
P A R A D I G M S

Romania's Entry in the First World War As Seen in the Russian Military Press

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“Romania—who had observed the war for two years—had enough time to analyze the battle conditions, and thus to prepare, perfect, and develop its armed forces.”

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ON THE eve of the Great War, the Russian military press had a strictly defined structure, which—to a great extent—was maintained during the war years. The central publication of the War Ministry was the scientific military magazine *Военный сборник* (The military almanac) (1858–1917), as well as the *Русский инвалид* (The Russian invalid) (1862–1917) newspaper.¹ These two were followed by the publications of the military districts and of the Cossack troops, i.e. *The Military Newspaper in Vilna* (issued by the chiefs of staff of the military district in Vilna, 1906–1915), *The Military Newspaper in Turkestan* (the chiefs of staff of the military district in Turkestan, 1906–1915), *The Military Messenger of Warsaw* (the chiefs of staff of the military district of Warsaw, 1906–1914), *The Far East* (the chiefs of staff of the military district of Irkutsk, 1913–1914), etc. Apart from the officials, there were also private editors who issued periodicals dealing

with military topics. Consequently, we shall mention here the military and literary magazine *Разведчикъ* (The scout), edited in Saint Petersburg/Petrograd by librarian V. A. Berezovsky, a reserve captain in the Russian army. To sum up, at the outbreak of the war in Russia, approximately 60 periodicals devoted to military topics were being printed.²

In the context of the intensification of the war preparations, in order to secure the military plans and structures, several measures were adopted to strengthen the censorship. On 28 January 1914, the list of information prohibited for publication in the press for military reasons was published; this list would be completed with new interdictions in the issues of 12 and 26 July 1914.³ On 20 July/2 August, one day after Germany declared war on it, Russia adopted the “Provisional Regulation on Military Censorship,” diligently prepared in advance. According to this regulation, a “total” military censorship was set up in all regions included in the military operations, while in the other regions the censorship was to be “partial.” Paragraphs from the articles and materials taken from the periodicals issued in the regions where the military censorship did not fully function would also be submitted for censorship. Typesetting a periodical in a printing house was allowed only after the editors had presented the permission to prepare for and to print bearing the signature of a local military censor.⁴ This only hindered the activity of journalists, whose materials would be published only when the information presented was no longer of interest for the public.⁵ In Saint Petersburg,⁶ the military censorship commission was set up on 20 July 1914, at the order of the Army General Staff, even though there was a military censor already working in that city. In the second capital, Moscow, which was not yet under the war regime, but was an important center for the publication of periodicals, in March 1915 the military censorship would also be instituted.⁷ Mention should also be made that, on 31 July 1915, the list of information prohibited from appearing in the press for military reasons would suffer another series of modifications and corrections. The restrictions were then expanded and also included the information that might have affected the diplomatic and defensive security of Russia’s allies.⁸

In approaching the proposed topic, one should not omit the fact that, in wartime, the official press increased its propagandistic mission in order to convince the country’s citizens, the existing and the prospective allies, about the firm unity of the Russian people, about Russia’s force and the legitimacy of its military actions, on the one hand, and about the weakness of the enemy and their atrocities, on the other hand. A very important role in the management of propaganda during the war was played in the Russian Empire by the Information Office attached to the Directorate-General for Press and Prints. The office, which at the beginning of war had over 600 collaborators, had been set up

in 1906 in order to provide “positive” information to the press reflecting the government’s point of view. This office cooperated closely with the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, with the Office of Russian Journalists, as well as with other news agencies and offices, press commissions, as well as private publications. The *Bulletin of the Information Office* was published daily, and the government agencies supplied the official press releases to it. The Bulletin was meant for the editorial boards of the periodicals.⁹

As the Crown Council—convened at Peleş Castle in Sinaia, on 21 July/3 August 1914—decided that Romania should maintain its neutrality given the non-fulfilment of the conditions for the “casus foederis” mentioned in art. 2 of the treaty with Austria-Hungary, the Entente countries—especially Russia—were hoping to attract Romania on their side. Those circumstances required that the information published in the Russian press about the potential ally be carefully drafted in order not to harm the relations between the two states. Moreover, in the first months of the war, the Russian military press would publish data strictly related to the incidents and troops movements on Romania’s border, as well as information about the visits to Bucharest of certain high officials of the belligerent countries.

The year 1915 saw the publication in the Russian military newspapers of the first politically-oriented materials about Romania and its entry into the war. The Russian press started to make public the information about the political actions and pro-Entente movements in Bucharest. We believe that this information was mainly meant to serve Russia’s domestic interests, in an attempt to strengthen the beliefs of its own army about the imminent entry of the Romanian army into the war on the side of the Entente, thus easing the military burden, as well as the certainty of the victory against the enemy. Furthermore, they started taking up and publishing the calls made in the Romanian press in support of the quick entry of Romania into the war on the side of the Entente. They frequently quoted materials from newspapers such as *Adevărul* or *Roumanie*, which were actively involved in the campaign for Romania’s entry into the war on the side of France and England, and, consequently, of Russia. The harsh criticism of Austria-Hungary and of its ally, Germany, found in the pages of the aforementioned newspapers, suited perfectly the needs of the Russian editors.

Mention should be made that the collaborators of the abovementioned Information Office were minutely examining the Russian and foreign periodical press—from the allied, neutral, and enemy states. Increased attention was paid to the press in England, France, the USA, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Italy, and the Balkan states. The analysis was not only meant to analyze general information, but particular aspects as well. Certain materials were sent to the editorial boards of the Russian newspapers, accompanied by the recommendation to publish.¹⁰

Moreover, Petrograd would subsidize a number of Romanian newspapers, including the aforementioned ones, *Adevărul* and *Roumanie*, because—as the Russian ambassador (minister) to Bucharest, Stanisław Koziełł-Poklewski, mentioned in his telegram no. 10 of 18 May 1915—“the number of newspapers advocating for the Entente is decreasing due to German corruption.”¹¹ Furthermore, the Information Office attached to the Russian General Staff had special funds to subsidize the printed publications in Russia, as well as beyond its borders, in strong collaboration with the Russian government. This way, the Information Office was trying to consolidate its influence over the public opinion in the empire and outside its borders, especially in the neutral states. Various articles, previously published by the Office’s employees, were sent to the numerous journalists—Romanian journalists included—“collaborating” with the institution.¹²

This type of materials increased significantly after Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on 10/23 May 1915. In the issue of 9/22 May 1915 of the *Русский инвалид* newspaper, there is an excerpt from the *Adevărul* newspaper of 28 April stating, among other things, that to Germany’s threats “Italy responded by concluding an alliance with the Triple Entente, while Romania will also not delay in properly responding to these threats. Bulgaria will never fight against Russia. Germany’s situation is becoming critical.”¹³ The promotion of the idea according to which the Romanians were eager to join the Entente alongside the Italians continues in the issue of 14/27 May of the same newspaper, which also includes a material distributed by the Petrograd Telegraph Agency. The material mentions that “in Bucharest, military censorship has been introduced for telegrams. The news from Italy stirs increasing interest; however, the Government still claims that Romania should pursue its own interests and maintain its neutrality. Take Ionescu’s and Filipescu’s supporters are asking Romania to join forces with their bigger Latin sister. Some say that the Romanian Government deliberately withheld the telegrams from Italy, which have not arrived for two days now, in order to avoid popular manifestations in support of Romania’s entry into the war.”¹⁴ The same issue also includes an excerpt from the *Adevărul* newspaper of 3 May: “Germany has actually spent several millions to make Italy and Romania maintain their neutrality, and it was actually hoping to receive the help of these two countries, sparing no expense in order to get them involved in the war against Russia, but even so Germany has failed.”¹⁵

When taking up materials from the Romanian press, the emphasis fell almost entirely on the *Adevărul* and *Roumanie* newspapers. There were very few exceptions. As such, in the same issue of 14/27 May 1915, *Русский инвалид* wrote that the *L’Indépendance Roumaine* newspaper, which analyzed the stages of the war, presently in its 11th month, at the end of the article called upon the

Romanian public opinion to maintain their calm and composure in the context of the events that were taking place (Italy's entry into the war), since Romania's interests could only be protected by the discipline and unity of its sons: "Impetus and reckless actions can damage our homeland."¹⁶ It is possible that for some Russian military strategists Romania's neutrality was more important than its entry into the war on the side of the Entente. Widening the battlefield could have brought more disadvantages than the advantages of gaining a new ally. However, this position was definitely a minority one, since the publication of the Russian War Ministry insisted upon the materials promoting Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

The enemy's denigration by way of the Romanian press was also often practiced. In the issue of 17/30 May 1915, the editors of the publication of the War Ministry published an excerpt from the *Roumanie* newspaper of 7/20 May 1915:

*Due to its barbarous way of leading the war, Germany has become the most unpopular country in the eyes of the neutral states. Until the beginning of the war, there were countries that admired Germany, even loved it. Now, the Germans have alienated everyone. The reason—the policy of terror, widely applied by the Germans, especially the terror manifested in its most abominable and criminal forms. The horrific wracking of Belgium, the atrocities against the peaceful population, the air raids, the bellicose attacks against commercial ships, which ended in the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the use of asphyxiating gas, the poisoning of wells—all these lie behind the infinite hatred of the entire civilized world against the Germans.*¹⁷

The opportunity presented by Italy's entry into the war was emphasized for the readers through the promotion of the conviction that this step would inevitably lead to the entry into the war on the side of the Entente also of Romania, which had been hesitant about it until that moment. As such, the issue of 21 May/3 June 1915 of the *Русский инвалид* newspaper distributed the information of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency regarding the rally of 18/31 May 1915 organized in Cișmigiu Park of Bucharest by the Romanian Cultural League, the organization of the Transylvanian emigrants, and other patriotic organizations, in support of Italy. According to the accounts, the manifestation gathered 15,000 people led by the members of the National Committee for "immediate action" and of the Romanian Cultural League, the former ministers Filipescu, Take Ionescu, Istrati, Delavrancea, and the Transylvanian priest Vasile Lucaciu, as well as university professors, soldiers, and civilians from all social classes. The event description abounds in pathos:

*The marchers organized a grandiose procession headed by the flags of the patriotic organizations. Singing Romanian and Italian patriotic songs, they walked towards the Italian embassy in Bucharest. On their way there, the marchers were supported by the passersby. When they reached the headquarters of the Germanophile newspaper *Minerva*, they held a hostile manifestation, shouting “Down with the traitors!” All the streets around the Italian embassy were full of people ceaselessly shouting “Long live friendly Italy! Long live Greater Romania!” Italy’s envoy, Marquis Fasciotti, received the marchers’ delegation. In his speech, Istrati, the former minister, mentioned the blood relation connecting the two Latin peoples, wished the Italian army victory in all battles, and expressed his wish that the Romanian army would fight alongside the Italian one. In his turn, Father Lucaciu expressed his confidence that soon the shores of the Danube would be patrolled by Latin guards together with their Italian brothers in arms. Marquis Fasciotti thanked the inhabitants of the capital for expressing their sympathy for Italy and finished his speech by shouting **Long live Greater Romania!***

The Agency pompously mentioned that “it was the most grandiose manifestation that Bucharest had ever seen, and was carried out in complete order, except for one incident when a person from the crowd threw rotten eggs at the balcony where Italy’s envoy and other high officials were standing. That person was immediately seized and was identified as a German citizen.”¹⁸

To emphasize the belief that the Romanians really wanted to enter the war on the side of the Entente, in its 22 May/4 June 1915 issue, the same periodical republished the call of the *Adevărul* newspaper of 13 May according to which “we have to stand up against Austria and Germany, as honor and fairness demand; moreover, we must fight against Austria, as this is the only way to build Greater Romania.”¹⁹ Next, in the issue of 28 May/10 June 1915, an excerpt was taken from the *Roumanie* newspaper of 19 May/1 June, called “God Bless Italy”:

*The die has been cast; if we were unable to do it before Italy, if we were unable to draw our swords out of the sheaths together with Italy, then we will soon follow it. Staying neutral is not what we should do. Shouting “Long live Italy!” means “Long live the war on the side of Italy!” Austria-Hungary represents a common enemy not just because it keeps under its dominance hundreds of thousands of Italians, for whose liberation they’ve started the fight, while millions of Romanians are still waiting. With it, the entire world has to be freed. In Italy, the idea about the national demands has become secondary; in their case, just like in our case, what comes first is the determination to obtain in Europe a place for the small peoples, to free the world from Prussian military authoritarianism.*²⁰

At the end of 1915, a Press Office was attached to the General Staff; the head of this new office was Mikhail Lemke, reserve staff-captain. The Office was meant to “normalize” the relations between the periodical press and the Russian Army High Command. Its task was to “correctly” inform the press on the development of the military operations and of the battles in Russia and abroad, as well as to prevent the unwanted interpretation of the military information circulating in the press despite the existence of military censorship. For this purpose, Colonel A. M. Machulsky and other officers of the General Staff, responsible for the collaboration with the press, held talks with the journalists and prepared the press releases on military matters. Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Press Office drafted and edited special unofficial brochures for distribution in the neutral states in order to create a public opinion favorable to Russia, and to counteract the messages of the hostile press. The whole office prepared articles, which were then distributed for publication in the unofficial news columns of newspapers. For their publication, connections with the editorial boards were set up; the latter did what was requested of them in an informal manner, printing the texts under the guise of editorial board articles.²¹ Therefore, it is clear that not all the materials published in the Russian press, irrespective of their topics, necessarily expressed the point of view of the editorial board about the events to follow, especially if they were not bearing any signature.

THE ROMANIAN Government signed the famous treaty with the states of the Entente on 4/17 August 1916, and on 14/27 August 1916 the Crown Council was convened to formally issue a statement about Romania’s attitude towards the world conflagration and the accomplishment of the Romanian centuries-old political and national ideal. In the evening of the same day, Romania declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In their turn, Germany and Turkey declared war on Romania on 15/28 and on 17/30 August, respectively. On 18/31 August, Bulgaria attacked Romania without any declaration of war, which only came on 1 September 1916.

The issue of 15/28 August 1916 of the *Русский инвалид* newspaper talks about Romania’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente, but only obliquely and indirectly. The foreign news column on the fourth page includes the information published by the *Timpu* newspaper on 13/26 August according to which Hungarian military details of 40–50 soldiers were ceaselessly monitoring the border, while important military forces were massing in Timiș. The article also states that “in two or three days’ time, the border with Hungary will be closed, and the trains arriving from Romania in Predeal are full of German and Austrian subjects leaving Romania.”²² The frontispiece announced that the next

issue would be out in three days, on 17 August 1916 (30 August according to the new calendar).

Romania's entry into the war was given just a little more than half of the second page and a column on page three only in the Wednesday issue of 17/30 August 1916. In the article signed with the initials M. B., called "The New Front," the author informed that "the opening of the fifth front has been long awaited, and the signs that this moment was coming were given by the recent transports of military ammunition from the Russian territory to Romania, by the meetings and patriotic demonstrations in Bucharest, by the telegram of 13 August from Stockholm, as well as by the fact that the Romanian king rejected the proposal made by Berlin to appoint a special envoy to Bucharest, in the person of the Duke of Meklenburg, to discuss the situation thus created." The author then states that Romania's entry into the war was "important for us from a military point of view." Moreover, the author underlines the moral and political impetus given to the Russian forces. The second article, signed with the initials V. E., focuses on the examination of the Romanian fleet on the Danube, compared with the Austro-Hungarian one. The author notices that the Romanian fleet was more modern, while the Austrian one, although larger, was outclassed in what speed, equipment, and armor thickness were concerned. "Since during the river battles there will be mainly single-ship engagements, the Romanian fleet will most certainly have the advantage," the author concluded. In the end, the author also stated that even if the actions of the Romanian fleet focused on the defense of the Danube border, the Romanian ports would serve as intermediary bases for the operations on the Bulgarian shore.²³

Furthermore, in the foreign news column on page three, announcements were made, in no chronological order, first that on 15/28 August in Bucharest "King Ferdinand called for the general mobilization, and there is huge enthusiasm all over the city." Then, that on 12/25 August a major in the Romanian General Staff was appointed as military agent in Petrograd instead of Colonel Holban. In the end, the newspaper wrote about the day of 14/27 August and the decision of the Crown Council, and about the note handed to the Austro-Hungarian envoy in Bucharest, Count von Czernin, which referred to the justification of Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente. All these pieces of news were presented in less than a column out of the five on the page.²⁴

The issue of 18/31 August 1916 of the same newspaper contains a new article about the war on the Danube, reiterating the importance of Romania's entry into the war for the control of the German-Bulgarian-Ottoman communications. The unsigned article concludes by stating that "due to its excellent strategic location on the shores of the Danube and to its strong river fleet, Romania would be certainly successful in this theater of war."²⁵ The Telegram Department received

information dated 17/30 August from the Romanian battlefield that the Russian armies, which had crossed the border into Romanian territory, were met by the population with admiration and rare enthusiasm: “Romanians everywhere are showing a strong feeling of sympathy towards the Russian armies and are asking them to sing the Russian anthem. The military operations assigned to the Russian army are being excellently carried out. This is what makes Romanians so enthusiastic, and they will be ready in the nearest future to join the Russians in the war against their common enemy.” Also on 17/30 August, the newspaper reported on the fierce battles fought in the Carpathian gorges. Thus, the newspaper stated that Romania’s entry into the war “has caused much anxiety in Berlin, where they constantly blame Austria for this. The indifference shown to this topic has consequently generated profound indignation in Germany.” On the same day, the newspaper spoke about the movement of trains towards the border with Bulgaria, where Romania’s entry into the war had allegedly “caused great restlessness.”²⁶

The issue of 19 August/1 September 1916 again featured information according to which the allied Russian armies, which had started to cross Dobruja, were being greeted by the population with enthusiasm. Furthermore, it indicated that the Commander of the Russian armies in Romania had arrived in Bucharest, accompanied by five officers. As they were moving from the railway station to the Russian mission, the capital’s inhabitants organized a noisy welcome for the newly arrived guests.²⁷ The account continued in the same bombastic style:

The declaration of 14/27 August for the mobilization of the Romanian army induced an indescribable state of happiness among the inhabitants of Bucharest, who had been impatiently waiting for this great event on all the streets of the capital. The royal family was enthusiastically hailed by the crowd, who threw bouquets of flowers towards the vehicle transporting the king, the queen, and the crown prince. Patriotic speeches were given, in which the speakers praised the king, who—like a true and great Romanian—had managed to satisfy the univocal hope of the people for the accomplishment of the national ideal. Thousands of inhabitants walked towards the Russian embassy and the allied ones, where manifestations were held.

In what followed, the newspaper included a translation of King Ferdinand I’s manifesto to the Romanian people on Romania’s entry into the war. The article also stated that in Galați the population had received the mobilization order with enthusiasm: “The crowds of marchers, who were singing patriotic songs, received the army troops with great admiration. Very warm was also the rally near the Russian consulate, which lasted until three in the morning. The large number of participants were showing their happiness, continuously cheering the con-



Нашъ новый союзникъ
Король Румынскій Фердинандъ I.


“Our new ally, the Romanian King Ferdinand I”

sulate.” The same newspaper officially informed the Romanian subjects scattered across the entire territory of Russia about the Decree No. 2784 of 14/27 August on the general mobilization.²⁸

The issue of 26 August/8 September 1916 of the *Разведчик* magazine, which until then had avoided the issue of Romania’s entry into the war, only published a photo of King Ferdinand I, which read “Our new ally, the Romanian King Ferdinand I.”²⁹ It was only in the next issue of 30 August/12 September 1916 that Romania’s entry into the war was given a larger editorial space, in an article that filled three editorial pages and was signed with the initials K. A., dedicated to the Romanian armed forces. The article starts by acknowledging the fact that, on 15 August, Romania had declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire; consequently, Germany declared war on Romania, while Bulgaria’s and Turkey’s envoys to

Bucharest requested their passports. With this, the author notes, “we, and together with us the Entente states, have obtained a new ally, while the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Turks are forced to consider a new enemy, whose entry into the world conflagration can only be considered of utmost importance. For two years, Romania has witnessed the bloody fight in Europe, and now, since it has taken the side of the Entente states, this can only represent a confirmation of the fact that our enemies’ objective is irreversibly lost.” Next, the author presents arguments in support of his statements. He states that “the entry of a well-prepared and organized army on the side of the Entente is even more important since, two years after the beginning of the war, our enemies no longer have top soldiers, and their armies are made up of quickly trained officers and soldiers, whose qualifications are rather questionable. Romania—who had observed the war for two years—had enough time to analyze the battle conditions, and thus to prepare, perfect, and develop its armed forces.”³⁰

Further on, the author analyses the Romanian armed forces in terms of training, number, and equipment. Somewhat contrary to the provisions of the Censorship Regulation, the author states that, according to the available data, the Romanian army annually conscripts 51,000 recruits, while the armed forces are made up of 368 battalions, 102 squadrons, 122 batteries (980 cannons), and army corps with special and auxiliary purposes (technical, aerial, transport,



Группа румынских офицеров и солдат у памятника, сооруженного румынскими солдатами в Гривитца на поле боя после заключения мира, 1913 г.

A group of Romanian officers and soldiers in front of the monument erected with their own hands on the battlefield in Grivitza, after having concluded a peace treaty with the Bulgarians in 1913.



на офицеров 3-го германского румынского полка королевы Великобритании, во главе с королем и наследником: 1) Король Фердинанд I, 2) принц Карл, 3) премьер-министр Брătianу, 4) генерал Котеску.

A group of officers of Queen Elizabeth Second Marine Regiment led by King Ferdinand I and the crown prince: 1) King Ferdinand I; 2) Prince Carol; 3) Prime Minister Brătianu; 4) General Cotescu.

Pleven, will fight together and entwine new laurels in the crown of victory.” The text is illustrated with two photos: a group of Romanian soldiers in Grivitza, after the conclusion of the peace with the Bulgarians (1913), and a group of officers of Queen Elizabeth Second Marine Regiment led by King Ferdinand I, Prince Carol, Prime Minister Brătianu, and General Cotescu.³²

etc.). The ground forces are made up of five army corps and 10 divisions. As to the total number of soldiers, since it was a state secret, the author estimated it according to the formula of 12% of the country’s population, stating that the army should include somewhere between 750 thousand and 1 million persons who could contribute to the defense of the country. The author also lists Romania’s most important river combat vessels which had been commissioned in 1907, and which represented, in the author’s point of view, “the best type of vessel in Europe.” Next, the author presents the technical specifications of these vessels and concludes by stating that the Romanian fleet had 200 officers and 3,200 sailors.³¹

In the conclusion, the author states that “the fact that Romania has joined the Entente states is of utmost importance, because until now Austria-Hungary has thought its back was covered, and from now on it becomes vulnerable. Moreover, following Romania’s entry into the war, we have free access to the Balkan Peninsula. It is possible that, very soon, our armies and the Romanian ones, just like 1877 at

THE ANALYSIS of the Russian press in the period 1914–1916 shows that Romania’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente was a very important topic not only for the editors—career officers themselves—, but also for the Russian army high command. The Information Office attached to the Directorate-General for Press and Prints, the Press Office attached to the General Staff, as well as the Russian press agencies were closely monitoring and trying to influence the evolution of the Romanian public opinion regarding Romania’s entry into the war as an ally. Certainly, the main target of the materials suggesting that Romanians would join the fight against Russia’s enemies were the Russian soldiers in the trenches, the main readers of these periodicals, with the purpose of giving them the certainty of the final victory. □

Notes

1. During 1910–1914, Lieutenant General V. V. Belyaev was editor-in-chief of the *Русский инвалид* newspaper; on 9 November 1914, however, he was appointed commander of the 83rd Infantry Division, which he led in the First World War, and on 19 June 1915 he was appointed chief of staff of the 12th Army. After an interim period, the management of the newspaper was taken up by Lieutenant General A. I. Zvonnikov, who, in 1895–1910, had been a permanent contributor to the *Развѣдчикъ* magazine.
2. Д. Г. Гужва, “Военные газеты и журналы в годы Первой мировой войны как основное средство информирования русской армии,” in *Русская публицистика и периодика эпохи Первой мировой войны: политика и поэтика. Исследования и материалы* (Moscow, 2013), 546.
3. *Собрание узаконений и распоряжений правительства*, СПб., 1914. No. 26, No. 2066, С. 821–822, No. 203, Ст. 2752.
4. *Временное положение о военной цензуре [Утверждено 20 июля 1914 года]*, Пг., 1914, 1–15.
5. В. Новоселов, “Печать и война,” *Пробуждение* 2 (1915): 580.
6. The name of the city changed to Petrograd on 18/31 August 1914.
7. Г. А. Салтык and А. А. Строева, “Первая мировая война: к истории военной цензуры,” *Ученые записки. Электронный научный журнал Курского государственного университета* 3 (19) (2011): 29.
8. *Собрание узаконений и распоряжений правительства*, СПб., 1915, No. 313, Ст. 2904.
9. Н. Л. Волковский, *История информационных войн*, Ч. 2, СПб., 2003, 108.
10. Ibid.
11. *Procesul dezastrului național: Documente secrete din Arhiva diplomatică a ministerului de externe din Petrograd* (Iași, 1918).

12. Волковский, 108–109.
13. *Русский инвалид*, 102 (1915): 2. Here and hereafter, we include our own translation from Russian of the materials published in the Romanian press, as we were not able to find the original Romanian texts.
14. *Ibid.*, 104 (1915): 3.
15. *Ibid.*, 105 (1915): 3.
16. *Ibid.*, 110 (1915): 2.
17. *Ibid.*, 107 (1915): 2.
18. *Ibid.*, 110 (1915): 2.
19. *Ibid.*, 111 (1915): 2.
20. *Ibid.*, 115 (1915): 2.
21. Волковский, 25.
22. *Русский инвалид*, 218 (1916): 4.
23. *Ibid.*, 219 (1916): 2.
24. *Ibid.*, 3.
25. *Ibid.*, 220 (1916): 5.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, 221 (1916): 5–6.
28. *Ibid.*, 6.
29. *Разведчик*, 1346 (23 August 1916): 535.
30. *Ibid.*, 1347 (30 August 1916): 550.
31. *Ibid.*, 551.
32. *Ibid.*, 549–551.

Abstract

Romania's Entry in the First World War As Seen in the Russian Military Press

The analysis of the Russian military press from 1914–1916 demonstrates that Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente was an important issue not only for the editors themselves, but also for the Russian army high command. The Information Office attached to the Directorate-General for Press and Prints, the Press Office attached to the General Staff, and the Russian press agencies were closely monitoring and trying to influence the evolution of the Romanian public opinion regarding Romania's entry into the war as an ally. The main task of the materials suggesting that Romanians would join the fight against Russia's enemies was to inspire the certainty of the final victory among the Russian soldiers in the trenches, the main readers of these periodicals.

Keywords

World War I, Russian military press, censorship, Entente, Romania