—under the collective guarantee of the powers which signed the Treaty of Paris." Assimilating, for reasons over which we do not consider necessary to reiterate, the collective security to the status of the *European Areopagus*[22], the representatives of the national party had to comply with Article 25 of the Treaty of March 30, 1856, which, by considering the Porte among the guarantors, dissociated the regime applied to the Principalities from that applied to the Ottoman Empire instead of making it subsequent to the latter.

The compliance was proved by the *report of the Moldavian ad hoc Assembly's committee for the establishment of the relations of the Principalities with the guarantor powers*, which expressly stated that "Article 25 of the Treaty of Paris put the Principalities under the collective guarantee of all the signatory powers "[23]; as also proved by the *Thanksgiving act to the guarantor powers* of the same ad hoc assembly. When Kogălniceanu read it in front of the audience, it generated "lively and repeated cheers of *Long live the guarantor powers! Long live the union!* [24] It was about a compliance which, judged from the perspective of the Romanians' essentially positive good intent, was, we believe, the main argument in support of the view that at least in the Principalities there were seven "guarantor courts." Perhaps that is why the expression "seven guarantor powers" found its "place" chiefly in the specialized literature dealing with the "Romanian question."

"The foremost, the biggest . . . wishes of the country" did not actually meet the favorable opinion of the Paris conference of May-August 1858. The Convention of 19 August established the "final solution for the Principalities" in a sense that was more restrictive than that illustrated in the political-national program of the ad hoc meetings. It was going to profoundly affect the Romanians' manner of approaching the collective guarantee of the Great Powers. The Romanians had expected that to apply only for their national state ("external") "political being"[25] in order to grant them sovereignty—the free exercise of the *right to be*, while the "high courts" had agreed to impose a *way of being* (political and state organization). The Romanian reaction to the "half-steps" adopted by the great powers as a the "final solution for

the Principalities"—"a weird hybrid blend of union and separation," in A.D. Xenopol's words—was going to be the energetic policy of fait accompli[26], whose main outbursts (in 1859, 1864 and 1866) would lead to the *realization of Romania*[27]. However, every great fait accompli would inherently involve the challenging of the *guarantors' collective rationality* and therefore the disposition in real terms of the "high courts" on the occasion of the diplomatic conferences in 1859 (Paris), 1861 and 1864 (Constantinople), 1866 (Paris), all devoted to the "Romanian question."

Worthy of note, however, is the fact that the disposition in real terms of the "high courts" had to take shape during the Paris conference in 1858. Thus, its meeting of July 15[28] was devoted to the deliberations on "the relationship . . . that the suzerain court, the Principalities and guarantor powers will have to maintain." They first recognized or sanctioned the "right of the suzerain court to receive tribute, to confirm the prince (of each principality), to combine (establish) with the Principalities their territorial defense measures in case of external aggression and, if necessary, enable an agreement with the guarantor powers to maintain order in the Principalities, in a word, the right of the suzerain court to enforce international treaties on the Principalities in all the respects that do not affect the immunities of the country"; then" the Principalities' right of to regulate, without the suzerain court's interference, their entire domestic administration within the limits stipulated by the agreement between the guarantor powers and the suzerain court, as well as the right to appeal to both the suzerain court and the guarantor powers in case of violation of their immunities"; and last but not least, the "reserved right of the guarantor powers to adjust through diplomatic channels and through an agreement with the Porte, any dispute that would occur between it and the Principalities. . ."

And such rights or principles will be subject to the *in spe* clauses in the Convention of 19 August 1858, whose Article 9 endorses that "in case of violation of the immunities the Principalities, the rulers will address an appeal to the suzerain power, and if justice is not done to their complaint, they will make it reach—through their agents—the representatives of the guarantor powers at Constantinople"[29].

There may be many comments on account of the content inserted by the protocol of the meeting on July 15, as well as of the clauses with special guarantee reference or of the entire agreement of August 19, 1858. Nevertheless, any new comments can but ascertain the guarantor powers—suzerain court binomial, and the fact that the latter was not included among those who had assumed the "united and undivided duty of collective guarantee." The veracity of such findings could be strengthened with relevant reference to the political and diplomatic texts on the relations between the guaranteeing and the guaranteed parties until 1878.

Thus, in the Protocol of September 6 of the Paris Conference of 1859, destined to deliberate on the "double election" of Al. I. Cuza, it was mentioned that "the Sublime Porte, taking into account the *recommendation made by the six guaranteeing powers*, exceptionally provides for this once only the investiture of Colonel Cuza as Hospodar of Moldova and Wallachia, being clearly understood that all future

elections and investiture of Hospodars will proceed strictly in accordance with the principles set forth in the Convention of 7/19 August 1859"[30]; in the *Firman for the administrative organization of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia* of December 7, 1861, the Sultan reminded of the agreement occurred between the "suzerain court and the great guarantor powers"[31], whilst in the *proclamation to the country* on December 15 the same year, Cuza emphasized that "the Sublime Porte and all the guaranteeing powers adhered to the Union of the Principalities"; in the Protocol of June 28, 1864 issued during the conference in Constantinople, as well as in the *Addendum to the Convention of August 19, 1858*, the Porte's position and signature are dissociated from the signatures of the "six," just as it happens in the Protocol of March 10, 1866 issued during the Paris conference, when Safvet Pasha, the Ottoman representative, "declared that he was ready to examine and regulate, in the name of the High Porte and in joint agreement with the plenipotentiaries of the guaranteeing powers, all the questions raised by the recent developments in the Principalities "(the forced abdication of Prince Cuza—A/N) [32]; the same dissociation is also apparent in the international recognition of Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as Prince of Romania in 1866, an act that was a Romanian-Ottoman direct arrangement to which the guarantor powers subscribed subsequently[33]; it is also transparent in the failed attempt "of the six guarantors" to mediate the bloody conflict between the Porte and the Christian insurgents in the Balkans (1876-1877), a failure which betrayed the inevitability of the 1877-1878 war, whose implications will be the subject of the deliberations of the peace congress of Berlin[34].

In conclusion, we feel that we are entitled to sustain that Turkey was a *signatory* or *contracting* party of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and its subsequent acts, and not a *guaranteeing* power; also, that there were six, not seven guarantors—this conclusion being actually supported not only by quantitative but also by qualitative clarifications on very interesting issues concerning the evolution of the international relations in the 19th century.

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Notes

1. *Dictionnaire diplomatique*, A.A. Frangulis (ed.), Académie Diplomatique Internationale, vol. I, Paris, s.a., p. 721, 947 and following.
2. Harald Heppner, *Osterreich und die Donaufürstentümer 1774-1812. Ein Beitrag zur habsburgischen Südosteuropapolitik*, Graz, 1984, *passim*; Leonid Boicu, *Principatele Române în raporturile politice internaţionale. Secolul al XVIII-lea*, Iaşi, 1986, p. 148-271.
3. Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856; see D.A. Sturdza et al.., ed., *Acte şi documente relative la istoria renaşterii României*, *Acta et Documents relatives to the History of Romania's Renaissance*, vol. II, Bucharest, 1900, p. 1075-1084.
4. Almost all the specialists in Modern history of the generation of the *Histoy of Romania* treatise; see, on p. 266 the observation that "the Treaty of Paris had granted the

Principalities an international juridical status based on the collective guarantee of the seven powers"; v. A. Oţetea, "L'Accord d'Osborne (9 août)," in *Revue roumaine d'histoire*, III, 1964, 4; v. and Gr. Chiriţă, "România în 1866. Coordonate ale situaţiei interne şi internaţionale," in *Revista de istorie*, XXXI, 1978, p. 2197-2219; L. Boicu, *Diplomaţia europeană şi cauza română. 1856-1859*, Iaşi, 1978, p. 112; Dan Berindei, *Epoca Unirii*, Bucharest, 1979; Idem, *Societatea românească în vremea lui Carol I (1866-1876)*, Bucharest, 1992, p. 10; I. Bulei, *Scurtă istorie a românilor*, Bucharest, 1997, p. 230; also see the new Treatise of *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VII/1 (ed. Dan Berindei), Bucharest, 2003, p. 434 and following; see, interestingly, some foreign specialists, among which Barbara Jelavich, "The Great Power Protectorate and Romanian National Development. 1856-1877" in *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, XIV, 1977, 4, p. 681-690, and, recently, Keith Hitchins, *Românii. 1774-1866*, Bucharest, 1996, p. 357.

5. Cf. L. Boicu, *op.cit.*, p. 112.
6. D. A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. VI/1, p. 492-497.
7. *Ibidem*.
8. For further considerations, see Gh. Cliveti, *România şi puterile garante. 1856-1878*, Iaşi, 1988, p. 10-12.
9. Gh. I. Brătianu, "Politica externă a lui Cuza vodă şi dezvoltarea ideii de unitate naţională," in *RIR*, II, 1932, 2, p. 113; T.W. Riker, *Cum s-a înfăptuit România. Studiul unei probleme internaţionale. 1856-1866* (*The Making of Romania. A Study of an International Problem 1856-1866)*, Bucharest, 1944; Barbara Jelavich, *op.cit.*; Keitch Hitchins, *op.cit.*, p. 348.
10. Apud Vattel, *Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains*, vol. II, Paris, 1863, p. 235.
11. D.A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 999-1001 and 1003-1007.
12. A. Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe*, vol. II, Paris, 1891, p. 149.
13. D. A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 1005.
14. Serge Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, Paris, 1910, p. 141.
15. R. W. Seton-Watson, *Histoire des Roumains de l'époque romaine à l'achèvement de leur unité*, Paris, 1937, p. 271.
16. D. A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 1089.
17. The term entered the vocabulary of the diplomatic deliberations in Paris.
18. The Treaty of March 30, 1856, Art. 22.
19. The Treaty of March 30, 1856, Art. 23, 24, 25.
20. D. A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 1067-1070.
21. Dan Berindei, *Epoca Unirii*, *passim*.
22. D. A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. VI/1, p. 427.
23. *Ibidem*, vol. VI/1, p. 425-427.
24. *Ibidem*, vol. VI/1, p. 492-496.
25. The fact was proved by the attitude of the ad hoc assembly of Wallachia, which subjected to the opinion of the upcoming conference of the great powers only the "four points" of their national political program; *Ibidem*, vol. VI/2, p. 133-144.
26. P. Henry, *L'abdication du prince Couza et l'avènement de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trône de la Roumanie*, Paris, 1930, p. 81-87.
27. T. W. Riker, *op.cit.*, *passim*.
28. D. A. Sturdza et al., ed., *op.cit.*, vol. VII, p. 283-285.
29. *Ibidem*, vol. VII, p. 306-308.

30. Idem, "Însemnătatea europeană a realizării definitive a dorinţelor rostite de Divanurile ad-hoc în 7/19 şi 9/21 octombrie 1858," in *Analele Academiei Române*, s. II, t. XXXIV, 1912, p. 771.
31. *Ibidem*, p. 774.
32. *Ibidem*, p. 793.
33. Gh. Cliveti, *op. cit.*, p. 98-101.
34. Idem, *România şi crizele internaţionale. 1853-1913*, Iaşi, 1997, p. 232-234.

Abstract

Protectorates and International Guarantees in South-Eastern Europe (1774–1878)

Protectorates are forms of domination or control exerted by a great power over smaller state entities, over certain territories, ethnic or religious communities within other neighboring or "overseas" countries. The present paper aims to analyze the protectorate regime in South-Eastern Europe in the 18th -19th century, emphasizing the "game of power" between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

Keywords

Modern history, Romanian Principalities, protectorate, Ottoman Empires, Russia, Danube region