
TRANSYLVANIAN REVIEW

Vol. XXI, Supplement No. 4, 2012

History, Philosophy and Politics (10th–21th Centuries)

Edited by
DANIELA MĂRZA • LIANA LĂPĂDATU

ROMANIAN ACADEMY
Chairman:
Academician **Ionel Haiduc**

**CENTER FOR
TRANSYLVANIAN STUDIES**
Director:
Academician
Prof. **Ioan-Aurel Pop**, Ph.D.

Publication indexed and abstracted in the
Thomson Reuters Social Sciences Citation Index®
and in Arts & Humanities Citation Index®,
and included in EBSCO's library products.

On the cover:
Densuş (Hunedoara county),
Orthodox church, 13th century, general view,
photo by ŞTEFAN SOCACIU

Printed in Romania by Color Print Zalău
66, 22 Decembrie 1989 St.,
Zalău 450031, Romania
Tel. (0040)260-660598;
(0040)260-661752



www.colorprint.ro

Transylvanian Review continues the
tradition of **Revue de Transylvanie**,
founded by Silviu Dragomir, which
was published in Cluj and then in Sibiu
between 1934 and 1944.

Transylvanian Review is published
4 times a year by the **Center for
Transylvanian Studies** and the
Romanian Academy.

EDITORIAL BOARD

CESARE ALZATI, Ph.D.
Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Istituto
di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea,
Università Cattolica, Milan, Italy
HORST FASSEL, Ph.D.
Institut für donauschwäbische Geschichte
und Landeskunde, Tübingen, Germany
KONRAD GÜNDISCH, Ph.D.
Bundesinstitut für Kultur und Geschichte
der Deutschen im östlichen Europa,
Oldenburg, Germany
HARALD HEPPNER, Ph.D.
Institut für Geschichte, Graz, Austria
PAUL E. MICHELSON, Ph.D.
Huntington University, Indiana, USA
ALEXANDRU ZUB, Ph.D.
Chairman of the History Section of the
Romanian Academy, Director of the A. D.
Xenopol Institute of History, Jassy, Romania

EDITORIAL STAFF

Ioan-Aurel Pop	Rudolf Gräf
Nicolae Bocşan	Virgil Leon
Ioan Bolovan	Daniela Mârza
Raveca Divricean	Alexandru Simon
Maria Ghitta	

Translated by

Bogdan Aldea—English
Liana Lăpădatu—French

Desktop Publishing

Edith Fogarasi
Cosmina Varga

Correspondence, manuscripts and
books should be sent to: **Transylvanian
Review, Centrul de Studii Transilvane**
(Center for Transylvanian Studies)
12–14 Mihail Kogălniceanu St.,
400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

All material copyright © 2012 by the
Center for Transylvanian Studies and the
Romanian Academy. Reproduction or
use without written permission
is prohibited.

cst@acad-cluj.ro
www.centruldestudiiitransilvane.ro

Contents

• Editor's Note	5
------------------------	---

• The Middle Ages: A Different Face	7
--	---

L'horizon des tombes à dépôt de cheval ou parties de cheval dans la région comprise entre le Bas-Danube, les Carpates Méridionales et Orientales et le Dniestr (X ^e -XIII ^e siècles)	9
--	---

Adrian Ioniță

Die Beziehungen zwischen Byzanz und dem Königreich Jerusalem am Beispiel des kaiserlichen Hofzeremoniells von Konstantinopel im 12. Jahrhundert	43
---	----

Vlad Sofronie

Notes on the Documentary Mention of Hațeg in June 19, 1278	53
--	----

Tudor Sălăgean

The Transylvanian Anthroponymy in the 13 th Century: Introductory Views	61
--	----

Victor V. Vizauer

<i>Payne's Universum</i> in The Graphic Collection of National History Museum of Transylvania Cluj-Napoca	73
---	----

Claudia M. Bonța

Représentations sociales, peurs et règlements de conflits : Les Roumains dans les chasses aux sorcières de Transylvanie (XVI ^e -XVIII ^e siècles)	85
--	----

Ioan Pop-Curșeu

• Ideologies: Between Philosophy and Theology	105
--	-----

<i>Quantum potest et eductio formarum</i> : L'analogie de réception dans le <i>Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus</i> , d'Albert le Grand	107
---	-----

Daniel Fărcaș

Berkeley's Argument for the Existence of God in the <i>Alciphron</i> dialogue	125
---	-----

Vlad Mureșan

Culianu and the European Philosophical Inheritance	131
--	-----

Liliana Sonea

Metaphysics According to Ion Petrovici	145
--	-----

Claudia Renata David

Is There a Political Pathology?	165
---------------------------------	-----

Ana-Maria Dragodan

Defining Populism and the Problem of Indeterminacy: Some Conceptual Considerations	175
--	-----

Camil-Alexandru Pârnu

• A World in Motion: Political Realities and International Relations	187
<hr/>	
Protectorates and International Guarantees in South-Eastern Europe (1774–1878)	189
Gheorghe Cliveti	
La genèse de la frontière sur le Prout : les négociations de Giurgiu et Bucarest (1811-1812)	201
Armand Goșu	
La modernité roumaine à l'âge de l'apprentissage politique	221
Raluca Alexandrescu	
The Modernization of Romania—A Success or a Failure?	245
Gheorghe Iacob	
Mining Labor Agreements in the Jiu Valley during the Interbellum Period	257
Mircea Baron and Oana Dobre-Baron	
Processes of Globalization and Sport Development	275
Jean Fircă	
• Cultural and Historical Diversity	289
<hr/>	
Das Wort als Transporteur eines autochthonen Bildes – kann „ <i>Pfanne</i> “ ins Rumänische eindeutig mit „ <i>Tigăie</i> “ übersetzt werden?	291
Annelore Mayer	
Die ungarische Geschichtsschreibung zur Zeit des Dualismus	301
Vilmos Erős	
Chanoines roumains dans les grandes universités européennes pendant la seconde moitié du XIX ^e siècle	317
Ioana Mihaela Bonda	
Matrimonial Behaviours of the Transylvanian Romanian Rural Elite (Second Half of the 19 th Century)	327
Daniela Deteșan	
Sergei Prokofiev: The Relationship between Music and Communist Ideology: Outline of a Typology	339
Florinela Popa	
The Paradigmatic Polyvalence of Romanian Historiography: Past and Present—Themes, Authors, Orientations	357
Stoica Lascu	
Producing and Consuming “Folklore”: Study of the Origins and Usage of Folklore as a Field of Media Culture in Post-Communist Romania	391
Corina Iosif	
Mixed Marriages in a Multiethnic and Multiconfessional Environment: A Case Study on the City of Cluj (1900-1939)	405
Ioan Bolovan	
Bogdan Crăciun	
Daniela Mărza	
• List of Authors	413
<hr/>	

Metaphysics According to Ion Petrovici*

CLAUDIA RENATA DAVID

Introduction

THE TERM metaphysics comes from the ancient Greeks in the Hellenistic period. Etymologically, the word derives from the expression τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, with both components in the neuter plural; and it means “after the physicals” or “the ones after the physical ones. The most common meaning is the investigation of what is beyond the experience.¹ However, metaphysics tries to find the deepest meaning of “reality,” showing its “supreme reasons.”² Over the course of history this expression has had many different meanings, its real meaning must be found in the initial use for which the expression was created.

With Aristotle “the first philosophy” or metaphysics is a rigorous speculative domain, into in a system of a complete philosophical encyclopedia; it presupposes a theory of cognition where the appeal to the experience and to the rational deduction it is not anymore intrinsic conditioned as it is in Plato, but it is fully integrated. Plato thought that we can find what goes beyond the experience, soaring over the empirical world: for him, physical experience only in intelligible terms; but Aristotle considers that what is beyond physical experience does not reveal itself if, first, the experience itself is not examined, because the intelligible is revealed only in physical reality. On the other hand, one can not reach toward absolute being without a thorough study of existence in its universal aspects, beginning from the finite being. Hence we speak of metaphysics as an ontological and theological science: it is the science which studies the being as being and its essential properties.

This study aims to highlight Petrovici’s attempts to analyze metaphysics and its value, proving its legitimacy, its necessity, the weakness and lack of rationality of views against metaphysics, but also the relations that metaphysics, seen as a theo-

* This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/107/1.5/S/76841 with the title “Modern Doctoral Studies: Internationalization and Interdisciplinarity”.

retical discipline, has with the exact sciences, and his thrust to delineate the field of metaphysics from that of religion.

Petrovici's researches were aimed at the content analysis of the concept of philosophy and the determinations of philosophy, the value of these determinations and their relationships with other spheres of the spiritual life. In this, Petrovici has a double particularity. First, he assimilated data from the philosophical concepts of A. Fouille, E. Boutroux and F. Ravaisson as theoretical sources; second, he bases his explanations on a spiritual position or more precisely, on the position of a spiritual rationalism in which one can find a strong influence of the Kantian a priori acquisition through the prism of Ch. Renouvier's concept.

The value of Petrovici is that, in a period when metaphysics was condemned without reservation, he tried to demonstrate the need for this philosophical discipline, articulating many arguments in its support. He tried to prove that metaphysics' right to life springs from the need of spirit explore the deep mysteries of existence, to observe the world's first principles and to know the constituent elements of the cosmos.³

1. Petrovici and the Metaphysics Need

1.1. The necessity of metaphysics

PETROVICI IS the one who brings to Romanian philosophy the problem of the legitimacy of the metaphysics, in a period when it had not recovered entirely from the strikes received from positivists.⁴ Being convinced of the idea that the only existential chance of humanity is to find its value in reference to the Absolute, Petrovici did not allow himself to be corrupted by positivist spirit of the age, but dedicated himself to the revival of metaphysics.⁵ He considered it impossible to extinguish metaphysical concerns from the human soul, because everyone has the right to seek, solutions to the big questions. But, if metaphysics is not allowed, at least as private occupation, the Romanian philosopher asks himself if on a positive science and a rigorously controlled method it will not arrive at metaphysical statements stronger than those found in the metaphysics imposed by holy baptism⁶ or in speculations left to the discretion of each one. Therefore, in Petrovici's opinion, it is better to officially accept, metaphysics, because, this way, it will be legitimized as a discipline at which specialist will work, as in the other disciplines, not only with the will to know, but with the skill and proper training, thereby sharing with others the result of their meditation, which, even with shortcomings would have, it would be of better quality than the work of untrained people.

Nicolae Bagdasar, referring to Petrovici position in the Romanian culture, says:

Beginning his philosophical research with problems from the most arid, more abstract and less glamorous discipline, Logic Petrovici could not remain at Logic, but he brought

the same perspicacity and breadth of mind to the fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge, of philosophy of religion, of metaphysics and ontology, succeeding to construct the base of an original philosophical system and thus to enrich our spiritual treasure.⁷

Trying to outline the authentic meaning of the term metaphysics, Petrovici notes that the premises are in the philosophical speculations inherited from ancient the Greeks. “Aristotle has used the term without inventing it and without using it,”⁸ therefore this term was not used by classical Greek philosophy. But, in Petrovici’s opinion, although the expression was obtained accidentally, it is the proper one to designate supersensible speculations. He considers that the main cause of metaphysics’ decline is the development of natural science, as a result of their use of rigorous rational methods. The strong attack came from Auguste Comte, the representative of the positivist current, who announced the “end” of metaphysics. Thus the spiritual history of the nineteenth century takes place as a permanent dispute between a weak metaphysics and a prosperous opposition, a situation which extended through the first decades of the twentieth century.

In this context, Petrovici’s worth value was his defence of metaphysics, which was demonstrated throughout his work. In this regard N. Bagdasar said:

He is a metaphysician who builds with care and takes every precaution refusing to soar in speculations which exceed the limits of reason... When he soars in the rarefied sphere of transcendent he takes as a guide the reason and does not intend for even a minute to lose touch with experience and with the real.⁹

Trying to defend metaphysics, he divides his opponents into two categories. Some “who support neither more nor less the death of metaphysics, that it had once, a glorious existence, but now its time past, remaining a kind of mythology, good for children to fall asleep,”¹⁰ considering metaphysics problems as the invention of non-existent things. Dealing with them Petrovici aims to prove that:

Metaphysics did not die and moreover, it can not die. On the other hand we will have to admit, there were periods of eclipse and disappointment in the history of thought, periods of skepticism about metaphysical powers arising from passing circumstances which do not destroy its sustainability.¹¹

Another category of opponents are those “who state that it is confused, and obscure, because it deals with things that are beyond the hard facts.”¹² They consider the real metaphysical problems as being beyond our spiritual powers. They use the argument that human power is limited regarding cognition. Petrovici states that there were obscure metaphysicians, but it is equally true that there are obscure people, without being metaphysicians, because the clarity of expression is in many respects a feature of brain structure.¹³ On the other hand, because metaphysical discourse

is inevitably hypothetical some elements of uncertainty remain, however, is “chiar-oscuro darkness blind metaphysics is preferable to that which would remain to if metaphysical speculations was relinquished.”¹⁴

Sustained by the Kant’s famous critique his opponents state the impossibility of giving valid solutions to problems that are inaccessible way for our mind.¹⁵

The object of metaphysics is the Absolute, and the aspiration towards the absolute and its comprehension is always a problem faced by metaphysics. To consider that the purpose of research is only the relative and to put the relative in the hypothesis of existence is an aberration, according to Petrovici. The relative exists only in its communication with the absolute and the absolute exists in relation to the relative. He considers that the absolute is involved in the relative, they are together everywhere, and there are not two separated ways, through which one gets to, on one hand pure cognitions, and the other cognitions of absolute purity.

Science and metaphysics make icons of the same reality (or the same facts). But science forges them with more relativity and less absolute, while metaphysics compiles them (or in any case tends to compile) having a maximum absolute and minimum of relativity (emphasizing their supersensible substrate).¹⁶

Therefore, there is not a difference of nature but of degree, because there is not a boundary between one and the other, although scientific accuracy may fail at times, and if science has a right to exist, this right may also be claimed by metaphysics.

A theoretical error that Petrovici postulates is the relationship between the absolute and the relative goes in a single direction, and that the relative is a function of the absolute. That led to a hidden metaphysical vision and thus to the break between the absolute of relative. The separation is the second error, and it had its aim to prove the existence of the absolute in itself, and its fixation in a position of the supreme monad, in the existence invested with the creative function that Petrovici defines with the notion of God. Therefore the Absolute or God represents one and the same thing, but with two names in Petrovici’s philosophy, which does not exclude the spiritualistic substance of the conception. Turning on the relationship between the absolute and the relative, he said:

This relative—manifested in an endless chain of relationships between phenomena, through a huge correlation—is a reflexion of and the Absolute itself, of that deep and irresistible unity.¹⁷

The connections between phenomena are based on “absolute unity” which in its transcendent existence escapes eternally to human knowledge. The Absolute offers a unity to phenomena not only transcendentally but irresistibly so that effective unity has its origins “in an invisible place.”¹⁸ The tendency toward unity of human spirit can be explained by the same absolute, being “the absolute voice that carries us too.”¹⁹

Metaphysical concepts have something vague and lax, something elusive, but scientific concepts, even if deeper and with wider move away from concrete intuition.²⁰ Thus, both the scientific and the metaphysical concepts designed to provide explanations. The metaphysical ones give a general explanation, aimed “to introduce everywhere, a consistency and a deeper understanding and to shed a clear light, if not to explain in detail the chain of phenomena, the laws and their determined aspects. For this kind of explanation metaphysical concepts may appear more unfit and the attempts to use them at any cost in this way would not have satisfactorily results, thus compromising their prestige and value that would be left whole, however, from another point of view and for other purposes.”²¹ However, science, must use with moderation any concepts which attempt to penetrate deeper into the heart of things, because they are inaccurate and unsuitable for accurate deduction.

Petrovici says that the name metaphysics is kept for those speculations of thinking, which try to enter the supreme source of the universe and to determine the fundamental laws of its development. This name “metaphysics” is distinct from the mental activity which it expresses, but remains more connected to that activity than was legitimate, rational and everlasting in the manifestation of our spirit. Petrovici’s belief was that metaphysics answers a human need, a need of the soul, and that “metaphysical necessity, however dirty the conditions, is given to find itself and can not disappear completely,”²² because of that it is clear for him “Metaphysics is the central discipline of philosophical thought.”²³

The Romanian philosopher takes focuses on a general need, common to all spirits, when he claims that metaphysics is a need of the soul. He does not think only about the romantics, for which reason metaphysics needs to be grounded both theoretically and practically. In theory, he believes that metaphysics answers the tendency of the spirit to unity. The axiomatic nature of the trend towards unity is deficient because “the trend toward a unitary conception of the world has a deep structural basis in our soul”²⁴ and it must be explained. To do as Petrovici did invoking the unity of the human mind means to propose a subjective legitimacy of metaphysics and in this way argument turns against him. This trend tries to unify the sciences which coordinate groups of events which, at first glance appear disparate and disunited. However, each of those which deal only with one category of things and facts, thus their unifications remain partial. The same trend, which has operated on them, leads us to a total unification, more precisely, in a harmonious coordination of all events throughout the world, bringing us to the cause of causes, the foundation of foundations and the law of laws. Therefore, the spiritual impulse of metaphysics is identical to that from which were born all the positive sciences, and its aim is to accomplish fully what sciences have done and carry out in partially. Thus the “theoretical necessity” of metaphysics, built on the idea of spiritual unity, on the erroneous conception of the relationship between absolute and relative, has a twofold purpose: on the one hand, postulating the existence of God, on the other hand, postulating the idea of the impossibility of absolute knowledge, knowledge is reserved for worldly events.

What demands a metaphysical concept is practice. This ensures the premises for the fulfillment of the permanent aspiration of humanity to focus in the world and broadens the vision of the universe. Thus, Petrovici justifies his position by stating that:

The human person understands naturally that all his conduct can change as does the universe itself, it is good or bad, as it has a goal or not, as it is a blind mechanism or has a master ruler. This dimension of the conduct of the nature and the value of the world influence each other no matter how little, implies that this world, has meaning, and that implies metaphysics.²⁵

A proof of metaphysics' role in the practical conduct is the frequent call upon God to witness what man says or renders.

The need for an ideal it is another spiritual movement which justifies the necessity for metaphysical research. "People are so constructed that they are not content with what it is, but they aspire to what they think it should be."²⁶ Thus, Petrovici believes man is driven by an ideal. He must first believe in it and additionally, be supported from somewhere. There the person finds support in an invisible world, a metaphysical region, above the sensible world. Therefore human beings tend to theoretical and practical metaphysics; those who try to stop this spiritual power will have no success, because the issues of metaphysics dominate and call continually and the wave of the soul rises towards it as that the tide rises, attracted invincibly by the moon in the sky.²⁷

Metaphysical issues are of great importance for human beings, because "besides being intellectual interests, they are connected to moral concerns" and not only moral. The explanatory function of philosophical concepts is limited because they stop, in Petrovici's assertion, in the face of the absolute "ultimate reality,"²⁸ because that always escapes human knowledge. And the ultimate reality is God himself, whose existence is asserted on the basis of the "cosmogony argument, whose structure Petrovici kept entirely.

1.2. The Metaphysics Method

PETROVICI ADDRESSED the problem of method in metaphysics in comparison with the methodology situation of scientific research, highlighting similarities and differences between the two areas. He believes that without a good method one can not reach a goal in any branch of knowledge, but the knowledge of the method is not enough; but it must be more "a natural gift to guess the truth, to get direction and the place of solution, something that can not be transmitted and learnt."²⁹ The two areas are similar in the permanent tendency to truth, hence the real importance of method in research. The difference is that "science can not live only with real successes while metaphysics may be maintained with apparent suc-

cesses too.”³⁰ Where it is apparent that, while scientific hypothesis can be verified in metaphysics it can not be a conclusive verification and assumptions do not affect the immediate safety of individual human potential. Thus, in this respect, “an incorrect method does not produce identical harmful results in the metaphysical and the positive sciences.”³¹

The method is more important for metaphysics than for science, because the truth of science is under the control of the facts, but for metaphysics the only guarantee is the method:

*The domain of metaphysics is beyond the control of our senses, metaphysical assumptions and conclusions can not ever take the form of tangible facts, tied to assumptions more or less in harmony with the material world, but without tangibility and concreteness.*³²

And this because:

*The condition of metaphysics existence is and remains beyond the experience of the observable world. Hence the degree of its uncertainty that if it were mistaken it not would be what it is.*³³

Thus, Petrovici concluded that “metaphysics is not a science that circles in the arena and field, of experience its method can not be an experimental method,” therefore metaphysics needs methods which exceed the field of experience, but without wandering. Although metaphysics has as its object the absolute, it can not avoid the sensitive or ignore tangible, because of the relationship between absolute and relative, between the transcendent and the sensible world. Petrovici stated that the aim of metaphysics is not to construct a possible reality, but apprehend reality as it is, but that perspective contradicts the idea of necessity idea of a speculative metaphysics, which also wants to legitimize the actual existence of a transcendent force.

Some thinkers have proposed a rationalist method for metaphysics, taking into consideration the truth that the senses are subject to error while the intellect has already proven its utility in modern scientific research. This approach seems to be a natural solution. Opposing the construction of a purely a priori metaphysics, Petrovici postulates that the method for metaphysics be a dialectical synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, a rationalist-empirical method in which the emphasis highlights role of constructive-deductive, but not entirely rationalist.

*Reason becomes the instrument of available knowledge, capable of capturing the nature of reality which is easily hidden by the deceiving appearance of the tangible world. Reason can not only compensate in the metaphysical land for the lack of sense knowledge, but in this conception only it is able to give us proper knowledge, while our senses get misleading knowledge, so that true knowledge is precisely metaphysical the tangible maintaining a secondary value and serving more for practical orientation.*³⁴

For the Romanian philosopher, rationalist metaphysics reaches even the upper level of empirical knowledge, replacing the track record of sense reason:

Reason is not itself a way of ideas, but a characteristic feature. Not a background but an instrument. It needs something material from outside. If it would produce the material by itself it would lose its character as reason, as the tooth chewing foods would lose the nature of tooth if it would be removed from its own substance.³⁵

Thus, reason does not beget the material, as the rationalists believed, it does not behave like a “tabula rasa” as the empiricists believed. Therefore, the task of reason is to process and transform the received information:

. . . the result of intelligence is not only forms of unity and order that is only one of the knowledge factors. It has supreme importance, knowledge that is not able to confine a whirlwind of sensations is not worth the name of knowledge any more than inserting our spirit into a priori forms.³⁶

Petrovici says that the a priori rationalist method deals with the concerns of our spirit; it does not construct potential realities such as mathematics, but it understands the reality as mathematics is. The a priori factor is one of the main elements of consciousness, it has its essential role in the construction of metaphysics, for this reason, in Petrovici’s opinion, this method may not be the method of metaphysics. Metaphysics following a mathematical model is excluded because as a priori factor it is one of the elements of consciousness and it has its essential role in metaphysical construction. Petrovici believes that the philosopher Kant started from a mistaken idea by saying that a part of metaphysics can be built a priori, because experience can not contribute with anything to the achievement of metaphysics, it climbs beyond the field of experience. Metaphysics is only “what we can say a priori about reality.”³⁷ Thus, some thinkers believe that metaphysical truths can not be acquired simply by any empirical method, but only by a rational method. They have become skeptical, while others suggested the method of mystical ecstasy. The mystical method is defined by Petrovici as an inner impulse of the soul which, at certain times, break free of the prison of the body and go to the regions of higher sources of existence, succeeding contemplating the ultimate true light, invisible to the common eye, “it is about a direct contact with the absolute reality, accompanied by superior and profound vision.”³⁸ He sees mysticism as close, in one respect, to rationalism in that its instrument of knowledge is an interior process including the extinction of tangible data and cutting off all communication with the outside world. This might explain the mystical elements of some rationalists. It is like empiricism in that it rises to the upper regions of the logical steps, that it has concrete visions with a spiritual eye. Therefore, according to Petrovici, “the fundamental method of metaphysics can not be other than empirical-rationalist.”³⁹ This method, according to the Romanian phi-

osopher, is gradually gaining a central position in metaphysical constructions. He notes, historically, that the analogical method has become the central construction. However, in order to be effective, it must fulfill certain conditions:

An analogy is only valid if it is surrounded by security and here it is just the work of reason which analyzes, compares, binds and concludes. A strong analogy is not created by a spontaneous expansion of a certain insights, even if it has as a starting point an intuition.⁴⁰

The metaphysical construction can also be considered aesthetic principles, but without confusing truth with beauty, but admitting a kinship between them, which makes possible the collaboration and the completion of one by another.

2. Metaphysics in Petrovici's Thought

2.1. Metaphysics and religion

PETROVICI WANTED to define metaphysics as “empirical-rationalist.” Metaphysics was associated with religion and even identified in some respects, with religion. From this perspective, his metaphysics is a religious metaphysics and he proposed that religion was metaphysical. In Petrovici's vision, philosophy and religion were on the same plane, both in view of their subject and the ideal on which they focused. To separate philosophy from religion is absurd and harmful, because both of them refer to the same domain, even if they are not always identical: metaphysics becomes the servant of religion the servant of religion. Petrovici criticize the law of three stages proposed by A. Comte, who claimed that the spirit of mankind in its evolution moved from the theological to the metaphysical and then to the positive stage. In regard to the second part of this law, the passage of the metaphysical spirit of the positive phase, the Romanian philosopher declares that “metaphysics can not be replaced by any positive science, nor by all of them.”⁴¹ He insisted first that the French philosopher argued that metaphysics is not historically exact, because the human spirit, “Although it changes directions often returns to previous thoughts which had been abandoned for a while; and we witness regular alternations of metaphysical aspirations and positivist provision.”⁴² In the second place, Petrovich recognizes value in Comte's statements that indicates a direction in the further development of metaphysics:

Admitting that under the growing influence of a positive spirit, metaphysics should not disappear, but become increasingly more positive, taking into rigorous account the results of sciences and using methods strictly controlled and enforced.⁴³

A particular interest for Petrovici was the first part of Comte's proposal that the transition of the human spirit from the theological stage, to the metaphysical one.

The situation of metaphysics regard to theology is not identical to the situation of positive science with metaphysics. Petrovici has the idea that religion does not come into being in the same way as metaphysics nor does it relate to science in the same way because the object of science is the sensible domain, while the supersensible, especially metaphysical is claimed by religion.

The Romanian philosopher notes that, although the essence of a cohesive personality is unity, some thinkers, tried to claim to sustain the rights of religion differently. He disagreed with them saying that:

The essence of a cohesive personality is the unity, it is impossible to divide us into a person who thinks and one who believes. Therefore it is not seriously possible that this be contested, and that our searching mind not admits our religious belief. The criteria for truth are always the same and just because there is or should be <a unity of method >, two sets of truths, which do not have the same control, do not fit together and are not indifferent to one another cannot live in us beside one another. . .⁴⁴

Petrovici does not accept the position of thinkers who believes that every religion is based on metaphysics, because:

Regarding the religion we should say more than that, its doctrinal part (without which it does not exist) is metaphysics. Religion does not have a particular terrain, different from metaphysics, but regards the emotional and volitional attitude which are constitutive factors of any religion; they are nothing else, in my opinion than practical consistency of a metaphysical theory.⁴⁵

Although the issue of divinity is also required in philosophical thinking, we can not settle for pure acceptance of experiential data and nor for irrationality assertions, but we will continually seek to solve the problem by accepting the concept of God. Connecting the religious plan with that of thought is possible, although they have different means and laws. Thus, the role of reason in religion is a secondary one, as the feeling may be insignificant in thinking. The Romanian philosopher stated that “the concept of God is an attempt to express the absolute in relative terms,”⁴⁶ because the fundamental issues of religious faith do not belong to thought, but to feeling, and this will may contribute to the infinite unity.

The conclusion at which Petrovici reaches is that religion is the metaphysical practice and because of that, there would not be conflicts between them because they are designed by their nature to understand one another. He recognized some possible conflicts because not all the metaphysical systems recognize a higher principle the material world. In addition to the materialist theory, all other metaphysical systems allow for and cause a feeling state that is called religious feeling. The conflict, says Petrovici, it may be between a new and an older metaphysics, the latter of which does not give up ground, although the new one is right, the older will not accept anything, and will not recognize the validity of the new. What the method

refuses and the modern consciousness, holds on to is that religious sentimentality defeats the old one. Other conflicts may be aroused in regard to religion, because:

*All the existing religions are conservative and traditionalist, declaring intangible the whole doctrinal parts of their body those dogmas which in many respects are only an old metaphysics, born and developed at a particular time of history, which have been overtaken by the progress of philosophical thought. From here the conflict is inevitable.*⁴⁷

Religion has advantages over metaphysics, in that, while metaphysics makes statements about problems, religion makes categorical statements, religion makes statements says without proof, while metaphysics strives to demonstrate. Another advantage is that “any religion has a ready finished building, while metaphysics is building in an eternal construction”⁴⁸; however it may seem inconvenient and outdated the first building offers a quieter refuge than the ever unfinished walls of metaphysics. The existence of ritual is another advantage of religion, which is always a force, because through some easy practices the human can avoid effort and still ensure happiness.

From religion’s advantage over metaphysics, Petrovici indicates that metaphysics encounters various obstacles which delay its victory; it needs someone to develop a religious doctrine in harmony with the hopes and the new knowledge being proposed. Until then, Petrovich suggests a symbiosis of philosophy and religion, showing that religion is the practice of metaphysics, and this situation “erases” the conflict between them. This symbiosis causes “religion to insist less on the old, and metaphysics to close its eyes to it.”⁴⁹

2.2. The Idea of Nothingness

IN THE philosophical language there is a distinction between nonexistent and nothingness, and between nothing and nothingness.

*Non-existence is considered the negation of Something, Existence and something are the two terms called transcendental by tradition because they are valid for all that is given. The term nothingness usually amounts to the negation of the two transcendental terms, which is a kind of summary of non-existence and of nothing. . .*⁵⁰

The Romanian philosopher does not consider the affective aspect of the idea of nothingness, nor its possible connection with the idea of death, but he seeks its logical value and the philosophical nature of the consequences. There is a difficulty in addressing this issue. The term nothingness *CAN* be the subject of a valid sentence as long as the subject of a sentence is something real. Thus, as long as the nothingness, involves the denying, saying that nothingness exists is a conflict. On the other hand, to assert that nothingness does not exist, simply denies it. Therefore Petrovici finds that this difficulty divides the thinkers into several categories, first, there are those reject the idea of nothingness,

considering it absurd and even contradictory. Second, there are those who legitimize the idea of nothingness. The third category are those who try to reconcile the statement with negation, to approve the transition from nothingness to existence.

He states on the side of the second category, building his own arguments on nothingness, entering into polemics with the thinkers of the opposing camp. Therefore, to those who argue that the idea of nothingness implies a thinking subject, and its presence contradicts the existence of nothingness, he answers that:

*No human thought can be conceived of apart from the human spirit. However, almost never is an individual subject an indispensable part of the content of concepts which are developed simply removing the thinking subject.*⁵¹

Petrovici admits that we can have an idea about the nothingness and this idea is valid because the existence is a fact that we can doubt because it is not an absolute necessity. And what makes existence appear to us is not understood in itself, but shrouded in mystery. The idea of nothingness is present even if only as a mere possibility.

*Without the feeling of mystery, there would be no need of supernatural explanations, that need was alive in the origin of world and serves as an engine to all religions.*⁵²

Petrovici starts from the belief that:

*Reality is a fact, but not a necessary fact...of course an undeniable fact, but a material fact, which compels us to admit it necessarily.*⁵³

Therefore, the cognoscible existence can not be explained by itself, because it is not self-sufficient to itself. Being contingent, degradable, the existence offers itself to knowledge as a corrupted reality, required to be related to the idea of necessity in order to increase its prestige by fitting into the category of the rational.

Even if the idea of nothingness is denied, however, the existence needs of rational “necessity” situation in which Petrovici said:

*Instead of making the impossibility of nothingness a kind of guarantee for the necessity of existence, a necessity which our intuition does not ever confirm because existence appears to us as a fact and nothing more, we could more easily take the opposite approach, considering the irrational and precarious character of existence as a proof of the possibility of nothingness, or at least of the legitimacy of the idea of nothingness, present in our mind and concept in the abstract of thought.*⁵⁴

Thus, if the idea of nothingness is conceivable, the transition from nothingness to something exceeds, according to Petrovici, any conceivability, because that passage is impossible, because the correlative terms, nothing and something are mutually exclusive.⁵⁵ In the same way, it is impossible to conceive the transition from possible to real, unless when by possible one means a hidden real. Real created by possibility,

understood in a strict way, gives us, according to Petrovici, the same idea of the oddity as the real created by nothingness.

In Petrovici's opinion, these difficulties seem insurmountable when the idea of nothingness precedes existence as well as when it follows it because absolute nothingness can not be conceived, either before or after existence. To identify nothingness with the unknowable, as Rickert did, is an error, although between the idea of nothingness and the unknowable there are some specific similarities. Both lack the quality of being knowable and both are terminal and restful concepts. Beyond that, there is no similarity between the two concepts. While unknowable is a kind of existence, nothingness is its denial. Moreover, Petrovici says:

*We develop this idea of the unknowable, because of our inability to deduce the world from nothingness and equally because sensible existence even developed by intelligence can not be explained by itself, nor affirm itself as necessary.*⁵⁶

This means that:

*We imagine the unknowable to escape from nothingness and we are forced to renounce the bold idea of deriving nothing from <something>. We think we are taking one thing from another which is beyond our natural knowledge, but which we conceive as absolute restfulness, and Nothingness. But far from it, total nothingness and vacuum would be complete and necessary existence. The unknowable replaces the Nothingness, unworthy to serve as a principle of the world and replaces it with the keeping of some apparent similarities.*⁵⁷

From the inability of the mind to derive something from nothing, we come to the idea of the unknowable which has the great advantage of being an unknowable existence, unknowable in terms of other qualities, a full and necessary concept. But we can not hold onto the unknowable. According to Petrovici, philosophical thinking has discovered a brighter idea and a higher prestige level: the idea of God. The idea of nothingness and the unknowable are steps toward the idea of God. Petrovici says, "The idea of God is the existential and fertile equivalent of the idea of nothingness, completely empty and barren."⁵⁸ Human thinking is characterized by the ability to deny, to separate itself from concrete existence and to project itself into the Absolute.

Petrovici says that "Nothingness is for us, an idea that is conceivable and even has a magical attraction. If it would remove us from God, it also brings us back to Him, and because of it we try to climb back to the lost paradise."⁵⁹

2.3. The Idea of God

PETROVICH'S STARTING point is the argument of *contingentia mentis*, which means:

*With the belief that the idea of an infinite God, present in our spirit can not be conceived by the human spirit which is essentially limited, it follows that we designate an infinite cause, God himself, and we understand that cause as to be as much reality as it is an effect.*⁶⁰

Regarding the existence of God, Petrovici disagrees with the tendencies of philosophers like Kant, I. D. Hume, who ruined the classical arguments for God's existence, driven by the desire to separate the subject of religious belief of any rational dialectic. This dissociation is based on the assumption that the notion of God did not first appear in philosophy, but was discovered in social life. This claim was accepted by Petrovici, but even if this concept of God springs from a complex of social beliefs, it also has roots in the philosophical spirit, theologically clothed at first, fueled by the need for understanding and a global explanation of existence. The idea of God gives human spirit far more than what comes the idea of nothingness, so that the human mind always tends towards this idea.

The position that Petrovici sustains, it is that without the intellectual element, the idea of God could not be created or retained. According to Petrovici excessively reduce or to overlook the role of reason in the genesis of the idea of God means to forget that religion was born in good part because of reason; it means to forget that religious explanations satisfied reason at the beginning. Reason was present both at the birth of the idea of God, as well as in its maintenance over the centuries.

It was the intellectual backbone that led to a concept of God which in all religions includes the concept of an "other" existence and a higher nature, of the concept of a "beyond," and even to preserve it.⁶¹

The idea of God can be proven through reason, by a posteriori way. As an a posteriori argument, the cosmological argument is built on the reason:

The existence we known is not necessary and is naturally contingent. Its base can not be found in itself, where the chain of causality never ends, but rather, in a higher principle, which embraces in itself the own raison of being. With this we reached the divine source of God's existence the ultimate reality, transcendent, perfect and eternal.⁶²

Some thinkers objected to this cosmological argument. The first such objection was that the theory does not demonstrate the existence of a "personal "God. To this, Petrovici replies that no exigency of scholarly theology requires that God be personal, but rather such a claim decreases divine dignity. Another objection is that, although the argument refers to a transcendent cause, it does not show its perfection. Petrovici replies that divine perfection is not the subject of the cosmological argument, but is linked to the ontological argument of ambition. A third objection is that it would be absurd to doubled the mystery of existence, putting the origin of the world into a mysterious God, rather than simply admitting that the world is actually unintelligible in its origins. Petrovici says:

Not every reality can be its own cause and we can not silence the category of causation to. The material world can not in any case be its own author giving it a basis entirely different from known phenomena.⁶³

From the realm of idealistic philosophy comes another objection through regarding the distinction between the world as it is and the world as it appears. Based on this distinction some claimed that the cosmological argument is based on a fictional premise, because the reality of contingency which we know may not be an objective one, but subjective, due to the limits of human knowledge. Therefore it is possible that the phenomena of nature be explicable in themselves and thus there is no need for a transcendent principle to explain their occurrence. Also as an objection to the cosmological argument it is an inconsistent Kant's remark, that the principle of causality should be applied only to the sensible world and not to go beyond it. Petrovici made two comments to this objection. The first concerns the causality of phenomena which "does not refer to one dimension but to two, preserving the surface and going deeper."⁶⁴ This refers to the old distinction between the occasional question, which explains the reality itself, and the efficient cause, that one which goes deep down beyond the plane of nature, in an inaccessible area. A second observation is that by accepting Petrovici's idea of God it does not extend the causality, but it is broken the causal chain.⁶⁵

Finally Petrovici noted that religious experience, as a mean of direct observation of God's existence, comes to a conclusion from a concrete experience of God, being convinced that the old cosmological argument did not lose its importance and that, as it was partially modified, it provides conclusive proof for God's existence. The existence of God can be proved starting from the hierarchical aspect of nature. Nature is presented as evolutionary grades, which culminate with man. The human spirit does not stop to notice the steps, but it imagines degrees which exceeds itself and raises itself toward the idea of a perfect existence. However, we must not conceive God as perfection in progress, but as a perfect from the beginning and forever. Absolute is above the instability, above empirical becoming, as God appears as the world's continuing support, without which it would collapse.

3. Possible Steps in the Absolute Knowledge

3.1. The Knowledge problem

ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE when the knowing subject is identified with the known object. According to Petrovici's opinion "our knowledge is relative, so we can not talk of absolute knowledge and therefore it can not be a metaphysical speculation, directed by definition, toward the absolute⁶⁶; therefore metaphysics is not able to achieve the absolute knowledge. In Petrovici's opinion, one of the problems that can not be avoided by any genuine philosophy is that regarding the possible levels to approximate in knowledge "thing itself" and the starting point comes from the theories of Kant and Schopenhauer. Kant divides the world into "phenomena" (apparently "the thing as it appears) and "noumena" (the essence or the thing itself⁶⁷) and concludes that "the thing itself" or the Absolute is unknow-

able. Thus, the intellect, using a priori forms, organizes the information of phenomenal world as a spatial-temporal and causal model, and therefore it can not include the thing in itself. With this theory, Kant denies the possibility of the existence of metaphysics and limits the possibilities of philosophical research.

Schopenhauer states that “. . . we can not find the thing itself in the external world, but we can find it in ourselves,”⁶⁷ because in human life the object and subject, the phenomenon and the thing in itself are the same and thus it is possible that internal sense, the eternal impulse to life, will reveal the work itself. The whole human capacity when faced with absolute knowledge, is forced to recognize relativity and Petrovici considers that the moment of recognition is the Kantian philosophy.

To those who argue that the limits of knowledge are an argument against metaphysical possibilities, the Romanian philosopher responds that the transition is gradual between the unknowable and the knowable because it can not define a limit beyond which the cognition would be impossible.

Varied and numerous obstacles stand in humanity's path man toward the truth, obstacles of fact and of right. The former ones, which the thinker also calls external, are less severe. The right obstacles are inside the spirit itself and necessarily and inevitably pose the problem of limits of our understanding. Our minds do not act only with rational elements, but also with irrational. Petrovici states:

*Human knowledge with its own structure is not capable of comprehending the countless versions of the eternal truth - versions placed at different levels, but still equivalent, in terms of their essential characteristics and their general meaning.*⁶⁸

Eternal truth is a distant ideal for human knowledge an ideal toward which it tends continually without reaching it, hence “the restless dynamism of human science, always looking to step forward,” but remaining far from its goal. According to Petrovici “this is a truth that we can not overlook and a thing that is understood by itself,” because knowledge was and will always be relative, there will never be a perfect correlation between knowledge and reality.

Although Petrovici defends metaphysics' right to existence, he recognizes that the ideal of knowledge can not be reached, but that does not threaten the aspiration to achieve it.

3.2. The Relation Mind – Body

THE RELATION between mind and body is the central problem of any philosophy. The spirit is deep, different from the body, with two striking attributes: spiritual consciousness which embraces in itself the whole infinite material world while the body is a tiny part of this material world. The spirit is transparent,

while the body is opaque. To prove that spiritual existence exceeds physical reality, Petrovici uses many arguments. A first argument is the memory. Memories appear in consciousness in relation to the need to maintain and further a selection. But in certain circumstances, memories are impetuous, not taking into account the selection imposed by the principle of conservation. This demonstrates that “the body is not a substrate, but a limit and a barrier.”⁶⁹ A second argument is the reason. Endowed with a priori forms, the mind organize the sensible world and encounters resistance. If the sensible world were the natural arena of the spirit, then its form should not look like “heterogeneous groups that work clumsily and imperfectly”. A third argument is the feeling. The body is experienced as an impediment and incomplete implementation of the spirit, because the earthly world arouses in the human person the presentiment that, freed from the body, the spirit will find its full realization. The fourth argument is the phenomenon of telepathy. These phenomena show that there are inter-spiritual communications dispensed through physical venues. There is, according to Petrovici, an unknown substance which is manifested by two attributes, one more deeply spiritual, more relevant, and the most superficial and desert material. According to Petrovici the two domains of reality, body and spirit, are heterogeneous.

Conclusion

ACCORDING TO I. Petrovici, everyone has their own metaphysics, because we can not give up the need to explaining the world in which we live and define our place and purpose in our corner of the universe. Giving up metaphysics is impossible because “our spirit can not be confined only fleeting fragments of knowledge without trying to overcome and unifying them and ascending them to the ultimate principles of reality.”⁷⁰ This is the mission of metaphysics. Petrovici’s belief was that, the motives of the metaphysical impulse are profound and are based in the nature of the human spirit, always committed to fully understanding existence.

According to Petrovici metaphysics and religion have the same object; hence the question arises whether metaphysics can replace religion. The interesting solution that he proposes is that religion is metaphysics, and the emotional and volitional attitude which are constitutive factors of any religion are nothing but the practical consequences of metaphysical theory. Clearly asserting the superiority of secular metaphysics over religious, he recognizes that conflicts have often sprung from giving the advantages to psychological nature rather than religious in metaphysics. Petrovici remains relatively confused, when he has to determine who will win the final victory in this competition and whether or not we can speak about a race which to end with one of the competitors emerging as victor.



Notes

1. J. Owens, *Metafizică creștină elementară*, Galaxia Gutenberg, Târgu-Lăpuș 2007, p.17.
2. *Enciclopedia filosofica*, ed. Istituto per la collaborazione culturale, vol. III, Venezia-Roma 1957, col. 533.
3. N. Bagdasar, *Istoria filosofiei românești*, Profile Publishing, Bucharest 2003, p. 147.
4. I. Ianoși, *Dicționarul operelor filosofice românești*, Humanitas, Bucharest 1997, p. 88.
5. Șt. Munteanu, *Raționalitatea metafizicii lui Ion Petrovici*, Axis, Iași 2003, p. 49.
6. *Ibidem*, p.10.
7. N. Bagdasar, "I.Petrovici metafizicianul," in *Revista de filosofie*, XXVIII, no. 3-4 July-Dec. 1942, p. 181.
8. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," in *Filosofi contemporani*, Garamond, Bucharest 1997, p.12.
9. N. Bagdasar, "I. Petrovici metafizicianul," p. 204.
10. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," p. 9.
11. *Ibidem*, p. 10.
12. *Ibidem*.
13. Șt. Munteanu, *Raționalitatea metafizicii lui Ion Petrovici*, p. 79.
14. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," p.10.
15. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," p.10.
16. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica și legitimitatea ei," p.17.
17. *Ibidem*, p.123.
18. *Ibidem*, p. 133.
19. *Ibidem*.
20. V. Zvâncescu, "Metafizica lui Ion Petrovici," p. 186
21. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica și legitimitatea ei," p.19.
22. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," p. 27.
23. *Ibidem*, p. 19.
24. I. Petrovici, "Prolegomena. La țărnul metafizicii," *Introducere în metafizică*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest 1929, p. 132.
25. *Idem*, "Metafizica și legitimitatea ei," *Introducere în metafizică*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest 1929, p. 14.
26. *Idem*, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," p. 17.
27. I. Petrovici, "Metafizica și legitimitatea ei," p. 16.
28. Gh. Cazan, *Istoria filosofiei românești*, Didactică și Pedagogică, Bucharest, 1984.
29. I. Petrovici, "Metoda în metafizică," *Introducere în metafizică*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest 1929, p. 27.
30. *Ibidem*, p. 40-41.
31. *Ibidem*, p. 41.
32. *Ibidem*, p. 42.
33. *Ibidem*, p. 43.
34. *Ibidem*, p. 49.
35. *Ibidem*, p. 52.
36. *Ibidem*, p. 53.
37. *Ibidem*, p. 31.
38. *Ibidem*, p. 57.

39. *Ibidem*, p. 74.
40. *Ibidem*, p. 76.
41. *Idem*, "Metafizica și religia", *Introducere în metafizică*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest 1929, p. 83.
42. *Ibidem*.
43. *Ibidem* p. 84.
44. *Ibidem*, p. 95.
45. *Ibidem* p. 97-98.
46. *Ibidem* p. 101.
47. *Idem*, *Filosofie și metafizică*, Aius, Craiova 2007, p. 256.
48. *Ibidem* p. 257.
49. *Ibidem* p. 258.
50. M. Baciuc, "Neantul - o problemă a filosofiei," *Studii filosofice și sociologice*, Ankarom, Iași 1997, p. 42.
51. *Idem*, "Idea de Neant," *Gândirea*, no. 5, May 1933, p. 164.
52. *Idem*, "L'idee du neant," *Seances et travaux de l'Academie des Science morales et politiques*, March-April 1933, p. 294.
53. *Idem*, "Idea de Neant," p. 164.
54. *Ibidem*, p. 166-167.
55. N. Bagdasar, *Istoria filosofiei românești*, Profile Publishing, Bucharest 2003, p. 155.
56. I. Petrovici, "Idea de Neant," p. 168.
57. *Ibidem*, p. 168-169.
58. *Ibidem*, p. 169.
59. *Ibidem*, p. 169.
60. *Idem*, "Idea de Dumnezeu în fața rațiunii," *Gândirea*, no. 7, September 1937, p. 313.
61. *Ibidem*, p. 314.
62. *Ibidem*, p. 315.
63. *Ibidem*, p. 316.
64. *Ibidem*, p. 317.
65. Șt. Munteanu, *Raționalitatea metafizicii lui Ion Petrovici*, p. 101.
66. V. Zvâncescu, "Metafizica lui Ion Petrovici," p. 185.
67. I. Petrovici, *O problemă de filosofie*, Socec, Bucharest, 1904, p. 5.
68. *Idem*, "Transcendentul și cunoașterea omenească," *Revista de filosofie*, 1936, p. 329.
69. Șt. Munteanu, *Raționalitatea metafizicii lui Ion Petrovici*, p. 66.
70. *Ibidem*, p. 84.

Bibliography

- Baciuc, M., Neantul - o problemă a filosofiei, in *Studii filosofice și sociologice*, Ankarom, Iași, 1997.
- Bagdasar, N., *Istoria filosofiei românești*, Profile Publishing, Bucharest 2003.
- Bagdasar, N. "I. Petrovici metafizician," in *Revista de filosofie*, XXVIII, no. 3-4 July-Dec. 1942, p. 181-204.
- Cazan, Gh., *Istoria filosofiei românești*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, Bucharest 1984.
- Enciclopedia filosofica*, ed. Istituto per la collaborazione culturale, vol. III, Venezia-Roma 1957.

- Ianoși, I., *Dicționarul operelor filosofice românești*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1997.
- Munteanu, Șt., *Raționalitatea metafizicii lui Ion Petrovici*, Axis, Iași 2003.
- Owens, J., *Metafizică creștină elementară*, Galaxia Gutenberg, Târgu-Lăpuș, 2007.
- Petrovici, I. "Prolegomena. La țărmlul metafizicii," in *Introducere în metafizică*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest, 1929.
- Idem*, "Metafizica și legitimitatea ei," in *Introducere în metafizică*, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest, 1929.
- Idem*, "Metafizica și legitimitatea ei," in *Viața românească*, 12, no. 2, April 1920, p. 202-214.
- Idem*, "Metafizica și religia," in *Viața românească*, 13, no. 1, Jan. 1921, p. 12-21.
- Idem*, "Metafizica în filosofia contemporană," in *Filosoși contemporani*, Garamond, Bucharest, 1997.
- Idem*, "Transcendentul și cunoașterea omenească," in *Revista de filosofie*, 1936.
- Idem*, *Filosofie și metafizică*, Aius, Craiova, 2007.
- Idem*, "Ideea de Neant," in *Gândirea*, VIII, no. 5, May 1933, p. 161-169.
- Idem*, "L'idée du neant," *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des Science morales et politiques*, March-April 1933.
- Idem*, "Ideea de Dumnezeu în fața rațiunii," in *Gândirea*, no. 7, September 1937.
- Idem*, *O problemă de filosofie*, Socec, Bucharest, 1904.
- Idem*, "Spirit și corp," in *Revista Generală a Învățământului*, year I, no. 8, 1 March 1906, p. 599-604 and no. 9, 1 April 1906, p. 692-699.
- Zvâncescu, V. "Metafizica lui Ion Petrovici," in *Studii de filosofie românească și universală*, Ramisa, Bucharest, 2000, p.185.
- Vetișanu, V. "Ion Petrovici," in *Istoria filosofiei românești*, vol. II, Academia Română, Bucharest, 1980, p. 565-600.

Abstract

Metaphysics According to Ion Petrovici

This study aims to highlight Petrovici's attempts to analyze metaphysics and its value, proving its legitimacy, its necessity, the weakness and lack of rationality of views against metaphysics, but also the relations that metaphysics, seen as a theoretical discipline, has with the exact sciences, and his thrust to delineate the field of metaphysics from that of religion.

Petrovici's researches were aimed at the content analysis of the concept of philosophy and the determinations of philosophy, the value of these determinations and their relationships with other spheres of the spiritual life.

Key words

metaphysics, legitimacy, positivists, the Absolute, relative, cognition, soul, empirical-rationalist, nothingness, God.