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Editor's Note

Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux was born in 1945 in Villeneuve-sur-Lot in France. In her first years of scientific activity, professor Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux was, between 1967 and 1974, Head of Research at École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Centre de Recherches Historiques. Between 1973 and 1977 she coordinated the Office of cultural exchanges at EHESS. Since 1985 Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux has continued her activity as professor and researcher at Centre de Recherches Historiques at EHESS, where she has been leading the seminar *Histoire de la famille: pouvoirs et dépendances au sein de la famille. Perspectives comparatives (XVIe-XXe siècle).*

Her scientific reputation is internationally acknowledged, due to the books she has published and the conferences and panels that she has organized. Among her works we mention here *Malthus hier et aujourd'hui* (ed.), Paris, 1984, Editions du CNRS, 504 p.; *Malthus Past and Present*, (ed.), 1983, London/New York, Academic Press, 416 p. (with J. Dupâquier); *Evolution agraire et croissance démographique*, (ed.), 1987, Ordina, Liège, 388 p.; *Socio-economic consequences of sex-ratios in historical perspective, 1500-1980*, (with Solvi Sogner), 1994, Milan, Universita Bocconi, 210 p.; *House and the stem-family in EurAsian perspective/Maison et famille-souche: perspectives eurasiennes*, (with Emiko Ochiai eds.), 1998, Nichibunken, Kyoto, 468 p.; *The Transmission of Well-Being. Gendered Marriages Strategies and Inheritance System in Europe (17th-20th Centuries)*, (with Margarida Duraes, Lorenc Ferrer and Jan Kok), 2009, Peter Lang, Bern, 525 p etc.). Since 1985 she has been general secretary of the International Commission for Historical Demography, member of the scientific Council of the international network H-Net (Humanities on line, Michigan State University), president of the international scientific Council of H-Net between 2000-2002, founding member of H-Demog etc.

Her domains of interest include the history of the family and of the woman, comparative models of family reproduction, historical demography etc. Through her seminars, she has coordinated the debates among numerous specialists from the entire world, masteral and doctoral students in the field of family history and historical demography. Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux is member of numerous editorial committees, such as: Annales de Démographie Historique, EHESS; Continuity and Change, Cambridge University Press; The History of the Family. An International Quarterly; Romanian Journal of Population Studies etc.

The connection of Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux with Romania dates from before 1989, when she had many times accompanied her husband, Jacques Fauve, to Bucharest. Jacques Fauve (1926-2010) was a philosopher formed at Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris and at Yale University in the US. He entered diplomacy in 1958, and between 1986 and 1988 he was Scientific and Cultural Counsellor at the French Embassy in Bucharest, Romania.

In 2009, professor Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux made an important donation of books to the Babeş-Bolyai University. It consisted in her father's library, the renowned Hellenist, member of the French Academy, and, since 1991, honorary member of the Romanian Academy, François Chamoux. The donated library is found in the central building of the University, in the *François Chamoux* hall.

Through her scientific work, her generosity and humanity, professor Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux is a model worthy of following and honouring by the international scientific community. For the support she has offered along the years to students, researchers and professors from Babeş-Bolyai University, as well as for her being a true cultural ambassador of Romania in the international scientific community, Madam professor Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux deserves our entire appreciation. The present issue of the *Romanian Journal of Population Studies* is our expression of gratitude.

Ioan Bolovan

Statistical Contributions Concerning the Orthodox Population in Cluj during the First Years after the Union of Transylvania with Romania

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Abstract. Our article shows that the new political realities that gained ground after the Great Union brought about major economic, social, cultural and demographic changes. The numerical increase of the Romanian demographic segment in Cluj also led to an increase in the number of Orthodox parishioners. From a demographic point of view, there was registered a phenomenon of population growth in the city of Cluj. A comparison between the Censuses of 1920 and 1930 and the Census of 1910 reveals that the Romanian population in the city of Cluj experienced an upward trend, by contrast with the Hungarian population. An explanation for the growth of the Romanian population in Cluj in the years following the Union is the industrialization and the social-economic modernization of the city. The economic development of Cluj attracted labour from the surrounding rural areas.

Keywords: Orthodox population, Great Union, Cluj

The Union of Transylvania with Romania on 1 December 1918 opened new perspectives for the Romanians here, but also for the situation of the Orthodox Church in the province, in general, and in the city of Cluj, in particular. While substantial changes affected economic, social, political and cultural life in the aftermath of World War I, the multiple transformations that occurred were also very visible at a demographic level. First of all, there was a phenomenon of urban agglomeration in Transylvania and, naturally, in the city of Cluj, where there was registered a substantial increase in the population, as a

consequence of the fact that the Ruling Council (the provisional Government of Transylvania up until its full integration into the Romanian State) established headquarters here. The city experienced a rapid "proliferation" of its administrative, military and intellectual personnel, envisaged to counterbalance the effects of the emigration to Hungary of many Hungarian officials who had been dependent on the former Austro-Hungarian State.

Insofar as ethnic structures were concerned, after the Great Union of 1918, there occurred a process of gradual reversal. Thus, the Censuses conducted in 1920 and 1930 found that the proportion of Romanians had increased, while that of Hungarians had gone into decline compared with the year 1910. Immediately after the Union, as previously stated, the Ruling Council was moved from Sibiu to Cluj, being changed into the Commission for Administrative Unification, whose role was to incorporate the state apparatus in Transylvania and Banat within the ever more unitary structure of the unified country. During the interwar period, there were higher migration rates among the Romanians in Transylvania, given the fact that cities here, including Cluj, underwent a new phase of industrialization and urbanization and needed a more substantial workforce, while Romanians, after having been prevented access to urban areas, either directly or indirectly, for centuries, now felt more protected and encouraged by the Romanian authorities to settle in an urban environment. At the same time, this reflected the demographic situation of the surrounding rural areas, which had a predominantly Romanian population.

In the process of industrialization and social-economic modernization that was in full swing after 1920, very many Romanians from the surroundings of the city, especially the youth, forming that rural overpopulation demographers speak about, emigrated to the city of Cluj to place their labour force there.

The pre-mountainous relief, which was not very favourable for agricultural exploitation, and the fact that the area of the Apuseni Mountains was characterized by the precarious material conditions of the inhabitants represented then, as in previous decades, a "demographic reservoir" for other parts of the country (Ciomac, Popa-Necşa 1936: 227sqq, Rotariu 1995: 103), the villages here gradually undergoing a process of demographic decrease. At the same time, the city of Cluj opened its gates to the Romanians, who had for centuries been prohibited, through legislative or administrative measures, from settling in the cities of Transylvania. As it is known, new industrial units were set up in the city of Cluj after the Union, so additional labour force was needed for such undertakings. The Romanians in the neighbouring villages of Cluj

were the first to settle in the city by the Someş River. This observation is confirmed by the decrease in the proportion of Romanians in several villages from the vicinity of the city. For instance, the most relevant case is that of the village Mănăstireni. Here, between 1920 and 1930, the number of Romanians fell from 1,606 to 1,098 inhabitants (Varga 2001: 94), in parallel with the substantial growth of the population of Cluj during the interwar period. The prevalently Romanian profile of the county and its cities was attested, during the interwar period, also through the establishment and development of important economic and cultural institutions, such as the University, the National Theatre, the Opera House, the Botanical Garden, etc., which were opened in 1919 or in the immediately following years. From such a perspective, it seems only natural that there should have occurred a proportional redistribution of the ethnic groups in the city. Thus, from 1921 to 1930, the proportion of Romanians increased from 33.8% to 34.6%, while that of Hungarians decreased from 49.8% to 47.2%. The gradual growth of the Romanian ethnic segment in Cluj, a phenomenon that had been underway since the time of the Austro-Hungarian regime but had amplified after the Great Union, also entailed an increase in the number of Orthodox believers – to 11,942, in the year 1930 – in the capital of Transylvania (Rotariu 2011: 250-251).

As a result of the fact that after the Union of Transylvania, there was a significant increase in the volume of Romanian Orthodox population in the city, two new parishes were organized in Cluj in the year 1922 (besides that "on the Hill" – Cluj I), namely: the Parish of Cluj-Mănăştur II and the Parish of Cluj III. All these three parishes were served (ministered) for a short while by Rev. Archpriest Tuliu Roşescu and by the (Archpresbyterial) priest-chaplain Vasile Spătaru. On 20 November 1922, the position of parish priest for Cluj II was filled, by contest, by *Vasile Spătaru* (who served in the chapel of Mănăştur), while on 22 April 1923, the Parish of Cluj III was occupied by the priest *Aurel Muşat*; note should be taken that in 1932 Saint Nicholas' Church was "brought into service" in Cluj, for the Parish of Cluj III (Mureşanu 1942: 101).

We should mention that for the smooth conduct of administrative-maintenance activities in the Orthodox Metropolitanate of Transylvania, following the "directives" issued by Andrei Şaguna (in the Statute that bears his name) (*Statutul Organic* 1910, *Regulament pentru parohii* 1913), parishioners were also "co-opted" in the structures of church leadership. At the beginning of the year 1922, *Tuliu Roşescu,* Archpriest of Cluj and priest at the Parish of Cluj I, based at the Church "on the Hill" – Cluj, conducted a census of the believers

in the city of Cluj, which revealed the existence of 1,500 heads of Romanian Orthodox families.

As a result of the need to have a record of the parishioners in town and to prepare, on the basis of clear statistical information, the future organization of the new parishes, the "censusing" of the members of the Orthodox parish in Cluj was carried out at the beginning of 1922, following the decision reached by the Parish Committee and confirmed by the Parish Synod. The registration of the heads of Orthodox families in Cluj, which remained, until recently (Moraru, Bolovan 2011: 114),[1] a unique undertaking, provides us with a socio-professional overview of the Romanian society in the city, in the years immediately following the Union of Transylvania with Romania, confirming the complex mutations that took place at the level of the urban community from the foot of Feleac Hill. Of course, those 1,500 members mentioned in the statistical document were only a part of the entire Romanian Orthodox community in Cluj in early 1922, but if we apply to these family heads a coefficient of 4 members per each family (a coefficient that is generally accepted by the specialists in population history for that period), we obtain a total of about 6,000 Orthodox believers. The number obtained is acceptable given the fact that 1,359 Orthodox lived in the city of Cluj in 1910, while in 1930 there were 11,942 members of the Eastern Greek confession who were censused. Bearing in mind that from 1910 to 1920, the growth rate of the urban population of Cluj was higher than that in the 1920s, we can also correlate for the Orthodox the same fast increase rate, since we consider that the number of six thousand Orthodox living in the city of Cluj in 1922 is quite realistic.

Let us see next the composition by profession of those censused at the beginning of 1922. Unfortunately, the document includes 158 individuals (representing 10.5% of total number of family heads who were members of the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj) whose socio-professional status is not specified, those who drafted the document leaving the rubric blank for them. The most numerous professional category was that of civil servants: 447, representing 29.8% of the total. This should not surprise us, because after 1918 very many civil servants arrived in Cluj from the Old Kingdom, as a result of the real need to fill the positions of qualified personnel in the administration: it is well known that many civil servants had belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian regime (some of them foreigners to the city and the province) and had left Cluj after refusing to submit the oath of allegiance to the Romanian

[1] The document is preserved in the Archives of the Archdiocese of Cluj (A.A.C.), II-12-924, and was published in Moraru, Bolovan (2011).

King and the Romanian State. In any case, the majority of those arriving from across the Carpathians were Orthodox. In order of percentage, the next category was that of workers (12.5%), who amounted to 187 individuals (32 worked for the Romanian Railways, the rest being type-setters, workers at various factories in the city, etc.). In a city with a booming population, the presence of tradesmen and craftsmen, who provided a wide range of services, was quite necessary, as attested by the fact that among the members of the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj there were 148 persons belonging to this socio-professional category (with a share of 9.9%).

Table 1. The socio-professional structure of the members of the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj in 1922

Education	115 (of which 70 were univ. prof.)	7.7%
Justice	23	1.5%
Medicine	58	3.9%
Artists	20	1.3%
Journalists	15	1%
Lawyers	19	1.2%
Banks	114 (16 directors)	7.6%
Tradesmen, craftsmen	148	9.9%
Civil servants	447 (77 at the Romanian Railways)	29.8%
Army, police, gendarmerie	100	6.7%
Engineers	23	1.5%
Landlords	10	0.7%
Workers	187 (32 at the Romanian Railways)	12.5%
Foresters	21	1.4%
Servants	13	0.9%
Clergy	6	0.4%
Other professions	23	1.5%
Unknown occupation	158	10.5%

Source: Archives of the Archdiocese of Cluj (A.A.C.), II-12-924

The next socio-professional category, in percentage terms, detected among the members of the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj in 1922 was that of the

teaching staff (7.7%), which comprised 115 persons. Of these, 70 were university professors, which was only natural if we consider the fact that the Romanian University had opened its gates of knowledge and enlightenment in the autumn of 1919 (Pușcaș 2003). The next numerical category after that of the teaching staff included those who worked in the banking sector (7.6%); of the 114 economists and bank clerks, a number of 16 people also filled management positions at various Romanian banks in the city (directors, deputy directors). The number of those who were active in the army, police and gendarmerie amounted to 100, representing 6.7% of the total number of members of the Orthodox Synod in Cluj. Apparently this was not a very high number, given the need to maintain order in the city: there were probably other such persons who belonged to this socio-professional category, but were members of the other denominations. Although Cluj was an important medical centre, the number of physicians of Orthodox confession in the city was only 58 in 1922, representing 3.9%. There will certainly have been many physicians among the Romanian Greek Catholics living in the city, but we should also not forget that after 1918, there remained many Hungarian, German or Jewish physicians who were able to keep their jobs in the medical field even after the coming to power of the Romanian government, following the Union of Transylvania with Romania. We should also note the modest percentages of other socio-professional categories, belonging to the elite, the middle class and the base of the social pyramid: jurists and lawyers, artists, journalists, foresters, engineers, servants and other professions practised by a small number of inhabitants.

Among those who were members of the academic and cultural elite of Cluj, as well as of the Synod of Cluj, we should mention the following names that require no introduction: Emil Racoviță, Victor Babeș, Sextil Puşcariu, Lucian Blaga, Silviu Dragomir, Ioan Lupaș, Onisifor Ghibu, Virgil Bărbat, Nicolae Bănescu, George Bogdan Duică, Ştefan Bezdechi, Teodor Capidan, Alexandru Lepădatu, Nicolae Minea, George Oprescu, Eugen Sperantia, Gheorghe Spacu, Iacob Iacobovici, Gheorghe Vâlsan, Ion Ursu, Romul Vuia, Sabin Manuilă, Nicolae Minovici and Marţian Negrea, etc.; then, from the Music Academy (Conservatory), the famous musicians and composers George Dima, Augustin Bena, etc.; from the National Theatre, the director Zaharia Bârsan, the actor George Calboreanu, etc. Some of them came from the Old Kingdom, others were Transylvanians and had studied in universities across the monarchy or in Western Europe and had asserted themselves professionally before Union. Naturally, the presence of so many personalities among the members of the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj was bound to raise

the prestige of this Romanian confession in a city in which the minority groups, massively supported by the former Austro-Hungarian regime, still had an important share in the demographic structure of the Transylvanian cities, but also in the cultural and socio-professional landscape of Transylvania.

After the Union of 1 December 1918, there emerged new opportunities for the Orthodox Romanians in Cluj to increase their numbers. Above all, they had the chance to have an eparchial centre organized here, from 1921 on. As the number of the Orthodox in Cluj had grown, it became necessary to establish two other Orthodox parishes in the city, aside from the Orthodox parish "on the Hill," a measure that was carried out after the "census" administered by the former priest and archpriest Tuliu Roşescu, from the church "on the Hill," at the beginning of 1922, producing an important statistical document that was commented on above. Among the 1,500 family heads registered in Cluj as belonging to the Orthodox confession, we came across individuals belonging to a very broad spectrum of socio-professional categories, from those who were usually regarded as members of the intellectual, economic, administrative, military and political elites to ordinary people, who earned their living by manual labour, which was very necessary, of course, too. Cluj was, indeed, an urban settlement that had embarked on the road to modernization, a place where industry, craftsmanship and their related services required the presence of such social and professional categories.

The "explosion" of Orthodox Romanians in the city of Cluj, as attested by the 1930 Census, was the result of a process that had begun decades before and progressed, under the existing Austro-Hungarian regime, at the beginning of the 20th century, becoming then a natural consequence of the gradual transformation of the city from all points of view, within the new political framework after the 1918 Union. The statistics compiled by the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj at the beginning of the year 1922 demonstrated the presence, in the city, of 6,000 souls belonging to the Eastern Greek confession. This legitimized the organization, in the immediate future, of two new Orthodox parishes that could provide proper spiritual assistance to the residents of this urban community.

In conclusion, the new political realities that gained ground after the Great Union brought about major economic, social, cultural and demographic changes. From a demographic point of view, there was registered a phenomenon of population growth in the city of Cluj. A comparison between the Censuses of 1920 and 1930 and the Census of 1910 reveals that the Romanian population in the city of Cluj experienced an upward trend, by contrast with the Hungarian population. An explanation for the growth of the

Romanian population in Cluj in the years following the Union is the industrialization and the social-economic modernization of the city. The economic development of Cluj attracted labour from the surrounding rural areas.

The numerical increase of the Romanian demographic segment in Cluj also led to an increase in the number of Orthodox parishioners. The censuses conducted in the Orthodox communities from Cluj in the years after the Union reveal the fact that civil servants represented the largest category (29.8%). One plausible explanation for this reality resides in the migration towards the cities of Transylvania of a large number of civil servants from the Old Kingdom. They came here to supplant the need for qualified administration personnel. It is well known that after 1 December 1918, many civil servants had left Cluj or refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Romanian State.

Another professional category that was consistently represented among the members of the Orthodox Parish Synod of Cluj in 1922 was that of teachers and professors (7.7%), particularly on account of the Romanian University opening its gates in 1919. Besides these two professional categories, there were also significant numbers of economists, bank officers, military personnel and physicians.

Acknowledgement
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Historical Population Database of Transylvania: Methodology Employed in the Selection of Settlements and Micro Zones of Interest

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Abstract: The present paper elaborates on the way in which the first sample of settlements whose historical population previous to 1918 will be included in the Historical Population Database of Transylvania has been selected. The selection was made so as to meet certain requirements related to the quality of existing sources, to ensure balanced ethnic-denominational representation, unity and homogeneity of the micro zones comprising the selected settlements. The twelve selected micro zones incorporate a sample covering almost 7% of the historical population of Transylvania, making possible a long- and medium-term research.

Keywords: HPDT, Transylvania, micro zones, sample, population databases.

1. Introduction

Building databases of past population is an almost half century long tradition. Historians and other researchers in the field of humanities and social sciences have collected data available in the archives (church and tax records, population censuses and registers) and stored them in databases. Technological progress has made possible the inclusion of datasets from wider geographical areas as well as the improvement of the analytical insight into primarily individual information. Thus, several attempts at creating local or national population longitudinal data infrastructures for scholarly circles have been initiated so as to supply the researchers with pieces of information concerning different stages in the life of people.

Even though the merits of longitudinal databases have been universally acknowledged, the access to these historical pieces of information is quite limited and the databases are difficult to build, requiring time and financial resources. Many such databases have been the outcome of various research projects, either limited in scope or chiefly focused on genealogical reconstructions for the benefit of the few interested.

The most elaborate and comprehensive databases have been built in Northern Europe, in countries with a long-standing tradition of accurately recording data on their population: *The Demographic Database* (DDB) in Sweden, *The Norwegian Historical Data Centre* in Norway, and the *Historical Sample of Netherlands* (HSN) in the Netherlands. Other extremely accurate, albeit local demographic databases, have been created in several European countries, and they are constantly updating, becoming more complex year by year. An overall picture of the current European initiatives of this kind can be found on the EHPS-Net website, whose aim is to bring together these scientific resources[1].

On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, there are no databases containing longitudinal pieces of information on the historical population that can provide answers to a wide range of questions related to demographic, sociological, and medical aspects. Therefore, it is critically important to create such databases, chiefly as they are an indispensable foundation for quality research.

A remarkable opportunity for the research on the population in the past of Transylvania was the EEA Financial Mechanism 2009-2014, The Romanian-EEA Research Program - "Research within priority sectors". The Centre for Population Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University, participated in the competition for the grant and, in partnership with the Norwegian Historical Data Center, University of Tromsø, received a 34 months funding for the project *Historical Population Database of Transylvania 1850-1914* (henceforth HPDT).

The main goal of the *HPDT* project is to create the first historical database of Transylvania's population, which will primarily encompass the period 1850-1914. The database aims at including 5-10% of the Transylvanian population in the period under investigation (c. 5.4 million births), that is providing between 350.000 and 500.000 individual IDS entries[2].

2. General aspects concerning the methodology of sampling

The present study elaborates on the way in which the first sample of settlements whose historical population previous to 1918 will be included in the HPDT has been selected.

For reasons detailed bellow, simple random sampling – apparently more statistically accurate – was not feasible in this case. In order to have a most statistically relevant sample at the same time taking into account historical realities, it was necessary to include a wide range of aspects such as local

[1] http://www.ehps-net.eu/databases.

[2] http://hpdt.granturi.ubbcluj.ro/about/project/.

ethnic-denominational diversity and the not always complete preservation of sources, side by side with the need to develop a strategy for medium- and long-term research to ensure continuity of the project[3].

During the modern age,Transylvania[4], as a province of the Habsburg Empire, part of Dualist Hungary afterwards, was inhabited by an ethnically and religiously diverse population. There always was a Romanian majority, denominationally divided into Orthodox and Greek-Catholic. The Hungarian population consisted of two ethic groups – Hungarians and Szeklers - denominationally divided into Calvinist, Unitarian, and Roman-Catholic. The Transylvanian Saxons, a German-speaking population, were mostly Lutheran, and a few Roman-Catholic. Side by side with the four major ethnic groups, there were Jews (with their own religion), Gypsies (in most censuses divided among the Romanian- and Hungarian-speaking population), Armenians (chiefly Catholic), and other small ethnic groups in different stages of acculturation.

The patchwork population structure is also mirrored in the sources of the research. Taking into consideration the fact that the primary data of the 1850 and 1910 censuses (census forms) were preserved in few cases and for limited geographical areas[5], any attempt at reconstructing the picture of the historical population in Transylvania must inevitably start from parish records. Actually until 1894, church records played the part of official civil documents, being the only source that can provide information on the main demographic events and behaviour of the people in the past of Transylvania.

A preliminary assessment indicates the presence of roughly 15.000 archive items of the aforementioned type in the Transylvanian County Record Offices of the National Archives of Romania, but their typology (baptisms, marriages, deaths, etc), chronological distribution and geographical division is uneven. In many cases, the church records from the beginning of the 20th century and later are still kept in the local parishes. Not in few cases, the Transylvanian Saxon communities that immigrated to Germany also took their church records with them.

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[3] For a similar approach to sample selection methods see Knodel 1988: 31-32.

[4] Transylvania in the accurate historical meaning of the term, including the area of the Great Principality as well (including *Partium*).

[5] The forms of the 1869 census taken in Năsăud and Telciu have been found in the archives of Bistriţa-Năsăud and published (Bolovan, Onofreiu, Rus 2010; Onofreiu, Bolovan, Chira 2015). Several primary data collected in the census taken in Transylvania in 1869 have been digitized within the project MOSAIC, for instance, data collected in Braşov and Târgu-Mureş, in 39 villages from the former Sălaj County, and in 100 villages from Mureş-Turda County (Őri, Pakot 2012).

While before 1894, the Church and her priests recorded and sanctioned the vital events in people's life, the documents issued by these authorities lost their official character after the respective year and from then on had only a strictly denominational role (Bolovan 1999: 67).

Article XXXIII of the third "political-ecclesiastical" law of 1894 dealt with civil registration issues. Its importance consisted in the fact that responsibility to keeping civil records was transferred to state administration; from then on registration was supposed to be carried out by government employees (Bolovan, Covaci, Deteşan, Eppel, Holom 2009: 94).

The official civil records kept after 1894 were sparsely preserved because not all the County Record Offices of the National Archives collected them, the majority being still kept in town halls[6] or, in best cases, in County Civil Registration Offices. Relatively complete collections are preserved only in the County Offices of the National Archives of Alba, Hunedoara, Braşov, and Bistriţa, and some disparate items in Sibiu.

It is plain clear that simple random sampling, even if it had covered the entire province geographically, would have inevitably included many settlements where the sources were incomplete and whose ethnic and religious structure might have not been representative for the whole province. To select randomly a sample from the group of settlements preserving complete archive sources would have still raised the question of ethnic-denominational representativeness, involving further decisions that would have ruined sample randomness. Not in the least, in order to be statistically relevant the random sample size would have exceeded the short-term data processing capacity and the partial results would have been less scientifically accurate (for example, it would have been more difficult to survey local migration between neighbouring settlements). These aspects would have led in time to a discrepancy between the data entry flow and the yielded scientific results with potential negative impact on the funding required for carrying on the research.

Starting from the aforementioned aspects, the sample selection approach was tuned to the strategy of building and developing the HPDT with the view to include data on an ethnic and denominational spectrum as diverse as possible and at the same time representative for the entire province. It also took into consideration the need for available and complete sources, for yielding valuable short-, medium-, and long-term scientific results in order to ensure the funding flow required for carrying on the research. The initial sample under investigation was designed not only for the period during which

[6] For instance, the civil records of Budeşti after 1895 are preserved in the Town Hall archive (Crăciun 2013: 56).

the research project laying at the foundation of the HPDT construction was implemented, but for at least a decade of activity. The underlying principles of selection were not only statistical, but also historical, closely connected to the state of the art and historiographical interest in certain research topics or historical-geographical entities.

In order to pinpoint the aforementioned ethnic-denominational diversity and the patchwork geographical distribution of the population as well as the economic, ethno-cultural and administrative-historical differences between various Transylvanian regions, we selected several micro zones. Three types of settlements were identified within every micro zone (see figure 1):

A. Settlements included in a first subset, ethnically and denominationally representative for the entire province. This category exclusively consists of settlements that have complete collections of parish records for at least 50 years and up to 1894 in order to facilitate future activity/allow further comparison with the official civil records. At the same time, in most cases, at least one urban/semi-urban centre with integrative role can be found among these settlements. Type A settlements are not of necessity statistically representative for the micro zone they are located in, but they incorporate qualitative features that are defining for it.

B. The other settlements in the micro zone area for which the available data will be fully processed irrespective of year. In this way, even though not all settlements have complete collections of sources, we will still be able to sketch an overall picture of the micro zone and the demographic processes that underlie local population dynamics. Theoretically, by processing data supplied by type A and B settlements we will be able to make up a statistically significant sample for every micro zone.

C. Settlements initially outside the micro zone, which will be included in the research with the progression of data processing so that the original micro zone area expanded constantly. In practice, data provided by type C settlements will be processed only in special circumstances: either when all the micro zones are thoroughly investigated or when required by local specificity or the need to broaden the scope of comparison.

Figure 1. Typology of a microzone



3. Description of selected micro zones

In the following pages, we are providing a description of the micro zones and the main reasons why they have been selected:

1. Valea Bârgăului. The eight type A settlements selected to be part of this micro zone (Livezile, Dorolea, Josenii Bârgăului, Susenii Bârgăului, Rusu Bârgăului, Tiha Bârgăului, Bistriţa Bârgăului, Mureşenii Bârgăului) are located along the valley bearing the same name, in the north-eastern part of Transylvania, along one of the main roads linking the province with Moldavia. Six were formerly included in the area belonging to the 2nd Border Regiment (Onofreiu, Bolovan 2006: 59-60). Two marketplaces were set up here in the past: Bistriţa Bârgăului and Prundu Bârgăului (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 393, 402). Inhabited by a compact Romanian population, the development of the area was also due to its forest resources; the construction of Bistriţa-Prundu Bârgăului railroad in 1898 facilitated transportation of both people and goods (Gidó 2013: 96).

2. The junction of Arieş and Mureş rivers. The ten settlements selected to be part of this micro zone are situated along the two rivers, in central Transylvania (Unirea I, Unirea II, Războieni-Cetate, Rimetea, Călăraşi, Ocna Mureş, Cisteiu de Mureş, Noşlac, Lopadea Veche, Decea). Before 1876, they belonged to the Szekler Seat of Arieş and Alba de Jos County. The most important urban center was Turda town, but there also were Vinţul de Sus market town (Unirea I), which maintained its status and urban privileges for a long time, and Ocna Mureş borough (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 401, 405, 406). Inhabited by a mixed population of Romanians, Hungarians, and

Szeklers, the area was economically dependent on the salt mines, at the same time being an important trading post for goods from the Apuseni Mountains. Of crucial significance was also the opening of the rail line between Cluj-Napoca and Războieni in 1873 (Gidó 2013: 55).

3. Gurghiu valley and Reghin area. The five settlements chosen to be part of this micro zone (Gurghiu, Caşva, Orşova, Glăjărie, Reghin) are located along the valley of the river bearing the same name, close to the Călimani Mountains, in the eastern part of Transylvania. A marketplace was set up in Reghin in the past (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983:402). Economically speaking, the area was focused on the timber trade that got a boost from the development of the railroad infrastructure. In 1886, the rail line between Târgu Mureş and Reghin was opened, followed by Reghin-Deda (1905) and, two years later, Deda-Gheorgheni lines (Pál 1999: 282).

4. Gheorgheni town area (Gheorgheni, Lăzarea, Voşlobeni). Due to the demographic particularity of its villages, whose relatively large population would have upset the balance of the sample, it is an area with few type A settlements. Its location on the border between Transylvania and Moldavia as well as the presence of the 1st Szekler Border Infantry Regiment in the area endows it with special features. The Armenians settled here as early as the 17th century also contributed to the economic development of Gheorgheni, which gained town status at the beginning of the 20th century. The opening of the rail line Deda-Gheorgheni in 1907 and Gheorgheni-Ciceu in 1909 likewise had a positive impact (Pál 1999: 117-118, 282). Not in the least, the limit of compact Romanian settlements in the region (represented by Voşlobeni in the sample) is also located here.

5. Sfântu Gheorghe town area. It consists of seven settlements (Sfântu Gheorghe, Chilieni, Arcuş, Sâncraiu, Ghidfalău, Coşeni, Ozun) gathered around the former seat of Trei Scaune County. The location at the crossroads of several trade routes between Transylvania and the Romanian Principalities, the presence of the 2nd Szekler Border Infantry Regiment in the area, and not in the least the fact that the capital town of the micro zone had unceasingly maintained its status of administrative seat have determined specific demographic processes that provide further justification for the inclusion of these settlements in the sample. Of special significance for the development of the area was the opening of the Braşov-Sfântu Gheorghe-Târgu Secuiesc rail line in 1891, followed by Sfântu Gheorghe-Miercurea Ciuc line in 1897 (Pál 1999: 282). Sfântu Gheorghe was formerly a market town (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 403).

6. Land of the Moţi. It is also a micro zone with few A type settlements (Abrud, Câmpeni, and Ponorel), located in the upper basin of Arieş and Crişul Alb rivers, in the mountain area of western Transylvania. In the past, marketplaces were set up in Abrud (enjoying urban status) and Câmpeni (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 391, 395). The area was chiefly famous for gold mining. A significant part was played by the opening of the narrow-gauge rail line between Alba Iulia and Zlatna in 1895 and, in 1910–1912, between Turda, Câmpeni, and Abrud (Gidó 2013: 174). In this particular case, more interesting results are anticipated after expanding the research to type B settlements, against the background of specific demographic movements generated by the convergence of the traditional lifestyle and the gold mining activities[7].

7. Crasna County. The ten constitutive settlements of this micro zone are located in the drainage basin of Crasna river, in the north-western part of Transylvania (Şimleu Silvaniei, Pericei, Cehei, Bădăcin, Uileacu Şimleului, Nuşfalău, Huseni, Ratin, Giurtelecu Şimleului, Ilişua). In the past, a marketplace was set up in Şimleu Silvaniei (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 404). Another feature of the area was the presence of a Jewish population in large numbers and compact communities[8].

8. Land of Făgăraş. The fifteen settlements of this micro zone are located along the lower course of the river Olt, in south-eastern Transylvania (Mândra, Ohaba, Şercaia, Veneţia de Jos, Pârâu, Săsciori, Dejani, Hârseni, Recea, Hurez, Beclean, Şona, Felmer, Şoarş). Marketplaces were formerly set up in Făgăraş, Veneţia de Jos, and Beclean (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 392, 396, 405). It was an area with compact Romanian communities and the seat of the Greek-Catholic vicarage of Făgăraş. One of the main reasons for its selection was the special attention Ţara Făgăraşului received from Dimitrie Gusti's sociological school in the interwar period, which might open helpful comparative perspectives.

9. Land of Năsăud. The ten settlements of this micro zone are situated in north-eastern Transylvania (Năsăud, Liviu Rebreanu, Parva, Rebra Mare, Rebrişoara, Feldru, Nepos, Salva, Sângeorz-Băi, Maieru). In the area, there was a marketplace in Năsăud in the past (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 400). Nine

[7] We should mention that Roşia Montană, where there is one of the most important gold mines in Transylvania, is also among type B settlements (Balog 2007: 199).

[8] Sălaj County, established in 1876 and including Crasna County among other administrative units, was in the top Transylvanian administrative units with the highest rate of Jewish population (4,3%) in 1900, surpassed only by Solnoc-Dăbâca and Năsăud district. At the same time, at the beginning of the 20th century, Sălaj had the highest number of Jewish elementary schools in historical Transylvania (Gyémánt 2004: 94, 98).

of these settlements were among the 44 former border villages that belonged to the 2nd Romanian Border Regiment area between 1762 and 1851 and, after the later was mustered out of service, they became part of the Romanian District of Năsăud in 1861-1876 (Lupşan, Onofreiu 2003: 25, 32). Together with the settlements of Valea Bârgăului micro zone, they cover one third of the settlements of the former border regiment, which turns them into an extremely valuable sample for population studies in this military-administrative unit. Sociological inquiries have been conducted here too at the end of the interwar age[9]. Not in the least, the preservation of primary census records in some of the settlements offers a valuable auxiliary in the endeavour to reconstruct local families and households.

10. Dej area. The eight settlements belonging to this micro zone are located along the course of Someşul Mare and Someşul Mic rivers, in northern Transylvania (Dej, Ocna Dejului, Nima, Buneşti, Orman, Pintic, Nireş, Unguraş). A marketplace was formerly set up in Dej (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 396). The area was located along the road connecting the central part of Transylvania (Cluj town) with the north-western parts and witnessed a significant impetus chiefly due to the construction of several rail lines. Thus, Dej–Ocna Dejului rail line was inaugurated in 1882, Dej–Bistriţa in 1886, and in 1890 the rail line linking Dej with Zalău (Gidó 2013: 96).

11. Sebeş area. The eight settlements of this micro zone are located along the river Sebeş, in central-west Transylvania, in the area of the former Transylvanian Saxon Seat of Sebeş (Sebeş, Petreşti, Pianu de Jos, Pianu de Sus, Lancrăm, Săsciori, Răhău, Câlnic). The special features of the area stem from the economic and administrative impact of the German ethnic group on a Romanian population gradually becoming a demographic majority without being able to take over political power. The marketplace in Sebeş town was a commercial landmark in the epoch (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 403). Since 1897, Sebeş has been connected to the railway system following the construction of the Vinţu de Jos–Sebeş line.

12. Orăştie area. The eighteen settlements in this micro zone are located south of the river Mureş, in south-western Transylvania, in the area of the former Transylvanian Saxon Seat of Orăştie and Hunedoara County (Orăştie, Romos, Romoşel, Rapoltu Mare, Cărpiniş, Uroi, Spini, Totia, Băcia, Sântămăria de Piatră, Beriu, Orăştioara de Jos, Orăştioara de Sus, Bucium, Cugir, Vinerea, Şibot). In the past, there were marketplaces in Orăştie,

[9] Two of the settlements in the sample, Rebrişoara and Nepos, were part of the 60 settlements selected by the student teams led by Anton Golopenţia for the sociological inquiry carried on throughout the country in 1938 (*60 sate româneşti*: 1941-1942).

Geoagiu, Băcia, Vinerea, and Şibot (Irimescu-Andruş 1982-1983: 392, 397, 401, 404, 406). In the dualist period, the area witnessed a remarkable economic growth due to agricultural production and development of trade routes.

4. Sample representativeness

Statistically speaking, the type A settlements included approximately 6.16-6.84% of Transylvania's population between 1850 and 1910 (Table 1). The slightly higher percentage in 1910 than in 1850 indicates the fact that the sample rather consists of settlements witnessing a demographic growth over the average of the province and of fewer settlements that have witnessed a slower increase or even regression. Taking into consideration the large number of boroughs and towns that make up the sample, the situation is quite normal.

Table 1. Ethnic composition of the sample

Year	Region	Romanians	Hungarians	Germans	Others	Jews (out of Others)	Gypsies (out of Others)	**Total**
1850	Transylvania	1225619	536843	192270	106913	15606	78884	**2061645**
1850	Sample	75053	32804	12269	6816	563	4646	**126942**
1850	Sample %	6.12	6.11	6.38	6.38	3.61	5.89	**6.16**
1910	Transylvania	1608108	1005529	234901	59969	-	-	**2908507**
1910	Sample	107199	73146	15514	3182	-	-	**199041**
1910	Sample %	6.67	7.27	6.60	5.31	-	-	**6.84%**

Sources: Bolovan 2000: 197, 215; *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények* 1912: 36.

Ethnically speaking, the circumstances of under and over representation in relation to the sample mean are ranged between -0.27%–+0.25% in 1850, except for the Jewish communities, whose scattering and poor preservation of parish records trigger substantial differences. Unfortunately, the same holds true for the entire province of Transylvania and the situation cannot be rectified in the absence of contemporary sources. On the contrary, the relatively even distribution of the Gypsies and the fact that they are recorded in the documents of all ethnic groups and denominations naturally led to a more balanced representation in the sample. The slight over representation of the Hungarians (+0.43%) in 1910 is a consequence of the same demographic phenomenon witnessed above, namely the preferential progress of urban and

semi-urban settlements developed by absorbing the flow of internal Hungarian migration by the end of the 19th century, settlements well-represented in the HPDT sample.

As far as denomination is concerned (Table 2), sample standard deviations are more substantial, chiefly in the case of denominations with lower demographic representation such as Lutherans and Unitarians. On the contrary, the Jewish community witnessed an out of the ordinary statistic situation (a massive increase from 3.61% to 11.26%), on the one hand generated by the demographic boom of Jewish population in certain areas of Transylvania[10], and, on the other, by the prevalence of settlements with urban or semi-urban status in the sample, which became more and more open and attractive for the Transylvanian Jews in the second half of the 19th century.

Table 2. Denominational composition of the sample

Year	Region	Orthodoxies	Greek-Catholics	Catholics	Calvinists	Luterans	Unitarians	Mosaics	Others	Total
1850	Transylvania	621852	664154	219536	297129	197359	46016	15599	0	**2061645**
1850	Sample	37771	40778	14889	18493	11405	3043	563	0	**126942**
1850	Sample%	6.07	6.14	6.78	6.22	5.78	6.61	3.61	0	**6.16**
1910	Transylvania	802293	882145	390894	460622	229814	67826	73923	990	**2908507**
1910	Sample	50100	62206	29975	32358	12723	3320	8326	0	**199041**
1910	Sample%	6.24	7.05	7.67	7.02	5.54	4.89	11.26	0	**6.84%**

Sources: Bolovan 2000: 215.

5. Conclusions

The research sample laying at the foundation of the HPDT construction was selected so as not only to cover the three years during which the project was carried on, but having in view a long-term perspective. The settlements included in the micro zones were selected according to criteria that took into

[10] We should mention here in the first place the former northeastern border area included in our sample, which witnessed one of the most significant increase in Jewish population after 1869 (Gyémánt 2004: 93).

consideration the presence of as complete as possible collections of parish documents for all three types of records related to marriage, baptism, and death (at least for 50 years), kept until the year 1894 in order to be able to compensate for potential missing data as well as to compare them with the official civil records. Another selection criterion was related to the presence of an urban/semi-urban centre that played an integrative part in the area. At the same time, the selection method paid attention to the geographic, ethno-cultural, and historical unity/homogeneity of the micro zone.

The 12 selected micro zones make up a sample that is quite faithful to the real circumstances in Transylvania, to her ethnic and denominational diversity. At the same time, the sample covers a significant percentage of about 7% of the historical population of Transylvania.

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They Played with Children's Minds. The Communist Propaganda through the *Pionierul* Magazine

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Abstract: One of communist propaganda's objectives was to attract a large number of members. For immediate results, these members were the young adults. Aware of the limited possibilities to convert adults' mentality, the communists focused their attention on children, whose beliefs and attitudes may be formed in accordance with their ideology. The techniques of the children's manipulation can be found in every aspect of life, but for the purpose of this study we will focus on one of the most effective means of propaganda – the newspapers – namely, the children's magazine *Pionierul* . Our analysis will include the numbers issued in the first year of *Pionierul* magazine, reviewing the means of manipulation, propaganda and disinformation used by the editorial board in order to form "the new man".

Keywords: propaganda, manipulation, disinformation, children, *Pionierul.*

1. Introduction

The date of August 23, 1944, marks not only the beginning of a major transformation of the Romanian society, but also the debut of a major player in the Romanian press – the communist propaganda machine, that would play the main role in what we may call a psychological war whose purpose was to erase the idea of individuality. With a solid backup from the Soviet forces present in the country, the Russian propaganda machine felt quite at home with the newly-installed government of Petru Groza, the first post-war Prime Minister of Romania. Since there was no television and the radio was a privilege of only a few in the countryside, the press was supposed to be the principal means to deliver the message to the masses. Setting the press as a top priority on their list of emergencies, the communists knew from past experience that in order to stay in power they needed the support of the public opinion. But, to impose their new doctrine, the communists had to reverse the effects of the "anti-communist crusade" that the population had been exposed to during the war

that just ended and allow ample time for the people to become familiar to the new regime, the new ideology, and, utterly important, to the new leaders, most of whom had been in jail for two decades during which the communist party was outlawed (Banu 2013: 37). The removal of the last obstacle-the monarchy-on December 30, 1947, open the flood gates for the communist propaganda to overwhelm the country with the new ideology and eulogize the Soviet Union, as the ultimate form of government (Henţea 2000: 228). The communists had a well-designed plan, based on the experience of the Soviet Union to implement their concept by force "by seizing the entire reality, past or present, to subdue the man by means of stimulation, persuasion, and coercion" (Wierzbicki 1996: 12). Once imposed, this ideology had to be maintained by force and manipulation of the national conscience that was supposed to adapt to social changes and comply (Bogdan 1998: 63). Life in Romania was no going to be the same ever again. A communist takeover of a country was underway, but there was stiff resistance. The year 1948 marked the beginning of Romania's political and cultural isolation from the West. (Niţescu 1995: 63-64).

The purpose of this study is to analyse the article published in *Pionierul,* in its first year of activity, their typology, and their impact on the young audience it targeted. We are about to demonstrate how much was fact and how much was propaganda in its pages. *Pionierul* represents a novelty in the field of children's press due to its exclusively propagandistic purpose. It was not new to the market because it was just a name change from *Jurnalul copiilor* (*Children's Jurnal*) and included the same editor's team.

2. The Communists' Haste to Create "the New Man" through Propaganda in Pionierul

Given the scarcity of real communists in the country, capable to run important state institutions and the press, their takeover and their transformation were done gradually. This way, in May, 1949, The General Department of the Press and Publishing was founded and put under jurisdiction of The Council of Ministers that controlled everything that had to do with public information (Domenico 1996: 34). This meant the press became automatically a spinoff of the communist party and the information delivered to the public had to have its seal of approval under a severe censorship (Căprioară 2009: 90). "The sharpest weapon of the party" became its main medium of propaganda, characterized "by its total devotion to the cause of democracy, progress, and peace through its gigantic role of an educator, mobilizing the masses through

its vision and its entire stature", as the communist leader Leonte Răutu used to say (Răutu 1948).

In the communist press, the mission of communication, which normally is to inform the reader, is integrated into the propaganda structures, "in which the informative strategies are replaced by those of persuasion and seduction". In this case, the role of information is replaced by that of publicity whose purpose is to stir emotions in the reader. Through this type of advertised communication, the purpose was "to recruit and retain a public of a specific ideology" (Roşca 2006: 168).

The success of this campaign was vouched by two basic techniques: repression and persuasion. Having the entire machine of propaganda at their disposal with unlimited funds, the communist system's purpose was to turn an entire nation into loyal and "obedient subjects of those in power", characters lacking personality and the freedom of expression, always following government's orders. Turned into a puppet, lacking his own judgement, the citizen was to become „a new man" who was forced to contribute to the construction of socialism and to the strengthening of the communist party's, imposed by the Russian Army (Denize 2011: 51-53). The communists used all the strategies possible: persuasion, repetition, association, composition, omission, diversion and confusion (Chelcea 2006: 193-198). The system left no room for option. Romanians were taught who the enemies of the people were (not of the ideology or leaders!) communication having demonization included: "the enemy [...] ideologically defined [...] has no rights" (Teodorescu 2007: 270). The communist propaganda machine had no limits or restrictions and morality was not an issue. To meet its objectives, an entire array of instruments of manipulation were employed, starting with unilateral presentation of things, stereotypes, exploitation of prejudices, underlining the negative, or stimulation of conflict among social groups and classes (Denize 2011: 22). A good part of the communist propaganda was dedicated to changing the perception of Romanians about Russia. For years that country was the enemy that was demonized (Căprioară 2009: 140). The safest way to do it was through the press. The alternative was force. A perfect act of manipulation is when the targeted people do not realize that they are being duped. "This is based on the audience's lack of freedom to debate the issues and to resist to whatever it is being offered" (Breton 2006: 23).

The principal objective of the communist propaganda was to create "the new man", indoctrinated with the communist ideology, obedient and ready to carry out orders. For the party (Denize 2009: 275). The final product was "a new man" with a new ego – homo sovieticus, as historians named him.

Children were the ideal target because they were just growing up into a new world that had nothing to do with the past and they were capable of absorbing the new philosophy to become loyal adults for the cause (Cathala 1991: 63). It is well known by parents and teachers alike that children crave attention when they grow up. The format created by the communist party was exactly right for this kind of attitude: the pioneer organization, where children had leaders, uniforms, badges, flags, banners, bands, choirs, a system of promotion in rank, ideology classes, patriotic activities, parades, field trips, all these giving them a sense of pride and responsibility. *Pionierul* was the guide book of this organization. Insisting on the details of the activities, the organization became attractive to children. Since they were at the beginning of their life's journey, kids had to be regimented and indoctrinated first. The pioneer organization was one of the main forms of attraction and indoctrination. Communists worked hard to make it a national institution to which children were attracted to, not obligated to join. Membership in the pioneer organization was offered as a reward for the good grades and behaviour in school. The organization held on a regular basis meetings, parades, and cultural activities dedicated to the young who found them extremely attractive. All these were publicized by *The Pioneer*, the dedicated newspaper (Pionierul 1949, 31: 1). More so, because the first to join were hand-picked best students in school and they looked important in society: "casting a new way, moving forward, fearless and determined, towards everybody's goal ... [...] right ahead, on the road lit by the Party, learning [...] to be able to become a good builder of socialism and then communism". In other words, the role of the pioneers was to become loyal servants of the Party. Among the most desirable qualities of a pioneer are love of the party, "under whose care and supervision he/she grows", but also for the Soviet Union "the liberator and great friend of our country". It's useful to point out that love for the Soviet Union was "unlimited", just like the loving care for the future builders of socialism. Everyone's future was depicted from childhood (*Pionierul*, 1949, 22: 3-4). In their activity, pioneers were supervised by another communist organization, the Comsomol, "the young heroes of the 5-year plan" [....] instructors of the pioneer detachments", later turned into UTC (Union of the Communist Youth), the equivalent of the Russian "Comsomol", who, during school breaks they were supervising their younger comrades. The concept of freedom was now defunct and replaced by that of total control (*Pionierul* 1949, 21: 1). "The Big Brother" syndrome was in place to help the young acquire by example the communist norms. The little ones are even told what kind of feelings to have towards their "big brothers": "In children's voices one could feel their love for their older comrades, their

admiration and respect for their determination to win against any hardship" (*Pionierul* 1949, 21: 1) The new generations had to be educated in the spirit of the party so that they would be able to represent its interests in the future: "Of the children we have in our care we have to get people capable of great passion, people with high feelings for the nation, with love for the working class, for the party, for honesty and justice, brave and determined people, who can fight for their motherland, for honesty and justice. [...] In this educational endeavor, revolutionary, the role of literature is overwhelming. It is destined in the first place to the hearts of the readers, so that it stirs strong emotions, to win them over for the cause of building socialism" (Stanciu 1957: 12). These recommendations were extended to the children's literature.

The communists were extremely keen on educating the new generations because they were supposed to carry on "from the hands of Stalin's the flag that Lenin once so triumphantly had raised" (Cioroianu 1995: 95). Children's manipulation was based on some principles: "We have to teach them how to influence their family. We have to take them under our control, and make it clear we nationalize them" (Heller 1985: 180). Besides school and church, the press, through its specific means and tools of persuasion, will become one of the most efficient means of manipulation. Children's press had a long tradition in Romania, contributing successfully to education along with other means. Moreover, due to its profile as children's press, it used to be propaganda-free before and during World War II, so that both parents and kids trusted it. From the first edition on, the editors indicated that they were in the business of propaganda and manipulation. Not even the little ones were spared of the copycat stereotypes of the Soviet society, where the pioneers "had learned a long time ago to be the first at everything". *Pionierul* will be a means of learning about our country, its beauty and its riches, a means of information and guidance: "The Pioneer will show us how to get there. It will show us: "Go forward!" (*Pionierul* 1949, 1: 1-3).

Malleable and dreamy, naive but willing to experiment, vulnerable because of age, children were exposed to a heavy campaign of indoctrination and manipulation while they were growing up and their personalities were forming with figures of power given as examples to follow. The communist means of mass communication offered a large galery of both positive and negative characters that would contribute to the building of a new ethical code for children. It is scientifically proven now that the first years of education are essential for the later development of the child in terms of character, morals, knowledge. In today's democratic societies, children have a vast array of information and knowledge at their disposal, and, as a result, to discern

between truth and falsehood is relatively easy (Berson, Outzts and Walsh 1999). In communist times, there were no alternative sources of information and the only one offered had to be taken for granted, a very efficient method of brainwashing.

The Soviet Union's leaders' and founders' of communism portraits were displayed in all schools of the country: Stalin, Lenin, Marx and Engels. The national anthem of the Soviet Union was the opening act of every school cultural activity and it was sung in Russian language that had become mandatory through high school. The modern Soviet literature was translated at assembly-line speed and filled the libraries and book stores. During some discussions we found that many children came to believe that the country was run from Moscow, not Bucharest. In smaller cities of the country Radio Moscow in Romanian was hooked up to the PA system and people were listening to its programs in the streets as they went about their daily business. The entire country was soaked in Russian culture, language and politics. Even the corn was sowed by Russian methods. In contrast to democratic societies where a variety of sources of information was available for the readers to be able to verify the authenticity of news, in communist Romania, just like in the entire Soviet Empire, there was no alternative. It was much later on when "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe" came into the picture, but listening to those stations was made illegal immediately, very few people had radios, and in the first years of broadcasting, the stations were jammed by powerful Russian electronic equipment. By comparison, today's children take nothing for granted. They cruise the net, they jam-pack libraries and work their smart phones. The communist system wouldn't have a chance today. But in postwar era such an anomaly was possible.

In a review of the articles published along the years in the children's press we can see that it reflected all the changes in the communist society and in spite of those changes, the attention given to the children's education was always a priority (Preda 2014: 30-31). The content of *Pionierul* was an instruction book of how the youngsters should organize and live, both during school time and on vacation, so that they would never have a break from propaganda and manipulation. The materials were of historical, political, and geographical nature, but to convey an educational message they put a spin on it: they added pictures with explanations on virtues like hard work, joy, happiness and success. The pictures show children in happy families who are doing everything to build a new country, and this is not considered a sacrifice, but a duty of honor for the peasants who are thrilled to be part of the new agricultural collective farms instead of working their small lots individually – a

terrible lie because everybody knew then and knows now that peasants fought tooth and nail to stay independent. The pictures also featured Soviet leaders, but also national, posing in the middle of people they claimed to represent. The cover of the magazine goes along with the content featuring snapshots from pioneers' activities and the communist party's successes. As for the content, there were two categories: simple, teeming with optimism and a strong drive to overcome obstacles, expressed in accolades, and the second category, with the purpose to lash at the non-communist past and the Western countries from beyond the Iron Curtain.

The texts in the second category surprise by their aggressiveness. Such an article, which demonizes the political system of the past comparing them to the current successes of the new order, is the letter *Tata iubea Partidul ca ochii din cap. Eu când o să fiu mare, o să lupt ca tata*. (*My Dad loved the party like he loved his eyes. When I grow up I'm going to fight like dad*). For the author it didn't make any difference that the children had no knowledge of history to understand class struggle and ideology. The article was inspired by the end of a trial in Timisoara where verdicts of guilty and sentences from hard labour to death were handed down to people branded "bandits" ("greedy merchants, boyars [...] former legionnaires"), who had acted against the working class "who did not want the times of darkness and oppression and luxury for the rich to ever return". One of these was sentenced because he had killed a party member, "and threw him into a ditch after cutting his nose and ears off and his party comrades found him there" The cause of the communist party was the most important, being dedicated the entire energy and it became the main topic even in the family:" "In the evening, he was telling us how he worked for the party and he was reading books about the party". The hatred for those who killed her father makes Maria Cernescu, the daughter of the deceased, to conclude :" When I grow up, I will also fight like my father" (*Pionierul* 1949, 4: 1-4). It is obvious that the letter was not written by a child simply because during that time the communists' ranks were very thin to fight the fierce popular resistance to communism. In both categories of content, the text was written in simple, clear language so that children could understand it, with the catchwords repeated at regular intervals to sink into the sub-conscience. In order to create a connection between the writer and the reader, many of the published materials (poems, letters, and reports) were written by the latter and sent in, but more often than not we can suspect that some were written by the editors themselves posing as children. What gives them away is the so-called "wooden language", a bland style of communist rhetoric that a child couldn't have possibly mastered at that point in time. *Pionierul* is a periodical entirely political.

Most articles are not signed. Sometimes, an author is introduced by name and he/she is a pioneer who wants to communicate with peers from other areas of the country about their activities. The titles suggest that they were written by the editors: *Scumpe tovarăşe Stalin* (*Pionierul* 1949, 29: 1), *Păşim înainte odată cu Republica noastră populară* (*Pionierul* 1949, 31: 4), *Spor la muncă sesiunii Comitetului executiv al FMTD* (*Pionierul* 1950, 3: 1), *80 de ani de la naşterea lui V. I Lenin* (*Pionierul* 1950, 16: 1), *Ca să învăţăm mai bine limba rusă* (*Pionierul* 1950, 20: 3), *Pionierii şi-au primit Palatul în dar* (*Pionierul* 1950, 23: 4), *Te-ai arătat a fi fiu vrednic al poporului tău!* (*Pionierul* 1950, 25: 1), *Aşa cu participat pionierii sovietici la pregătirea alegerilor* (*Pionierul* 1950, 42: 1), *Marea revoluţie din octombrie a deschis întregii lumi muncitoare calea spre fericire* (*Pionierul* 1950, 44: 1), *Stalin ne luminează drumul* (*Pionierul* 1950, 5: 1). By publishing poetry, letters, and stories written by children, a spiritual connection was established between readers and the newspaper. Moreover, children were thrilled at the idea of seeing their names or even the pictures published in the paper- a real hit among peers and community. The magazine is in black and white, but in special editions the colours red and blue, symbols of the communist power are used.

At a closer look of the magazine we find that the purpose of each function (to inform, to entertain, to develop language and imagination, to educate and to interpret messages) is severely altered by the propagandistic overtones and manipulation throughout its life. Information was actually disinformation, kids lacking the means to verify the facts or events presented in its pages. As for the development of language and vocabulary, this was really limited to some slogans and catchwords, good for official ceremonies, but totally useless in every-day situations: "The leaders of a totalitarian regime always create a jargon specific to their group, made up of words and expressions because the language delivers to the mind the symbols with which to operate. By controlling the symbols one can control the mind" (Ficeac 1998: 138). An example of this "wooden language" used by the youngsters of communist Romania is a letter to the Russian pioneers, with all the specifics of communist jargon: "Dear comrades, we would like to renew our pledge under our beloved Party guidance, as proud citizens of our beloved country, committed fighters for peace and the victory of socialism and communism, long live the friendship between the pioneers of the Romanian Popular Republic (RPR) and V. I. Lenin". The letter is written in Romanian, without any word that it could have been a translation. It was supposed to be a message of congratulations for the Soviet pioneers, but besides "our hottest congratulations" and "we wish you new successes in your work", the rest of the content is dedicated to the results and the plans of the Romanian pioneers

(*Pionierul* 1950, 21: 1). Normally, by reading the magazine, the children were supposed to develop a taste for reading and a skill for extracting the salient messages from a text, to enrich and develop an active vocabulary, to express themselves with ease and write correctly. Instead, they are obligated to repeat over and over the same platitudes that turned them into pathetic robots. There was nothing educational in these messages – it was all political. Communist party ideology had become the only priority. Not even the entertainment function mattered anymore. Like the Russian counterparts, highly appreciated in the pages of *Pionierul* , the communist party focused on the free time of the school children. They had to be kept busy after classes and on vacations and those activities had to be also political. No piece of information was given as a factual event, but as an explanation that pointed into a specific direction, so that the little reader would get a prefabricated idea that he had to believe and act upon. Proof is the code of conduct with 23 rules for school children issued by the Ministry of Education that stipulated "The observance of these rules is a duty of honor of each and every student and any violation may lead to sanctions as severe as removal from school" (*Pionierul* 1950, 10: 1).

According to the experts, a child is the product of a social settings (family, peers, school) whose values and ideals he learns by example and mimicry. Usually, these groups are homogeneous and they generate a dominant mentality that is shared by all members, giving them a perspective on life and a certain conduct. This was possible also because of the limited space the children lived in, something that determined one single perspective on life and world, which coincided with their knowledge already acquired leading this way to its consolidation (Kapferer 2002: 103). Communist ideology was about social classes, power and wealth. They set out to eliminate classes, to seize all power for themselves, and to confiscate wealth for the state. To manage this unprecedented type of society they needed "a new man" who would never think on his own, but only followed orders. That man did not exist when they seized power. He had to be created and the best place to start was the school where personality is cast.

Besides the social setting an individual belongs to, the press has a great role in moulding a personality because they carry the culture that he needs to acquire in order to be able to function in that particular society. Responsibility, national identity, social relations, personality and culture are some of the issues an individual has to work on (Ponte 2014) Fairy tales and legends were born out of the human necessity for guidance, the urge to follow a moral model or idol from whom to learn and hold in high respect thus galvanizing the values and ideals that an entire society can embrace (Chelcea 2006: 337). Fact is that

depending on the political aim, these heroes may take different representations. In communist Romania, the objectives of "the cultural revolution" were first and foremost the implementation of the doctrines created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin that stated "the imperialist ideology in all its forms had to be fought against", the successes of the Soviet Union in economy had to be made known all over the world, and a re-written version of history had to be thought (Denize 2011: 25). This cultural resettlement had the final aim the creation of "the new man".

In the manipulation process, the Communist Party used a few fundamental objectives decided in weekly meetings of the Political Bureau and relayed to all press organizations to be implemented (Domenach 2004: 78). One of these important objectives of communist propaganda was to eulogize the Soviet Union, The little ones had no perception of the general picture they were just fed misinformation about the true history. From the first issue of *The Pioneer* they were instructed about the approved conduct, and the examples to follow were all from the Soviet pioneers: "The parks and woods of the Soviet Union echo with the songs of the USSR pioneers. After a school year ended with good results in the exams, the pioneers go happily on vacation". The text is supported by a group photo of pioneers singing and playing musical instruments. The photo could have been taken at any given occasion, not necessarily related to the school year's end, but the devotion to the country and the pioneers' organization and the happiness resulted had to be pointed out (*Pionierul* 1949, 1: 1).

Not only songs but also literature and movies were promoted in the pages of *The Pioneer*. The new releases of the Russian authors with topics from the new reality are mass-produced, illustrating an ideal world focusing on the Russian pioneers. Through these life stories, children were introduced to the world of collective farms, to the friendship of the North towards the South, suggesting the USSR and Romania. Because the little ones follow their heroes' life stories, they want to be like them, the main characters "are a group of heroes" with whom "the readers will remain friends" (*Pionierul* 1949, 1: 2). If reading a book takes time and imagination, the movies, through their capability to deliver messages instantly, were a powerful political tool of propaganda meant to publicized the things to come in Romania via the Russian models. The Russian peasants had at least one thing in common to Romanians' – their love of land- and the propaganda was expected to anticipate the hard time the peasants would have being pushed into collective farms they didn't want. Through these propaganda movies the communists were sugarcoating the

bitter pill of collectivization that most peasantry in Romania was forced to swallow (*Pionierul* 1949, 2: 2).

The successes of the Soviet Union and the activities of the Soviet pioneers made the headlines in the pages of each issue of the Romanian *Pioneer* magazine. In spite of this, there were no guarantees that the children were able to grasp the message contained in the articles. To evaluate the impact these messages had, and the efficiency of their indoctrination purpose, the children were challenged to answer 7 questions in a mail-in contest. Some of the questions sounded like this: "How did you learn from the Soviet pioneers to work as a team?, How did your conduct in the family change after you learned how the Soviet children do in their families?, Which activities of the Soviet pioneers that you have read in books or seen in movies did you follow as models?, How do you split your study time and your free time following the example of the Soviet pioneers?, How did you manage to overcome hardships in your activities, following the Soviet pioneers example?" (*Pionierul* 1949, 219: 1). The answers sent in show that the children answered these questions by simply copying what the Russian pioneers were doing without any reference or information about themselves. This is proof that the children actually didn't think like pioneers, but they simply repeated something they were asked to. Moreover, except for those activities set up by the party that were mandatory, there is enough evidence to show that children preferred to spend their free time in many other ways than by the norms imposed. In spite of all these, the editors wrote, "From this kind of events and many others we found out from the letters we received in this survey, we could see how you get more of the traits of a real pioneer: courage, determination, honesty, and decisiveness in work" (*Pionierul* 1949, 25: 2).

Another exceptional topic were the days celebrated with grand fanfare as national holidays, especially August 23. The days officially declared national holidays were, especially August 23, were particularly festive and celebrated with big fanfare. In 1949 it was the 5th anniversary of the "liberation of our country", a day on which the joy of the people was overwhelming" because, with the help of victorious Russian Army, the people regained liberty and took "its fate into its own hands". The irony of the message is sad, and now, after years, reveals the real drama the nation was going through. The parade of August 23, 1949, looks like a picture of a happy nation, free and grateful to the Soviet leader ("from everyone's chest Stalin's name was heard all the time"). The pioneers are mentioned briefly, as simple participants in the parade. Words and expressions with positive impact like: victory, freedom, strong shield, liberty, strong will of the people, building a new life, etc. lead to the idea

that the nation was happy under the new leadership that was struggling for a better life (*Pionierul* 1949, 12: 1). Stalin's birthday was a major event of the year, celebrated with pomp throughout the Soviet block, and a major topic of all the press for some time. The letter of a pioneer from Constanţa, published on the front page and printed in long hand of a child for authenticity, thanked "the beloved comrade Stalin", under whose "wise leadership" the children of Russia were living a happy life. Even the little ones had to express publicly their gratitude for Stalin who "gave them the chance to live happily in our beloved country" (*Pionierul* 1949, 27: 1). Festivities were organized all over the country to celebrate Stalin's birthday. Moreover, the pioneers were making strange pledges (to get grades over 7, to learn Russian, and to be more organized) – all gifts to Stalin (*Pionierul* 1949, 27: 1). The materials published in magazines 24-27, but also in the following issues, had to be presented to all pioneer organizations at detachment level (*Pionierul* 1949, 27: 3). This is confirmation that *Pionierul* was an active participant to the creation of "the new man".

Along with the eulogy of the Soviet Union, *The Pioneer* dedicated ample space to the benefits of the reforms introduced by the communist party. Time after time, the children were kept informed about the reforms the communists wanted to implement. The establishment of the first collective farms was an unusual topic for a children's magazine that, under normal conditions, wouldn't have been featured. For communists, adapting the topic for the specifics of the young was a priority. Children's education and the preparation of them and their families' for the radical reforms about to begin were top priorities. Such a topic opens up the *Pioneer's* issue of 28 July 1948. Being a vacation issue the impact and the rate of access to it were surely high. Smaller in size, placed on the right side up, the article "the big news" let the world know that the land owners have decided on their own free will to form an agricultural association "a handful of hard-working peasants from each village to break away from poverty". It was the road to socialism "the road indicated by the Party". The key words here, "wise", "strong", "working class", "muscular" came to support the message. To back it up, a picture with men, women and children, all smiling happily, is added (*Pionierul* 1949, 8: 1). The topic is carried over in the following issue with a family from Luna de Jos, Cluj County, made up of two adults and three children who were poor before the land reform of 1945 when they got land from the new regime. Disinformation through outright lies became the norm. "They read and heard" says the paper in an era when illiteracy was rampant in Romania, an issue that even the communists admitted as really serious. The propaganda campaigns intensified: "The Party is talking to people about the wonderful life of the Soviet collective

farmers who left behind poverty and exploitation". Given the scarce sources of information available to people in the countryside, the Party publicized lies that in other parts of the country peasants were signing up in droves for the new system of collective agriculture at a time when passive and even armed resistance were widespread. In the propaganda materials, the emphasis was on "the free will" of the people to join the system. "They decided by themselves, without any pressure" (Gârneață 1949). Children, instructed in schools, were supposed to take this message home and persuade the parents to join.

The next major objective, largely publicized, was the campaign against illiteracy. The literacy campaign was underway and the pioneers again were asked to help by urging others they knew to come back to school to learn the basics "because our plan for 1950 says "no child of school age can stay out of school" (*Pionierul* 1950, 7: 1). The same campaign also targeted adults. Instructed by their teachers, children were able to persuade adults to go to school and learn how to read and write. The examples used were from the life of the people of the Soviet Union that gave them the chance to built a better life (*Pionierul* 1950, 17: 5).

Following the same manipulative line, the communist propaganda was trying to demonstrate that all reforms mentioned that had as objective the country's reconstruction, wouldn't have been possible without the contribution of the young generation and of the working class. The feeling of national unity was this way forged. The communist propaganda emphasized the importance of self-sacrifice in the struggle against the old order and for the construction of a new society saying that the hard situation in the country was not only the result of the war but also the consequence of the long decades of exploitation by the ruling class that was overthrown from power by communists. The economic situation of the country is contained in this expression that will be used throughout the entire time communists were in power: "under development", which suggests an undeveloped economy (Zafiu 2012). Nowhere is it mentioned that the aid from our new "best friend", the Soviet Union, was free of charge. The work for the country's reconstruction was slow due to the poor financial situation, a good reason for the communists to encourage "volunteer" or "patriotic" labor that went unpaid (Denize 2011: 211). The idea of "patriotic" work was pushed as coming from the pioneers, who, in reality, did not know or care about the whole thing, especially since they were on vacation. *Pionierul* features pictures of pioneers picking the grain off the field after the harvest, their effort being rewarded with 50 kg of wheat and 50 of barley in one day (*Pionierul* 1949, 10: 1). The initiative and the results of their work are eulogized on the first page of the magazine: "day after day

the number of hard-working pioneers and scholars who help harvesting is growing. Over the field one can hear the pioneer songs". (*Pionierul* 1950, 28:1). Using kids in agriculture was an abuse by the communist state. About 50.000 children were working for free on the fields of the country during their vacation (*Pionierul* 1950, 29 (60): 1).

The population's efforts wouldn't have been possible without the visionary spirit and underground class struggle of the first believers in communist ideology. From the ranks of those who fought underground there were a lot of working class people who later on would serve as symbols of the communists. A symbol of the struggle for power, Doftana, was more than a history chapter. It was a communist Mecca, where visits looked like pilgrimages to holy places. A trip to the place where the freedom fighters were locked up was a trip of initiation supposed to trigger in visitors respect and adulation for the communist leaders in power. The children learned about the leaders' sacrifice in their struggle for freedom and about the inhumane treatment they suffered at the hands of their prison staff. It is another page of history rewritten for political ends. To maintain momentum, pictures with pioneers touring these facilities and their activities related to the topic abound in the magazine. These trips to Doftana were part of the "education" process of children, with a pattern easy to identify in the way the articles were written. In an article by Marius Mircu, it is emphasized the struggle of communists for "freedom, land and a better life". The courage of these freedom fighters could only arouse admiration in the new idealist generation. In spite of the risk they were taking, workers never gave up the struggle against "the capitalists" and "land owners".

The negative epithets towards the old political class called "people's tormentors" and "hangmen" who "had launched a persecution campaign against the working class" came to support the cause of the underground communists who were arrested and incarcerated "badly beaten and tortured", and repeatedly told "you will never leave Doftana alive". Since many of the visitors were children of the working class, one can imagine the impact these messages had on the minds and souls of a young generation who thought that their own parents had been mistreated by the old regime (Mircu 1949). In the same pages, a gallery along with the freedom fighters of the day, a number of predecessors are introduced to the young to vouch the idea that communists came from a long line of revolutionaries, not brought over by Stalin's tanks. The history was being rewritten for political ends and Romanians were people with qualities only surpassed by those of the Soviet Union, and failures were due to the outside conspirators. In communist ideology reigns supreme the

"they vs. us" syndrome, with "they" representing evil and decadence. In this context, words like liberty, justice, democracy, impostor and aristocracy cannot be neutral. They get their meanings based on the communication intent. In general, the words with positive connotation were used to amplify the successes of the communists. In case the same words were used in relation to capitalist realities, they came with "...." to signal that only the opposite was true. An article about a trip to Doftana prison is relevant to this topic. For communists, there is no "I or me"; it's always "we or us", a compact mass of the same kind where individuality is ruled out because the individual cannot be strong (Zinoviev 1991: 92). This kind of unity reveals "a typical form of manifestation of the dictatorial spirit". In these cases, the plural indicates the sole owner of the certain object, of the discourse, and, implicitly, of the power" (Betea 2012). By using "we", it is suggested that there is unity between the leader and people, on one hand, and a gap from "they", the reactionary forces (Thom 1987: 19-20). Most articles in *Pionierul* use the pronoun "we", suggesting the idea of unity of opinion that has to be accepted by all.

In this context the central place in the communist society was occupied by the workers, those people of a "healthy social origin". The new society didn't need intellectuals to question the new doctrine and its implementation. From early childhood, kids were directed to choose practical professions, like welders from whose hands came out "shiny parts, white or gold, parts of engines that power the turbines, the lathes and the tall stacks of the forges" (*Pionierul* 1949, 3: 2). In the first year of its life, *The Pioneer* never urged its readers go to an institution of higher learning- only industrial vocational schools.

The articles in *The Pioneer* cover a large array of topics of interest for communists. In order to fake objectivity, communists do not discredit only the past, but also educated the youngest, as future citizens, to be obedient and accept current evaluation. An important part of the communist doctrine was self-criticism, supposed not only to be known by all but also applied at all levels, including school. Even on vacation, pioneers were asked to self-criticize: "A glimpse at the activities of our detachment is enough to assess that we did good. But, we also had some shortcomings" (*Pionierul* 1949, 10: 2). It's easy to see that these children were not at the summer camp to relax, but to learn, because they talk about work, results, and activities- all favorites in the communist "wooden language". This way, the children were supposed to learn that their work and activities were permanently scrutinized and evaluated by the "big brother" and they were also under the scrutiny of their own peers.

Through propaganda and indoctrination children became familiar to the doctrine, but mainly they were taught to accept it without questioning the changes and the abuses. The Pioneer is a detailed reflection of the daily life in communist Romania at the beginning of the regime.

3. Conclusions

Children's press had a long tradition in Romania, but *Pionierul* is a radical departure in terms of content and purpose. Compared to the press from pre-war years, when its purpose was to inform, educate, and entertain, *Pionierul* illustrates the communist world depicted according to its target public's level of understanding. In order to create "the new man", children had to become familiar to the communist ideology, to accept it and to become obedient to the leaders.

The simplest and most efficient way to get there was to mold new generations from whose ranks to recruit both the leaders and the foot soldiers of the regime. Another difference between the old press for children and the new one was the huge numbers of articles sent in by pioneers but never signed. The style is the same, wooden language" specific to communist ideology. Each dictatorial regime chooses a typical style that defines it and by accepting it the people accept the norms imposed upon them. The main topics of the communist propaganda can be found in each and every issue of the magazine: The Romanian-Russian friendship, the eulogy to the leaders, celebration of important dates in the history of the party converted into national holidays, demonization of the past and the Western world, etc. Articles are backed up by pictures for more credibility. The text is not always suitable to the reader's age and was at times surprisingly violent in expression. It also tried to push topics totally uninteresting to children, like facts from collective farms, Soviet farms, Stalin's birthday, etc. Designed to serve as a means of information and entertainment for children, now the press became a successful communist propaganda and manipulation agent.

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Norms of Filial Obligation and Actual Support to Parents in Central and Eastern Europe

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Abstract: Country differences in intergenerational relationships are not only attributable to economic, policy, housing contexts but also to a cultural tendency towards closer intergenerational ties. This study is a cross-national comparison regarding the relationship between norms of filial obligation and actual giving of financial support and care in several Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as compared to Western Europe. We examine to what extent norms of filial obligation are consistent with helping behaviour, whether the responsiveness to norms varies by country context, and whether CEE countries differ from societies benefiting of more generous public support to ageing people. The data used in this study come from the Generation and Gender Programme. We show that actual support to parents is not more prevalent in CEE than in Western European (WE) countries, even if norms of filial obligations are more strongly expressed. On the contrary, emotional support has a higher prevalence in WE. However, the connection between filial responsibility and instrumental care is stronger in CEE, while the connection between financial help and norms of filial obligation is stronger in WE. In CEE countries contrasting mechanisms may play: in some countries people have no choice but to assist parents in need financially, but in others they do not provide such help as they do not consider financial support being part of their filial obligations. Interestingly, we did not find any connection between filial responsibility and emotional support to parents, neither in East nor in West European countries.

Keywords: Intergenerational solidarity, norms of filial obligations, support to parents, country contexts, Central and Eastern Europe, Generations and Gender Programme

1. Introduction

The objective of this study is to gain a better understanding of how norms of filial responsibility influence adult children to provide support to their ageing parents and in what context this relation can manifest. Family support can be defined as social, emotional, instrumental, and economic exchanges (Treas and Cohen 2007) between family members. We base our analysis on the theory of intergenerational solidarity (Bengtson and Roberts 1991), to study the interrelationship between normative solidarity and functional solidarity while controlling for structural solidarity.

Different concepts can be used to describe the scope of the study, like the "intergenerational exchange" (Eggebeen 2002), a concept more encompassing as it includes routine exchanges (besides support and care) which are, however, difficult to measure due to their episodic frequency. Thus the scope of this study is limited to specific types of support: instrumental care (that is regular practical help, personal care, or help with day-to-day activities), emotional support (listening to the problems of the parent) and financial support: the offering (for one time, occasionally, or regularly) of money, assets, or goods of substantive value to a family member.

Our report is structured as it follows: in Chapter 2 we begin with a clarification of the concepts and theories we will use in our study also incorporating results from earlier research on the topic. We build on the perspective of intergenerational solidarity of Bengtson and Roberts (1991) and address three aspects of solidarity: functional, normative and structural solidarity. Normative solidarity is captured by the filial obligation concept, and we investigated whether it can be considered as an attitude measure (having an effect at a personal level) or if it rather reflects societal norms. The pattern of intergenerational solidarity across countries is influenced by societal context, specified at the micro and macro level by structural (demographic, labour-force and income factors), institutional (legal obligations, welfare state, household arrangements) and cultural (religion, values, beliefs and attitudes) factors, in line with Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2007).

In chapter 3 we describe our data source, the countries studied, the measures and the analytical approach. We rely on data from the Generation and Gender Survey (part of the Generation and Gender Programme) for seven Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Russia) and two Western European (WE) countries (France and Norway). Hence we can compare Central and Eastern Europe with societies belonging to other welfare regimes. In chapter 4 we examine how norms of filial obligations influence adult children to provide

social support to their ageing parents in CEE countries, comparing with WE countries and paying attention to the different effects of societal context. Chapter 5 contains discussions and conclusion regarding our findings.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Norms, values, attitudes and filial obligations

The conceptual apparatus used to study the cultural factors involved in the explanation of intergenerational exchanges is diverse. Many studies use attitudes as a central concept (Daatland, Veenstra and Herlofson 2012), along with concepts like values (van Bavel et al. 2010) or norms (Gans and Silverstein 2006). All these concepts are linked to the idea of familism (Daatlandand Herlofson 2003) or familialism (Gans 2007), a broad term that describes "attitudes about the centrality and importance of the family and values surrounding the enactment of help and support norms between family members" (Parrot and Bengtson 1999: 76). Attitudes are individual orientation toward a specific situation (using the language of Rokeach, 1973), in our case different aspects of intergenerational exchanges, but values are principles. Attitudes and values are internal but they are not norms (which are external), as they do not represent standards of behaviour. Social norms are general (pertaining to the overall relationship between individuals and their parents, for example) and they are different from expectations (what a specific parent is expecting from his/her own children). Yet, many studies address only the social (general or universal) expectations and not the individual, specific expectations (Lee, Netzer and Coward 1994).

The "most prominent conceptualization" (Silverstein and Giarrusso 2010: 1040) on our subject is the approach of intergenerational solidarity (Bengtson and Roberts 1991). It is a multidimensional concept (Bengtson and Roberts 1991) that includes six different constructs of solidarity (associational, affectual, consensual, functional, normative and structural). Functional solidarity refers to the extent to which assistance is given (in its three forms: financial, physical and emotional), normative solidarity can be equalized to familism (normative expectations on intergenerational roles) and structural solidarity (opportunity structures for family interactions) represents the structures that inhibit or provide opportunities for intergenerational exchanges. Relying on these concepts, this study addresses the interrelationship between normative solidarity and functional solidarity while controlling for structural solidarity.

Using the delimitation of Rossi and Rossi (1990) we will distinguish between filial norms (the normative obligations towards parents), parental

norms (the normative obligations towards children) and general kinship norms (obligations towards kin in general). Filial obligation norms reflects the "generalized expectation that children should support their elderly parents at times of need" but they are also "duties and obligations that define the social roles of adult children with respect to their ageing parent" (Gans and Silverstein 2006: 961).

The relationship between intergenerational support and norms has been approached by a number of studies, and a common starting point was the idea that "a potentially important explanation of intergenerational support lies in norms" (De Vries, Kalmijn and Lifbroer 2008: 188). Social norms that prescribe appropriate behaviour toward family members are important because they serve as "mental maps for decisions and behaviours" (Dykstra and Fokkema 2012: 97). Research has shown that norms of obligation toward family members have a predictive value for the actual exchange of care. For example, Gans and Silverstein (2006) found that providing support to a parent was positively associated with filial norms. In another study, Silverstein, Gans and Yang (2006) used longitudinal analysis to show how norms of filial responsibility influence adult children to provide social support to their ageing parents.

The study of Lowenstein, Katz and Daatland (2004) pointed to the relevance of a "prospective approach" (Parrot and Bengtson 1999): in most countries studied there was a significant effect of parental and filial norms on receiving help from adult children. This finding was explained by referring to the transmission of filial norms in the family. This is in line with the study of De Vries, Kalmijn and Lifbroer (2008) that showed that a quarter of the variance in filial norms can be explained by the family of origin, while family background is less important.

Comparative studies indicated that filial norms are supported in Europe, but the strength of support varies across countries (Daatland and Herlofson 2003, Lowenstein and Daatland 2006). It has been shown that in Southern and Central European countries care is perceived as a responsibility of the family, whereas in Northern European countries obligations to care by family members are weaker (Haberkern and Szyldik 2010). Filial and parental obligations seem to be weaker in Western than in Eastern European countries (Van Bavel et al. 2010). The interplay between social and personal value orientation is important, as Jappens and Van Bavel (2012) shown that in explaining functional solidarity the normative climate has a significant impact while the individual attitudes do not.

2.2. Intergenerational solidarity

We will rely on the theoretical model of intergenerational solidarity described by Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2007) that differentiates between a micro (individual and family factors) and a macro (anything of higher order) level and between three categories of conditions: structural, institutional and cultural.

2.2.1. Structural factors - macro level

The demographic circumstances of families have a direct effect on the total (aggregate) help towards the parents. Thus, reduced family size means the reduction of the number of adult children and the increase of the generation age gap, which in turn can lead to lower level of support. But even in countries where population ageing is more pronounced, the current generation of elderly still has a higher number of descendants. In cross-national comparisons also other macro level factors, such as the labour force structure and income distribution, must be taken into account. Increasing labour force participation for women is considered to be the driver of change of the welfare state and of intergenerational relationships in particular. Given the fact that family care is gendered (Leitner 2003), in societies with higher female economic participation, support responsibilities are often diverted to other forms of provision of the 'welfare mix': the state or the market (Saraceno and Keck 2010). In low- income countries direct help from children might be more common, as the fiscal pressure from ageing population with respect to pension, health and long-term care (see OECD, 2011) might not allow for the development of a comprehensive public sector. Labour migration is another factor to be taken into account. From Eastern European countries substantial numbers of young and middle aged workers migrated to Western Europe (both to the South and to Nordic countries) thus reducing the availability of instrumental support providers in case of parental need but increasing the financial support availability (Nemenyi 2012, Zimmer, Rada and Stoica 2014).

2.2.2. Institutional factors - macro level: legal obligations of intergenerational support and welfare state

Intergenerational care is more prevalent in Southern and Central European countries, where children are legally obligated to support parents in need (Haberkern and Szydlik 2010). Twigg and Grand (1998) show that legal obligation of filial responsibility toward aged parents are linked in French legislation (and thus in many country that follow the Napoleonic Code, including Romania) to determine patterns of inheritance, while in common-law countries (e.g. England) there are no legal obligations to support the elderly

and testamentary freedom is the legal principle. However, it is not clear whether the legal obligations are enforced (i.e. the jurisprudence shows cases concerning the legal obligations of elderly parents) or if they are largely ignored in different societies.

The existence of legal obligation toward elderly or toward adult children is not general - we can find it in Georgia, France, Lithuania, Romania, Russia but not explicitly in of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Norway, Poland (Herlofson et al. 2011, Saraceno and Keck 2008). Interestingly, the reciprocal obligation (of parents toward adult children) is not that widespread, as we can find it in Bulgaria, France and Romania but not in the other countries in our study.

Who is responsible for the wellbeing of the elderly and what are the sources of the welfare?

> *"Seen from the perspective of either the citizen or of society, our welfare comes inevitably from the combination of family, market and government inputs. Indeed, for most people throughout most of their lives, the all-dominant source of welfare is derived from the family and market. We receive most of our income from the market and typically most of our social support from family members. From a life cycle perspective, the welfare state only really gains prominence when we are very young or old, or when we fall on bad luck."* (Esping-Andersen 2009: 79).

The combination of family-state-market in providing welfare for the individuals in different societies requires a welfare regimes approach in dealing with country comparison. The concept of de-commodification represents the emancipation from market dependencies, while Leitner's approach of de-familialisation refers to "the extent to which the satisfaction of individual care needs is dependent on the individual's relation to the family" (Leitner 2003: 358). Starting from this, and basing welfare regime analysis on welfare-mix responsibility (between the family and the state) for the old and the young, Saraceno and Keck (2010) consider that the welfare state influence on intergenerational exchanges is profound and obligations regarding care or financial support (whether upward or downward) can be conceptualized in different models of intergenerational policy regimes. The resulting typology distinguishes between: (1) the familism by default type (or unsupported familialism, where there are no alternatives to family care and no financial support for such care), (2) the supported familialism (the so-called cash-for-care, where families are financially compensated for caring responsibilities), (3) de-familialisation regime (that reduces family responsibilities and

dependencies) and (4) optional familialism (an option between supported familialism and de-familialisation).

Regarding upward support (toward the elderly) the countries in our study can be grouped as follows: Norway and France belong to the de-familialisation regime and Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania belong to the familialism-by-default, while the Czech Republic can be considered to display a de-familialisation trend (Saraceno and Keck 2010, Herlofson et al. 2011). On downward support (toward the children) some countries belong to one group, while on upward support they belong to other group. Czech Republic has one of the highest degrees of supported familialism on leaves and transfers for children (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008) but it is nearer the familialism-by-default regarding the old, according to Saraceno and Keck (2010). In the case of Romania, on childcare we can see a mix of implicit familialism for parents with irregular labour market participation and an optional familialism for working parents (Raţ 2010). On upward support we should consider Georgia, Romania and Russia belonging to the familialism-by-default typology, based on less developed public (and private) services for the elderly (even in the presence of cash-for-care payments, like in Romania).

What is the welfare regimes influence on the support offered by the family and on filial obligations? For Daatland and Herlofson (2003: 556) the answer is unequivocal: "welfare state expansion has not eroded filial obligations, and indeed many of those who most strongly advocate filial responsibility also believe that it is formal services that should be primarily responsible for care provision". Research shows that in Europe the development of welfare services has not crowded-out the family and "solidarity seems to vary in character more than in strength" (Daatland and Lowenstein 2005: 181). Sometimes results indicate the crowding-out effect of family (when the provision of social and health services for the elderly is substantial), but this can be interpreted as a sign of the family specializing in other aspects of support instead (Brandt, Haberkern and Szydlik 2009). Moving behind "substitution or consolidation" of private (family) transfers, Brandt (2013) proposes a perspective that can be named the "functional differentiation" or specialization. When social service providers step in (with their technical or medical standardized support tasks) the private support from family members becomes complementary and flexible. All these results have led to the consideration that "Wolfe's theory about "the moral risk of the welfare state" [...] has been proven wrong" (Herlfoson et al. 2011: 8).

2.2.3. Cultural factors - macro level: religious traditions

Religion is one of the main sources of expressed moral obligations, since the religious doctrines prescribe the appropriate behaviour between parents and children, emphasize helping behaviour and inculcate collectivistic values of helping those in need (Gans, Silverstein and Lowenstein 2009). Yet, the effect of religiosity on helping behaviour on an individual level is less obvious.

In certain societies we can see more women (than men) rejecting the societal expectations of filial obligation. This phenomenon was documented for the Netherlands by Van Bavel et al. (2010) and Dykstra and Fokkema (2012) and also for France, Germany and Norway by Herlofson et al. (2011). The latter study shows that the reverse is true for several Eastern European countries as women show stronger attachment to filial responsibilities in Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and Georgia. This could be an indicator of a cultural change: the gendered distribution of intergenerational solidarity between daughters and sons is challenged by women in Western Europe but in Eastern and Central Europe the pace of change is slower.

2.2.4. Micro level: need, opportunity, exchange and personal characteristics

The level of help provided appears to be low in Europe. When the parents are healthy routine assistance tends to be episodic, while in case of health related needs specific services are used (Brandt, Haberkern and Szydlik 2009). Silverstein, Gans and Yang (2006) show that filial norms are activated in case of need (deteriorated health) and this calls for a dynamic perspective on the intergenerational solidarity.

Shared housing is an important part of intergenerational exchanges. Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2007: 326) consider co-residence as "the Southern European way of transferring resources from parents to children and vice versa". Eastern European countries display higher rates of co-residence than Western or Southern European Countries, and this phenomenon might be influenced by a combination of factors, such as historical patterns of extended families (De Jong Gierveld, Dykstra and Schenk 2012), the economic hardships of the elderly and the poor housing conditions for the young (Botev 1999). Co-residence is important as it is the "ultimate form of structural solidarity" (Dykstra et al. 2013: 4), providing ample opportunities for support and being in itself a form of support. Hărăguş (2014) showed that co-residence is more beneficial for the young: beside a place to live the old also offer childcare and help with household chores.

Gender differences are often documented in the literature: men provide financial help and women are more likely to give face-to-face

assistance. At the same time women are greatly involved in activities that structure family events. Silverstein, Gans and Yang (2006) have shown that daughters are more likely to offer help (in time of need) and more so toward mothers than fathers. It is possible that quality of the relation can explain this, since the mother-daughter tie is stronger than other parent-child relationship (Eggebeen 2002). But it is also possible that since wives are responsible for organizing the family care, in competition situation matrilineal preferences emerge: it will be less likely that the wives' parents will be excluded from care (see Shuey and Hardy 2003).

Daatland, Veenstra and Herlofson (2012) show that with age, the intergenerational exchanges diminish. Indeed, family responsibilities are strongly structured by age: expectations on children tend to decrease with age and expectations on parents tend to increase with age. Altruism theory can explain this, but also theories of adult development: with age the relationship between parents and children improves. Silverstein and Giarrusso (2010) suggest that altruistic motivations can explain why adult children provide social support to parents who are in worst health (or why parents provide support to the children with the fewest economic resources). However, support to the parents can also be governed by a reciprocity mechanism as Lowenstein, Katz and Daatland (2004) have shown. Support toward adult children is often reciprocated, sometimes as time-for-money exchange: older parents provide money while adult children provide time for care (Silverstein and Giarrusso 2010).

2.3 Research hypotheses

In line with our literature review we constructed several specific research hypotheses, grouped in three categories. We distinguish between research questions and suppositions related to i) filial norms and country context, ii) support behaviour and country context, and iii) connection between filial norms and actual support given to parents. Each category has two hypotheses.
The hypotheses concerning filial norms and country context are:
(1) The family-culture hypothesis: Filial norms are stronger towards the East and South of the continent, with Norway and Georgia as extreme cases (Daatland, Herlofson and Lima 2011);
(2) The familialism-by-default hypothesis: Where there are few public alternatives to family care and financial support, filial obligations will be stronger: the belief that it is important to give support to family members in need, is in line with a more limited availability of public support (Saraceno

2010). Consequently, East Europeans - where the welfare state is weaker - will express stronger filial responsibilities than West Europeans.

The hypotheses concerning filial support and country context are:

(1) The family-steps-in hypothesis: When publicly funded services are not available, adult children will be more supportive of ageing parents (Cooney and Dykstra 2011). If this is true, then Central and East European adult-children should be more supportive toward their ageing parents than West Europeans. This hypothesis is also known as the "crowding-out effect" of the welfare state on the family involvement.

(2) The complementarity hypothesis: Welfare states do not necessarily interfere with family solidarity but may even promote it (Attias-Donfut and Wolf 2000). When public support is generous, family members are able to redistribute resources to assist those in need (Kohli et al. 2000), and more willingly perform support tasks they feel capable of doing well (Lowenstein and Daatland 2006). In this case West European adult-children will be more supportive than those in Central and Eastern Europe, or at least they will be equally supportive.

The last set of hypotheses regards the connection between filial obligations and support behaviour:

(1) The family-steps-in hypothesis: The connection between obligations and support behaviour is stronger where public support is reduced, because of more severe consequences that may occur if one fails to follow norms of filial responsibilities (Cooney and Dykstra 2011). Consequently, the link between obligation and support behaviour has to be stronger in Central and East Europe.

(2) The no-choice hypothesis: The connection is weaker where public support is less available, hence no matter of the circumstances adult-children have no choice but to assist parents in need when public support is limited (Cooney and Dykstra 2011). In this case, the link between obligations and support behaviour has to be weaker in Central and East Europe than in Western Europe, where people can act more in accordance with their beliefs. As it stands, the no choice hypothesis contradicts the family-step-in hypothesis.

3. Data and method

3.1. Samples

Our intention is to test the relation between normative solidarity (filial obligations) and functional solidarity (instrumental, emotional and financial support) while controlling for structural solidarity in several Central and Eastern and Western European countries. The data set we employ comes from

the Generations and Gender Surveys[1], Wave 1, conducted in 2004-2011 (depending on the country) for seven CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Russia) and two WE countries (France and Norway). This choice reflects our aim to compare CEE with societies benefiting of more generous public support to ageing people. From the total of respondents we have selected only those who still have a living parent. See Table 3.1 for the interview dates and resulting sample sizes.

Table 3.1. Interview dates and sample sizes

	Interview date	Sample size
Bulgaria	Oct-Dec 2004	9071
Czech Republic	Jan-Dec 2005	6236
Georgia	Sep 2004 - Dec 2005	6365
Lithuania	Apr-Dec 2006	5944
Poland	Nov 2010 - Feb 2011	11497
Romania	Nov-Dec 2005	6672
Russia	June-Aug 2004	6452
France	Sep 2004 - Dec 2005	6689
Norway	Jan 2007 - Oct 2008	9756

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Index of filial responsibility

The GGS questionnaire contains items that are designed to assess individual value orientation and attitudes toward family and intergenerational relations (Vikat et. al. 2007). For the purpose of this report we selected the questions that refer to the filial obligation:

- "Children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need."
- "Children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents."
- "Children ought to provide financial help for their parents when their parents are having financial difficulties."
- "Children should have their parents to live with them when parents can no longer look after themselves."

[1] More on the GGP project: http://www.ggp-i.org/.

The response alternatives on these Likert-type items range from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". We constructed an index by recoding the items (from 0 meaning 'total disagreement' to 4 showing 'total agreement') and computing the average for the scale of filial responsibility[2]. Like other authors before us (see Herlofson et al. 2011) we dropped from the analysis one of the items, not included in the list above:

- "When parents are in need, daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons."

We considered this item less addressing care obligation than gendered care (the sexist distribution of care obligations). Reliability analysis further shows that this item belongs to another theoretical dimension and eliminating it results in a better Cronbach's Alpha.

Table 3.2. Reliability for index of filial responsibility

Country	Cronbach's Alpha 5 items (not used in this study)	Cronbach's Alpha 4 items (used in this study)
Bulgaria	0.590	0.673
Czech Republic	0.563	0.668
Georgia	0.626	0.728
Lithuania	0.491	0.631
Poland	0.554	0.687
Romania	0.583	0.643
Russia	0.630	0.679
France	0.460	0.689
Norway	0.714	752

Although we acknowledge that there can be identified at least two more "tensions": the orientation to labour market vs. orientation to family and the acceptance of co-residence vs. the independent living we nevertheless use the index in this form.

3.2.2. Support provided to parents

The GGS makes it possible to map the social network of the respondent (Vikat et al. 2007) by asking in which domain the individual is offering (and/or

[2] For Norway the original scale had different responses: from 0 - completely disagree to 10 - completely agree so we used a linear transformation to bring it in line with other countries. This way the index should have a higher variability than the standard version of the GGP scale.

receiving) support: childcare, personal care, emotional support and monetary transfers (or inheritance). For our purpose the focus will be on the actual support provided to parents, considering three types of help offered in the last 12 months: 1) instrumental help: personal care provided regularly at day-to-day activities such as eating, getting up, dressing, bathing, or using the toilet; 2) financial help: giving money, assets, or goods of substantive value to parents, and 3) emotional support: listening to the personal experience and feelings of the parent.

1) Instrumental care (regular practical help, personal care, or help in day-to-day activities) was measured by the following question: "Over the last 12 months, have you given people regular help with personal care such as eating, getting up, dressing, bathing, or using toilets?" Respondents were instructed not to include care to small children, and as recipient they could mention up to five [adult] persons, family members or not. As one of these persons could be one of the parents, we constructed a dichotomous variable: instrumental support given to at least one parent.

2) Emotional support (listening to the problems of the parent) was addressed based on the question: "Over the last 12 months, has anyone talked to you about his/her personal feelings?" Up to five persons (family members or not) could be mentioned. As one of these persons could be one of the parents, again we constructed a dichotomous variable: emotional support given to at least one parent. As noted by other authors (Moor and Komter 2012) it is possible to distinguish between "emotional support offered" and "emotional support received".

3) Financial support was measured based on the question: "During the last 12 months, have you or your partner/spouse given for one time, occasionally, or regularly money, assets, or goods of substantive value to a person outside the household?"[3] Respondents were instructed to think about land and property transfers and, again, the recipient could be one of the parents. We constructed dichotomous variables showing whether the respondent is providing financial support to at least one parent. We should note here that while instrumental and emotional support is individually given, financial support involves the household, so both the respondent and the partner/spouse (if exists) are involved.

These three dependent variables constructed are dichotomous (a specific type of support is given or not), but the gain of simplicity is offset by

[3] For Lithuania no similar question exists in the GGS. Consequently Lithuania is not included in the analysis regarding financial support.

the loss of information: we do not know the frequency or the intensity of the actions.

3.3.3. Control variables

The relationship between filial obligation and parent support must be studied controlling for opportunity and need structures (Isengard and Szydlik 2012) but also for other individual factors. Several personal and familial attributes were found in the literature to be linked to both filial obligation and to different types of support provided by family members. We grouped the control variables into the following categories: respondent characteristics, needs, opportunity, household composition and reciprocity.

Personal characteristics. The education of the respondent is a proxy for social status, and we expect that higher educated respondents will have more resources at their disposal and thus will exhibit higher level of support. We distinguish between three categories for the level of education: low, middle and high. Gender is important for the analysis, since we expect that daughters offer more help to their parents, so we coded with 1 if the respondent is a daughter. To have elderly parents in need of help is more likely for more mature respondents, hence age is an important factor for our topic and was measured based on three categories: under 30, 30-54 years and over 55 years. Religiosity is measured starting from the median of the frequency of church attendance but computed separately for each birth cohort. The variable has the value 1 if the individual is attending church more often than the median of her/his birth cohort.

Needs. Whether middle-aged children act on feelings of obligation may depend on parental needs, so we control for parental widowhood (recent or longer-term) and for parental health problems or disabilities (Silverstein, Gans and Yang 2006), which may activate a latent support behaviour.

Opportunity. Child's practical possibility to help is also controlled for. Having health problems (1 for yes) and being employed (1 for yes) could diminish the support opportunities and actual behaviour.

Household composition. Co-residence with parents provides more opportunities for help and thus should increase the odds for offering support. The respondent's current family and household composition could also matter since own partner and children may constitute additional receivers, competing with non-resident ageing parents for the limited time available and money to offer as support. The presence of siblings will ease the burden on the respondent (Van Gaalen, Dykstra and Flap 2008) and reduce the need for offering regular support. The presence of respondent's children (0 - no

children present) will lower the odds of offering support of any kind to the elderly.

Table 3.3. Characteristics of children and parents in the sample (%)

	BG	CZ	GE	LT	PL	RO	RU	CEE	FR	NO
Personal characteristics										
Age group 30-54 yrs	58.8	55.8	60.2	56.3	56.6	66.2	60.4	59.1	61.4	64.2
Age group 55+ yrs	6.3	7.9	6.0	7.1	14.3	8.9	5.8	8.6	12.9	10.3
Daughter	55.6	51.1	54.2	48.5	56.0	48.1	59.2	53.7	57.0	51.3
Middle education	56.8	65.7	61.9	62.9	63.8	61.7	48.4	60.4	45.6	43.7
High education	21.5	14.0	30.2	25.4	25.1	12.5	44.9	24.5	32.3	37.5
Church attendance above median	44.8	25.3	46.0	42.7	41.0	45.8	38.4	40.9	22.1	58.1
Needs										
Parent widowed 3+ yrs ago	25.9	22.9	33.6	29.6	27.4	32.1	36.1	29.3	27.8	26.6
Recently widowed parent	8.0	4.9	8.0	6.8	5.8	8.1	8.9	7.1	6.4	5.6
Parents' limitation /disability	9.8	17.9	12.2	14.0	14.8	27.6	13.8	15.4	26.9	45.1
Opportunity										
Health problems	15.4	10.3	17.0 1.15	11.6	22.4	12.9	29.1	17.5	23.2	26.9
Employed	59.7	64.1	43.2	68.5	60.0	64.1	65.6	60.6	66.7	77.7
Household composition										
Co-resident parent(s)	36.7	28.0	47.0	24.5	26.8	24.1	25.7	30.4	8.5	8.0
Co-resident partner	64.3	54.7	63.5	59.9	63.6	73.2	62.4	63.3	61.3	66.1
Co-resident children	62.5	47.0	68.2	53.2	56.4	62.0	63.8	59.0	47.3	53.5
Siblings 2+	23.9	31.5	54.2	38.5	53.9	51.2	35.2	41.6	62.9	59.7
Reciprocity										
Support from parent(s)	49.9	43.9	30.7	41.2	33.4	24.2	38.3	37.5	36.9	49.8

Reciprocity. The effect of reciprocity in giving and receiving help is assessed by the actual support received from a parent in the last 12 months. As with the upward support, the GGS questionnaire differentiates between three types of downward support: instrumental, financial and emotional, from parents to the adult-children. Instrumental help received from parents include here regular help with household tasks, with personal care, and with childcare. Nevertheless, we decided to use a sole indicator of parental support received, instead of three (one for each kind of support), having a positive value (1) if the adult-children had received in the last 12 months any kind of support from their parents. The reason for this solution was to avoid overburdening our explanatory models with unnecessary details, and thus increasing the goodness of fit of the explanatory analyses.

3.3. Analytic approach

As stated above, here we study the interrelation between normative solidarity and functional solidarity while controlling for structural solidarity. As such, we focused on the link between filial obligation and support to parents controlling for several micro-level factors.

In the first step of the analysis we used descriptive statistics to assess differences and similarities between countries, regarding the mean score of filial obligation and likelihood of support given.

In the second step we relied on multivariate analysis to study the effect of filial obligations and other control factors on the support offered to parents in the CEE region. We modelled separately the three types of support (instrumental, emotional and financial) by means of logistic regression with a pooled data set for our seven CEE countries.

In the third step we rerun the analyses separately for each country (both for CEE and WE countries), differentiated by type of support, in order to asses country differences and compare the former-communist countries with societies benefiting of more generous public support.

Thus we developed thirty models, one for each combination of type of support and country/region (3 types x CEE plus 3 types x 9 countries). Although the filial obligation index is introduced as a factor in the analysis we refrained from implying any causality.

4. Results

4.1. Filial norms and country context

Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present descriptive national results regarding the main variables from our study: filial obligation and actual support. Western Europe

has a lower level of filial obligation, with a score of 1.8 for Norway and 2.1 for France. All Central and Eastern European countries have higher scores, varying between 2.4 for Czech Republic and Poland, and 3.2 for Georgia. The maximum score in Central and Eastern Europe is one point higher than the maximum score in Western Europe.

Table 4.1. Descriptive results for filial obligation and actual support given to parents, by country.

	BG	CZ	GE	LT	PL	RO	RU	FR	NO
Index of filial obligation									
mean	2.81	2.45	3.22	2.52	2.45	2.66	2.96	2.12	1.76
standard deviation	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.88)	(0.85)
Actual support to parents (%)									
any kind of support	21.89	23.99	21.85	23.84	23.78	13.86	28.55	27.46	33.64
instrumental support	3.06	2.55	3.46	3.30	4.71	2.77	4.59	2.30	3.03
financial support	0.35	0.45	0.94	-	1.31	0.99	3.60	1.87	0.66
emotional support	19.47	22.37	18.66	21.40	19.28	10.87	23.28	24.59	31.15

Figure 4.1. Mean score on filial obligation and proportion of actual support to parents



Figure 4.2 shows the countries in a decreasing order by the mean score of filial obligation. It is clear not only that West European countries have a lower level of support for filial obligation than Central and East European countries, but also that norms are weakening from Nord-East to South-West. The *family culture hypothesis* is confirmed once again. The *familialism-by-default hypothesis* is also confirmed, since in Central and Eastern Europe people display stronger filial responsibilities given more limited public support available. The filial obligation gradient is more evident for respondents who do not live with their parents. West European countries show not only lower level of support for filial obligation but also a higher variance of the score, which may indicate different sub-populations with various levels of filial obligation.

Figure 4.2. Mean scores of filial obligation, in a decreasing order by country



However, looking closely at the items that compose the filial obligations index we find striking differences. Asked about whether "Children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents", 0.4% and 0.5% of Georgians and Russians disagree completely compared to 29.4% and 51.0% of Norwegians and French, respectively. When asked if "Children should have their parents to live with them when parents can no longer look after themselves", 0.2% and 0.3% of Georgians and Bulgarians disagree completely,

compared to 31.7% and 15.2% of Norwegians and French. The responses to individual items of the filial obligation scale shows (data not shown here) that in CEE there are very few[4] individuals who completely reject the filial norms, while in WE a small group completely rejects filial norms (2.4% and 2.6% in Norway and France). This suggests that filial obligations are more supported in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. One alternative interpretation comes from Herlofson et al. (2011): it can be argued that the scale used in the GGP may reflect norms for some societies and groups which are more traditional and place more importance on social identity. But the same scale can reflect personal attitudes for societies or groups that structure their identity around personal preferences. This argument can explain the higher level of support for filial obligation in East European countries along with low level of variance that indicate larger overall consensus on such norms. It can also explain why in WE countries we find lower consensus (the relative standard deviation is double compared to CEE) combined with low level of support to filial obligations.

4.2. Filial support behaviour and country context

If we look at the actual support of any kind given to parents (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3) we notice an inverse gradient as in the case of filial obligation (Figure 4.3 keeps the decreasing order of countries by the index of filial obligation, as in Figure 4.2): countries with lower mean score of filial obligation have higher proportion of adult-children who offer any kind of support to their parents, and vice versa, countries with higher mean score of filial obligation have lower proportion of people actually supporting their parents. This indicates more support for the *complementarity hypothesis* than for the *family-steps-in hypothesis*. There is only one exception: Russia, with relatively high score for filial norms also has high level of support.

Figure 4.3. Actual support (of any kind) given to parents

[4] 0 cases in Georgia and 1 in Romania to a maximum of 9 in Czech Republic and 10 in Poland.



Figure 4.4. Actual support given to parents, by type of help



However, looking at the support to parents by type (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4), we notice that most help provided and the descending gradient concern

emotional support. Indeed, emotional support is the most common form of help to parents and it shows larger variation across countries: from 10.9% in Romania to 31.2% in Norway offered support to their parents. Hence, the *complementary hypothesis* seems to be confirmed with respect to emotional support: in our two West European countries where public support is generous, family members are more willing to listen to personal experience and feelings of their parents, than in Eastern Europe.

The proportion offering financial help to parents is the smallest of the three types of support, varying between 0.4% in Bulgaria and 3.6% in Russia, but there is no clear East-West divide. Instrumental help is also less common, between 2.3% (in France) and 4.7% (in Poland) offer personal care to parents in the countries studied.

The results are hardly surprising, since Rossi and Rossi (1990) showed that children provide instrumental support to parents in poor health, while financial support often flows from parents to children. Poland and Russia show higher levels of instrumental support given to parents (above 4.5%), while in the other countries only 2-3% of concerned children offer that kind of support. Hence, neither the *family-steps-in hypothesis*, nor the *complementarity hypothesis* are confirmed for instrumental and financial supports to parents, and we find no clear East-West divide.

4.3. Connectivity between filial obligation and support behaviour

First we modelled a set of pooled data, from our seven CEE countries taken together, in order to see which connections are strongest (see Table 4.2). Thereafter we modelled separately each type of support for each of our nine countries, in order to explore East-West differences and similarities (see Tables 4.3 to 4.5).

Norms of filial obligation play an important role in two forms of support addressed in this study. Table 4.2 indicates that stronger filial norms held by adult-children have a positive effect on the instrumental support offered to ageing parents. This is true also for financial help. The *family-steps-in hypothesis* is confirmed in Central and Eastern Europe for instrumental support and financial help to parents.

As regards emotional support, we did not find any connection with the index of filial obligation. Instead we found that those who received any kind of support from parents in the last 12 months have higher odds (21 times higher) to offer emotional support to parents. Thus the *exchange mechanism* seems to be at play here rather than the idea of *no-choice*. In any case, our models (which control for a wide range of other predictors) show that parental needs (like

widowhood, health limitations or disabilities) play an important role in activating support from children.

The models conducted separately for each country allow us to compare the former communist countries with France and Norway. When modelling for instrumental support (Table 4.3) in five of the seven CEE countries and also in France, stronger filial obligations were seen with higher odds ratios of help provided.

The link between filial obligations and financial helping behaviour is effective in fewer CEE countries (only in Romania, Georgia and Russia), but it is present in both Western European countries. The *family-steps-in hypothesis* is confirmed in CEE and in France for instrumental support and for financial help it is confirmed in half of CEE countries and both Western countries. In the other half of CEE countries the *no-choice hypothesis* seems to apply in connection with financial help.

As regards emotional support (see Table 4.5), we did not find connections with a higher index of filial obligation, neither in Central and Eastern Europe nor in Western Europe. For CEE countries this result was evident even in the model of pooled data, and we see that it holds in every country separately, which indicates support for the *no choice hypothesis*. Yet, as we found much higher odds among those who received (any kind of) support from parents in the last 12 months (10-27 higher odds predicting emotional support to parents) there may be rather an *exchange mechanism* in place instead of the idea of *no-choice*.

4.4. Other factors influencing support behaviour

The strongest effect on the likelihood of providing instrumental help is the *need* of the parent (the presence of disabilities that impair the daily activities), but much less effect is shown regarding financial or emotional support (see Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). As instrumental support responds to specific needs of the parents, this was expected. One might ask whether we should split our population in two groups: the cases where the parents have health problems (20.8% of the total sample) and thus they require support from their children, and a separate group with healthy parents. The idea of analysing only the situation where the parents had needs and to see in what circumstances children offer support (2.2% of the total sample) or they did not offer instrumental support (18.6% of the total sample), has merit, but the same rationale could not be applied to the other type of support (financial and emotional).

Table 4.2. Odds ratios predicting support to ageing parents in CEE countries, by type of help. Pooled data for 7 countries.

	Support to parent(s)					
	Instrumental		Financial		Emotional	
Index of filial obligation (0-4)	1.31	***	1.25	***	1.01	
Personal characteristics						
Age group 30-54 (ref = 18-29 yrs)	4.02	***	1.14		1.03	
Age group 55+ (ref = 18-29 yrs)	9.93	***	1.34		1.08	
Daughter (ref = son)	2.11	***	0.93		1.47	***
Middle education (ref = low ed)	1.12		2.12	***	1.22	***
High education (ref = low ed)	1.17	*	3.70	***	1.50	***
Church att. above median (ref = below median)	1.03		1.19	*	1.19	***
Needs						
Parent wid. 3+ yrs ago (ref = no wid.)	1.70	***	1.18	*	1.10	***
Recently wid. parent (ref = no wid.)	2.87	***	1.36	**	1.19	***
Parents' limitation/disability (ref=no)	10.12	***	1.41	***	1.23	***
Opportunity						
Health problems (ref = no)	1.11	*	1.24	**	1.16	***
Employed (ref = no)	1.08		1.61	***	1.14	***
Household composition						
Coresident parent (ref=no)	4.16	***	0.09	***	0.92	***
Coresident partner (ref = no)	1.01		0.84		1.05	
Coresident children (ref = no)	0.82	***	0.73	***	0.79	***
Siblings 2+ (ref = 0 or 1)	0.88	**	0.92		0.87	***
Support received from parent(s)	1.21	***	2.64	***	21.15	***
Country (ref = Romania)						
Bulgaria	1.89	***	0.32	***	0.98	
Poland	2.73	***	1.08		1.57	***
Czech Republic	1.42	***	0.38	***	1.53	***
Lithuania	2.38	***			1.46	***
Georgia	1.63	***	1.09		1.78	***
Russia	2.40	***	2.28	***	1.67	***
Pseudo R2	0.26		0.14		0.28	
N=	51789		45845		51789	

Note: Significance levels: * p ≤ 0.10, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01

The next important situation is the *co-residence*, the "ultimate form of structural solidarity" (Dykstra et al. 2013: 4) that provides opportunities for support. In all countries we find a strong positive effect on the odds of providing instrumental support. The results of the analysis for the financial support (Table 4.4) show that living in co-residence with the parents, strongly decreases the likelihood of support for all countries. Hărăguş (2014) showed that in Romania the large proportion of co-residence is made up by the "never left parental home" category and only a small proportion are formed by "bringing the parents in". In the former case, poverty and poor housing situation of the young can be considered deterrence of upward financial support, while in the latter case (even if financial support is possible) instrumental support may be needed. Regarding emotional support (Table 4.5) our results are mixed: in some countries there is no effect on the odds of offering emotional support but in others the effect can be positive (Georgia and Russia) or negative (Czech Republic, Lithuania and Norway). Our interpretation is that we have different phenomena of co-residence: in Georgia we have historical patterns of high rate of co-residence and societal norms define them as natural and desirable. The situation in Norway (but also in the Czech Republic and Lithuania) can be explained by the concept of ambivalence (Silverstein and Giarrusso 2010): emotional support belongs to the realm of sentiments in the family, and these can be warm and antagonistic at the same time.

Personal characteristics of the respondent are important, in line with our expectations: instrumental and emotional support is gendered in all countries (daughters are more likely to provide support) while financial support is not. The positive effect of the *age* of the respondent on the instrumental support is due to the fact that it captures the need of the parent. The negative effect of age on the odds of giving emotional support might show that other types of support are needed for elderly parents (instrumental support, for example). *Education* of the respondent has been used as a proxy for social class. The positive effect on the likelihood of financial support in CEE countries was expected: having higher education (usually) means higher income and thus greater possibility of financial help for parents. The effect is stronger in the pooled data of CEE countries (Table 4.2) for the financial support. In case of emotional help the same positive effect in all countries might be a sign of *habitus* (the importance of communication for middle class).

Opportunities. The presence of health problems for the respondent should have hampered support giving, but we still see positive effects on CEE countries for all types of support (Table 4.2). Being employed could lower the opportunities for instrumental support but we found positive effect in some

cases (Bulgaria and Norway). The effect on the odds of offering financial support is significant in CEE countries and France (Table 4.5).

Household composition. The presence of the partner does not limit the support given unlike our expectation, hence this might call for an analysis on the gender of the partner (or an interaction between respondent gender and having a partner) as care is gendered work. But having children living with the respondent is lowering the odds of offering every type of support.

Reciprocity. Unsurprisingly, reciprocity (measured as responding to any type of support from the parents) is increasing the odds of returning any type of support, but we find the strongest effect on emotional support. This suggests that the exchanges between parents and adult children might be linked to a higher degree of affectional solidarity.

5. Discussion and conclusions

Summing up, our results show that filial obligation is stronger in Central and Eastern Europe than in West European countries. The belief that it is important to give support to family members in need is in line with the more limited public support available, so the *familialism-by-default hypothesis* seems to be confirmed. Filial norms are stronger towards the East (and South) of the continent, so the *family-culture hypothesis* is also confirmed.

A second conclusion is that support behaviour is less likely in CEE countries then in Western Europe, if all kind of help are considered together. Adult children are less supportive where the publicly funded services are hardly available. Hence, the *family-steps-in hypothesis* is not confirmed (with the possible exception of Russia), and our results indicate that welfare services crowd-in the family. When public support is generous, family members are more able to redistribute resources to assist emotionally those in need. The *complementarity hypothesis* is partially confirmed, but only for emotional support.

As regards the connection between filial obligation and actual support to ageing parents we conclude firstly, that it is stronger in CEE than in WE countries, especially when considering personal care. When publicly funded care is not widely available it is more critical to act upon beliefs on filial responsibilities and offer instrumental help to ageing parents in need. The *family-step-in hypothesis* is partially confirmed, only for instrumental help.

Logistic regression results for instrumental support (personal care), by country. Odds ratios

	BG		CZ	GE	LT	PL	RO	RU	FR
filial obligation (0-4)	1.44	***	1,57***	1,36**	0,99	1,37***	1,40**	1,16	1,20*
characteristics									
up 30-54 (ref = 18-29 yrs)	2,91	***	3,07***	2,38***	8,29***	5,04***	2,45***	5,82***	6,09***
up 55+ (ref = 18-29 yrs)	9,75	***	6,93***	4,90***	22,13***	12,65***	6,17***	8,10***	16,92***
er (ref = son)	1,87	***	1,86***	1,97***	1,87***	2,44***	1,70***	2,34***	2,21***
ducation (ref = low ed)	1,29		0,94	2,50**	0,81	1,41**	0,91	0,74	0,95
ucation (ref = low ed)	1,36		0,74	2,39**	0,80	1,45*	1,08	0,91	1,03
att. above median (ref = below	1,08		0,92	0,98	1,09	0,89	1,34*	1,02	1,40*
vid. 3+ yrs ago (ref = no wid.)	2,06	***	2.19***	1,92***	1,48**	1,40***	1,92***	1,72***	1,37
wid. parent (ref = no wid.)	4,83	***	3,55***	3,22***	1,69*	2,53***	2,93***	2,66***	3,64***
limitation/disability (ref = no)	18,77	***	7,87***	16,80***	10,32***	8,53***	5,80***	11,96***	6,87***
nity									
problems (ref = no)	0,84		1,82***	1,20	1,19	0,98	0,88	1,33**	1,40*
ed (ref = no)	1,39	**	1,30	1,24	1,25	0,85	0,88	1,02	1,00
ld composition									
ent parent (ref=no)	2,62	***	4,20***	5,53***	11,61***	4,18***	1,79***	4,56***	27,30***
ent partner (ref = no)	0,81		1,05	0,89	1,12	1,00	0,98	0,97	1,58**
ent children (ref = no)	1,07		0,93	0,80	0,72*	0,80**	0,63***	0,92	0,88
2+ (ref = 0 or 1)	0,72	*	1,00	0,78	0,98	0,82**	0,84	1,08	1,29
ity	1,07		1,78***	1,22	1,17	1,12	1,34	1,29*	1,07
2	0,29		0,25	0,28	0,27	0,27	0,17	0,29	0,20
	9067		6236	6365	5944	11449	6672	6056	6689

ficance levels: * p ≤ 0.10, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01

Logistic regression results for financial help, by country. Odds ratios

	BG		CZ		GE		LT		PL		RO		RU		FR	
filial obligation (0-4)	1.03		0,98		1,88	**			1,11		1,71	**	1,28	*	1,41	***
characteristics																
up 30-54 (ref = 18-29 yrs)	1,60		0,63		1,14				1,64	*	1,64		0,97		0,51	***
up 55+ (ref = 18-29 yrs)	n.s.		1,62		0,61				1,48		3,29	**	0,93		0,46	**
r (ref = son)	0,32	***	0,66		0,94				1,08		0,82		1,05		0,77	
ducation (ref = low ed)	2,41		4,52		2,71				2,62	*	1,55		2,42	*	0,58	**
ucation (ref = low ed)	7,18	**	8,96	**	5,41	*			4,61	***	4,22	***	3,62	***	1,03	
att. above median (ref = below median)	2,51	**	0,99		1,05				0,81		1,50		1,44	***	1,24	
vid. 3+ yrs ago (ref = no wid.)	0,34	*	0,41		1,13				1,92	***	1,18		1,00		1,77	***
wid. parent (ref = no wid.)	1,55		3,30	**	0,78				2,00	**	0,72		1,11		0,86	
limitation/disability (ref = no)	1,60		1,38		0,94				1,90	***	1,95	***	0,99		1,57	**
nity																
problems (ref = no)	1,46		1,72		1,32				1,24		0,91		1,22		1,39	
ed (ref = no)	0,96		0,85		2,31	***			1,44	*	2,02	*	1,77	***	1,70	**
ld composition																
ent parent (ref=no)	0,10	***	0,15	**	0,03	***			0,11	***	n.s.		0,14	***	0,24	**
ent partner (ref = no)	0,44		1,66		0,81				0,96		0,81		0,75	*	0,65	**
ent children (ref = no)	1,24		0,38	**	0,53	*			0,73	*	1,03		0,72	**	1,15	
2+ (ref = 0 or 1)	1,54		1,22		0,77				0,77		1,60	*	0,90		1,30	
ty	2,46	**	4,76	***	2,21	***			2,32	***	1,87	**	3,18	***	1,12	
2	0,13		0,14		0,15				0,09		0,07		0,10		0,05	***
	8495		6236		6365				11449		5065		6056		6689	

.s. = no support to parrent(s) ; 2. Significance levels: * p ≤ 0.10, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01

Logistic regression results for emotional support, by country. Odds ratios

	BG		CZ		GE		LT		PL		RO		RU		FR	
ilial obligation (0-4)	0,93		1,03		0,92		0,93		1,08		1,13		1,10		0,99	
characteristics																
up 30-54 (ref = 18-29 yrs)	1,00		0,84	*	0,95		0,88		1,24	***	1,31	**	1,05		0,77	***
up 55+ (ref = 18-29 yrs)	0,90		0,69	**	0,94		0,93		1,52	***	1,96	***	0,95		0,70	**
r (ref = son)	1,52	***	1,41	***	1,31	***	1,73	***	1,51	***	1,18	*	1,51	***	1,74	***
ducation (ref = low ed)	1,18	*	1,23	**	1,60	***	1,17		1,05		1,40	***	1,33	*	1,34	***
ucation (ref = low ed)	1,44	***	1,73	***	1,84	***	1,51	***	1,29	**	1,45	**	1,56	***	2,54	***
att. above median (ref = below	1,43	***	1,21	**	1,13		1,14	*	0,99		1,25	**	1,21	***	0,91	
vid. 3+ yrs ago (ref = no wid.)	1,14		0,98		1,08		1,23	**	1,04		1,21	*	1,17	*	0,98	
wid. parent (ref = no wid.)	1,37	***	1,11		1,23		0,96		1,25		1,22		1,16		1,10	
limitation/disability (ref = no)	1,20	*	1,36	***	1,33	**	1,05		1,13		1,00		1,43	***	1,26	***
ity																
problems (ref = no)	0,91		1,32	**	1,32	***	1,45	***	0,99		1,27		1,27	***	0,99	
ed (ref = no)	1,01		1,01		1,26	***	1,12		1,31	***	0,97		1,05		1,00	
ld composition																
ent parent (ref=no)	0,80		0,51	***	1,35	***	0,71	***	1,13		0,86		1,30	***	0,91	
ent partner (ref = no)	0,99		0,80	**	1,01		1,19	*	1,07		1,24		1,08		1,12	
ent children (ref = no)	0,85		0,85	*	0,77	**	0,95		0,57	***	0,84		0,78	***	0,65	***
2+ (ref = 0 or 1)	0,99	**	0,82	***	0,97		0,71	***	0,91	*	0,94		0,79	***	0,89	
ty	13,87	***	26,67	***	19,65	***	14,78	***	27,45	***	57,88	***	20,28	***	9,90	***
2	0,19		0,29		0,29		0,24		0,32		0,38		0,30		0,25	
	9067		6236		6365		5944		11449		6672		6056		6689	

ficance levels: * p ≤ 0.10, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01

Secondly, the connection between filial obligation and financial help to parents is twofold in CEE and is positive in WE countries. Where the welfare state is less developed, adult-children may have no choice but to assist financially parents in need, like in Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland; or they may act more upon their belief like in Georgia, Romania, Russia, France and Norway. The *no choice hypothesis* is confirmed for financial support in three of the former communist countries, while the *family-steps in hypothesis* is confirmed for the other three and for the two western societies.

Thirdly, there is no connection between filial obligation and emotional support neither in CEE nor in WE. Rather the *exchange perspective* is confirmed: receiving and giving emotional support between ageing parents and their adult children is reciprocal.

We are aware that our approach has some shortcomings. Some of the theories in the study can be fully validated only if we construct parent-child dyads. However, the GGS data allow only to use measures from the perspective of adult children and we try to evaluate the parent-child relations. The cross-sectional nature of the data makes it impossible to draw any conclusions in terms of causality. Also, limiting our data just to individuals and their parents we exclude in-law relationships (intergenerational relationships through marriage) and thus it is impossible to study couple decisions about whom to help, choosing between parents and in-laws, or to address matrilineal or patrilineal preferences.

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Being a Child in a Mixed Family in Nowadays Transylvania

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Abstract: Mixed marriage is an image, on a small scale, of the multiethnic, multilinguistic and multicultural society of Transylvania. Previous studies have attempted to explain the mechanisms through which (ethnic or denominational) intermarriage occurs or issues related to language, religion and identity concerning these couples. The present study tackles the ways in which mixed couples from Transylvania solve problems regarding their children's ethnic, linguistic and denominational affiliation. If in the case of intermarriage the fear of an identity-related fading opens up the path to intrusions from the part of the extended family, of the community and of the church, in relation to the choices made by parents regarding their children these interferences are limited and the partners alone decide their children's future. This research thus details three elements that we have deemed determinant for what we have labelled "the issue of children born into intermarriages": language, religion and ethnic identification. The study is based upon the qualitative research unfolded within the project *Interethnic marriages: between an exercise of tolerance and a modern expression of indifference. 1895-2010.*

Keywords: mixed marriages, Transylvania, family upbringing, children, language, school, identity

1. Introduction

Many questions referring to the subject of mixed marriages were raised in the last two and a half years at the Centre for Population Studies from Cluj, which is running the project Mixed Marriages: between an exercise of tolerance and the modern expression of indifference. Papers were delivered at conferences, articles have been written, and a collective volume focused on this subject is under the printing process. The team's research hypothesis is that mixed marriage acts as a connecting element within a society, not only between individuals, but also between the groups to which they belong, since every individual brings a whole range of values, specific attitudes and beliefs into his

or her marriage. When marital relations occur between members of different ethnic groups many other social contacts are likely to be established among them: children from different groups have the opportunity to meet each other in school, in their neighbourhood, during leisure activities. Mixed marriages bridge these groups and often connect the social networks of the two spouses. New associations and interpersonal relationships which overlap group boundaries can appear. Intermarriage lowers the salience of cultural distinctions for the new generations. It makes it less likely that the descendants of such marriages will identify with only one group. And this statement seems to hold true even when the couple socializes their children only in the culture of one group, given that intermarriage is common within a society (Kalmijn 1998). Through mixed marriage, people might give up their negative attitudes towards other groups. Personal interactions can sometimes lead to conflicts as they emphasise economic and cultural differences, especially when the relationship is intimate. Nevertheless, they provide people with the opportunity to understand individual variations amongst the members of a group and, thus, their prejudices and stereotypes diminish.

There are papers written in the course of this project which deal with the factors that shaped mixed marriages throughout history, such as the regulations issued by the Churches or by the state (Bolovan and Eppel 2012), with the characteristics and trends of marriages and divorces in a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society (Bolovan et al., forthcoming) or with the role of education in ethnically mixed marriages (Hărăguș 2014). For this particular study we chose to concentrate mainly on the problem of children born into mixed marriages in contemporary Transylvania, a suitable place for mixed marriage, designated to be the area of our investigation in the period 1895-2010. Suitable because, besides Romanians, other ethnic groups found their home here: Hungarians, Germans, Jews, Serbians, Slovaks, Gypsies, and others. These groups experienced moments when they fought with each other and built together, moments when they found meeting grounds, became relatives and built a common destiny! The increasing number of marriages that were denominationally mixed could be a sign of the changing value of religion when choosing a spouse. There are many questions regarding the identity of the children who resulted from such marriages, the capabilities of their parents to raise them taking into consideration a dual cultural heritage and also in harmony, and their place and role in society, respectively. When national identity is involved, the confusion is even larger and the general assumption is that a child born in a mixed marriage somehow stands between two worlds, and never completely embraces one nationality or the other. Growing up

seems to be a constant pull and push between two cultures. Nonetheless, intermarriage may reduce ethnic conflicts and prejudice in the long run because children born into a mixed marriage are less likely to identify themselves with a single group (Kalmijn and Tubergen 2010: 459).

Although many works have been written about the individual determinants of intermarriage, about the trends and characteristics of specific groups which were involved in mixed marriages, the specific literature on the children born into ethnically or denominationally mixed marriages is rather scarce. Additionally, relatively fewer studies have been conducted on denominationally mixed marriages in Europe, the great majority of works related with intermarriage being focused on inter-racial marriages or marriages between immigrants and residents.

In theory, the desire to identify with a certain ethnicity is determined by social and psychological reasons, such as a desire for social recognition or self esteem. Yet, there are situations in history when groups gradually or suddenly change their identity to gain access to some material advantages. For instance, Botticini and Eckstein (2007) demonstrate how material benefits played an important historical role in individual conversions from Judaism to Christianity and vice versa. We shall see that there are cases in Transylvania in which the idea of nationality was enriched with certain material gains, which were most valuable for parents at the moment of declaring the nationality of their offspring.

2. Children born in mixed marriages in Transylvania

In our study focused on the problem of children born in a mixed marriage in Transylvania three elements need to be taken into consideration: identification, language and religion. Identification is a variable phenomenon, constructed and re-constructed throughout one's entire life. Individual identification is defined as personal self-perception and starts in early childhood (Matanova 2014: 53). This is achieved through the socialisation process, as it was defined by Vygotsky, who explained that the child cannot develop in the absence of social interactions within his immediate family and community. Vygotsky asserted that cognitive development occurs through the internalisation of cultural values acquired during social interactions. Every function appears twice in the child's cultural development: first on the social level, and later on the individual level; first between people (inter-psychological) and then inside the child (intra-psychological) (Vygotsky 1978). The first actors in the process of children's socialisation are the parents and the family, followed by the peer groups and educational institutions – kindergarten, school, university, etc.

Through these actors children get acquainted with national-cultural elements such as folk tales, literature, music, cuisine, history, material culture, celebrations and so on. For children born into a mixed marriage this process consists in the adoption of both cultures, of both ways of thinking and reference to both groups.

The language spoken within the family is the main link between the parents' cultures. To learn and speak the native language of an ethnic group is one of the most important processes related to socialisation and group identification. In many cultures, the "mother tongue" is considered the first individual language experience and is seen as a legacy that is handed down from the parents to their offspring (Matanova 2014: 54). Research carried out in Bulgaria showed that only a small number of the interviewed people considered that both their parents' languages are their mother tongues and more than half of the participants understood the notion etymologically, as the language of their mothers (Matanova 2014: 54). In theory, an important factor influencing the parents' family language policies and patterns of language used is represented by parental attitudes towards the so called "the heritage language"; specifically, if parents felt it was important for their children to learn their language and if parents were willing to push their children to do so.

Religious socialisation begins at birth and affects behaviour throughout life. Religion provides a means of worship, a foundation of customs and values, and a way of life (Chinitz and Brown 2001). Religion has been shown to play a significant role in marital stability and spouses' marital satisfaction. If religion is not a valuable key feature for the spouses, the religious questions – related to the child's baptism or denomination - are more likely to be treated as social aspects which must be accomplished rather than elements involved in identity construction. If religion plays a chief role in the spouses' life, the differences in customs and beliefs may cause misunderstandings or strain in the marital relationship. Studies found a greater risk of divorce amongst those in a denominationally mixed marriage (White and Lehrer 2003, Bolovan et al. 2014).

As we are going to see, these elements are interconnected and they influence the way in which the parents build their relations with their extended families, between themselves and with their own children.

3. Qualitative methodology and sample description

Our analysis consisted in qualitative semi-structured interviews applied to 70 individuals, 34 men and 36 women, involved in mixed marriages in Transylvania. We have to mention that 60 interviews were collected from

couples, in the sense that both spouses were interviewed. The life story approach allowed us to examine events, action, norms, and values through the eyes of the person who entered into a mixed marriage. Through this method we obtained a detailed description of the social context and we were able to understand events and behaviours within the context in which they occurred. The research instrument was an interview guide comprising a series of aspects related to mixed marriages. More specifically, the guide referred to six large areas of the respondent's life: the existence of other intermarriages within the family, the years during which the respondent's opinions were shaped (childhood, adolescence), the formation of the couple, the attitudes and behaviours of the two partners' families during the period in which the relationship consolidated itself, the couple's children and the respondent's evaluation of the experience of a mixed marriage. The first and second sections of the interview guide depict socialisation practices, characteristics of the familial and social environment in which the individual grew up, the contacts and experience that the respondent had with the other's ethnicity during the period of socialisation. The third section, the formation of the couple, provided information about the importance of cultural similarity in the evolution of interpersonal relationships, while the fourth section allowed the researcher to document the family's intervention in the process of choosing a partner. By tracing the different stages of the consolidation of the relationship between the two partners, one can notice the continuity or change in the family's attitudes and behaviours towards the relationship between the son/daughter and a person of a different ethnicity and also the factors that have caused the change (marriage, birth of a child). The fifth section focused on the mixed couple's choices regarding ethnic, religious and linguistic affiliation of the children born into their marriage. The last section comprises evaluations of the experience of intermarriage, the manner of dealing with conflicts and the role of cultural differences. In order to discover both the perspective of the person of the ethnicity that represented the majority and that of the person who belonged to an ethnic minority, we interviewed both spouses of a mixed couple. The selection of the participants started with the social networks of the researchers involved in the project, and new respondents were selected through the snowball technique: members of the respondents' social networks.

For the aims of the present study we took into consideration only the respondents' quality of belonging to the majority group or to a minority one from Transylvania and the manner in which their affiliation to one of the two categories influenced how they perceived and socialised their children. In the

case of the 30 couples that were suitable for this analysis, we have attempted to establish the potential differences in attitudes and manners of referring to the three elements that we have considered defining for the analysis of the issue of children born into mixed marriages: ethnic identification, language and religion. The analysis can be conducted on two axes and here we have decided to consider only the choices made by parents regarding their children's language, religion and ethnic identity; hence, the manner in which belonging to a mixed family has influenced the development of the children who are now the respondent adults will be tackled in another work.

The respondents are young couples, with small children – up to the kindergarten level –, most of them with university education, coming from various parts of Romania and established in Cluj-Napoca. In all cases, the respondents met owing to their university education, choosing Cluj-Napoca as the town in which they studied.

4. Language

The problem of language in mixed families appears with acuity at the moment when the first child is born. Habitually, until this event the spouses had agreed on the language in which to communicate amongst themselves – this being, most of the times, the Romanian language when one of the partners is Romanian and thus belongs to the majority group, while the other is Hungarian or German (minority groups). Once the domestic group becomes larger due to the birth of a child the situation changes and involves negotiations, explorations, compromises for each of the two partners. The subject of the child's "mother tongue" appears twice: with regard to the language spoken at home, within the family, and later on, at the age when the child enters the collectivity and parents must decide the language in which the child will study. Parents also refer to a third milestone, namely the moment when they will need to decide the language in which their child will continue his or her studies, but, as most of them had small and very small children, they thus still dealt with the problem at the first and second level and the discussions concerning high school studies were fragmentary and centred around the idea that, at that age, children will participate in the process of taking a decision concerning their future.

All interviews reveal very clearly that the spouses/couples are informed, have read, have analysed very seriously and know in detail the theories regarding the role of language in identity formation and the methods through which each of the parents can transmit to the child, by means of language, the dowry specific to the culture to which they belong. Given the

importance of language in defining and assuming an identity, the option for a particular mother tongue places the couple in front of the first major decision regarding the child's future: what language will the child learn as a mother tongue? Right from the start, the idea of an advantage of children born into mixed families becomes obvious, namely that they have the opportunity to concomitantly assimilate two languages and two cultures, by means of language:

> *"Because that child has the chance to learn two languages at once, something that we haven't had, or others don't have. So she has this chance and we must take advantage of it"* (Zsolt, male, Hungarian).

> "*I find it normal [for them] to know both languages. I have nothing against it, it's an advantage for them because they need to know [these languages;] it's like when you go to a foreign country and you don't know the language...*" (Carmen, female, Romanian).

Regarding the language spoken within the family, things seem to get solved very simply: each parent will speak to the child in his or her native tongue, as correctly as possible, so that the child will have the advantage of familiarising himself or herself with the two languages right from the start. Amongst themselves the spouses use the Romanian language, because they both know it well, avoiding, at the same time, to address to the child in the Hungarian or German languages (or in Romanian, in the case of the partner pertaining to the minority group) if they do not speak it properly and even if they are making efforts to learn and use the other spouse's mother tongue:

> "*...yes[,] we have spoken to specialists and they said that we should respect one thing. Each speaks to the child in his or her language. So never mixed because then... especially from Ema she learns wrong. Firstly we are trying to..., I mean I am trying to speak correctly the Hungarian language and this is what I agreed with my wife that she will speak the Romanian language, correctly, without mixing the language, without mixing the two languages together and without using English words or as clean to keep it.* [sic!] *We are trying songs, folk traditions, folk songs, children's songs to teach her...* [sic!][1]" (Mihaly, male, Hungarian).

[1] These word inversions and/or abnormal linguistic constructions are chiefly caused by the fact that the respondent is a Hungarian speaking in the Romanian language, but they are also fairly common in native speakers' oral responses, as some of the subsequent quotes will show (translator's note).

Using each partner's mother tongue is not restricted to basic communication, but also involves initiation into the culture, into the tradition of the ethnic group that the parent originates in and relates to. Consequently, within the family, which represents the place of the first cultural contacts, the rudiments of the culture of a particular group are bestowed upon the child alongside language. Parents are aware that, in theory, the medley of languages and cultures can induce the child a state of "puzzlement", as the interviewees called it, but they nevertheless assume this mixture's risks, placing their stakes on the long-term effects of this intentionally bilingual situation:

> "*I speak, I try to speak exclusively in Hungarian and it is naturally for me to speak Hungarian with him, sometimes I find it difficult because my Hungarian is rusty and Mariana of course speaks Romanian, in front of him the two of us speak in Romanian, he has begun to take on Hungarian words, I am not sure that it's very good for the child because it can confuse him, but he's cute, on the other hand*" (Antal, male, Hungarian).

Even more, each of the parents introduces the child to a second socialisation circle comprising members of the same ethnic and cultural group (including the extended family), by means of various events (holidays, attending religious service, visits) or through daily contacts at the playground. In a certain sense even the contact with the couple's dominant culture (the one declared by the couple as the most comfortable or the one to which it aspires) is obviously encouraged:

> "*I want him to socialise with Hungarians, not preponderantly and [not] exclusively because that we can't afford, but I want it in a sufficient quantity so as to have the linguistic experience through which to learn the language as a first language. I would prefer, I would like him to have two mother tongues, not necessarily Hungarian, but nor Romanian, because I have the impression that if Hungarian comes second, then due to the preponderantly Romanian environment and due to the fact that Hungarian is much more difficult, he will give up on it sooner or later. Of course, it also depends on luck and it also depends on him, but, yeah, this is what I'm trying, to provide him the chance that being Hungarian to be a complete experience for him*" (Antal, male, Hungarian).

There were no situations in which the parents preferred one language to the detriment of another for familial communication, even if, depending upon the ethnic status of the respondent (namely belonging to the "majority" or to the

"minority") there exist some tendencies to positively evaluate one's own mother tongue: "Hungarian is ten times more difficult than Romanian, [the child] needs to learns it correctly now", or "to learn German precisely because he knows that he can have access to another world as well..."; "it is just that [in] Romanian it matters to learn the terms, to manage in the country in which she lives and to know the terms very well in Romanian, that's, that's what I'm thinking about".

Which are the effects of such a linguistic amalgam? Unanimously, the respondent parents from our sample declared that they were confident in the long-term effects of the child's familiarisation with both languages and both cultures. In the short run, the effects also seem to be remarkable, as the child begins to represent a bridge (yet another one) between the two partners:

> "*Today we have reached the phase in which the child already translates between us. And even more, if Rodica speaks in Hungarian she admonishes her*" (Zsolt, male, Hungarian).

If in the case of the language spoken within the family things seem to get solved fairly simply, the parents counting on the chance of bilingualism, the problem of choosing the education/teaching language and implicitly the kindergarten and/or school that the child will attend involves negotiations, explorations, postponements. In the case of Cluj-Napoca, for instance, there exists one state kindergarten that has Hungarian as a teaching language, kindergartens with intensive courses of Hungarian and German language and a series of private institutions that also have Hungarian or German as teaching languages. As for primary education, in 2014, there existed 11 state schools that had Hungarian as a teaching language (at least for some classes) and a school in which all the courses were taught in German (ISJC-2014). Therefore, there are plenty of possibilities to choose schools in which the teaching language is not Romanian, so let us see what are the terms in which negotiations are carried out when it comes to deciding upon the education language for the child.

As in the matter of declaring an identity, as we will see later on, selecting an educational variant is achieved in terms of advantages/disadvantages. The couples have agreed that within the family and in the community to which they belong they can transmit rudiments of language and culture specific to the group that they represent, but starting with the school years, and implicitly the education language, expectancies are projected onto the future. In other words, bilingualism, both languages spoken

and transmitted within the family, is meant to preserve the link with the past, with traditions, with the origins, while the education language will be defining for planning the future. One can notice, firstly, two situations: the one in which the parents had already decided the children's line of education, irrespective if we are referring to kindergarten or school, and a second one in which, as the children were still very young – and thus the pressure was not very large when the interview took place – the matter was still being debated, often with contradictory opinions (as the interviews conducted with the couple's both members have demonstrated), the spouses habitually counting on the time factor for the problem's resolution. Secondly, with reference to those who had already decided, two further tendencies could be remarked: that of valuing the Romanian language, perceived as the language of the state in which the child resides, learns, will work and will eventually lead his or her life, and another, opposing one, of valuing the language of the minority, perceived this time not as a means of preserving one's identity, but as a major advantage for the future, given that, by living in Romania, as the respondents declared, the Romanian language will be learned by the child anyway. In the case of the couples in which one of the partners is of German descent, the option for the German language is strengthened by the fact that within his or her environment the child cannot come into contact with the German language and culture in other ways than through schooling, given the relatively small weight of the German ethnic group within contemporary Romanian society.

"*The idea would be however to go on and learn in the German language. So I know the advantages and culture that he might learn, which, so to speak, he would miss, he wouldn't... he wouldn't have anywhere else to learn it. He will learn the Romanian culture and the Romanian literature anyway because... we are in Romania. In any school in Romania it's compulsory to do this. So in any case I do not want to take him to a normal school in the classic Romanian language. Firstly because he has a status that allows him to do something else as well... And then this would also lay the foundations for a future perhaps more... more different*" (Otto, male, German).

"*...we would prefer a kindergarten in German... we are not thinking further than this, but probably he will learn the German language*" (Mihaela, female, Romanian, Otto's wife).

"*Not only do I want him to learn Hungarian, I want him to learn Hungarian at least at a level that is close to mine, I mean that I have also written Hungarian literature, so to even speak a beautiful, rich and hmmm, I don't know, expressive*

Hungarian and for this [reason] I want to enrol him at kindergarten and school in the Hungarian language and, moreover, at a good one, if it's possible" (Antal, male, Hungarian).

On the other hand there are the parents who have themselves went through adjustment difficulties after graduating from a school in the Hungarian language or who have such examples in their proximity:

"*I said that they should nonetheless go [to school] in the Romanian language 'cause we are in Romania and this is [a] basic [thing]. You know and I think that it would be harder [for them] to learn a lot, a lot of subjects in Hungarian and a small amount of Romanian. They would have difficulties later on. I know university colleagues who were Hungarians and had difficulties comprehending*" (Lăcrimioara, female, Romanian).

"*Of course that he needs to know Romanian very well because we live in Romania. And without knowing the language, I know how difficult it was for me after attending a Hungarian school... to... oh... the words... not the words, but expressions from certain subjects such as mathematics and everything, oh, everything for me was Chinese when I heard for the first time that you actually say addition or multiplying or these technical words [that] I learned in another language and then [it was] very hard to recognise them in Romanian. After what, now I know, but it was a moment when one or the other asked me some basic things and I didn't know how to answer. Not that I didn't know, 'cause I knew, but in Hungarian if they asked me I knew how to answer and I had the feeling that, man, I am so stupid and others had the feeling that, well, this one doesn't know what addition means*" (Szilard, male, Hungarian).

"*I don't want to give him [to school] to Hungarians, because it's a very large disadvantage, in the sense that I have graduated from the Hungarian high school, so I studied all the subjects in Hungarian, including Romania's geography and history. I went on to university and...*" (Kato, male, Hungarian).

"*That's why, because children who attend kindergartens in the Hungarian language go to school in the Hungarian language and then end up and don't cope in the Romanian language. I had many colleagues, that's why I say [this], many colleagues who had attended Hungarian schools and who in Romanian were a catastrophe*" (Raluca, female, Romanian).

As the quotes from above have revealed, the motivation of a subsequent maladjustment is strengthened, in very many situations, by the idea that the Romanian language is the basic language and that it must be learned correctly in school. Even more, in cases such as that presented below, the choice of the Romanian language, even by a Hungarian, does not necessitate any additional argument than the fact that:

> "*As long as we live in Romania, the basic language is the Romanian language. If alongside [it] you know Hungarian, English, French, Portuguese, anything, [then] well done*" (Abel, male, Hungarian, Raluca's husband).

The typical example of postponing a decision and of temporary disagreement is habitually encountered in the case of couples whose children are still very small and who thus have not yet reached the critical moment of deciding, but who, as one can notice from the fragments noted below, extracted from a common husband-wife interview, envisage their child's future in very different manners:

> "*Well my idea is that she will learn maximum until kindergarten or maximum five, until the fifth grade [in] Hungarian and then in Romanian... Somehow I strongly agree that she should know both languages so not... hmm and... just that [in] Romanian it matters to learn the terms, to manage in the country in which she is and to know the terms very well in Romanian, that's what I'm thinking about. You know? Because if she learns in Hungarian, afterwards it is very difficult to use, I don't know, I'm thinking. It doesn't matter, afterwards even if she studies in Hungarian then she has more exams and well, that sort of thing... indeed Mihaly says that it would be good to learn Hungarian literature, for that he would insist that she studied Hungarian, but I don't know, we'll see...*" (Ema, female, Romanian).

> "*Probably she will attend a Hungarian kindergarten, a Hungarian nursery and kindergarten and afterwards the Romanian high school*" (Mihaly, male, Hungarian).

In conclusion, the problem of the language spoken by children born into intermarriages is solved amongst the partners, who decide, most of the times, that the children will use and learn both languages as mother tongues and who include the long-term advantages and disadvantages of each solution and, particularly, of their children's future as adults in the analysis of education opportunities in one language or another.

5. Religion

However, things are not as simple when the couple needs to choose a denomination for its child/children, discussions appearing, most of the times, within the enlarged group. Problems begin at marriage, when, in theory, one of the partners should embrace the other's denomination so as to obtain the religious sanction of the civil act, if this is desired. Our interviews have revealed that the spouses had two answers to this problem: they either married religiously as members of a neo-Protestant denomination (the Baptist church) or adhered to their partner's denomination, from conviction or declaring themselves "unbelievers" – consequently without considering it a compromise or a concession made to their partner. In short, religion is losing its importance and, as we shall see when analysing the mechanisms that concur in the formation and assumption of a certain identity, it is not even mentioned as an identity-related factor.

Amongst the respondents there are also persons who have declared themselves "atheists" and for whom neither marriage nor their children's baptism do not represent anything more than topics of discussion with the enlarged family, discussions from which the couple emerged victorious, marrying only in front of the civil authority's representative and not baptising the child, in spite of some controversy:

> "*What was more difficult for them was to accept that we do not want to baptise Ianick. So with the marriage, ok, it's our choice, but why do we pick on the child? So it would have been... embarrassing for me to go back to a church in which I don't believe to marry someone of a different denomination. Then go to the Orthodox Church, they would have asked from me to accept the Orthodox ritual and to perform some actions that are completely horrifying for me as an atheist. Eventually, the wife's parents also accepted that it's not a problem, no, we really don't have to do it in church*" (Otto, male, German).

> "*We are not religious, either of us, and we didn't baptise Ianick, we left him to choose his own religion, if this will be the case*" (Mihaela, female, Romanian).

> "*Religion is not important*" (Mihaly, male, Hungarian).

The couples who have chosen one single denomination declare that the decision was mutual and it was taken for two reasons: in order to simplify things (the reasons that were invoked were financial ones related to marrying into two churches or the smaller percentage of guests invited by one or the

other of the partners) and in order to preserve the family's unity, preference being given to a single denomination:

"*We have decided together. I was completely open[-minded] if I remember correctly, you can correct me, hmmm, but also Mariana was completely in order to be completely on a single line, to be on a clear line, but on the other hand we kept [in mind] the idea that in the case in which he, we'll, we'll show him and, how to put this, differences between Orthodoxy and Protestantism and we'll give him a certain chance to be able to choose at maturity. This I find [it to be] a particularly artificial thing that we are born and reared within a certain religious community, if we were churchgoers and profoundly religious, that would be something else, but like this, that a stamp is being put on us somewhere that we are something, that doesn't mean much for us, it should be something that is more related to a choice, unlike ethnicity*" (Antal, male, Hungarian).

"*My mother said it doesn't matter, as long as he's baptised... she wasn't that inclined [towards religion]. My grandmother said that she now discovered that it's not ethnicity that matters, but rather religion and that the child should be Reformed. But anyway, I had long before decided that the child should be Reformed, I mean that it wasn't some pressure from your part, but rather...*" (Mariana, female, Romanian).

Other respondents have chosen their children's denomination based on personal experiences, their own or belonging to family members, experiences that have marked them and which they consider defining for their subsequent evolution:

"*That[,] regarding religion I don't get involved because it's a thing that's very... I was shocked by some things. Well, shocked, I had some things with my sister, you know? She attended the Reformed college of the school from Cluj... I saw what that turned her into, you know?... And that's why I chose... I prefer some sort of light Christianity. I mean to know that this and that are options too, and yes to try to maintain yourself whole. No, not there either, no 'cause you have to, but it's not good there either. But to know to tell the difference between... good and evil*" (Zsolt, male, Hungarian).

"*I went through this, for the last two years I went to church every weekend, I've been scrupulous, ...now I sat and I'm thinking, it didn't do me any good, it's not that it didn't, it didn't teach us, 'cause it taught us good things in the end, 'cause it's about the Bible, so you cannot say that you learned bad things and it also guided you along*

a somewhat good path, but that obligation, it's like when all the time you tell someone do that, don't do [that]. If not, leave it like this, he [or she] does it willingly and that's what I said, rather than to be forced to get close to God, it's better to leave him [to do so]" (Szilard, male, Hungarian).

The respondents do not associate religion with ethnicity and do not deem it important when thinking about how they define their identity. An exception from this rule is represented by the situations in which the partner feels the need to get ever closer to the community he or she entered through marriage and which he or she values more than his or her own one: "I know it. I baptised my child at the Reformed only to strengthen the affiliation to the Hungarian community" (Mariana, female, Romanian).

6. Identity

In theory, one of the consequences of intermarriage consists in a decrease in the importance of cultural distinctions for the future generations, because children born into mixed marriages are less likely to be inclined towards identifying with a single group. Although mixed couples will attempt to socialise them in the culture of a single group, children will have alternatives for association when they become mature – especially if intermarriage is not an isolated phenomenon (Kalmijn 1998: 396). In the case of the couples interviewed in Transylvania, only the first part of the theory seems to hold, while the second is only partly confirmed. Couples are making efforts to familiarise children with both cultures, each parent taking the task of representing a cultural intermediary between the child and the group to which he or she belongs very seriously and striving, at least apparently, to transmit the specific cultural baggage to the child. The question of choosing an identity pertains habitually to the practical advantages that this ethnic identification involves. Our interviews were conducted shortly after the 2011 census and thus those interviewed had in mind the fresh experience of declaring a citizenship, associated, without exception, with identity:

"*We've decided at a certain moment, at the moment when we had to say what he is... then we said he's Hungarian. He has more facilities, if it's to be very practical, that's all. I know that this is a great dilemma*" (Balasz, male, Hungarian).

"*Then again it's that citizenship or the other citizenship. For me the thing like this no, again no... in the sense that if it's good for me, if I know that, look, if I choose*

Romanian I have advantages or not? I have or?... if not..." (Zoltan, male, Hungarian).

"*We are people... and that's all. He knows both languages, so that you can't say that he's Hungarian or Romanian. He's not. In the citizenship it says he's Hungarian. We've decided at a certain moment, at the moment in which we had to say what he is...*" (Petra, female, Romanian).

In some cases the parents declared that they do not think about their child from this identity-related viewpoint and that they currently do not associate a particular identity with him or her:

"*No, I don't think, I don't think in these terms. Maybe because I don't... I don't know... I'm not forced to think like this or, well, if now you've asked me and I've got to think then I say he's Hungarian... But otherwise I don't think like that. So we are a single whole in which I don't know... it's an amalgam of... or, well, it's not an amalgam, it's Romanian culture, Romanian language, Hungarian culture, Hungarian language and we know them all and we frequent them all*" (Lehel, male, Hungarian).

Of course, as in the case of a preference for learning both languages, many couples count on the advantages of having a dual citizenship:

"*Now that's what I'm saying, I was also speaking to A. earlier and when we all spoke, I can't say, my child... I am Romanian, a Romanian female from the Olt county, so that's as Romanian as one can be, but my husband can't be more Hungarian than he is, yes he's Hungarian, he's from here, from Cluj. The child is half Hungarian, half Romanian. I can't deny that, to say that he's Romanian, he's not Romanian and that's why I say that he must know the language, I will try to teach him, to take him to school, I've hired girls to come to him, some students to teach him, the father speaks in Hungarian, I take him to kindergarten... I don't know... he will have dual citizenship, I mean both Romanian and Hungarian. No, I can't say that he'll be only Hungarian having in view that his mother is Romanian, then... and vice versa. Vice versa. We are trying, I mean I will try to educate him in such a way so as he'll know that he's both [Romanian and Hungarian]*" (Mariana, female, Romanian).

Those who have had in their personal/familial history experiences related to assuming an identity-related mark regard things with detachment, claiming that

this identity trait, this element is not important to them and that there are other defining aspects that need to be taken into consideration:

> "*My grandmother is a Hungarian countess, so... Yes. Yes, she married a Romanian and her family of course didn't agree. My parents nothing. They don't care. They don't care about the ethnicity part, as my father is also half Hungarian. They care about schools, not ethnicities. Those are important, the schools*" (Raluca, female, Romanian).

On the other hand, one can notice in the case of some of the respondents, both Romanians and Hungarians, the idea that as long as they live in Romania they cannot be anything else than Romanians and, similarly, if they lived in another country, they would assume another identity:

> "*My children? I see them as Romanians. Hmmm... they're Romanians because they live in Romania, with... That we have different ethnicities, that's the second part. We are all Romanians*" (Carmen, female, Romanian).

> "*Romanian. I don't find the right words to make myself understood. Not 'cause I'm a nationalist or a believer in 1 December or 23 August. No. Effectively 'cause we live in this country. Here we pay taxes, from here we buy bread, here we eat, here... You walk along the street, you don't know how to get somewhere, you can't say [words in Hungarian], what bus do I have to take to get there, that's why I say I'm Romanian, that's why I believe I'm Romanian, because I live in this country. Because if I lived in Hungary I would adapt to the other thing. Then also the basic questions that I want to want to buy a bread I would speak in Hungarian*" (Abel, male, Hungarian).

As a result, identity turns out to be an extremely fluid notion in our respondents' understanding. Many of them, Romanians or Hungarians alike, had applied for the Hungarian citizenship[2] following the same practical advantages: Schengen Area, the Hungarian passport which allows an access without a visa in USA and Canada, access to the European labour market in states in which Romanian citizens do not yet possess this right, etc. Only a few

[2] Owing to an amendment to the Law from 1994 regarding the manner of obtaining the Hungarian citizenship, which came into force at 1 January 2011, any individual who can prove that he or she has Hungarian ancestors and that he or she speaks the Hungarian language can ask for citizenship. The requests for citizenship can be submitted to Hungary's consulates in Romania and within a 3-month period the person receives a reply. Knowing the Hungarian language does not need to be proven by documents, but depends upon the opinion of the functionary who interviews the applicant.

have declared that they applied for the Hungarian citizenship due to sentimental reasons (the feeling of belonging to the Hungarian culture and nation).

7. Conclusions

The ample analysis of the interviews conducted within the project Intermarriage throughout History will generate, surely, many keys in which to read the phenomenon of mixed marriages (particularly in the case of ethnically mixed ones) in Transylvania, but it will also raise, at the same time, numerous question marks or it will imply the continuation (by enlarging the sample) of research on certain types of problems for which the answers are not easily obtainable. Within the ensemble of research dedicated to intermarriages those that regard marriages between natives and immigrants stand out and those studies' hypotheses and conclusions can only be sparsely tested and verified when it comes to ethnically mixed marriages.

For centuries, Transylvania has had a population comprised of three numerically dominant ethnicities (Romanians, Hungarians and Germans) and six religions: (Eastern) Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Greek-Catholicism, Calvinism (or Reformed Evangelism), Lutheranism (or Evangelism CA – *Confessio Augustana*), Unitarianism and Judaism. Despite the tensions that have existed amongst these ethnicities, marriages between partners belonging to different ethnic or denominational groups did not represent an isolated phenomenon. As a result, these groups inhabiting the same province came into contact from material, linguistic, cultural, etc. viewpoints and when marriage was the result of these contacts, unlike what is typical of marriages involving immigrants, the preservation of identity was preferred to assimilation and children were reared by having contacts with both languages, both cultures, both ethnic traditions. As our research has shown, this option was largely influenced by education. Mihaela Hărăguş (2014) showed that those with a higher educational level are more inclined towards concluding ethnically mixed marriages. The conclusions we have reached after the analysis of the manner in which parents from ethnic intermarriages cope with the various aspects regarding their children (conclusions which question the theories of assimilation and acculturation that imply the loss of one group's language and traditions) can be interpreted through the prism of this finding as well: the respondents are, in their vast majority, well-educated and open-minded people with university education, who desire both to transmit their own identity and to contribute to the formation of a new identity on the basis of a combination of their ancestors' group culture and its responses to the challenges of the contemporary social environment.

Our respondents positively value the state of being a descendant of an intermarriage, irrespective if we are referring to Romanians (the representatives of the majority) or to Hungarians or Germans (which are ethnic minorities in Transylvania). Parents mention the advantage of being able to speak two languages and to call them "mother tongues", the chance of familiarising oneself with two cultures and of coming into contact with two traditions. One cannot speak about the phenomenon of language loss – that is so characteristic of immigrants' families – or about assimilation and loss of one group's identity in favour of the other. At least at the time when the interviews took place, parents have explicitly expressed their hope and desire that their descendants would value both languages, both cultures and both identities, although, as they themselves admit, they often think about these previously-mentioned elements in terms of advantages/disadvantages.

A subsequent study will select amongst the respondents only those who, in their turn, come from mixed families and will attempt to find similarities/differences regarding the manner in which their own families of origin have solved the issues related to language, religion, ethnic identity and, especially, the influence of these methods on the ways in which the respondents intend to manage the problem with their own children.

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Dynamics of Mixed Unions in Transylvania, Romania

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Abstract: In this work, mixed union formation and dissolution of Hungarian ethnics in Transylvania have been investigated, with the aim of finding which characteristics of individuals were connected with the tendency towards exogamy, and whether inter-ethnic unions are more fragile than endogamous ones. The analysis showed that the language of studies makes a clear difference between endogamous and exogamous union formation: persons that had studied at least one educational level in Romanian language had visible higher risks to form an inter-ethnic union, both marriage and cohabitation. In case of marriage dissolution, higher divorce risks for exogamous than for endogamous marriages have been found, and in case of formation of a second union, the results showed that persons who had a first exogamous union exhibit twice the risk of entering a second exogamous union compared with persons that had a first endogamous union.

Keywords: inter-ethnic marriage and cohabitation, Hungarian ethnics, Transylvania, language of education, event history analysis

1. Introduction

Marriage commonly implies a choice for a long-term relationship with a person who shares similar values, norms, life-styles, leisure activities, tastes, intellectual erudition, and who uses socio-economic resources to produce family economic wellbeing. All resources, whether cultural or socio-economic, are pooled together for the benefit of common activities in marriage. Even if similarity of traits has been found as the dominant pattern in marriage choices, there are trade-offs among characteristics and homogamy on some dimensions may be more important than on others. This would be the case of ethnically mixed marriages.

There is a large body of literature on intermarriage with regard to inter-racial marriages or marriages between immigrants and natives, which refers mainly to immigration countries such as the US or the UK. Usually empirical research on the topic has been focused on groups of immigrants or groups

with low socio-economic status, and the discussions are in terms of social status exchange, cultural adaptability or enclave effects (Qian 1999, Fu and Heaton 2008, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011, Furtado 2012). Nevertheless, not all minority groups are immigrants or under-privileged (O'Leary and Finnas 2002). This is the case with our research.

We will address the dynamics of mixed unions from the perspective of the largest minority group in Romania, which consists of Hungarian ethnics, concentrated in Transylvania, with a long history of living together with Romanians. The survey we use has a retrospective design and allows us to study mixed unions formation in a life-course perspective and to move beyond first union formation. In this way we could investigate which characteristics of individuals are connected with a greater openness toward ethnic exogamy and whether inter-ethnic unions are more fragile than endogamous ones.

In the next section we present the situation of Hungarian ethnics in Transylvania, discussing how their social positions have changed along time, under different regulations that altered their traditional institutions. Then we discuss possible characteristics that may influence the formation of mixed unions, with a special attention on education level and language of study. Then we present our analytic approach, which is event history modelling, followed by results and conclusions.

2. Hungarian ethnics in Transylvania

The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918-1920 left a part of the population which identified with Hungarian ethnonationality outside Hungary, to form a national minority in the new countries. According to 2011 Census data, the largest Hungarian minority population is to be found in Romania (1.32 million), followed by Slovakia (458 thousand), Serbia (290 thousand) and Ukraine (151 thousand) (Veres 2013).

Before union with Romania, Hungarians in Transylvania had a privileged position compared with Romanians: they were overrepresented in the upper- and middle-class categories, especially among intellectuals, artisans, and large landowners (Veres 2006). The territorial changes had significantly altered the position of Hungarians from Transylvania (Culic 2006): not only they became a minority, but also their political, economic and social status have deteriorated under the new rule. Under new regulations about use of Romanian language, many Hungarians were dismissed from their jobs and replaced with Romanians. The education system was uniformized with the rest of Romania, which meant instruction in Romanian language and soon the higher education system in Transylvania was made completely Romanian (Culic

2006). During the interwar period many Hungarians left Romania, which led to a change in ethnical structure.

The communist regime in Romania had explicit national policies, which combined repressive and compensatory measures in different periods, and there are no doubts that they employed different strategies to change the ethnical distribution in Transylvania (Culic 2006).

Culic (2006) makes a periodization and a comprehensive review of these measures: the period from 1944 to 1956 was characterized by "permissive-promoting policies" regarding the national minorities, bilingualism was officially introduced after 1948 and many schools in the language of minorities were established in areas with important minority population. Ambivalence characterized policies concerned national minorities during 1956-1965: extension of system of instruction in Hungarian, on the one hand, and reduction of schools that provided instruction exclusively in Hungarian, together with increase in the number of mixed schools. The particular form of nationalism promoted by Ceausescu (period 1965-1989) meant, at institutional level, "the reduction and close down of many forms of representation and functioning of the Hungarian community in Romania" (Culic 2006: 180). The use of mother tongue in the public space was drastically restrained; some faculty courses taught in Hungarian were suppressed. In the last years of the communist regime, large numbers of Hungarian ethnics left for Hungary, on the background of a worsening situation of both minorities and whole population.

If at the change of the political regime in 1989 Hungarian ethnics were under represented within the middle class and leaders, the disproportion started to counterbalance during the transition period (Veres 2006). Although the pace of change has been appreciated as slow by Veres (2006), he also shows that the ethnic disproportion of social stratification factor is much less significant in Transylvanian society.

Among the policies of the communist regime toward ethnic minorities, the expropriation of the property of the national minority churches in 1945 and reorganization of all ecclesiastical and private school as state schools in 1948 meant that "the most important institutions of socialization, identity construction and culture preservation of national minorities were almost completely dissolved" (Culic 2006: 180). This is important, since Hungarians and Romanians have different forms of representing their ethnic identity: Culic (2006) argues that the source for Romanian national community is perceived in the institutions of the Romanian state, while the source of the Hungarian community in Romania is seen in their traditional institutions, partially

destroyed by communism. Veres (2013) found that Hungarians living in minority in different countries form a separate group, toward which they feel closest, distinguishable from both Hungarians in Hungary, and from the majority population in respective countries. Veres (2013) also found that most of Hungarian minority perceive members of the majority population (Romanians, Slovakians, Ukrainians and Serbs, respectively), as well as Hungarians in Hungary, as having personal characteristics that are different form their own.

Against this background, it is not surprising that relations between Hungarian minority and Romanian majority have been conflictual sometimes. But beyond the perceived differences, they found common grounds, too, and mixed marriages have emerged. Along time, a share of 80-83% of endogamous marriages has been registered for Hungarian ethnics in Transylvania. Of course this share varies for different counties by the proportions of Hungarian ethnics. In counties where Hungarians represent more than 80% of the population, only 3-5% of them enter mixed marriages (Kiss and Veress 2010).

3. Theoretical considerations

3.1. Union/marriage formation

Scholars agree that marriage patterns are the result of the interplay of three elements: the individuals' preferences for certain characteristics in a spouse, the influence of the social group of which they are members and the constraints of the marriage markets (Kalmijn 1998, 2012, Qian 1999, O'Leary and Finnas 2002, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011).

Regarding the issue of preferences, virtually all research on marriage choice found homogamy (marriage between individuals with similar characteristics) as the dominant pattern (Becker 1974, Schoen et al. 1989, Kalmijn 1991). The benefits from marriage are most efficiently utilised when individuals marry persons with similar characteristics, such as intelligence, education, age, health, race, language, ethnicity, religion (Becker 1974, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011).

Among the characteristics of the potential spouses, seen as resources they would bring into marriage, sociologists consider the socio-economic and cultural ones as the most important. Socio-economic resources are used to produce economic well-being and status (Kalmijn 1998). Cultural resources include values, norms, life-styles, leisure activities, tastes, intellectual erudition, styles of speech and life experiences (Kalmijn 1991). When married, individuals pool these resources together for the benefit of common activities

in marriage: rearing children, the purchasing of a house and other consumer durables, the spending of leisure time, all of these leading to family well-being, confirmation and affection (Kalmijn 1998, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011).

Education is a complex variable in marital process. On the one hand, education is strongly related to taste, values and lifestyles, which are cultural characteristics. On the other hand, education is strongly related to income and status, which are socio-economic characteristics. The general finding of the research on the link between education and intermarriage is that persons with higher level of education are more likely to marry outside their ethnic group.

Different ways through which general education may affect the probability of mixed marriage have been identified and they are linked with preferences and opportunities. Persons with higher education may have spent more time among people of diverse ethnical backgrounds; not only have they been more likely to meet people of different ethnicities, but this may have influenced their interethnic attitudes. They may have less prejudice toward ethnic minorities and an increased understanding of members of other groups (Qian 1999, O'Leary and Finnas 2002, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011, Kalmijn 2012). Highly educated persons may also benefit from greater autonomy from the constraints of the family and community of origin, since pursuing higher education may involve greater geographical mobility and greater distances from the family of origin (O'Leary and Finnas 2002, Chiswick and Houseworth 2011). In this line of thought, we expect that *better educated persons are more likely to enter an ethnically mixed union than lower educated ones.*

On the other hand, O'Leary and Finnas (2002) propose an alternative hypothesis regarding the link between education and formation of ethnically mixed unions in case of minority groups with high socio-economic status. Studying intermarriage in case of minority groups that are indigenous, are traditionally of high socio-economic status and have strong communal institutions (Protestant minority in Ireland and Swedish speaking minority in Finland), they found that the rate of intermarriage is lower for minority members with higher rather than lower levels of education. They explain these findings by the social context of mate selection, showing that participation in higher education facilitates contact and marriage within one's own group. When separate educational institutions are established for minority groups, they act as an obstacle against intermarriage. In case of people participating in higher education a substantial part of mate selection takes place in direct connection with their studies. Moreover, O'Leary and Finnas (2002) discuss an indirect effect of higher education in case of high status minority groups,

through careers and leisure activities where higher educated members of the minority are over-represented.

We could apply part of these arguments to Hungarians in Transylvania. There are well-developed education institutions in Hungarian language, at all levels of education, which may favour mate selection within the minority group. Different from the minority groups studied by O'Leary and Finnas (2002), Hungarians in Transylvania are not over-represented in high social strata and professional occupations. They were indeed over represented in upper and middle class before union with Romania, but across time their social status worsened, especially during communism. Thus the Hungarian ethnics were under represented within the middle class and leaders at the change of the political regime, but the disproportion started to counterbalance during the transition period (Veres 2006). Under these circumstances, we could argue that social stratification of Hungarian minority in Transylvania is similar to the majority group.

Following O'Leary and Finnas's line of thought, we appreciate Hungarian minority to have well-developed education institutions and therefore we may *expect higher education to hamper ethic exogamy*, by facilitating the meeting of other minority group members.

However, another important issue connected with the above arguments is the fact that across time education in Hungarian language was sometimes hindered by different policies, especially during communism. As a consequence, Hungarian ethnics completed, at least some of the educational levels, in Romanian language. Not only in times of restrictions did Hungarians studied in Romanian, but also at present some people put their children into Romanian schools to increase their social chances, which is considered an existential compromise they are compelled to make (Culic 2006).

Studying in Romanian language means interactions with members of the majority and greater openness toward Romanians. As shown by Veres (2013) for Hungarian minorities living in four countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine), age and Hungarian as language of instruction, are more relevant for shaping ethnic Hungarians' attitudes of liking/dislike towards the majoritarian population than education or gender. Hungarian language of instruction increases the attitude of dislike; in other words, instruction entirely in Hungarian leads to group closeness for Hungarian ethnics.

Under these considerations, we *expect that Hungarian ethnics who attended at least one educational level in Romanian language are more opened toward mixed unions.* Moreover, since Hungarian ethnics had the possibility to pursue all their

education in Hungarian, we consider that having studied at least one educational level in Romanian is a stronger predictor for exogamous unions than education level per se.

Birth cohort. Citing previous research, Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2006) discuss that ethnic exogamy increases across immigrant generations because they are more strongly socialized in the culture of the host society, leading to fewer attachments to the own ethnic community. Kalmijn and van Tubergen (2006) consider that across time both immigrants and natives are influenced by modernization and develop weaker preferences for potential spouses on ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity. Even though in our case we discuss inter-ethnic union formation and not mixed unions between immigrants and non-immigrants, we believe that a similar argument could function here, too: younger birth cohorts of Hungarian ethnics have been socialized in increasingly modern environment, so they may show a weaker tendency towards ethnic endogamy. On the other hand, the concerns of Hungarian ethnics about their "survival" may hinder the openness toward ethnic exogamy.

Previous research on ethnic intermarriage in Transylvania (Hărăguş 2014) found that in case of Romanians, younger birth cohorts showed more attraction to exogamy than older ones, especially for women. In case of minority members, results were more variate: for minority women exogamy increased across birth cohorts towards other minorities, while for minority men exogamy increased towards Romanian women.

Given these arguments, *we expect to find decreasing ethnic endogamy, and consequently increasing exogamy, in union formation across birth cohorts.*

Gender. Looking at existing exogamous marriages as given by vital statistics, Horvath (2008) notes the differentiated attraction of Romanian men and women towards their Hungarian counterparts. The odds for Romanian males to be married with Hungarian women are visible higher than for Romanian women to be married with Hungarian men. From the perspective of (Romanian) men marrying exogamous, explanations may be linked with greater autonomy in their case, such as less social control from their families than women (O'Leary and Finnas 2002). For Hungarian women marrying exogamous more than Hungarian men, we may connect this with the mother tongue that usually is passed to the children; when a Hungarian women marries exogamous, we think it is more probable that her children will speak Hungarian than when a Hungarian man marries exogamous. In other words, the Hungarian identity is less threatened when a woman marries outside her ethnic group than when a man does the same. In this line of thought, we *expect that women show higher risks of entering an exogamous union than men.*

Urban/rural settlements. Horvath (2008) showed that the incidence of ethnically mixed marriage in Transylvania is visible higher in urban than in rural settlements. He proposes two explanations for this situation: first is connected with the structure of opportunities and the fact that villages in Transylvania are less ethnically heterogeneous than urban settlements. The second is connected with the strength of endogamy norms, in relation with children's economic dependency of their parents, which allow the latter to be more effective than urban parents in respecting the community norms.

Type of union. Partner choices have been documented to be less endogamous in unmarried cohabitation than in marriage: Schoen and Weinick (1993) found that cohabiting couples were more homogamous with respect to achieved characteristics such education, which reflect a short-term ability to contribute to the relationship, and less homogamous with respect to ascribed characteristics such as religion. Blackwell and Lichter (2004) found that homogamy with respect to race and religion increased only slightly from dating couples to cohabiting partners to married couples and actually all types of relationships were marked by substantial homogamy. Kalmijn & van Tubergen (2006) argue that norms of endogamy and third parties involvement are expected to be stronger when the union is to become formalized and more permanent, such as marriage. Given that in Romanian context marriage is the dominant pattern of family formation, *we expect to find higher risks of exogamous cohabitation than exogamous marriage formation.*

3.2. Union/marriage dissolution

If similarity on different characteristics is the dominant pattern of marriage formation (Kalmijn 1991), we have to keep in mind that ethnically mixed unions may involve a high degree of cultural dissimilarity between the spouses. Differences in ethnicity are correlated with differences in tastes, values and communications styles (Kalmijn 1998), which may lead to difficulties and disagreement in the partnership and lower level of support from, or interaction with the social network and kin (Dribe and Lundh 2012). On this line of thought, we propose the heterogamy hypothesis (Kalmijn, de Graaf and Janssen 2005): we *expect higher dissolution risk when the two spouses are of different ethnicities*, even after controlling for other characteristics, such as birth cohort or education level.

4. Data and method

The database we worked on was a replication and adaptation of the first wave of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS). Both Romania and Hungary

had participated in the Generations and Gender Programme, with the Generations and Gender Survey as one of its pillars. For the sake of a more detailed analysis of the Hungarian population in Romania, a separate data collection was initiated and accomplished in Transylvania in 2006 (Speder 2010). The questionnaire was a combination of first wave GGS and the Hungarian "Turning Points of Our Life Course" Panel Survey, and the financial constraints limited the interviewed population to age group of 18-45. The sampling was two-stage (visiting addresses, data collection), and the selection criterion for becoming a sample member was the following: "those people are Hungarians who understand the questions of the questionnaire and are able to answer them" (Speder 2010). Speder (2010) considers that they obtained this way a sample representing the Hungarian population of Transylvania in respect of their research better than the former ones. The sample included 2,492 persons (1,306 women and 1,186 men), aged 18-45 (cohorts 1960-1988)[1].

The survey had a retrospective design, which allowed the reconstruction of partnership histories of the respondents. Besides registering the dates of starting and ending of all partnerships (cohabitations or marriages), the ethnicity of each partner was recorded. This was a supplementary feature of this survey compared with the GGS. Thus we could trace the type of unions in term of ethnic endogamy or exogamy and could investigate transitions to endogamous or exogamous unions, as well as dissolutions of these unions. For union formation we choose to study the transition from single to first endogamous or exogamous (direct) marriage, and the transition from single to endogamous or exogamous cohabitation. Then we study dissolution of first endogamous/exogamous marriage and cohabitation. We go further and study the transition to second endogamous or exogamous union, but this time we consider marriage and cohabitation together, due to the small number of persons that had a previous union.

We construct piecewise constant exponential event history models for each transition. For first union formation the baseline hazard is the time elapsed since the respondent turned 15 , for the first union dissolution the baseline hazard is the duration of the first union, and for the second union formation the baseline hazard is the duration from union dissolution.

For union formation we distinguish between two competing events that may appear, namely the formation of an endogamous or of an exogamous

[1]Access to the *Turning Points of Our Life Course - Transylvania* database is granted by the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities.

union. In this situation, cases are censored at interview or in the case of the competing event. We run separate event history models for transition to first endogamous and first exogamous marriage, and cohabitation respectively, having thus four models for the transition to first union. For second union formation we consider marriages and cohabitations together and distinguish only between formation of second endogamous or exogamous union. For union dissolution cases are censored at interview or at the death of the partner. We run one model for first marriage dissolution and one for first cohabitation dissolution, with type of marriage/cohabitation (ethnic homogamous or exogamous) as independent variable. Then we also run models for first endogamous/exogamous marriage and cohabitation dissolution.

When studying each transition, cases with missing information about the dates of starting and ending of the respective union were excluded from the sample.

We used in our models several time constant independent variables, such as gender, birth cohort, and whether the respondent had studied any educational level in Romanian. We do not have the type of settlement where the person grew up, which we would have needed in a life course perspective. When we model duration (of the first union or since the union dissolution) and not age of the respondent, we include calendar period as a time-varying covariate. We distinguish among three periods: before 1990, 1990-1999, and 2000 and after.

We introduced a time-varying covariate accounting for respondent's educational enrolment and attainment, that we name current educational status. The survey did not register completed educational histories, but only the highest educational attainment at the moment of the interview, and the date when this level was attained. For the construction of this covariate, we followed the approach of Hoem and Kreyenfeld (2006) and Mureşan and Hoem (2010) for data with no complete educational histories, assuming that the respondent was enrolled in education all the time before they attained the level reported at the interview, and continuously out of education (with the reported level attained) between the date of attainment and the interview. We constructed a time varying covariate which combines educational enrolment and educational attainment, with the following categories: enrolled in education; not enrolled, low educational attainment (pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education); not enrolled, medium educational attainment (upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education) and not enrolled, high educational attainment (tertiary education).

5. Results

5.1. First union formation

Results of event history models (Table 1) show that the (absolute) risk of transition to first endogamous marriage is the highest for age group 20-24, a pattern similar to first marriage formation in general in Romania. The (absolute) risks of transition to first exogamous marriage are more than ten times lower than for transition to first endogamous marriage, similar in values and age pattern to transition to first exogamous cohabitation (Figure 1). We did not find higher risks of exogamous cohabitation than exogamous marriage formation, as expected, and we link that with (direct) marriage still dominating first union formation in Romania. However, the differences in the absolute risks of transition to first exogamous and first endogamous cohabitation are much smaller than the difference between the absolute risks of transition to first exogamous and first endogamous marriage. We consider this as an indication that indeed barriers in the way of exogamous cohabitation are weaker than barriers in the way of exogamous marriage.

Figure 1. Absolute risks for the transition to first endogamous/exogamous (direct) marriage and first endogamous/exogamous cohabitation



Note: Controlled for current educational level, any level studied in Romanian, gender, birth cohort

Regarding the current educational level, we found clear effects of being enrolled in education and not of the attained level of education. The strongest negative effect of being in education on union formation was found for transition to first (direct) marriage, both endogamous and exogamous one: persons enrolled in education have transition risks with 65%, and 74% respectively, lower than persons that attained a low education level. The negative effect of being enrolled in education is less strong for transition to first endogamous and exogamous cohabitation, compared with transition to first (direct) marriage: persons enrolled in education have transition risks with 27% , and 47% respectively, lower than persons that attained a low education level. A worth mentioning fact is that the negative effect of enrolment in education is stronger in case of exogamous unions (both marriage and cohabitation) than in endogamous ones. Since persons enrolled in education most probably pursue a tertiary education, we may interpret these findings as confirmation of the hypothesis proposed by O'Leary and Finnas (2002) about the decreasing rates of intermarriage in case of higher educated minority.

As we have expected, we found a clear positive effect on the transition to first exogamous union (both direct marriage and cohabitation) of whether the person had studied in Romanian language, at any level. Having studied in Romanian increase the risk of transition to first exogamous (direct) marriage by 3.28 times and the risk of transition to first exogamous cohabitation by 2.19 times. We do not find any effect of this variable on the transition to first endogamous union (marriage or cohabitation).

Regarding gender, we found higher relative risks for women than for men for all transitions studied here: to first endogamous or exogamous (direct) marriage and to first endogamous or exogamous cohabitation. We connect this finding with the younger ages of women than men at union formation, visible for all types of first union studied here. Thus we could not say that the hypothesis about women being more prone to exogamous unions is confirmed.

Regarding birth cohort, results are as expected for transition to first union in general: the younger the birth cohorts, the lower the risks for transition to first (direct) marriage and the higher the risks of transition to first cohabitation. As in case of gender, we could not say that the hypothesis about younger birth cohorts being more open toward exogamous union formation is confirmed.

Table 1. Results of event history models, transition to first endogamous/exogamous marriage and to first endogamous/exogamous cohabitation

	First endogamous (direct) marriage		**First exogamous (direct) marriage**		**First endogamous cohabitation**		**First exogamous cohabitation**	
	Absolute risks	P>z	Absolute risks	P>z	Absolute risks	P>z	Absolute risks	P>z
Age								
15-19 years	0.002461	***	0.000253	***	0.000521	***	0.000157	***
20-24 years	0.006972	***	0.000467	***	0.001139	***	0.000245	***
25-29 years	0.005366	***	0.000386	***	0.001318	***	0.000248	***
30-34 years	0.001462	***	9.28E-05	***	0.000885	***	0.000162	***
35-39 years	0.000406	***	5.42E-05	***	0.000502	***	0.000219	***
	Relative risks	P>z	Relative risks	P>z	Relative risks	P>z	Relative risks	P>z
Current education level								
in education	0.35	***	0.26	***	0.73	**	0.53	***
low	1		1		1		1	
medium	0.86	*	1.00		0.93		0.71	
high	0.93		0.77		1.17		0.83	
Any educational level in Romanian								
no	1		1		1		1	
yes	1.05		3.28	***	0.95		2.19	***
Sex								
men	1		1		1		1	
women	2.05	***	1.87	***	1.45	***	1.73	***
Birth cohort								
1960-1969	1		1		1		1	
1970-1979	0.67	***	0.61	***	1.51	***	1.79	***
1980-1988	0.26	***	0.52	**	2.04	***	2.31	***
N	2,444		2,444		2,444		2,444	
Events	1,046		145		354		136	

Note: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, * for p<0.1

5.2. First union dissolution

If we look at the relative risks of union dissolution by type of union (endogamous or exogamous) (Table 2), we see that ethnic exogamy increases the dissolution risk in case of marriage but not in case of cohabitation.

Figure 2 shows the absolute risks of first endogamous/exogamous marriage and cohabitation dissolution, controlled for other characteristics such as current educational level, any level studied in Romanian, gender, birth cohort and calendar period. We can see that risks of dissolution are much lower in case of endogamous than exogamous marriages. In case of cohabitation dissolution, there are no differences in the level of absolute risks between endogamous and exogamous cohabitation. Thus we could say that the heterogamy hypothesis is confirmed only in case of first (direct) marriage dissolution.

Figure 2. Absolute risks of first endogamous/exogamous (direct) marriage and first endogamous/exogamous first cohabitation dissolution



Note: Controlled for current educational level, any level studied in Romanian, gender, birth cohort and calendar period.

Table 2. Results of event history models, first marriage and first cohabitation dissolution

	First (direct) marriage dissolution		First cohabitation dissolution	
	Absolute risks	P>z	Absolute risks	P>z
Union duration				
0-4 years	0.000607	***	0.005807	***
5-9 years	0.000546	***	0.00211	***
10-14 years	0.00035	***	0.001121	***
15-19 years	3.91E-05	***	0.000382	***
20+ years	0.00018	***	1.72E-09	
	Relative risks	P>z	Relative risks	P>z
Type of union				
Endogamous	1			
Exogamous	2.23	***	1.11	
Current education level				
in education	0.94		2.39	***
low	1		1	
medium	0.85		1.51	*
high	1.32		0.78	
Any educational level in Romanian				
no	1		1	
yes	1.23			
Sex				
men	1		1	
women	0.96		0.54	***
Birth cohort				
1960-1969	1		1	
1970-1979	0.55	*	1.03	
1980-1988	0.36		2.36	**
Calendar period				
Before 1990	0.92		0.78	
1990-1999				
2000 and after	1.50		1.16	
N	1,189		472	
Events	81		157	

Note: N for first (direct) marriage and cohabitation dissolution is smaller than the number of first (direct) marriages or cohabitations (see Table 1) because we dropped from the sample cases with missing information about the date of union dissolution or with negative union durations.
*** for $p<0.01$, ** for $p<0.05$, * for $p<0.1$

5.3. Second union formation

Results of event history models (Table 3) show that the absolute risks of transition to a second union are higher when the union is endogamous than when it is exogamous. Any of the covariates used does not show a significant effect on transition to second endogamous union. In case of transition to second exogamous union we find that persons who had a first exogamous union exhibit twice the risk of entering a second exogamous union compared with persons that had a first endogamous union.

6. Conclusions

We have investigated mixed union formation and dissolution of Hungarian ethnics in Transylvania, with the aim of finding which characteristics of individuals were connected with the tendency towards exogamy, and whether inter-ethnic unions are more fragile than endogamous ones. Besides the retrospective design of the survey we used, which allowed us to reconstruct partnership histories, an important feature was the registration of each partner's ethnicity. In this way we could investigate inter-ethnic union formation in a life course perspective.

An important characteristic considered in our study was educational level of individuals. We have constructed two alternative hypotheses for the influence on mixed union formation: one linked higher education with a greater openness toward other ethnic groups and thus with greater ethnic exogamy in union formation, while the other linked higher education with higher ethnic endogamy in case of minority groups that are indigenous and not underprivileged. We did not find an effect of the attained level of education for neither of the two alternative hypotheses. We find instead a strong negative effect of being enrolled in education on union formation, both in case of marriage and cohabitation, both in case of endogamous and exogamous unions. This negative effect was stronger in case of exogamous union formation (both marriage and cohabitation) and since persons enrolled in education most probably pursue a tertiary education, we may interpret these findings as supportive of the hypothesis that links higher education with less attraction for inter-ethnic unions.

Table 3. Results of event history models, transition to second endogamous/exogamous union

	2nd endogamous union		2nd exogamous union	
	Absolute risks	P>z	Absolute risks	P>z
Time since union dissolution				
0-4 years	0,012009	***	0,005388	***
5-9 years	0,006449	***	0,00326	***
10-14 years	0,003	***	0,000794	***
15-19 years	3,67E-09		5,86E-10	
20+ years	3,81E-09		4,92E-10	
	Relative risks	P>z	Relative risks	P>z
First union type				
endogamous	1		1	
exogamous	0.95		2.19	*
Education level				
in education	1.55		02/01/63	
low	1		1	
medium	1.36		2.11	
high	0.79		0.41	**
Any educational level in Romanian				
no	1		1	
yes	1.08		2.23	
Sex				
men	1		1	
women	1.02		0.79	
Birth cohort				
1960-196	1		1	
1970-197	0.65		0.24	*
1980-198	0.67		0.26	
Calendar period				
before 1990	0.60		0.10	***
1990-1999	1		1	
2000 and after	2.27		1.38	
N	223		223	
Events	88		23	

Note: N for second union formation is smaller than the number of union dissolutions (see Table 2) because we dropped from the sample cases with missing information about the date of second union formation or with negative time since union dissolution.
Note: *** for $p<0.01$, ** for $p<0.05$, * for $p<0.1$

Another important finding was that more than educational level, the language of studies makes a clear difference between endogamous and exogamous union formation: persons that had studied at least one educational level in Romanian language had visible higher risks to form an inter-ethnic union, both marriage and cohabitation. Studying entirely in Hungarian language leads to a group closure that hampers long term relations with majority members, such as marriage. Having studied in Romanian, too, reduce the attitudes of dislike toward the majority group (as found by Veres 2013), and ease the way toward mutual understanding and subsequent union formation.

Regarding gender and birth cohort, we found similar effects for transition to both exogamous and endogamous unions: the younger the birth cohort, the lower the risk for transition to direct marriage and the higher risk for transition to cohabitation, and women showed higher risks than men for transition to all types of unions.

In case of marriage dissolution we found support for heterogamy hypothesis: higher divorce risks for exogamous than for endogamous marriages. We did not find differences in the dissolution risk of exogamous and endogamous cohabitations, although the dissolution risk of cohabitations was much higher than that of marriages.

In case of formation of a second union, we have found that persons who had a first exogamous union exhibit twice the risk of entering a second exogamous union compared with persons that had a first endogamous union. In other words, a bad experience of a non-lasting mixed union does not scare them and go for a second try with an exogamous union. Probably this is a special category of persons, with a strong affinity towards Romanians.

The event history approach imposed some limitations to our study regarding the characteristics of individuals that we could account for. Except for ethnicity, we had no other information about previous partners of the respondent, in order to see, for example, the degree of educational or age homogamy.

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Changes on the Wedding Ceremony as an Effect of Migration. A Rural Community from Braşov County*

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Abstract: This study is the result of a fieldwork conducted in the village of Ohaba, Braşov County. It aims to describe the reason for reusing the humorous and satirical extempore verses chanted during the wedding ceremony, in the context of the interethnic alliances determined by migration or alliances between Romanian migrants. We also intend to observe which is the main reason why, villagers from Ohaba, after a period of living and working abroad, return to their native village in order to get married and understand this space as one of certification, that gives validity and authenticity to their act. The phenomenon can be understood as an expression of the sense of belonging to a certain space, which increases and becomes pregnant during the defining events of an individual's life, such as marriage, but can also be caused by the desire to give the community of origin a chance to take part in their change of status, and so to perceive them as married people in the future. Moreover, this study intends to investigate to what extent the migration has caused the villagers the need to bring out specific forms- such as wedding extempore verses- in order to (re)shape their identity.

Keywords: migration, wedding, marriage, Romania, Italy.

1. Introduction

The findings in this study are the results of a fieldwork begun in the second half of the year 2009 and finished in 2011, in Ohaba, a village from Şinca Veche, Braşov County.

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Studies on cultural anthropology, globalization and migration often talk about the interaction between immigrants and the host society. We find it important to refer also to the home society and how it reacts to this process of interaction with other communities, geographically located far away from it, but with great impact on its life- through the relationships created by external migration. Considering this issue, during this study we will refer to the immigrants and the people in the labour receiving country as "first hand actors of migration" and to the home locals as "second hand actors".

Starting from the consideration of Edward Shorter, that in traditional rural world, the community is actively and closely involved in the private life of its members during birth, marriage and death (Shorter 1997: 263), Mircea Brie shows that "from a symbolic point of view, this involvement of the community states individuals' appurtenance not only to their families but also to a broader construction of community group" (Brie 2009: 662-663). This is an important statement, also verified by the results of our field research. Even more, in our case, the home locals- as "second hand actors of migrations" feel the need to interfere during the wedding celebration of their migrant villagers, in order to compete the influence that the host country might had have on the ones experiencing migration. We will see at a certain point of the study that in Ohaba, during 1990-2011 there are only two cases of marriages between Romanian women and an Italian/ a French husband- thus a small number, but with important significances in territory, if we are to compare to the total annual number of marriages celebrated in the villages. Beside of these particular marriages, the majority of the alliances contracted in the Ohaba have indirect connection to other European spaces reached by migration. These "spaces of otherness" are built in the imaginary of locals, through the references received from the ones considering the option to work and live abroad, and so, experiencing a direct interaction. But what seems to be the most interesting discovery is that the locals develop a feeling of otherness even versus their close relatives and subsume them to foreigners, after they have spent a certain number of years abroad and give signs that they would not return. For sure, here is also the migrants' fault, since, once they get to other spaces, tend to dissimulate their specificity and to approach as much as that adoptive country's model. The explanation should be search in the fact that in the host societies their specificity is admitted with reticence by public authorities, employers and the common population (Leveau, Schnapper 1987: 494), therefore they feel the need to hide their identity and transform themselves in one of them. And, in most of the cases, get to be perceived as such even at home.

As a result, this study emphasizes ethnic groups in a process of interaction (home group and host group) and observes the importance of migration in widening ethnic identities. In the village we have studied, we see that the triad mobility- migration- otherness creates side effects among home locals. While the migrants experience a process of identity change, the locals remain in the same background (that also suffer changes, but maybe less visible) and feel the duty to defend their identity against the strangers that form the new reality of their relatives. As this duty or need is contextually determined (by migration), the combative measures taken tend to be exaggerated, or artificial. The best example is the reuse of wedding extempore verses.

These verses have lost their significance and importance in Ohaba, during communism, being removed from the wedding ritual. A research on the collective imaginary of the inhabitants generated the idea that the appearance of the *stranger* (or, rather, a projection of the stranger in locals' minds), in post-revolutionary period, generated the need of the local inhabitants to highlight their specificity. The "stranger" (who, sometimes, is even one of them) came with an economic priority against villagers, enjoying a real prestige. But what could have turned the local inhabitants, especially the old ones, into outstanding people? Thus, through expressiveness, rhythm and the atmosphere created, the wedding extempore verses proved to be the kind of performance that could positively represent the locals. It turned into a way of saying "welcome", into a strategy of hospitality- a kind of local recognition of a future relationship that involves not only the union of the spouses, but an entire community that opens to this union.

Therefore, in its final form, the study aims to show how the phenomenon of migration, getting out of the place of origin and dealing with another space, affects a specific area of migrants' reality: the wedding ritual. Moreover, to show how migration determines certain attitudes and how residents inter-relate with the "strangers" getting married in their village.

2. Methods

In this research we bring together anthropological fieldwork method and demographic analysis, in an attempt to offer an interdisciplinary perspective. We extend the use of demography from the level of studying the population to the one of studying the social actors of a specific area.

On one hand, the research is based fundamentally on participant observation and semi-structured interviews conducted with Ohaba villagers who experienced migration, either as direct participants or as indirect participants. The interviews with the members of the community helped to

create a dialogue, in the sense of building a relationship that would make the people understand the presence of the researcher inside the community, but also provided the necessary information for the researcher so that could be aware of the insights of the studied society. Participant observation allowed a deeper immersion into the wedding ceremonies celebrated in the village, but also facilitated further understanding of the migration's effects on the villagers, the contrasts they identify between their cultural specificity and the strangers they come in contact with.

On the other hand, in order to analyse the demographic behaviour of the inhabitants of Ohaba, regarding marriages between 1990-2011, we used the method of stripping and recovery of parochial registers of civil status, initiated by the French demographer Louis Henry and the archivist and historian Michel Fleury. Parochial registers of the marital status are sources of first category showing the marital choices of migrants, after their pallet of possible partners has remarkably diversified as a result of migration.

3. Ohaba: an area experiencing europeanization

The European culture requires a set of desirable behaviours not always supported by the traditional mentality. We have noticed the opposition of the elderly population of Ohaba, the reluctance they manifest against the cultural changes experienced by their migrant descendants, and this made us wonder if the re-use of the wedding extempore verses, in Ohaba, could be understood as a way of competing Europeanization. Before globalization expanded from the economic plan to the cultural one, we were talking about what Horaţiu Rusu qualifies as a world of ethnic spaces in which identities were perceived as given, fixed, set, inherited or as an expression of some strong links with the past (Rusu 2008: 37). In spite of globalization's intention to amalgamate the cultural and ethnic areas, it "has had the curious effect of reinforcing ethnicity and national identities" (Salazar 1998: 114) , as we will see in the results of the present research.

In the past 20 years, the community of Ohaba, however limited from the numerical point of view, was particularly affected by migration. After *The Prototype Plant and Chemical Equipment Repair Făgăraş* and *The Chemical Plant Făgăraş* were closed, population of the area could not exercise their right to work. Searching for solutions, people from Ohaba, like those from the surrounding villages, took into account the economic opportunities that other countries could have offered and so the international migration begun. Thus, the commuters from country to city turned, of need, in transnational commuters going from short to long distances (Ricci 2010: 17). The idea of

leaving Romania was also a post-communism trend, showing people willing to defy previously existing restrictions. In her study, Simona Wersching shows that "mobility and migration is seen as a necessary consequence of transition to a capitalist market economy", but, in the same time, mentions the so-called "migration hysteria" that caused a migration flood independent of the economical or political causes (Wersching 2008: 73). As shown in the study of Antonio Ricci, regarding immigration of Romanians in Italy before and after the adhesion to EU, enthusiasm to emigrate was influenced by the opportunity to know new worlds, to travel across borders and build their own good luck, opportunity prohibited before by the Communist regime (Ricci 2010: 15). Therefore, after 1989, the demographic structure of the village has changed, young workforce moving to European countries, especially to Italy.

For those who have left the village, the *ethno space* does not acquire a concrete sense any more. It is rather transferred to their mental level- marked by two opposing forces. On the one hand, we distinguish the cultural solidarity they feel in relation to the space of origin, the sense of belonging to their village, and, on the other hand, we talk about their integration to a new cultural space that will reveal new directions and rules. Initially, they are oriented towards home and continue to use the Romanian cultural patterns, and, while the time living away from home is extended, they are absorbed by the new cultural coordinates. In time, they create a mixture of traditions, beliefs and practices and the new acts as a filter over the old, cancelling those cultural habits impossible to practice in their adoptive space, due to lack of human and material resources.

Another issue, deriving from migration, is the familial organization of the Romanian people in the adoptive area and the types of families they form. We can refer to *mixed marriages* or *interfaith marriages*, *bilingual marriages* or *bicultural marriages* or even to *binational marriages*, as used in the volume *Gender, Generations and the Family in International Migration* in order to highlight that these marriages are not only about cultural differences and "mixty", but are also linked to citizenship and residence rights (Kraler, Kofman, Kohli, Schmoll 2013: 45).

Anyway, if we are to analyse these families, we notice that language interferes here, as a binding agent, on one hand, between the child and the mother's cultural reality, and, on the other hand, between the child and the father's one- two different cultural poles, with their own traditions, customs and beliefs. Alexandru Suciu observes that the origin of the term tradition is to be found in the Latin noun *traditio* and the verb *tradere* which means the act of giving, transmitting, and therefore the sense of transferring the knowledge

(Suciu 1998: 9-10). As shown by Suciu, André Lalande defines tradition as being something vividly transmitted in a society, whether by word, writing or by way of acting (Lalande 1932: 899-900). Therefore making use of the possibilities of communication is a key condition for transmitting traditions. To what extent can a child born in a bicultural family, or even a child born in a family of Romanian migrants, who grows up and receives institutional education in another country, acquire and transfer into his world Romanian cultural values, is hard to say. The children of Romanian migrants, born and raised in the host community, become students of the adoptive countries' schools, being the most influenced with respect to education and cultural affiliation. Their relationship with the society of installation are more accurate than their parents' (Leveau, Schnapper 1987: 494), and so their language skills. If we have in mind the fact that language is related to the creation of culture, permitting "the transmission of collective solutions and their preservation" (Salazar 1998: 117), we understand the deficiency in intercultural communication and preservation of traditional customs in Ohaba by some teenagers oriented towards another linguistic universe. Given the conditions, we can notice that the traditional spiritual framework, already broken by the parents- the first ones who have left the village- continues to be broken by their descendants. So that the phenomenon becomes very difficult to stop.

The elderly population of the village, although not aware of the causes of these changes, can easily feel the effects. They have no other solution than to compete the above mentioned reality with the cultural valences of the past- used more strongly when the two worlds (the home world and the foreign one) meet- for example: a wedding.

4. Marital strategies: the road to integration

A history of more than 20 years of international migration, from Ohaba, has led to the possibility to make the migrant's profile. At the beginning of the migration process, the ideal candidate was a young man, generally with a high-school degree or a vocational school diploma. Women were absent in this first phase of migration, mostly because the action of leaving their home was regarded with suspicion- as being an immoral behaviour, but also because, as shown in the study of Ionela Vlase, "they lacked information and the financial means" to pay for the visa, and "were reluctant to take the risk of an illegal border-crossing" (Vlase 2013: 747). Why are young people eligible for such an extreme experience: working in very hard conditions, away from their home country, in order to achieve some personal goals? Because they expect that at the end of this "marathon" will have enough money to build a house, to buy a

car or household appliances etc.- the kind of needs that elderly people have already satisfied.

We can easily observe that migration highlights the antithesis between "actors" belonging to different worlds, emphasizes the otherness at all levels. We have mentioned the variances between the migrants and the ones left at home. Now, we shall analyse the relationships between the "first hand actors of migration"- the migrants, and those they find in the area of destination. In other words, to describe the opportunities migrants use to integrate in their adoptive space. It does not seem at all surprising that the majority chooses the integration by marriage.

Romanian citizens have a particular reputation among the European countries, with respect to mixed marriages. During 2000, 3.200 foreign citizens married Romanian citizens, of which nearly 80% were foreign men marrying Romanian women. Of all marriages, Italians are ones of the most frequently involved in mixed marriages (Trends in International Migration 2002: 244-245). Therefore, there is a preponderance of marriages between foreign men and Romanian women. On our opinion, the explanations may be found in the type of jobs women execute, in: restaurants, pizzerias and the family support sector, housekeeping, baby sitting or elderly care etc. We see that women get to be integrated, particularly, into the private space of Italians, often associated with various manifestations of intimacy. Women are more attached to the areas where jobs are intertwined with the exercise of coexisting with the members of a family. So, the whole process of negotiating a possible relationship- the game of seduction and consummation of love- is more easily accomplished in the intimate space than in any other medium. On the other hand, women's jobs permit them to acquire destination country's language easier than the Romanian men abroad- which facilitates communication and so makes flirt easier. Even more, the statistics confirm that Romanian migration is performed, during recent years, mainly by female representatives, and most of the marriages - about 75%- are officiated with an Italian husband (Annual Report 2006 ISTAT).

Besides the mixed ones, there is another type of alliances- between the Romanians that migrated to other European countries (for e.g., Italy or Spain) and met there other co-nationals. Those looking for such marriages are rather nostalgic for their home space, and, through such alliances compete, to some extent, the cultural differences they have to face abroad. They recreate the atmosphere from their home space within their new formed families and continue to speak Romanian, at least inside the family. Andreea Raluca Torre defines this as a life in which the habits, customs and contacts with the country

of origin inevitably coexist with everyday practices meant to encourage integration into the new social environment (Torre 2010: 31).

Therefore, these two types of matrimonial alliances are identified in the village Ohaba. However, what raises our interest is that, in order to marry, whether it is the first type of described marriages or the second one, people from Ohaba return to their native village as to a space of certification. They consider that the wedding ceremony in the village of origin gives validity and authenticity to their union. The phenomenon can be understood as an expression of the sense of belonging to a certain space, which increases and becomes pregnant during the defining events of an individual's life, such as marriage, but can also be caused by the desire to give the community of origin a chance to take part in their change of status, and so to perceive them as married people, in the future. Generally speaking, migration promotes a revival of the religious conscience. The difficulty to integrate into the adoptive area awakens strong national and religious feelings- especially to women. It was pointed out that the maintenance of religious fervour is closely related to the maintenance of traditional norms and, in particular, to a traditional conception of gender roles (Leveau, Schnapper 1987: 503). So, given women's attachment to the religious sphere, we can identify their influence on men when choosing the place where to officiate the religious marriage. In the community we have studied, the gender issue is a very important key: generally, the women are from Ohaba and the men are outsiders (Romanians or non-Romanians). In another train of thoughts, in a country like Italy, where Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion, the motivation for returning home for marriage can be an exacerbated manifestation of the Romanian's Orthodox faith.

The Sacrament of marriage is recognized as one of the Seven Sacraments of the Orthodox Church, and, as even the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church states, marriage means the entrance of the new couple (man and woman) in the life of a Eucharistic community of a parish (www.basilica.ro). In rural communities, this sense of belonging to a parish community appears to be stronger than the sense of being part of a commune, for instance, as a basic unit of administrative organization. And this may be another reason why people experiencing international migration need the blessing of their home space, through the power with which is invested the Church. And even if, after marriage, they are physically away from the village, their relatives from Romania continue to make them part of the parish community. For example, they are mentioned in the annual diptych known as the "Crown of the year", which the priest reads before each Holy Liturgy.

Another issue that raises our interest is the position of The Romanian Orthodox Church towards mixed marriages. As already known, "the Holy Canons do not allow a marriage between orthodox and heretics or non-Christians (can. 14 of the IV-th ecumenical Synod, can. 72 Trulan; can 10, 31 Laodiceea, can. 21 Carthage; can. 23 of John the Abstentionist), unless the heretic or non-Christian spouse accepts to convert to Orthodoxy" (Gârdan, Eppel 2009: 459). The position of the Orthodox Church may be also a reason that causes the returning of people considering the option to marry in Romania. As we can understand, the most important three issues claimed by the Romanian Orthodox Church towards mixed marriages are that: - mixed marriages are accepted only between a Catholic and a Christian of another faith whose baptism's validity is recognized; - mixed marriages cannot be celebrated without dispensation from the Orthodox bishop; and - in order to obtain the dispensation, the future spouses shall promise to baptize and raise their children in the Orthodox faith and the heterodox spouse not to influence the Orthodox one to abandon Orthodoxy and embrace the other religion (Cozma 2010: 165-166).

The chart below shows the frequency of marriages that took place in the Orthodox Church "The Assumption of Mary" from Ohaba, during 1990-2011, a period that coincides, in the history of the village, with the beginning of the migration to other European areas. In our analysis, we will select of the total number of marriages those that represent the subject of our research, between a Romanian and an Italian citizen or two Romanian citizens that formed a couple while being in Italy (we will see that besides the Italian space, that gives the majority of these stories, there are young people that have met in Sweden, France or Ireland). But the majority of people from Ohaba considering the option of foreign employment go to Italy. Actually, the entire area situated in the proximity of Făgăraş Mountains practice the mobility to this area since, as shown in other studies, "the larger the community abroad, the stronger is the signal that a particular location is desirable for migration" (Hiriş 2008: 39).The phenomenon of migration, in Ohaba, should be understood as a "mirror process": between 1990-2004, the young couples experience the labour migration in the post-marriage period- migration is either familial or singular (usually, the man is the one that leaves), but, between 2005-2011 the situation is reversed- women start to experience migration by themselves and, after several years of living in Italy, young people return home with the only purpose of getting married .

This situation involves a long debate on the different types of education that the two generations have received. Young people educated in

communist and influenced by the regime's way of valorizing family, and the generation who grew up in the post-communist period- an era of democracy that emphasized individualism, personal development and financial comfort. Also, we observe an evolution of the roles that women have assumed in the family. We notice that inside the families formed between 1990-2004, the partners played unequal roles. The rural mentality describes migration as the effort of living in a hostile space, where unsuitable conditions are found and where physical and mental strength are required in order to resist. Inside the couple, the woman was the fragile one, while the man was associated to strength and courage, and thus was designated to migrate. On the contrary, the families formed between 2005 -2011 do no longer face this kind of inhibition. The union is formed after the women prove the strength and courage of living and working abroad. Women's empowerment, their economic independence and the possibility they have to change multiple partners without being seen as immoral, led to flexible relations within the couple. Therefore, we can speak about the modern family, in which the construction of authority and power concerns both partners.

Thus, in 1990, after the marriage of B. F. with T. R., the husband experiences the labour migration to Italy. In 1993, out of the five marriages celebrated in Ohaba orthodox parish, a couple formed by S. V. and M. M. will get to live and work in Sweden. In 1994, the two marriages of F. A. and S. M., respectively T. G. and S. D. will generate two families that will settle down in Italy. The brides of the two alliances formed in 1994 are sisters, one of the weddings being planned for the 11th of June and the other one on August 27. Both couples will move to Italy, generating the first case of migration extended to a familial level. In 1995 appears the first marriage that follows the structure Romanian - Italian citizen, between M. S. (Ohaba) and the Italian man C. P. (Via Prato della Corte, Rome, Italy). The year 1996 is associated to the same type of marriage, excepting the fact that the man (G. C.) that marries the Romanian woman (L. B. E.), is French. In 1998, the alliance formed by M. G. and P. L. is followed by the migration of the man, a few years later, to Italy. The only marriage of 2000 is that of P. V., from Şinca Veche, and M. M., a short marriage ending with a divorce. After divorce, the woman, M. M., will choose to go for foreign employment in Italy. She will marry an Italian man, will take her daughter from the first marriage there and will give birth to a boy.

In conclusion, out of the 27 marriages formed between 1990- 2004, eight are connected to the phenomenon of migration, which means a percentage of 29.62 %. Eight is also the number of the alliances formed between 2005- 2011. But, while the first decade we have studied includes a

period of 14 years, the second phase of migration contains a number of six years. Out of the 16 marriages contracted in this period, eight are related to the experience of foreign employment, which means 50 % of the number of marriages. Thus, we see that in the second phase the phenomenon is extended in a shorter period of time.

Also, we should highlight the fact that only two of the marriages are actually mixed, the case of M. S. (1995) and L. B. E. (1996), which shows the timidity of women to approach migration and find foreign partners. But, as we will see, the cases of women migrating on themselves are more common in the village beginning with the year 2005.

Therefore, in the above mentioned year, we notice the marriage of M. P., an Italian citizen of Roman Catholic religion with R. A., after her prior living and working in Italy. In September 2007 is formalized the union of S. V. from Sita Buzăului (Covasna County) with M. S. from Ohaba, both of them previously being labor migrants in Italy, where they have also met. Following the same structure, in 2008, in Ohaba was officiated the marriage of M. P. (Ohaba) and S. E. (Şinca Veche), who went back to Italy immediately after the marriage. In August 2008 repeats the previous matrimonial scheme: the alliance between M. S. (Drăguş) and M. N. (Ohaba), who came to Ohaba exclusively for marriage and then returned to Italy. The union of I. R. (Ohaba) and C. C. of Roman Catholic religion follows the same structure shown above. The year 2009 is associated with the marriage between S. I. and M. A., both of Ohaba - S. I. is S.V.' s nephew , who married in 1993 and later settled down in Sweden. Before marriage, S. I. and M. A. went to Sweden to work. They returned there after the marriage. In July 2011, M. A. (Ploieşti) and D. B. (Ohaba) come back home from Ireland, with the precise purpose of getting married. Lastly, in 2011, M. D. and M. V. (Ohaba), who formed a couple in Italy, followed the same pattern and formalized their marriage in Ohaba.

We see from the data above, how the marital behaviour of young people in the village has evolved: from looking for a possible partner in the same village or in the nearby villages, to marriages with unknown Romanian people, met abroad, or people of other ethnic groups and religions. The community in the village does not appear to have a reaction of rejection to any of the two directions mentioned above, and even less to the ethno- religious interference produced by some of these marriages. Parents encourage young people to form alliances with people from other European regions, whereas they associate marriage with future changes in the socio-economic status of their children and, by extension, to their own economic prosperity. As Liliana Hiriş observes, this positive attitude towards migration derives from "general

benefits of migration to the home society (for example, remittances)" (Hiriş 2008: 32). Moreover, to marry a foreign citizen attracts the respect of the entire rural community. Romanians confer a great prestige to other ethnic communities (for example, to Italians) as a consequence of their economic superiority. They solve the real problems in the village (one of this problems being the rate of unemployment) by hiring Romanians, who, as a consequence, send important amounts of money at home, giving their relatives the chance to increase their standard of living. These relatives share their experience with other neighbours, so that the collective mentality is influenced to positively value the Italians.

5. Wedding extempore verses- defending an identity

Decades ago, wedding was a pretext for performing an entire ritual that nowadays, for luck of human and material resources is not is not brought to light. Since the entire vision on the wedding ceremony has evolved, it is natural that the wedding customs are being renewed and directly influenced by the present context. In the first few years after the fall of communism, locals also brought out the extempore verses from the wedding ritual, since those no longer met the desire of modernity and development that characterized the period. This happened until the moment when the interference of the stranger generated the need of locals to reveal their specificity. What could better represent the people from Ohaba inside the wedding ceremony than the wedding extempore verses? By performing these distinctive verses - a sign of local pride- people were actually making an effort to defend their identity.

Dicţionarul Explicativ al Limbii Române ("The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language") defines extempore verses as an onomatopoeic exclamation, a species of popular poetry, usually in verse, with an epigrammatic character, satirical or amusing allusions or emotional content that are loudly said in the countryside during the performance of some popular games (DEX 1998) or, by extension, a wedding. Ion Şeuleanu identifies as the primary function of the wedding extempore verses their intention to establish and maintain a dialogue between the two families, the bride's and the groom's (Şeuleanu 1985: 185). The recurrent themes in the wedding extempore verses are: the bride leaving her home, the crying of the bride, the relationship between the bride and her mother-in-law, the end of grooms' s flirting with other girls in the village, young couple's future life etc. Given these themes, the extempore verses sometimes play a a moralizing-reparatory function (Şeuleanu 1985: 187), being like a guide to be followed within marriage.

Besides these general functions exposed before, we can identify other features of the wedding extempore verses, that might have contributed to the revival: they animate the atmosphere and create a specific climate that perfectly describes the wedding- understood as one of the most important celebrations during one's lifetime; have humorous valences, although their substrate is often moralizing; are results of improvisation, so the performers do not have to be previously trained (the wedding extempore verses are remembered almost involuntarily, by attending other weddings and repeating them in similar contexts); represents an opportunity for performers to make themselves heard- performers are represented (today!) by women aged between 60 and 80 years. As shown in the studied area, these women are either friends or relatives, and link by a neighbourhood relationship. They represent a small percentage of the villagers and appear condensed into a well-defined area, both geographically and symbolically.

We suggest the following detailed description in order to better understand the source of the wedding extempore verses nowadays. We will refer to V. R. and M. C. as the principal performers of the wedding extempore verses in the village. These two sisters are around 80 years old and live in two opposite parts of the village: M.C. in the commercial area of Ohaba (where the two little grocery stores are located), while V. R. in that segment of the village that creates the connection to the centre of the commune- Şinca Veche-, where kindergarten, school, dispensary and administrative institutions are found. The stores attract daily customers and so, the part of the village where M. C. lives is an important one, all the more so as the church is situated in the same area, but even so V. R.'s zone is the outstanding part of the village - where most of the rumours and gossip are generated and interpreted. The women from this area are considered by the rest of the community to be the most tenacious, curious and willing to express themselves, but also to represent the community in relation to other surrounding villages. A wedding is, for these women, an opportunity to manifest and, as representatives and ambassadors of their community, to defend their own specificity, traditions and identity.

Each of the two sisters mentioned above has one friend, corresponding to the area in which they live. So we can identify how the main source is expanded through these two connections: V.R. and O.T., respectively M. C. and M. S. Furthermore, V.R.'s daughter, V.M, has a friend, E. R. (both of them are around 60 years old), these two being the last women in the village that have the ability to perform wedding extempore verses. The daughters of

these last performers live and work in Italy, without any thought to come back to Ohaba. The network seems to stop here.

If we are to analyse what determinants do these women have in order to carry on a part of a specific wedding ritual, we have to understand how they perceive collective identity and the values that their group shares. We have to take into consideration the *social identity theory* (SIT) which "posits that individuals not only adopt a personal identity as unique persons, but also form a social identity which reflects their membership in various groups to which they belong", but also Turner's *self-categorization theory* (SCT) which suggests that "individuals categorize themselves as members of social categories, and then define, describe and evaluate themselves in terms of these categories" (Bar-Tal 1998: 93).

These women's mission, after all a self-imposed one, reflects their membership in the group. They feel the need to represent their group, to participate in the construction of a social identity of group in present times. They are also a connection with the obsolete identity of the past (given their age) - from which they acquire essential elements and so bring them into present creating a wave of identitary revival. The wedding extempore verses provide meaningful evidence of how the entire community- whose ambassadors these women are- perceive the wedding ceremony and its meanings in an individual's life. As shown before, wedding extempore verses are like a set of rules, a guide to a future marriage, that the community feels the necessity to share, as a collective gift of the utmost importance.

These women play the role of social agents, with ritual and ceremonial positions. By their performance they make the migrants aware of the fact that they are part of the social category of Ohaba and offer them this dimension of themselves- one of the multiple representations that the migrants might posses. To understand this process, we find ourselves tributaries to the theories of social identity and social categorization that focus exactly on the on "the definition of 'we- ness' by group members in terms of 'We belong to a group'. Group members in this process perceive themselves as group members, identify themselves as such, and differentiate between their own group and other groups" (Bar-Tal 1998: 94).

6. Conclusions

In this study, we have focused on the importance of migration in widening ethnic identities and collective values inside a rural community. We have shown that, when talking about migration, we have to take into consideration

not only the first hand actors (migrants and the host society), but also the home society, that also participate in the process of cultural interaction.

Willing to prove their identity (contextually determined by migration) in opposition to the ethnic strangers, women from Ohaba chose to perform wedding extempore verses during nowadays wedding ceremonies. They become the local agents dealing with the maintenance of the ethnic identity of the migrants. But, on the contrary, this not makes them sceptic to the idea of external migration and do not minimizes the prestige of the stranger in the village. From this point of view, the local community of Ohaba is the one that strongly encourages the option of working abroad of their villagers, since is the one solving their economic problems. Even so, they feel the necessity to point out those values of their community that bring them prestige and participate in the (re)construction of their collective-esteem, already shadowed by the economic superiority of the strangers.

In conclusion, this approach shows that, as borders become weaker - as people and goods traverse them more easily- , notions of 'us' and 'them' become stronger (Macdonald 1993: 1) and so identity gets to be "considered in terms of the community defending itself from the incursion of outsiders" (McKechnie 1993: 134).

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Analysis on Immigration from EU10 States in Ireland between 2004 and 2010

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Abstract: Following the EU enlargement in 2004, Ireland decided to carry out an economic experiment by not imposing restrictions on the labour market. In this paper we investigate the economic and social impact of these measures, showcasing the difficulties encountered by immigrants, with disproportional earnings related to their qualifications, improper representation in the sectors of the economy and exploitation being preeminent. Negative impacts to the labour market such as displacement are also discussed. We conclude that immigration doesn't pose a threat to the native workforce and can have a positive effect on the receiving country as long as the migrant population has the same rights as native workers.

Keywords: Immigration, EU10 Member States, Sector analysis, Displacement, Exploatation
JEL Classification: I21, J08, J15, J61, J62, J70, J80

1. Introduction

At the end of the 20th century Ireland witnessed an economic revival, with a GDP growth of more than 9 % and growth in the number of jobs of 5 % annually. By the beginning of the 2000's the unemployment rate was 4.3 %. In the next 5 year period the GDP continued to grow at around 4 % and employment increased at a slower but still favourable rate. The figures for the period between 1996 and right up until enlargement speak for themselves: immigration had grown from 39.200 per year to 58.500 per year, emigration had fallen from 31.200 to 26.500 and the net balance of immigration had grown from 8.000 per year to 32.000 per year.

Just a year after the enlargement the inflow of immigrants reached 84.600, emigration accounted 29.400 and the net migration balance had risen to 55.100. In 2007, at its highest point, immigration numbered 109.500 and emigration around 42.200 with a net balance amounting to 67.300. All this will

soon start a downfall trend following the 2008 financial crisis and the net migration balance will change from positive to negative. Thus in the year 2010, the number of immigrants was only 30.800 and the emigrants now accounted 65.300 with a negative balance amounting to 34.500 (Hughes 2011).

We can thus see two very distinct phases following enlargement in 2004: the first period of 2004-2007 characterized by a boom in immigration and the period of 2008-2010 in which the country has been through the financial crisis and in which recession severely affected the migration in and out of country. Therefore, most of the analysis from here on will concentrate and compare this two different periods. A large part of the data was collected from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ireland's national statistical office.

2. Data Concerning Inflows of Migrants from EU10 States

Because the demand for labour was big: employment growth was 2.6% in 2003 and the unemployment rate was 4.5%, almost indicating full employment, the Irish government replaced regulation of migration from Central and Eastern European countries, which previously existed under a work permit system, with market regulation through free movement of labour, opting out of the clause offered by the EU on maintaining restrictions to the labour market. It also made amendments to the work permit system for non-EU member states in order to favour the highly skilled workforce (Hughes 2006).

A number of studies were carried out before enlargement in order to predict the number of immigrants that would transfer from east to west. One study for the European Commission estimated that the flow of workers from Central and Eastern Europe would be around 325.000 per year in the first five years and afterwards it is going to decline to around 60.000 per year after a decade. However, based on the number of Irish work permits handed out to nationals of the aforementioned countries before enlargement, it was concluded that the studies turned out to the Commission have grossly underestimated the flows of immigrants. We can notice that even before enlargement, migrant workers from Central and Eastern European countries accounted for almost 1% of the Irish population, thus casting a shadow on the aforementioned predictions (Barry 2004). A possible explanation for this failure was that no prior estimates were published in Ireland and therefore nobody was aware of the threat imposed.

In order to showcase and better interpret the actual flows there should be a clear distinction imposed between the two types of migrant workers: long-term and short-term migrant workers. Long-term are defined as those resident in the country at the time the survey is conducted, in mid-April each year, and

whose place of residence was outside Ireland one year previously. Short-term are identified those who came to Ireland over the course of a year and who have been granted a Personal Public Service number (PPS), regardless if they chose to leave Ireland or they decided to stay during this period of time.

There is not a lot of information about long-term migrants of EU10 Member States prior to 2005 since no specific studies to collect the data were carried out. However, one can use the statistical records of the Census in order to have a better image about the migration process involving these countries. Thus the 2002 Census identifies somewhere around 25.000 nationals of EU10, representing 0.6% of the population in Ireland. A big surprise came in the 2006 census when there were recorded more than 120.500 nationals of EU10, representing 3% of the population, as residents in the country. The huge increase is representative for the period prior and just after the 2004 enlargement.

The data from the Central Statistics Office regarding annual migration estimates shows that after enlargement there was a very high number of immigrants that came from the Central and Eastern European countries. (Central Statistic Office 2006). Up until April 2007, there were 136.700 long-term migrants recorded as coming to Ireland from the EU10 countries. One can see the significance of that when compared with the total number of immigrants in that period, those from the EU10 representing more than 75%. In comparison, in the next three years, up until April 2010, only 53.000 long-term migrants had arrived from EU10 states, this representing 40% of the total number of immigrants in this time period. This severe decrease is of course due to the global financial crisis and a consequence of the recession that followed it. Even more relevant would be if we take into account only the last year from which the data was collected, that is ending in April 2010, when only 5.800 immigrants from EU10 were recorded in the archives, representing just 20% of total long-term migrant workers and thus bringing the immigration process from the EU10 Member States to a practical halt.

But accounting just for the long-term immigrants only paints half of the image since there were many more EU10 nationals entering Ireland on a short-term basis in order to look for work and the reason why they are not accounted as long-term migrants is that they either didn't find work or they were working in seasonal business environments such as construction, retails, tourism or hotels and restaurants.

By comparing the number of Personal Public Service Numbers (PPS Numbers) handed out to nationals of EU10 with those of other EU Member States excluding Ireland (EU14) as well as with those from the rest of the

world, the low figures for PPS numbers issued before 2004 are evident. After that, there is a surge of almost 340.000 migrants from the EU10 States that have been issued a PPS number in the three years after the enlargement. However, if one is to look at the next three year period, associated with the recession, the number of those coming from EU10 was almost half of the initial one, at around 177.000 (as can be noted in Figure 1).

Figure 1. PPS Numbers issued, 2000-2009



Source: Hughes 2011, figure 3.

For a better understanding, it should be stated that 531.140 PPS numbers were received by EU10 nationals between 2004 and 2010. When considering that the labour force of the Irish economy amounted to around 1.9 million in 2004, we can clearly observe the huge influx of migrants who were actively looking for a job in this time period.

We can also observe a disparity between the influx of immigrants from EU10, EU14 and the Rest of the World before and after enlargement, and this is credited to the policies of the Irish Government of trying to offer an advantage to EU10 nationals by supplying most of its work to them, thus complying with the general policies of the EU of providing most of its own workforce from within the member states. There is evidence of this from statistics data with PPS numbers issued to nationals of EU10 responsible for 9 % of total in 2003, a highest ever 60% in 2006 and then dropping to 33% in 2009. This contrasts the data from the EU14 States, with 33% of total PPS Numbers issued in 2003, which dropped to 22% in 2006, as well as the data for workers from the Rest of the World which recorded the biggest decrease from

53% in 2003 to 18% in 2006. A visual representation of these statistics is given in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Shares of Total PPS Numbers issued to Non-Irish National 2000-2009



Source: Hughes 2011, Figure 4.

In terms of the distribution of migrants among the Central and Eastern European countries we can see that the majority, almost two thirds, came from Poland. 13% came from Lithuania and almost 7% each from Latvia and Slovakia. Hungary and the Czech Republic only recorded about 4%, while the numbers of those coming from the other four remaining EU10 States (Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia) can be considered insignificant with less than one percent each (as can be seen in figure 3). The explanation for the migration is evident when looking at the relationship between GDP per capita in the EU10 States relative to GDP per capita in Ireland. The countries which exhibit the largest propensity for migration are those whose GDP per capita are among the lowest out of the EU10 States when compared with Ireland, which signified that the higher living standards are the biggest incentive.

Figure 3. Share of PPS numbers issued by nationality, May 2004-December 2010



Source: Hughes 2011, Figure 6.

3. Characteristics of EU10 Migrants

Most of the immigrants that found work in Ireland after enlargement share some common traits, among which they are younger, more educated and they have higher participation rates.

3.1. Demographics

In Q4 2007 the percentage for participation of migrant workers was 76 % in comparison with just 62% for the native workers. If we take into account EU12 nationals only (including here Romania and Bulgaria), the participation rate is a staggering 87%, but that shouldn't come as a surprise considering the majority of them are economic migrants, who came to Ireland with the specific purpose of finding work. The nationals of these States were responsible for about 40% of the jobs created in Ireland after enlargement. They also recorded the highest employment rate, with 83%, compared with just 59% for Irish nationals. When we consider the unemployment rate however, this was higher for nationals of EU10 States, with 5.3% in comparison with 4.3% unemployment rate for Irish nationals during the same quarter (McCormick 2007). More details about this are given in Table 1.

Table 1. Labour Force Statistics of Irish Labour Market by Nationality, Q4 2007

Nationality	Employed	Unemployed	Labour Force	Not economically active	Participation rate	Unemployment rate	Employment rate
Irish	1804.2	81.1	1885.2	1153.8	62.0%	4.3%	59.4%
Non-Citizen Immigrants	334.7	20.0	354.7	113.4	75.8%	5.6%	71.5%
Of which							
UK	51.4	4.1	55.5	36.3	60.5%	7.4%	56.0%
EU15 (excl. Ire & U.K)	34.5	1.2	35.8	8.4	81.0%	3.4%	78.1%
EU12	167.7	9.4	177.1	25.9	87.2%	5.3%	82.6%
Non-EU	81	5.3	86.7	42.7	67.9%	6.1%	62.6%

Source: CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey.

If age is to be taken into account, we can see that migrants from EU10 were way younger than the Irish population: the biggest age group sectors were 15-24, with a percentage of 42.3, followed by the 25-44 age group with a similar percentage of 43.0; thus these two age groups accounted for nearly all of the foreign labour force. By comparison to the Irish nationals we can observe a high disparity, especially in the 15-24 group, indicating that most of the migration force is young (see Table 2). Another interesting fact with regards to demographics is that male population represented 60% of the EU10 immigrants, as opposed to 51% for the Irish population, which indicates that women are less likely to immigrate, as well as integrate in the Irish society than males are. This is supported by evidence, with 62% of the migrant population being single in comparison with 54% of the native one.

Table 2. Age Distribution of Irish natives and EU10 population, 2006

Age group	Irish	EU10
0-14	21.5	8.1
15-24	14.5	42.3
25-44	29.4	43.0
45-64	22.8	6.6
65+	11.8	0.1
Total	**100**	**100**

Source: Census 2006.

High levels of education are another common trait for the immigrants in Ireland. More than half of the immigrants have higher education as opposed to less than 50% for the native Irish population. 40% of the immigrants had third-level qualifications, which demonstrates a highly skilled workforce (please refer to figure 4). An explanation for the difference in the higher levels of education between natives and immigrants can be offered by the informational effect since better educated people would be the first to find out about the improving economic environment of Ireland. (Barret et. al 2006). Although the EU10 immigrants have the lowest percentage of third-level education among all the migrants, they still fare better than the Irish population. A much better comparison between educational attainments of the native population and nationals of EU10 States can be shown through figures gathered by the CSO through the Quarterly National Household Survey. With regards to the low levels, 28% of the Irish workforce did not progress beyond secondary level, in comparison with 17% for EU10 nationals. For mid-level education, the EU10 nationals still fared better than their Irish counterparts, with 52% of them having upper secondary education or post leaving certificate, as opposed to 40 % of the native population. For third level there is a balance, with 32% of EU10 nationals having a third level education, regardless if they obtained a degree or not, while Irish nationals follow close by, with 31%, according to figures from Q2 2006.

Figure 4. Educational Profile of Labour Force by Nationality, 2006



Source: CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey.

However there is a concern that although the EU10 immigrants in Ireland have higher levels of education than the Irish population, they are not being employed at a level reflecting their qualifications and educational status (Hand and Shanaham 2005).

From all this data a demographic profile for EU10 nationals can be obtained which indicates that they are predominantly young, single, male and with similar or better education than the average Irish worker. It can thus be argued that the main reason for migration to Ireland was economic activity instead of seeking social and welfare benefits.

3.2. Sector Analysis

With respect to data pertaining to employment of immigrants, there are two main sources of information. The first one is the Work Permit Program, run by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) which provides data regarding the employment of non-EU nationals. The second source for data is the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), carried out by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) on behalf of Eurostat which provides data on the characteristics of immigrants by nationality. By analyzing data from the Work Permit Program, we notice that non-EU nationals have maintained their share of highly skilled position after enlargement, while EU10 nationals on the other hand were found to be filling skilled or low-skilled positions, with an increase in this category of positions occupied by workers from EU10 from 3.5% in 2003 to 6.3% in 2005. We can thus observe a disparity between the two types of immigrants (Hughes and Quinn 2004).

Data collected from the QNHS better shows the situation of nationals of EU10, who are mostly concentrated in the low-skilled categories of occupations. Less than 8% are encountered in professional or managerial posts. In comparison, Irish workers are equally distributed throughout the entire range of occupations. This occurs even though EU10 nationals have similar or even better education than their Irish counterparts (Taguma et al 2009). An explanation lies in the intent of the government to solve the low-skill shortages with nationals of EU10 countries. Other possible reasons are the language barriers and the recognition of skills or education by the host country. We must also consider the fact that EU10 immigrants are younger than the average Irish worker and as such it is natural for them to start working in lower-skilled jobs in the beginning.

Figure 5. Proportion of EU10 Workers by Sector, Q4 2007



Source: CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey.

28.100 EU10 nationals found employment in Ireland in Q4 2004. This represented 1.5 % of the total employment. However, in Q1 2008 about 169.200 nationals of EU10 secured a job in the country. The percentage of EU10 migrant workers in the total employment population rose to 7.8% in Q4 2007. Taking into account the rest of the migrants with non-EU10 status we get a total share of 16% of the employed population consisting of immigrants at the end of this period (see figure 5). However, in in Q3 2010, after the recession struck this figure fell to only 12%. But in reality EU10 nationals lost their jobs at a faster rate than the rest of the labour force. The unemployment

rate for them peaked at 20% in 2010, while for the rest of the workforce it lingered at around 14%. At the end of the boom period almost two thirds of EU10 nationals were concentrated in just four sectors, with the most important one being the hotel and restaurants sector which involved 21% of all EU10 migrant workers. Second in order was the construction sector with 16 %, followed by the manufacturing sector with 14%.

Starting with the crisis in 2008, employment began to decrease and EU10 nationals lost their jobs at the fastest rate. The heaviest losses were in the construction sector where more than half of the 35.100 jobs at the peak in 2007 were lost. Other sectors experienced smaller losses but still significant. Overall 85% of all job losses were concentrated in the exact same four sectors that represented what accounted for the majority of the EU10 working force in 2007: hotels and restaurants, construction, manufacturing and wholesale and retail.

3.3. Displacements on the labour market

Two factors can be attributed to the larger than expected number of immigrants after enlargement. The first one, was the great demand for work in Ireland while the second was the option of most EU-15 countries, following enlargement, to close access to the labour market for other EU-10 nationals in order to protect their own workforce. Although from a legal point of view, Ireland had the right to do the same, it bulked out due to the favorable economic conditions and the huge demand for labour. However, the benefits of migration did not come without a cost. The immigrants ended up contributing to an increase in the price of renting and accommodation, with further effects observed in the bubble of 2008. Another downside was the increase in congestion on transport and other infrastructure (Duffy 2007).

Instances of displacements of Irish workers by immigrants were beginning to surface, due to employees opting to pay the immigrants less than the collectively agreed rates of pay. The most noteworthy incidents concerning the issue of displacement are the Gama and Irish ferries cases, in which Irish employees were gradually displaced by Turkish, respectively Latvian workers which were in turn forced to work under sub-par conditions and paid significantly under the minimum wage (Hughes 2007).

The difficulty in confirming displacement lies in the lack of quantifiable factors that can prove its existence or not, and as such measuring it proves cumbersome. In the period from Q2 2004 to Q2 2007 the biggest difference in the growth of employment between Irish citizens and non-EU15 nationals was in the manufacturing sector, with the number of Irish workers decreasing by

34.000 and that of non-EU15 nationals rising by 23.000 (see figure 6). Although displacement can be inferred from this data, a generalization is not likely to be made since no evident displacement was noticed in the other sectors.

However, another topic of concern on the same line can be that of downgrading of employment standards in the economy, with cases of direct replacement by lower cost workers, outsourcing, offshoring or use of temporary employment agency workers being noticeable. Moreover, there should be a distinction between the influx of workers in a market vacuum and employees who are conscientiously seeking foreign workers with lack of English skills and education in order to be entitled to treat them worse (Begg 2008).

Figure 6. Employment Growth by sector Q2 2004- Q2 2007



Source: CSO, Quarterly National Household Survey.

3.4 Wage gap between immigrants and Irish nationals

A good indicator of the healthiness of the labour market can be the ratio of earnings of immigrants to natives. A low ratio can reflect losses incurred by sub-optimal use of the immigrant capital. The particularity of immigration in Ireland lies in the high level of education among immigrants, on top of high levels of participation and employment. However, immigrants from EU10 countries were found to experience severe disadvantages in comparison with the native population when employment and earnings are taken into account (Barret and McCarthy 2007).

A study by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) published in April 2008 evinced a gap of 10% to 18% between earning of migrants and Irish nationals, at the time of the conclusion of the study, as can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Average hourly earnings in Euros for Irish nationals and migrants, by gender, 2006

Nationality	Total	Male	Female
Irish	19.86	21.15	18.48
Migrants(total)	15.63	15.85	15.34
Of whom:			
UK	19.62	20.82	18.24
EU13*	17.10	17.77	16.41
EU10	11.40	11.99	10.48
Non-EU English speaking nationals	22.39	24.14	20.48
Non-EU non English speaking nationals	13.81	13.09	15.04

Source: Census 2006.
Note: EU13 indicates EU15 with the exclusion of Ireland and the UK.

Earnings by hourly pay rate for each individual employee were measured by ESRI. The average hourly earnings for the ESRI population sample as a whole was estimated to be €19.47. For Irish native citizens, average hourly earnings are estimated to be €19.86, compared with €15.63 for migrant workers.

This gap is proportional to the level of education. One of the reasons for it is the lack of English language proficiency which severely affects the earnings of migrants. Noteworthy is the fact that the earning gap is more pronounced for the EU10 category than for groups such as those from the United Kingdom or EU15 Member States, a cited reason being the more recent arrival into the country of EU10 migrants (Barret et al 2008). Notwithstanding influences by gender, age, education or size of the sector, the data indicates that immigrants from EU10 countries earn roughly more than a half of what the Irish population does. Whether this can attributed to insufficient language skills and levels of education or to discrimination is questionable. Findings suggested that the gap is due to a failure to capture full return on human capital (Barret et al 2012) and that discrimination is not the

main culprit but the fact that the qualifications of the immigrants are not specifically what the Irish employers are searching for and the quality of education in the immigrants home countries is not deemed as valuable as that received in Ireland.

3.5 Exploitation of migrant workers

Quantitative data about exploitation is difficult to obtain as well. The Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI), suggest exploitation occurs often in the low paid range of particular sectors. (Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland 2008). The most vulnerable and predisposed to this are those migrants working in poorly regulated sectors and sectors which do not offer too much protection from trade union, like agriculture, cleaning, catering and hotels. A number of irregularities have been identified among which: irreverence to the Registered Employment Agreement (REA) rates of pay in the construction industry, the denial of holiday and sick pay entitlements and the breaching of the number of legal working hours by many employees. Polish construction workers working gruesome 18 hours shifts and Philippines beauticians on wages of one euro per hour. A pledge to reform the Employment Permits Act 2003 was made in 2014 in order to provide better protection. (Office of the attorney general 2014)

The most vulnerable sectors to exploitation appear to be the restaurants and hotel sectors. Over one third of all the complaints received by the MRCI have come from the restaurant sector, where the greatest percentage of EU10 nationals are working. Also the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA) found breaches of employment in 73% of catering businesses and in 78% of hotels. However, the greatest majority of these cases seem to be non-EU migrants with around 80% of them involving migrants holding work permits. Since EU10 nationals did not require a permit they were less vulnerable to threats of work permit revocation from employees.

4. Conclusions

The expectations of the stakeholders in the Irish labour market, mainly the government and the trade unions, were very low concerning immigration which followed enlargement of the EU in 2004. This was based on the underdeveloped trade and cultural links between Ireland and EU10 Member States. These expectations proved to be very wrong and the immigration influx in Ireland from Central and Eastern European countries was larger than anywhere else in Europe since the post WW2 era.

Most of the new immigrants that entered the Irish workforce were concentrated in low skilled jobs, even though the average EU10 immigrant is

young and well educated. The employment rate for them is also very high at around 87% (this figure includes Romania and Bulgaria as well). Most of them were single males which came for work instead of seeking benefits of the welfare system. However, during recession they lost their positions faster than the native population and this reflects in a higher unemployment rate than the Irish working population.

There also exists a very big gap in earnings between migrant workers and the native population. The data shows that migrant workers from non-English speaking countries earn a third less than their Irish counterparts and this is even more pronounced in the case of EU10 immigrants. It is still not know if this is partly because of discrimination or partly because of the lack of English language proficiency on account of the immigrants as well the lack of proper educational qualifications recognition. The recognition of international qualifications may be one step forward in the fight against the unequal representation of EU12 nationals on the labour market. Although the DETE set up the National Qualifications Authority of Ireland (NQAI), it was found that the majority of employers and migrant bodies were not even aware of its existence (Linehan and Hogan 2008). It is recommended for all third-level colleges to come up with a clear, transparent and fair method of assessing prior learning and qualifications in order to avoid the unequal representation of high-skilled positions.

No clear evidence for displacement can be found although this was prevalent in one sector of the economy, namely the manufacturing sector. Econometric studies are needed be performed in order identify the effect of a larger pool of factors on displacement before and after EU enlargement.

Exploitation is also a serious issue that needs to be taken into consideration, especially after the conflicts brought by the GAMA and Irish ferries cases. The main actors here would be the trade unions who are advised to continue their support for the minimum wage and to continue to assimilate migrant workers as trade union members (Hyland 2010). The importance of the freedom of movement of labour in the EU in preventing exploitation is showcased in the lack of threats of work permit revocation by employees.

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that immigration can have a positive effect on the receiving country as long as the migrant population has the same rights as the native workers. A better immigration policy that tries to capture full return on human capital is needed and this would benefit both the immigrants as well as the economy and the society as whole.

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BOOK REVIEW

Gumenâi, Ion (2013). *Comunităţile romano-catolice, protestante şi lipoveneşti din Basarabia în secolul al XIX-lea* (Les communautés romano-catholiques, protestantes et de Lipovènes de Bessarabie au XIX^{e} siècle). Chişinău: Institutul de Studii Enciclopedice, 283 pages

Les minorités de la République de Moldavie ou, comme elle s'appelait jadis, la Bessarabie (actuellement un État souverain, indépendant, qui jusqu'en 1812, quand il a été rattaché à l'Empire tsariste, avait fait partie d'une province importante de la Roumanie, la Moldavie), jouissent des mêmes droits que la plupart de la population, pouvant se servir de tous les instruments juridicolégislatifs et institutionnels qui leur permettent de préserver et développer leur propre identité. Il est cependant vrai que la situation n'a pas été la même au fil des deux derniers siècles, tout comme les Roumains, population majoritaire de la province, n'ont pas bénéficié, durant l'occupation russe (1812-1918, 1940-1941 et 1944-1991) de l'égalité de droits avec ceux qui tenaient les rênes de la direction de la Bessarabie, à cause des nombreux changements du statut politicojuridique de la province. C'est ce qui a généré à plusieurs reprises des tensions et des conflits, souvent accompagnés de manifestations de violence et même de pertes de vies humaines (voir, par exemple, le conflit de Transnistrie). L'ouvrage du professeur Ion Gumenâi de l'Université de Chişinău se propose d'analyser quelques composantes essentielles de la structure démographique de la Bessarabie au XIX^{e} siècle, l'évolution numérique et en pourcentage des principales ethnies et confessions, pour saisir, entre autres, les éléments communs ainsi que les différences de comportement ayant existé dans un espace multiculturel, les relations interethniques et la manière dont le facteur politique russe s'est rapporté à une pareille réalité ethnoconfessionnelle, le degré de tolérance ou d'intolérance des habitants et de l'État face à une telle diversité ethnoculturelle.

L'histoire des minorités ethniques et confessionnelles de Bessarabie au fil des deux derniers siècles a offert des échantillons de destin tragique et des pages extrêmement dramatiques, qui justifient l'intérêt pour une pareille problématique. Outre les recherches sur les caractéristiques et l'évolution démographique des minorités de Bessarabie en général, il est nécessaire d'étudier les communautés, afin de pouvoir mieux encadrer les tendances générales en ce qui concerne la croissance de la population, les structures socioéconomiques et professionnelles, les organisations religieuses et culturelles etc. Le livre du professeur Ion Gumenâi constitue une telle approche, qui vient compléter l'historiographie de spécialité par

l'investigation des réalités démographiques de la Bessarabie pendant le XIX^e^ siècle. L'ouvrage est structuré en quatre grands chapitres, qui développent des aspects à la fois historiques et statistiques-démographiques, répondant parfaitement aux intentions de la recherche. Après avoir argumenté, de manière correcte et cohérente, le choix du thème, l'*Introduction* passe en revue l'historiographie, les sources statistiques et la bibliographie de la question, énonce les principes méthodologiques et les intentions de la recherche. Le premier chapitre, qui s'intitule *Les minorités religieuses de Bessarabie de 1812 à 1828 : pourcentage numérique et organisation*, fait un excursus historique sur la structure ethnique et confessionnelle de la province, évoquant l'évolution du nombre d'habitants appartenant aux minorités ainsi que la structure confessionnelle de la population de Bessarabie au XIX^e^ siècle.

Le professeur Ion Gumenâi emploie correctement les sources d'archives inédites provenant de quatre pays (Moldavie, Ukraine, Lituanie et Russie), les bibliographies de spécialité, les volumes de sources statistiques, une ample bibliographie internationale etc. Le deuxième chapitre fait une analyse de *l'Évolution démographique des minorités religieuses de Bessarabie entre 1828 et les années '70 du XIX^e^ siècle*. L'auteur y dévoile quelques aspects intéressants de la politique des autorités russes en ce qui concerne la population, de même que des problèmes liés aux stratégies destinées à changer la structure ethnique-démographique de la province située entre le Prout et le Dniestr. Dans le troisième chapitre, qui s'intitule *Les communautés romano-catholiques et protestantes de Bessarabie dans la politique de l'Empire russe au XIX^e^ siècle*, l'attention de l'auteur porte sur deux directions importantes: l'évaluation de la dimension quantitative des colons adultes que les autorités russes avaient fait venir dans la province et le processus difficile d'organisation religieuse de ceux-ci. Le dernier chapitre suit *L'évolution de la communauté de Lipovènes de Bessarabie et ses relations avec les autorités du pouvoir central et ecclésiastique*, offrant des renseignements sur cette minorité religieuse qui avait la même confession orthodoxe que l'élément russe dominant du point de vue politique. Nous remarquons une fois de plus la rigueur et la méticulosité de l'information, la richesse et la variété des notes en bas de page, ce qui confirme la qualité du travail documentaire et interprétatif.

Les informations contenues dans le livre du professeur Ion Gumenâi constituent une consistante base de données démographiques, une impressionnante documentation statistique censée reconstituer la dynamique et la structure des minorités ethniques et confessionnelles de Bessarabie au XIXe siècle, pouvant en même temps s'appliquer aux réalités démographiques actuelles de la République de Moldavie.

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