The New European Union Leadership
What Does it Mean for the European Union's Eastern Neighborhood?

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The present article discusses the influence that the new European leadership has on a state of Central Eastern Europe: Ukraine, in the context of the country's crisis and of its pro-European government.

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Introduction

EUROPE OF the 21st century is a Europe of universal values, strategic thinking, a shared vision, and common actions. Member States of the European Union, through established values, taking into account common European interests, principles, and priorities, contribute to the expansion of Europeanism and the strengthening of the structure as a global actor. The Eastern Neighborhood is one of the European Union's priorities in terms of peace, security, and cooperation. Ukraine is one of the European Union's most significant and politically most critical direct neighbors. The current dynamics between Ukraine and the European Union provide a cautious window of opportunity for the European leadership to act more assertively and help the EU contribute to a peaceful settle-

ment of the conflict, which would consequently increase the European Union's role in addressing security challenges in its Eastern Neighborhood.

In 2014, Russia, based on a referendum, claimed Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation. This action was condemned as illegal by the Ukrainian Government, the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations General Assembly. In light of these events, the present paper aims to provide a constructive holistic approach to Ukraine's crisis from Catherine the Great's reign through the Soviet Union to the present day. In the context of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the USA, we note the presence of the North American leadership on the new European path of the Ukrainian country. As the US is an important actor in the area of international relations, it becomes relevant to analyze what this means for Ukraine. The European leadership sought to intervene in Ukraine, given that security, stability and prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law in Eastern Europe have always been a priority for the European Union. Besides, the European Union has initiated the Eastern Partnership as part of its integration and enlargement policy and the Regional Strategy for the Danube Region as an important neighborhood policy meant to facilitate bilateral and multilateral cooperation between states, demonstrating the importance of its relations with the Eastern neighbors.

The European Union is not a static entity, but a continually dynamic structure changing in keeping with the events taking place on the European and international arena. These also have a direct influence on the European leadership, and maybe on our current environment rapid change can be vital to the organization's survival, as the leaders promote change by creating new visions. According to the definition provided by the authors Tömmel and Verdun, a leader is an individual who acts in line with their followers and with their values and motivations, and leadership is a relationship that enables leaders and followers to take part in a joint enterprise.[1]

Regarding the international system, the new European leadership of today faces numerous priorities and challenges and is characterized by the idea of a more strategic, more assertive, and united Europe in the world. The European Union needs to be a stronger global actor and needs to strengthen its global leadership in the relations with partners and neighbors, operating as a more operational Europe on the ground and a more geopolitical Europe capable of solving the problems in its immediate neighborhood.

To better illustrate the neighborhood problem, for the first time, according to Josep Borrell Fontelles, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, vice-president of the European Commission,[2] the European intention is to tackle the challenges of the Southern neighborhood,

to develop a new comprehensive strategy towards Africa, to work out on a po-
litically rounded approach in and with Asia and Asia (China and Japan are two
the most important areas of potential cooperation), to step up European coop-
eration with Latin America and to reset transatlantic relations. Apart from the
European Union's priority relations with the United States and with China and
Turkey, the European Union will focus on problems "closer to home." In light
of this scenario, the European intention is to engage in reforms and integration
processes in the Western Balkans and to support the democracy and territorial
integrity of Ukraine. The Western Balkans are considered a region of strategic
importance to the EU. The European Union supported the opening of accession
negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in 2020, whereas regional co-
operation and good neighborly relations are essential for the European enlarge-
ment strategy.

Ukraine is one of the European Union's largest and politically most impor-
tant direct neighbors. The annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine
in 2014 led to a deep political crisis between Russia and other actors. Of course,
European and US leaders seem to understand this, and they have a significant
intention to continue to support Ukraine's defense capability, keep the pressure
on Russia through sanctions, and provide assistance—as the European Union
and the European Union member states have already pledged to do. The Eu-
ropean Union, together with its Member States, has, since last year, delivered
unprecedented levels of support to help Ukraine in its efforts for launching this
renewed reform process. In 2015, the European Union and European Financial
Institutions committed EUR 11 billion in support of Ukraine's political, econom-
ic and financial stabilization. So far, around EUR 6 billion has been mobilized in
the form of loans and grants, including the recently approved additional third
macro-financial assistance program of EUR 1.8 billion. The European Union is
both currently and since the country's independence the biggest international
donor to Ukraine.[3]

As we can see, this measure is essential because the Ukrainian state continues
to face a substantial external threat from its Eastern neighbor. This seems to be
the Russian strategy to regain dominion over the former Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) members, as the expansion of Russian domination in
Asia meant the loss of Russia's position as a superpower and of its hegemony in
the European space.

In this context, the Ukrainian territory represents the point of collision of
two poles of power—the European leadership (a union of 27 democratic states)
and a Russian authoritarian political system (a single actor dominated by one
person).

The Holistic Approach to the Ukrainian Crisis

U KRAINE IS a state in the East of the European continent with a troubled history, a historically fragmented state because, from Catherine the Great's reign through the Soviet Union to the present day, Ukraine continues to be Europe's battleground.

For a more systematic analysis of the crisis situation on the territory of Ukraine, it is important to return to the historical origins and nature of the crisis. From a historical point of view, we can say that the Ukrainian crisis started during the reign of Catherine the Great of Russia, whose statute contributed to the disappearance of the old Ukrainian state. In 1762, as a result of a palace coup, Catherine the Great ascended to the throne. At that time, Russia played a decisive role in the Seven Years' War, and Catherine aimed to turn the Russian Empire into one of the leading countries in Europe. In her attempt to impress the West, ruthlessly imposing her power on Russia and the surrounding region, she annexed most of what is now Ukraine through wars with the Ottoman Empire and the division of Poland, aiming to control the Black Sea. Peter the Great had opened Russia up to the Baltic Sea, founding St. Petersburg on the Baltic Coast. Still, Catherine the Great was determined to expand her southeastern frontier and develop a permanent Russian presence on the Black Sea. First of all, for Russia, the presence on the Black Sea means control of critical ports on the peninsula. For that reason, Catherine refused all offers of further mediation from Prussia, Austria, and France, determined to pursue her territorial ambitions in the region. Catherine's victories when Russia formally annexed the Crimea in 1783 enabled Russia to establish a Black Sea fleet. The exclusive access to the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits that connected the Black Sea with the Aegean Sea through the Sea of Marmara became a key foreign policy goal for Catherine's descendants, since Ukraine, especially Crimea, represents a relevant geopolitical point not only for Russia or the European Union.[4]

After the 2004 Orange Revolution (the name comes from the colors of the parties: blue was the color of the pro-Yanukovych government supporters, strongly pro-Russian, and orange came from Yushchenko's protesters, who were pro-EU and wanted to have stronger ties with Europe and the rest of the West), in late 2013 Ukraine became the center of global attention as a result of the protests triggered by its government's refusal to sign a new agreement with the European Union[5] because of the pressure from Russia. This marked the beginning of the disturbances in Ukraine, and the major disputes between the pro-Russian and the pro-EU camps were reignited. In this context, the protest ultimately had an impact on both Ukraine and the entire international system.[6] It should be noted that, first of all, the concentration of domestic power and authority re-

sulted in a real government change, in turn provoking a powerful countervailing reaction from Russia: the annexation of Crimea and the integration of the central city of Sevastopol, as well as support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine (the conflict in the Donbass).

A British expert in Ukrainian political, economic and security affairs, Taras Kuzio, considers that Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea in February–March 2014 and the hybrid war in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) is Europe's worst crisis since World War II, because "events in Ukraine constitute a crisis of proportions Europe has not experienced since the fall of the Berlin Wall."[7]

Second, on a regional level, the crisis brought profound challenges to Ukraine's statehood and led to greater instability in the area. Political instabilities split the people into two political camps. Thus, in November 2019, the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation for Democratic Initiatives, in collaboration with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, conducted a national survey on Ukrainians' attitudes towards the country's European integration. The study was conducted in 110 settlements from all regions of Ukraine except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, polls were conducted only in the territories controlled by Ukraine. As a result of the field stage, 2,041 questionnaires were collected. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.[8]

Motivated by many factors, more than half of Ukrainians (53%) have indicated that they see their future in Europe, beyond Russian principles, rules, influences, and ideologies. Still, the country continues to grapple with extreme corruption and deep regional rifts that impede its real European path. In recent years, Russia-oriented foreign policy preferences significantly dropped after the Russian invasion, annexation, and military aggression on the Ukrainian territory. Still, some 13% of Ukrainian people support the pro-Russian system.

TABLE 1. THE UKRAINIANS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COUNTRY'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

	May 2013	March 2014	May 2014	October 2017	August 2018	November 2019
European Union	41.7	45.3	50.5	49.3	50.7	52.6
Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan	31.0	21.6	21.4	10.8	10.9	12.9
It shouldn't join either the European or the Eurasian Union	13.5	19.6	17.4	26.3	32.5	24.0
Hard to tell	13.7	13.4	10.6	13.5	5.9	10.5

SOURCE: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, "European Integration of Ukraine: The Dynamics of Public Opinion."

Looking at the results of the poll featured in table 1, we see that the majority of citizens believe that Ukraine should join the European Union in the long term. The foreign policy orientation towards Russia dropped significantly during these seven years. Still, most of those who hoped in an alliance with Russia joined those who felt that Ukraine did not need to join either the European Union or the Eurasian Union.

TABLE 2. THE UKRAINIANS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COUNTRY'S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY REGION

	West	Center	South	East
European Union	70.6	59.9	31.6	33.7
Eurasian Economic Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan	3.2	6.8	23.8	26.8
It shouldn't join either the European or the Eurasian Union	17.5	22.3	31.2	29.4
Hard to tell	8.7	11.0	13.4	10.1

SOURCE: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, "European Integration of Ukraine: The Dynamics of Public Opinion."

According to the data shown in table 2, the focus on the European Union is most strongly supported in the Western Region and clearly in the Central Region. In contrast, in the Southern and Eastern regions, the opinions of the inhabitants are divided. In the Southern Region, 32% support a European Union orientation. As many as 31% say that Ukraine should not join either the European Union or the Eurasian Union, and 24% prefer the Eurasian Union with Russia. The situation in the East is similar: 34% for the European Union, 30% for not joining any of the Unions, and 27% support the orientation towards the Eurasian Union.

Third, on a global scale, these developments shattered the international order established in the aftermath of the Cold War. The Member States of the European Union, as well as the entire international system, have different kinds of perspectives and interests in the Russian-Ukraine crisis. Nevertheless, apart from some individual cases—because of historical ties to Russia (Greece, Cyprus), while in other countries pro-Putin nationalist-populists are in power (Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria) or these political forces receive large numbers of votes (Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Italy), or due to the dominant business, financial and energy interests and long-term ties to Russia—the European Union has maintained its typical position towards the sanctions since March 2014. In December 2019, the Council announced the extension of sanctions until 31 July 2020. One reason for this was that the Member States accepted the political and

economic costs of sanctioning Russia due to a sense of collective commitment to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination.[9]

Ukraine maintains bilateral relations with the United States and the European Union. The main objective of the European and international leadership in the Ukrainian crisis is to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reduce the effects of the crisis, and strengthen the European path of the Ukrainian state.

Bilateral Relations Ukraine–United States Over Time

Ukraine has long played an essential role in the global security order. Now, following the end of the Cold War, one of United States' foreign policy priorities is restoring and strengthening Ukraine's sovereignty, a policy revived as the result of the intervention of Russian forces in Crimea. The United States does not recognize Russia's claims to Crimea, and it encourages Russia and Ukraine to resolve the Donbass conflict via the Minsk agreement signed in 2014 and 2015 and brokered by France and Germany.

After the recognition of Ukrainian independence in 1991, the country became a suitable partner for the United States on issues that are critical to United States foreign and security policy. In early 1994 Ukraine agreed to align its non-proliferation policy with the United States. Three years later, the NATO–Ukraine distinctive partnership was established. As an immediate result, in 2003, Ukraine agreed to contribute 1,800 troops to the Iraq coalition stabilization force. The Kyiv administration also carried out some reforms on critical foreign policy issues but did not begin to carry out internal political and economic reforms very quickly. The United States' interest in Ukraine decreased with the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010, because of his policies. However, the crisis ended after the Maydan Revolution, when Yanukovych fled and an interim government was appointed, and the United States took a keen interest in what happened in Ukraine.

Moreover, American Vice President Joe Biden visited Kyiv and delivered a tough anti-corruption message. This is of interest to the United States, given the trans-Atlantic relationship with the oldest and closest friends and partners, and the defense within NATO. White House support for Ukraine, along with political and economic sanctions, are the ways in which the US administration makes it clear to the Russian administration that these are consequences for its illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent support for the conflict in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine.

In 2016 Donald Trump was elected as United States president; this has raised the concern of Volodymyr Zelensky, the newly elected president of Ukraine, about possible significant shifts in the United States policy. The North American leader fixated on Ukraine as a solution to his political problems, circulating a conspiracy theory that Ukraine, not Russia, had intervened in the 2016 election campaign. Nonetheless, the United States is an essential player in the international arena because it controls NATO, and there are excellent reasons why the United States should take an interest in Ukraine.[10]

The European Union and its Eastern Neighborhood

THE ORIGINS of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) date back to the beginning of 2002 when Great Britain insisted upon creating a Wider Europe initiative meant for countries such as Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, but not for the countries in the Western Balkans already involved in the process of stabilization and association or for those from the Southern Caucasus.[11] European Union policies are designed to bring benefits to citizens, states, businesses, and other stakeholders in the European Union. On the one hand, the integration and enlargement strategy was created to extend Europeanism among European countries. On the other hand, the European Neighborhood Policy increases the visibility of European actions and leads to a more coherent implementation of support mechanisms.

Security, stability and prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus have always been a priority for the European Union. Following the conflict in Georgia and its impact on regional stability, in June 2008 the European Commission prepared a proposal for an Eastern Partnership (EaP) to support regional cooperation and reinforce European Union relations with its eastern neighbors, whatever the individual level of ambition in their relationships with the European Union. The Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 under the Barroso Commission as a joint initiative between the European Union, European Union member states, and six Eastern European and South Caucasus partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.[12] The Eastern Partnership provides for the possibility of concluding Association Agreements with each of the participating states who have Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.[13] Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia were states that continued the European path by initiating association agreements with the European Union. The study of these countries will show different results of the European normative power in the Eastern region. The EU's Eastern Partnership program has brought sizeable

benefits in terms of a political association, economic relations, and regulatory convergence. Still, it covers areas that need to be reviewed to eliminate strategic challenges without compromising its own values and the security and socio-economic progress of its eastern neighbor, and to generate mutual benefits for the EU and its eastern neighbors.

When discussing the European Union and its Eastern Neighborhood, it is essential to bring into discussion another European way to facilitate enlargement. The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) is a macro-regional strategy adopted by the European Commission in December 2010 and endorsed by the European Council in 2011 following the model of cooperation developed by the European Union Baltic Sea Strategy. The Strategy was jointly developed by the Commission, together with the Danube Region countries and stakeholders, to address common challenges. The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region involves 14 states: 9 European Union member states (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia) and 5 non-European Union countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine). So far, the European Union Strategy for the Danube region has helped to strengthen the European Union's major political initiatives and to facilitate bilateral and multilateral cooperation between states. The creation of a new macro-regional dimension of the European Union's regional policy is perceived as a unique added value of the European territorial policy. The primary role of the Strategy for the Danube Region is a regional approach to common challenges, meant to ensure strengthened cooperation towards the economic, social and territorial cohesion related to the Member States and the third countries located in the same geographical area.[14]

The year 2019 brought a remarkable event on the agenda of the European Union. The new European leadership, Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell, set the new action guidelines at the European level.[15] The unique vision considers the impact of a more assertive Russia, the significance of Turkey, the limitations of the Eastern Partnership with Belarus and Moldova, the position of a Ukraine in crisis, caught between Russia and the European Union, security, and democracy in the South Caucasus. It also takes into account the contested nature of European identity in areas such as the Balkans, as well as the interplay between values, integrity, and interests and their effect on the interpretation of Europeanization, between the European Union and its neighbors.[16]

Upon gaining its independence, Ukraine identified a range of geographical, cultural, historical, economic and security reasons for wishing to join the European Union.[17] Always perceived as a post-communist country in the east of the European continent, with an old civilization and culture with profound Russian influences, in the light of recent events it has begun to be perceived by the

international order as a community defined by values, norms, and standards. The Ukrainian quest for inclusion in Europe was driven by three key motives: security, national identity, and modernization. Thus, in challenging contexts, Ukraine showed its determination to tackle significant reforms and become a European country. At this point, it is important to emphasize that Ukraine is a priority geopolitical partner for the European Union, too.[18]

The European Union supports Ukraine in ensuring a stable, prosperous, and democratic future for its citizens and is unwavering in its support for Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. The Association Agreement, including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, signed in 2014, is the primary tool for bringing Ukraine and the European Union closer together, promoting deeper political ties, more strong economic links, and respect for universal values.[19] In addition, European Union policy-makers strongly wanted to believe the Ukrainian leadership was committed to European integration and these feelings overshadowed any doubts they may have had towards the Ukrainian leaders.[20]

With the advent of the new pro-European President, Volodymyr Zelensky, who supports the new European path of the Ukrainian state, Josep Borrell seeks to contribute to the formation of a new European state and solve the Ukrainian crisis in Eastern Europe. In January 2018 Josep Borrell—at that time Spain's minister of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation in the Pedro Sánchez government—during the Brussels press conference with Ukrainian Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk which came after a meeting of the eu–Ukraine Association Council, expressed his intention to visit Ukraine in the near future, including the disputed region of Donbass, which is under the control of pro-Russia separatists, to get a first-hand impression of the situation on the ground. The authors Milan Nič and Cristina Gherasimov[21] draw attention to the European Union need to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict as this conflict and its new dynamics present a particular challenge for the European system. According to these authors, under former President Petro Poroshenko, relations between Ukraine and Russia were tense and a settlement on the Donbasss was difficult to envision. Now Volodymyr Zelensky is creating a new momentum by calling for the revival of peace talks with Putin's Russia, aiming to stop the war in the region by the end of his mandate. On 21 July 2019 Ukraine's parliamentary elections produced an absolute majority in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) for the Servant of the People party of President Volodymyr Zelensky. The party will have 254 of the 424 available seats. It is the first time since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991 that a president has had such power.[22]

The current dynamics between Kyiv and Moscow present a cautious window of opportunity for J. Borrell to act more assertively and help the European Union contribute to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, which would consequently elevate the European Union's role in addressing security challenges in its Eastern neighborhood.

As we have mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian quest for inclusion in Europe was driven by three key motives: security, national identity, and modernization. Its own norms, underpinned by values and standards recognized at the European Union level, come to assert the national identity of Ukraine and its language. Language is a sensitive issue in Ukraine, where some Ukrainian speakers argue that the prominence of Russian is a legacy of the Soviet era that undermines Ukraine's identity. There has been a push in recent years to promote the Ukrainian language in state institutions, schools, television, and the media, but President Zelensky, according to the Venice Commission recommendations, said that Ukraine would ensure the protection of the rights of national minorities. Also, Ukraine would provide a substantial level of teaching in official languages of the European Union, such as Hungarian and Romanian, both of which have significant minorities in Ukraine, and a sufficient proportion of education in minority languages in addition to Ukrainian.

The European Union contributes to the modernization of the Ukrainian state by strengthening the rule of law, advancing reforms and fostering economic growth. Also, in the margins of the EU and Ukraine summit, held in Kyiv in last year, the EU agreed to provide assistance worth €109 million to support four priorities:

• decentralization (designed to strengthen democracy and accountability at the local level, and to invest in local infrastructure);

• the fight against corruption (to ensure that previous reforms, such as the introduction of transparent e-procurement for government contracts, are sustained);

• strengthening civil society organizations.

The European Union is supporting the reforms needed for Ukraine to be able to implement the EU–Ukraine association agreement fully.[23]

The European Union classifies Russia's actions to annex Crimea and integrate the central city of Sevastopol and support separatism in Eastern Ukraine (the Donbass conflict) as illegal and continue to impose sanctions. However, as Josep Borrell's visit to Ukraine was postponed due to the international pandemic of COVID-19, and given the crisis on the Greek borders with regard of a new wave of Syrian migrants, further security actions have not been envisaged.

Conclusions

THE PRESENT article discusses the influence that the new European leadership has on a state of Central Eastern Europe: Ukraine, in the context of the country's crisis and of its pro-European government. The Russian expansion on the Ukrainian territory has increased the assertiveness of Ukrainian citizens towards the European integrity of the state, and confidence in European leadership has increased. The results of the national poll show that more than half of Ukrainians (53%) consider that the Ukrainian future might be in Europe, beyond Russian principles, rules, influences, and ideologies. Still, some 13% of the Ukrainian people support the pro-Russian system (the Eurasian Union), and another 24% of the people feel that Ukraine shouldn't join either the European Union or the Eurasian Union.

So far, Ukraine has recorded relevant results in the adoption of European norms, and it is essential to emphasize the European Union's action in this area. The European Union has supported Ukraine in ensuring a stable, prosperous, and democratic future for its citizens and is unwavering in its support for Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, facilitating the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Ukraine and European Union members states and between Ukraine and the partner states of the European Union. In this regard, the European communication entitled "Eastern Partnership" and the European Union Strategy for the Danube region constituted a collaboration between European states, promoting relations with neighboring countries, and strengthening the European path of the Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian crisis strengthened the interest of the Ukrainian state in the European leadership, as European leaders tried to contribute to the formation of a new European country and solve the crisis in Eastern Europe. Now, the current dynamics between Kyiv and Moscow provide a cautious window of opportunity for the new European Union leadership to act more assertively and help the European Union contribute to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, which would consequently increase the European Union's role in addressing security challenges in its Eastern Neighborhood.

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Abstract

The New European Union Leadership: What Does it Mean for the European Union's Eastern Neighborhood?

The purpose of this article is to analyze the normative power of the European Union, with an emphasis on the neighborhood and enlargement policy. We discuss the new leadership of the European Union that seeks to act more affirmatively to create a more strategic, more determined, and united Europe in the world, as well as its importance in terms of the European Union's Eastern Neighborhood. Through an analysis of a national opinion poll survey, this article seeks to evidence the Ukrainians' attitudes towards the country's European integration in the context of the present crisis. As Ukraine is one of the European Union's most significant and politically most critical direct neighbors, the new holistic constructive approach intends to determine the extent to which European and international leaders could contribute to the formation of a new European country and the resolution of the crisis in Eastern Europe and identify what the new European leadership means for the European Union's Eastern Neighborhood.

Keywords